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Abstract
This thesis presents research designed to explore the role of 
physiological and psychological factors in mediating the effects of 
victimisation upon eyewitness memory. A tripartite model of arousal 
and memory is proposed encompassing physiological, psychological 
and motivational mechanisms.
In order to investigate the potential role of these mechanisms, three 
laboratory based studies and one archival study are presented.
The results of the laboratory studies suggest that physiological 
arousal may not influence eyewitness memory. In contrast, whilst 
direct support for an influence of psychological arousal is not 
provided, the possibility that psychological arousal may be an 
important factor cannot readily be dismissed.
From a methodological perspective, contrary to existing 
laboratory-based research concerning visually-induced arousal, the 
results of the laboratory studies suggest that personal involvement may 
be an important factor influencing memory. Furthermore, the third 
laboratory study found that, differences in memory for emotional and 
neutral material may be a function of inherent differences between the 
material rather than an influence of arousal.
Finally, in order to compare and contrast laboratory based research 
with the performance of real witnesses, a field based study utilising 
closed-circuit television to assess eyewitness accuracy for action 
details was conducted. In line with Studies One and Two, victims and 
bystanders were not found to differ in their memory performance. This 
study provides direct support for existing field and archival research 
suggesting that real victims and bystanders tend to be highly accurate 
in their eyewitness accounts.
Taken together, the results of the research presented in this thesis 
suggest that whilst physiological arousal may not be an important 
factor influencing eyewitness memory, psychological and motivational 
influences may be important when witnesses are personally involved 
with the target incident.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis presents research conducted to investigate the effects of victimisation, 
specifically perceived threat and physiological arousal, upon eyewitness performance. 
The aim of this chapter, which is divided into two sections, is to place the current 
research in a wider context The first section provides an overview of the field of 
eyewitness research by examining:
• Whether there is a need for eyewitness research;
• How eyewitness research may be utilised in practice; and,
• What eyewitness research has contributed to practice so far.
The second section is more specific, providing a background to victimisation and 
eyewitness testimony by describing:
• The importance of the victim’s role within the judicial process;
® The uniqueness of the victimisation experience; and,
• How victimisation may influence eyewitness performance.
1.1 Oveiwiew of Eyewitness Research
1.1.1 Is there a need fo r  eyewitness research?
There are three fundamental reasons why research concerning eyewitness testimony 
is of importance: moral issues; the reliance upon eyewitness testimony as evidence 
within the judicial process; and economic issues.
From a moral perspective, members of society relinquish their own right to retaliate 
to harm done to them in exchange for the protection that the criminal law offers. As a 
result, this places a fundamental moral requirement upon the judicial system to punish 
criminals, just as it places a moral requirement upon it’s members to refrain from 
breaking the law (Allen, 1995). In order for society to meet these requirements, it is 
essential that measures are taken to prevent the occurrence of miscarriages of justice, j
thereby ensuring that society is (i) protected from those actually violating the criminal j
law, and (ii) to ensure they are protected from the possibility of being wrongly j
convicted and imprisoned themselves. In doing this, the criminal justice system can f|
maintain a societal perception of being fair and trustworthy. If these virtues are not j
maintained, however, individuals may become less likely to report crimes or give 1
evidence and the moral basis of society may be significantly weakened.
Across all areas of law and stages of the legal process there is great reliance upon 
eyewitness evidence. At the beginning of tlie process, witness reports to the police 
play a major role in directing the path of investigations. At the trial stage 
eyewitnesses may be called to give evidence in a wide variety of cases. Whilst 
criminal trials in particular rely heavily on eyewitness testimony, eyewitnesses may 
be called to give evidence in cases involving many other aspects of law. For example, 
an eyewitness may be called in a case based upon tort law concerning the details of a 
motor vehicle accident. Similarly, an eyewitness might be called to testify regarding 
the signatory of a challenged will in a probate case. Legal and psychological 
questions concerning the veracity of eyewitness evidence are often raised in such 
cases. This is not surprising when one considers it has been estimated that since 1900,
52.3% of miscarriages of justice that have come to light in the United States are 
primarily the result of erroneous eyewitness identification (Huff, Rattner & Sagarin,
1996). Similarly, eyewitness identification was also found to be the most prevalent 
cause of wrongful imprisonment in an earlier British study (Brandon & Davies,
1973). Although we have no unequivocal way of knowing how frequently
miscarriages of justice actually occur, it is evident they do. Psychological research 
concerning the veracity of eyewitness evidence may contribute to minimising their 
frequency.
In economic terms, an erroneous conviction is extremely expensive. Not withstanding 
the cost of the investigation, the pre-trial period and the trial itself, simply to keep an 
adult male in prison for one year costs the UK Government between approximately 
£15,000 in an open prison and £35,000 in a high security prison (Wilson & Ashton, 
1998). The total financial cost of a number of years of wrongful imprisonment, 
therefore, could be quite considerable. In addition, for many cases there aie 
subsequent judicial reviews and/or appeals which further increase the costs. 
Furthermore, the cost of compensation for wrongful conviction may also be 
considerable.
The principle applied aim of eyewitness research, therefore, can be conceptualised in 
terms of assisting the judicial system to effectively and efficiently (i) identify those 
who have committed crimes, and (ii) contribute to preventing mistaken convictions of 
innocent people.
1.1.2 How may eyewitness research be used in practice?
Fundamentally, there are three ways in which eyewitness research can be 
implemented in a practical sense to assist the judicial system. Firstly, psychologists 
can help to draw up guidelines, or make recommendations, for those involved with 
the judicial process to follow. These recommendations aie often directed towards 
police procedures or court procedures. In terms of police procedures, 
recommendations have been made, for example, concerning the conduction of lineups 
(Wells, Seelau, Rydell & Luus, 1994), and concerning effective interviewing 
procedures (Kebbell & Wagstaff, 1999). Similarly, recommendations have also been 
made concerning children’s testimony (Davies & Westcott, 1999).
Secondly, psychologists may appear in court as expert witnesses, on behalf of 
prosecution or defence counsel, in order to inform or educate the judge and/or jury 
concerning the psychological factors that influence eyewitn^s memoiy (Gudjonsson 
& Ha ward, 1998). Psychologists have been giving expert evidence in court on issues 
of eyewitness testimony for at least one hundred years, the first recorded instance 
being in Munich in 1896 (see Blackburn, 1996). Consequently, both the British 
Psychological Society and the American Psychological Association publish registers 
of practicing, qualified expert witnesses.
Although recommendations, such as those mentioned above are often made on a 
discretionary basis, as research findings, practical evidence and case law accumulates, 
recommendations and guidelines may ultimately become enshrined in statutory 
legislation such that they are no longer discretionary. For example, the Police and 
Criminal Evidence Act (1984) contains codes of practice for police officers 
conducting identification parades.
1.1.3 What has eyewitness research contributed to practice so far?
Over the last century, particularly the last 20 y^rs, a great deal of eyewitness 
research has been conducted (see e.g., Kebbell & Wagstaff, 1999; Loftus, 1979; Ross, 
Read & Toglia, 1994; Sporer, Malpass & Koehnken, 199^ Wells & Loftus, 1984; for 
comprehensive reviews). This research has been conducted in a number of areas 
across all stages of the judicial process,
1.1.3.1 The incident, stage
The majority of eyewitness research has tended to focus on this stage of the judicial 
process, exploring a wide variety of factors that appear to influence how individual 
witnesses experience incidents. These factors have been termed estimator variables as 
they are not under the control of the legal system and can only be estimated after the 
occurrence of the event (Wells, 1978). In terms of expert testimony, it is generally on 
these factors that expert psychological witnesses can be requested to inform, or
educate, the judiciary. Consequently, a great deal of research has investigated the 
effects of these variables upon eyewitness memory. For example, witness factors 
researched include: the expectations, gender, age, race, intelligence, face recognition 
skills, confidence, and personality characteristics of witnesses; whilst situation factors 
researched include: perceptual salience, exposure duration, number of perpetrators, 
weapon presence, crime seriousness, and post-event information effects (see Kebbell 
& Wagstaff, 1999, and Narby, Cutler & Penrod, 1996, for reviews).
1.1.3.2 The investigatory stage
In addition to the large body of research concerning identification procedures (see 
Sporer, Malpass & Koehnken, 1996, for a review), a similarly large area of research 
centres around the study of interview techniques for improving the accuracy and 
amount of information witnesses recall. The realisation that individuals, ranging from 
parents and social workers to police officers, may use flawed questioning or 
interviewing techniques (i.e., use suggestive or leading questions) inspired research 
that led to the development of investigative interviewing techniques. In par ticular, a 
technique known as the Cognitive Interview has been developed which uses a variety 
of means to help witnesses recall as much accurate information as possible without 
increasing the chances of recalling inaccurate information (see Fisher, McCauley & 
Geiselman, 1994, for an account of the development, revision, testing, and 
applications of the Cognitive Interview). This technique has undergone considerable 
reliability and validity testing (Fisher et al., 1994) as well as comparisons to other 
similar memory enhancing techniques (Clifford & George, 1996). Although a 
national curriculum does not currently exist, many police forces within the UK train 
Investigating Officers in how to conduct effective investigative interviews, including 
using cognitive interviews (Davies, Marshall & Robertson, 1998).
1.1.3.3 The courtroom stage
Although for some eyewitnesses the end point of their involvement with the criminal 
justice system may be an interview with the police, for many the judicial process may
ultimately result in an appearance in court at which they have been called to give 
evidence. A great deal of eyewitnœs research has looked at factors affecting 
witnesses’ ability to give evidence during cross-examination. In particular, research 
has investigated the effects of factors including the intimidating environment of the 
courtroom and the nature of cross-examination for vulnerable witnesses such as 
children (Westcott & Page, 1998) or those with learning disabilities (Kebbell & 
Hatton, in press). Following research in this area there have been significant advances 
in understanding and consequent changes in legislation. In particular, under the 
Criminal Justice Act 1991, in cases of child sexual and physical abuse video-taped 
evidence may be submitted in place of the child’s live cross-examination. Although 
children are still required to give evidence, they do not have to do so in what is often 
a particularly frightening and intimidating environment. Similarly, in the United 
States, although some states have maintained the right for defendants to confront their 
accusers (e.g., Iowa), many states (e.g. Maryland) have legislation that allows for the 
use of video-links (Davies, 1996).
Despite the wide variety of factors investigated at each stage of the judicial process, 
some factors that may be fundamental to witnesses’ experience and behaviour during 
and after the actual incident have received little direct research attention. These 
factors concern the effects of victimisation, in particular arousal and perceived threat, 
upon eyewitness memory. Fundamentally, there is a large gap in the research 
literature concerning the effects of these variables upon eyewitness memory despite 
their prevalence during most criminal incidents. For example, although the term 
‘weapon focus’, which refers to a witness’s focus of attention onto a weapon to the 
detriment of other aspects of the incident, has been relatively well-documented in 
laboratory research, the principles and mechanisms underlying this effect are little 
understood (see Steblay, 1992, for a review and metaanalysis of the weapon focus 
effect). Addressing this gap in our knowledge might provide a much needed insight 
into the factors that can affect the encoding of information and subsequent eyewitness 
memory.
1.2 Victims and eyewitness testimony
1.2.1 The importance o f the victim's role within the judicial process 
As mentioned above, eyewitness reports are heavily relied upon at all stages in the 
judicial process with victims in particular playing a central and important role j
throughout. Although the precise nature of victimisation varies depending upon the I
crime type, in all criminal incidents, excluding victimless drug-related offences, there |
is at least one victim, whether the crime is directed against an individual (e.g., a |jsexual offence), a group (e.g., a bank robbery with multiple perpetrators) or against a |
company (e.g., fraud). Furthermore, in terms of investigation, victims are often the |
first individuals to report the incident to the police. Hence, they are the police’s first 1{point of investigatory contact and therefore may affect the initial investigation ;Ïdecisions. A Scottish Office report found that 61% of a sample of 255 victims 
reported the incident to the police themselves. Only 8% of the 255 cases were !
reported by unknown bystanders, the remaining 31% of cases were reported by I
individuals known to the victim i.e., family members, neighbours, or work colleagues ;
(see MacLeod, Carson & Prescott, 1996). Not only are victims most likely to report j
!the crime in the first instance, but the likelihood of reporting increases when the 
victim has been physically or emotionally affected, and for cases of violent crime the i
police depend almost entirely on victim reports to direct whole investigations j
(Petersilia, 1994). I
i
Finally, in terms of evidence, victims are central witnesses in court, and in many j
cases they may be the only witness. Both the judge and the jury will be extremely I
interested in the victim’s testimony and may, therefore, place a great deal of icredibility on the content of the testimony. Although it is clear that victims have a j
crucial role to play at all stages, it is particularly important to point out that the role )
of bystanders should not, as a consequence, be minimised. In particular, some non- ;
victim witnesses may be extremely involved with the incident, for example, in terms !
of proximity and/or relationship to the victim, even though they are not themselves 
being directly victimised. They could, therefore, also be crucial witnesses and may 
represent a proportion of the 31% of cases mentioned above (MacLeod et al., 1996) 
where the incident is initially reported by an individual known to the victim.
1.2.2 Uniqueness o f the victimisation experience
Whilst the precise nature of the effects of victimisation will vary depending upon the 
type of incident and the victim involved, there is no doubt that many of the effects 
will be unpleasant or negative.
1.2.2.1 During the incident
Excluding victims of fraud, almost all victims will experience some form of arousal 
or emotion during the victimisation experience itself. Specifically, the level and 
perseverance of the arousal will be dependent upon the type of incident experienced. 
Crimes involving weapons, or physical threat, for example, are likely to be more 
arousing than crimes involving no threat of physical harm, although the lattqr crimes 
may still be very arousing. In addition, it is likely that the level of arousal 
experienced by victims will be higher than tliat experienced by bystanders present, 
although bystander witnesses may also be significantly aroused by the incident.
Although the effects of victimisation can be unique and varied depending upon the 
nature of the incident, as expected there is a clear trend in terms of more emotional 
effects experienced by victims of more violent crimes. For example, MacLeod et al. 
(1996) found that:
® Two-thirds of the victims in the research sample said that they had been 
emotionally affected by the victimisation episode;
• 11% of victims reported feelings of fear and helplessness;
® A greater variety of feelings were expressed by victims of 
violent/threatening incidents;
« Feelings of anxiety were high across threatening/violent incidents;
» 25% of victims of violent or threatening incidents said that they felt afraid or 
helpless after the incident;
In particular, it is not surprising that victims for whom the target incident had been 
their first experience of victimisation were more likely to feel shocked or surprised 
(23%), and worried, scared or helpless (17%) in comparison to those who had 
experienced a previous victimisation episode. This should not, however, minimise 
perceptions of the effects of repeat victimisation which can be extremely traumatic. 
Similar results were found in an earlier study by Haward (1981). When questioned, 
92% of 119 victims of personal direct assaultive crimes questioned reported feeling 
extremely distressed by the experience of victimisation and 11% felt they would 
never fully recover from the experience.
Although it is clear that the effects of violent crimes are significant, less violent 
crimes may also have a significant emotional effect upon victims. For example, a 
study reporting victim’s first reactions to the effects of residential burglary showed 
that 30% of the 322 victims questioned felt anger/annoyance, and 19% shock. Only 
17% reported feeling no strong reaction (Maguiie, 1981). Similar results were 
presented by Norris, Kaniasty & Thompson (1997) who, although they found that 
victims of violence were the most severely distressed group of victims, also found 
property crime victims showed considerable distress, thus highlighting the importance 
for how a crime is perceived.
The relationship between victim and offender will also most likely have an effect 
upon the nature of the victim’s experience. In cases where the offender is known to 
the victim (e.g., in most cases of sexual assault), the victim will already have attitudes 
towai ds the offender which may affect the experience. Eighteen percent of the 
victims surveyed by MacLeod et al., reported knowing the identity of the offender, 
and 41% of these said that they had a negative attitude towards the offender before
the incident. Similarly, the relationship between bystander witnesses and victim(s) 
may also have a role in mediating the effects of victimisation. Witnesses other than 
the victim were present in a third of all the cases surveyed by MacLeod et al., and 
were known to the victim in 71% of the incidents.
As well as the psychological effects associated with victimisation, many victims are 
also physically injured. A detailed analysis of injuries from violent crime committed 
in the United States (rape, robbery or assault) by Harlow (1989) revealed that of the 
sample studied approximately 28% of the victims of violent crime were injured, 13% 
requiring medical attention and 7% requiring hospital care. The injuries included 
bruises (85%), broken bones or teeth (6%), knife injuries (3%), and gunshot wounds 
(1%).
1.2.2.2 After the incident
In addition to the emotional upset experienced during the crime, the effects of 
victimisation may persist long after the incident. For example, indirect post-event 
physical effects may appear for victims. Victims may experience an intensity of 
symptoms more commonly associated with post-traumatic stress disorder. Indeed, a 
decline in physical health was reported by just over 25% of the victims suiweyed by 
MacLeod et al., 1996. Some of the emotional effects appeared in the period 
immediately after the incident e.g., anger, shock and surprise, whilst other reported 
effects (e.g., anger, annoyance, tension, anxiety, feeling upset, vulnerable, frightened, 
suspicious, distrustful, depressed, withdrawn, persecuted, and violated) were evident 
long after the actual episode. In addition, in terms of preoccupation, 41% of victims 
said they spent ‘a lot of time’ thinking about why the incident had happened to them 
after the incident. Of the victims interviewed by Maguire (1981) 65% reported that 
the residential burglary was still having some effect upon them 4-10 weeks after the 
incident. Similarly, Norris et al. (1997) found that criminal victimisation was 
associated with: depression, anxiety, hostility, somatic symptoms, fear of crime.
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avoidance, lower self-esteem, increased alienation, and the need for both formal and 
informal support. |
I
In recognition of these clear psychological and physical effects of victimisation, jjvictim assistance programs have been established in many countries in order to assist j
victims in dealing with the consequences of crime (Erez, 1989). To supplement this, )j
police personnel are increasingly being trained in the special needs of victims with a j
particular emphasis on identifying and referring victims to appropriate support i
schemes. j
I
1.2.3 How might victimisation influence eyewitness performance? |
In summary, then, as a result of their unique role in the incident victims have a j
icentral involvement within the judicial process. The effects of victimisation may, Ihowever, be extremely traumatic, involving physical and psychological arousal and i1may exert particular influence on certain aspects of a victim’s memory. Critically, ' |
there is a wide range of existing psychological research that suggests arousal and j
perceived threat may have a significant role to play in directing attention towards and jIsubsequent memory for information. In light of the existing research it is suggested j
that the experience of victimisation, characterised by increased physiological arousal ]jand perceived threat, may have an effect upon the type, amount and accuracy of |
Iinformation reported. |
I
jIn light of the key role played by victims in the judicial process, therefore, it is argued j
that it is essential that the potential effects of victimisation upon eyewitness memory 1
are investigated. In pai ticular, research in this area may help us to identify those j
factors that may influence victim’s eyewitness memory, both during and after the I
victimisation experience, and how these may affect the memorial ability of victims in î
comparison to that of bystanders. The research presented in this thesis was J
specifically conducted to investigate this. i
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Chapter 2
Key Issues
As discussed in Chapter One, experiencing any crime against the person (be it 
assault, theft, or other threatening behaviour) is likely to result in fear for one’s 
personal safety and a heightening of emotional arousal both during and after the 
incident. Despite the potential importance of such factors for eyewitness 
reliability, however, psychological research has largely failed to address this issue. 
The principal reasons for this revolve around a set of complex methodological and 
ethical issues which, in practice, have proved difficult to surmount. Furthermore, 
research concerning arousal and eyewitness memory has been characterised by a 
relative lack of consistency and clarity in the use of terminology. Consequently, in 
order to place the research presented within this thesis in context, in this chapter 
the key methodological and ethical issues which impinge upon work in this field 
are discussed and the terminology commonly used in this area are briefly 
described.
2.1 Methodological and ethical dilemmas
Chapter One set out how eyewitness research can be used in practical settings. 
Although such clear examples of practical applications exist, it is not a foregone 
conclusion that such applications are unanimously accepted or encouraged.
Indeed, many legal practitioners and academics argue that eyewitness research is 
of limited practical use in its current form because the majority of this research 
has been conducted within the laboratory where external validity has been 
compromised (Berkerian, 1993; Egeth, 1993; Yuille, 1993). In particular, there 
has been considerable debate surrounding the extent to which psychological 
mechanisms concerning eyewitness memory are sufficiently understood to be 
presented in court as expert evidence (Elliott, 1993; Goodman-Delahunty, 1997;
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Gudjonsson, 1993; Kassin, Ellsworth & Smith, 1994; Konechi & Ebbesen, 1986; 
Leippe, 1995; Loftus, 1983; McCloskey & Egeth, 1983b; Seelau & Wells, 1995; 
Sheldon & MacLeod, 1991). Fundamentally, these arguments revolve around an 
internal versus external validity debate.
2.1.1 The internal versus external validity debate
Firstly, it is important to clarify what is meant by internal and external validity. 
Internal validity specifically refers to the extent to which the tests of a study 
actually measure the variables of interest. External validity, on the other hand, 
refers to the extent to which a study is able to measure the variables of the 
population to which the study is generalised, in this case real victims and 
witnesses. The rationale for this particular debate concerns the fact that whilst 
laboratory based studies may have high internal control and validity, they are low 
in external validity. That is, they lack the realism and consequentiality of real life 
incidents. In contrast, although field and archival studies investigate memory for 
real-life incidents, they lack the internal control available with laboratory based 
studies. Consideration of the methodology employed in studies of eyewitness 
performance is important when trying to compare and understand the apparent 
discrepancies in their findings. In particular, a fundamental question arises: are the 
memories studied in these two settings qualitatively different or does the source of 
discrepancy lie within the methodological diversity of these studies, i.e., type of 
stimulus material, time of memory test, or type of memory test? In the following 
section the particular methodological strengths and weaknesses of field, archival 
and laboratory based research are critically discussed.
2. L 1.1 Field and archival research
Many have argued that human memory should be studied in natural everyday 
environments, i.e., studying real victims and witnesses to actual criminal incidents 
(e.g., Yuille, 1993). Initially, this would seem like a sensible argument as the aim 
of such research is to inform policy and practice. Indeed, field and archival based 
research has been conducted where the incidents studied are serious, directly 
involve and are consequential for the victims and witnesses present (e.g..
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Christianson & Hubinette, 1993; MacLeod & Shepherd, 1986). Hence, there are 
also high levels of witness cooperation with police and other judicial personnel as 
a result of witnesses’ motivation to see ‘justice done’.
Despite such obvious high external validity, however, field and archival research 
is characterised by an associated trade-off in terms of internal validity. Most 
importantly, no studies conducted to date have been able to measure the accuracy 
of real witness statements because there has been no way of knowing what 
actually happened. As a result, studies have generally only been able to look at the 
amount or consistency of information reported by witnesses over time (e.g., 
MacLeod & Shepherd, 1986; Yuille & Cutshall, 1986). Despite such attempts to 
circumvent the issue of eyewitness accuracy, the problem remains as information 
concerning accuracy is of paramount importance if we are to be able to say 
anything concrete about actual eyewitness performance.
Another fundamental trade-off concerns the extent to which real witnesses are 
physiologically and psychologically affected by the incidents with which they are 
involved. Although it is not possible retrospectively to measure physiological 
arousal experienced at the time of the incident, self-report measures can be used 
retrospectively to assess the extent to which the witnesses were emotionally 
aroused by the event. While the reliability of such reports is questionable (Wright,
1997), they may provide an insight into the degree of affect experienced.
A further problem, often encountered when conducting field research, concerns 
witness self-selection. For example, in studies measuring the consistency of 
witness reports between an original report given to the police and a later research 
interview, there is often a high attrition rate when witnesses are contacted and 
invited to participate in a research interview (e.g., Christianson & Hubinette,
1993; Yuille & Cutshall, 1986). This raises the possibility that only witnesses who 
feel confident about the reliability of their memories for the event may be 
prepared to come forward and participate, thereby inflating reliability estimates.
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Additionally, comparison across real witnesses is complicated as the roles of 
individual witnesses may vary depending on the type of incident witnessed and 
their relationship with other witnesses (MacLeod, 1989). The content and style of 
police interviews may also vary, contributing to problems of comparison: i) across 
real witnesses, ii) with research interviews conducted in studies concerned with 
consistency of reporting, and iü) with laboratory based witnesses where memory 
measures may be more detailed or involve recognition rather than recall. This is 
an important distinction to make as it has long been argued that recall and 
recognition may involve different memory processes. For example, Anderson & 
Bower (1972) proposed that recall involves two successive stages: i) a retrieval 
stage and ii) a recognition stage. On this basis, whilst recall involves search and 
retrieval as well as recognition, recognition tests only involve the second stage 
and therefore may facilitate the remembrance of more information than when only 
recall memory is measured (Koriat & Goldsmith, 1994). Although not all 
researchers agree with the details of Anderson & Bower’s proposal (e.g., Tulving 
& Thomson, 1973), there is a general consensus that retrieval is a more important 
component of recall memory than it is of recognition memory (Morris & 
Gruneberg, 1994). In addition, laboratory based memory measures can tap into 
additional information such as the confidence of the witness by asking them 
explicitly to rate their confidence, or, using a technique from pure memory 
research, by asking participants whether they consciously remember or simply 
have a ‘feeling of knowing’ or seeing the information before (Donaldson, 1996; 
Tulving, 1983).
In summary, then, field and archival research is characterised by a number of 
fundamental methodological problems serving to reduce internal validity.
2.1.1.2 Laboratory based research
In light of the problems associated with field and archival research, the majority 
of research in this area has been conducted within the laboratory where the 
variables of interest can be more readily manipulated and controlled. However, as 
Chapter Three highlights, in addition to the discrepancy between the findings of
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laboratory and field or archival based research, there is a lack of consistency 
across the findings of laboratory based research which is most likely due to the 
wide variation in paradigms used.
Nevertheless, in contrast to field and archival based research, laboratory research 
is characterised by two fundamental advantages; i) the opportunity to measure the 
degree of affect associated with stimuli; and ii) precise knowledge of the stimulus 
material against which witness memorial accuracy may be assessed. With regaids 
to affect, it is possible to measure physiological effects of stimuli during 
presentation as well as employing self-report measures of psychological effects. 
Unlike field and archival research, such methods are generally employed during 
and immediately after the incident rather than weeks or months afterwards. 
Additionally, there is less influence from the biases associated with witness self­
selection encountered in field studies. In line with this, instead of relying on 
police interviews or research interviews, often conducted many months after the 
original event, laboratory based studies have control over not only the type of 
memory measures employed, i.e., recall versus recognition, but over the interval 
between stimulus experience and memory testing.
Despite such high internal validity, however, laboratory research is plagued by an 
associated trade-off in terms of external validity. Fundamentally, the majority of 
laboratory research has been conducted with stimuli which are relatively 
innocuous. There are two main reasons for this. Firstly, the majority have 
presented their stimulus using unrealistic methods such as slides (Christianson & 
Mjomdal, 1985; Christianson & Nilsson, 1984; Christianson et al., 1984; Kramer, 
Buckhout & Eugenio, 1990) or video-tapes (Clifford & Hollin, 1981; Clifford & 
Scott, 1978; Loftus & Bums, 1982). Only a very small number have attempted to 
maximise external validity by using live staged-events or simulations to compare 
victims and bystanders (Hosch & Bothwell, 1990; Hosch, Leippe, Marchioni & 
Cooper, 1984; Hosch & Platz, 1984). Secondly, although the content of the 
stimuli are generally forensically relevant, i.e., depicting bank robberies (Loftus & 
Burns, 1982; Loftus, Schooler, Boone & Kline, 1987) or assaults and muggings
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(Clifford & Hollin, 1981; Kramer, Buckhout & Eugenio, 1990) some have shown 
non-forensically relevant stimuli such as disfigured faces (Christianson & Nilsson, 
1984) or hospital operations (Heuer & Reisberg, 1990).
In combination, an unrealistic presentation method and content results in 
relatively innocuous stimuli. Indeed, despite having the opportunity, many studies 
have not measured the effect of their manipulations on witness physiology in 
order to ascertain whether their emotional stimuli are indeed arousing. Where 
manipulation checks have been employed and successful creation of differential 
arousal levels between treatment groups demonstrated, ethical constraints mean 
that the physiological reactions experienced may remain quite different from those 
experienced by actual victims of crime. It should be acknowledged, however, that 
a level of innocuousness in laboratory studies is insurmountable because of ethical 
constraints. For obvious reasons there are limitations as to the level of arousal or 
victimisation that can be created within the laboratory without participants’ prior 
consent. In particular, such research should always comply with ethical guidelines 
published by societies such as the British Psychological Society and the American 
Psychological Association.
Another effect of ethical constraints concerns the debriefing of participants, which 
in laboratory studies occurs immediately following stimulus presentation and prior 
to memory testing. As a result, participants’ motivation may be diminished and is 
unlikely to be equatable with the motivation of a real witness trying to remember 
as many details as possible when aiding the police ‘catch the criminal’ and ‘see 
justice done’ (cf. Foster, Libkuman, Schooler & Loftus, 1994; Leippe, Wells & 
Ostrom, 1978).
Finally, it is often argued that the sample population is not representative of the 
population to which the results are being generalised (O’Rourke, Penrod, Cutler & 
Stuve, 1989). For example, the majority of laboratory based studies employ young 
undergraduates. Clearly, real witnesses to crime are not all undergraduate 
students.
17
In summary, although laboratory studies provide the opportunity to use a 
controlled environment in which to explore a wide range of factors that may 
influence eyewitness memory, they are ethically constrained often to the extent of 
having little or no involvement or consequence for the participant witnesses.
2.1.2 The way fonm rd  - a combined approach
As discussed, field, archival and laboratory based research are each characterised 
by a number of advantages and disadvantages over one another. Unfortunately, 
combination of all the advantageous aspects is not an option. Hence, it is argued 
that for research in this area to be of use a combined approach should be adopted 
where ideas and hypotheses are investigated both in a controlled laboratory 
environment and in a real-eyewitnessing situation. In order to maximise the 
potential of future research it is argued that, in line with ethical guidelines, 
laboratory based studies should maximise their external validity by using 
forensically relevant paradigms and utilising manipulation checks to assess the 
extent of physiological and psychological arousal. Overcoming the internal 
validity problems associated with field studies, although harder, is not 
insurmountable. In particular, Chapter Seven presents an exploratory study 
specifically designed to overcome the problems of assessing eyewitness accuracy 
in field and archival studies.
Fundamentally, as Endel Tulving has pointed out, there is no reason to believe 
that there is only one correct way in which memoiy should be studied (Tulving, 
1991). Similarly, Yuille (1993) also advocated that in addition to the plethora of 
laboratoiy based studies in this area we must study actual forensic eyewitnesses. 
In line with these views, the research presented in this thesis utilises a variety of 
methods.
2.2 Defining and clarifying terminology
Within the eyewitnessing literature, the terms stress, arousal, emotion, mood, and 
anxiety are widely used and everyone understands what is generally meant by the
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terms. Despite such a general level of understanding, however, the lack of a 
precise and agreed definition, in conjunction with the interchangeable use of the 
terms, has heightened the lack of clarity in the use of any one of them. A brief 
description of the common teims used in the eyewitness literature is provided.
Whilst these definitions are by no means definitive, they do provide a basis for 
understanding their general meaning and use.
2.2.1 Stress
Broadly, stress is a set of responses elicited by the perception of a stressor. A I
stressor may be defined as an uncontrollable event that is perceived as threatening j
physical or psychological hann. Consequently stress responses are negative Ii(unpleasant) in affect and can be physiological (i.e., activation of the |
sympathetico-andrenal system to produce and circulate adrenalin preparing the |
body for fight or flight), or psychological (i.e., feelings of anxiety). |
I2.2.2 Arousal \
Arousal is a fundamental part of the stressor-stress relationship in that it is the |
physiological state elicited by an organism in response to its perceptions of the ]Ienvironment. In addition to producing states of extreme anxiety (generally termed j
!the stress response), arousal can also be used to define states at the opposite end of j
the continuum, such as states of deep sleep. Therefore, unlike stress, arousal may j
!
be used to define states of positive affect as well as negative affect. As with stress, j
however, arousal may be physiological, (i.e., resulting from activation of the |
sympathetico-adrenal system), or psychological (i.e., perceived threat). '
j
2.2.3 Emotion j
Emotion, on the other hand, is much harder to define but may include the |
psychological and physiological state elicited in response to an organism’s j
perceptions of its environment. A working definition is provided by Oatley and |
Jenkins: :
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“1. An emotion is usually caused by a person consciously or unconsciously 
evaluating an event as relevant to a concern (a goal) that is important; the emotion 
is felt as positive when a concern is advanced and negative when a concern is 
impeded. 2. The core of an emotion is readiness to act and the prompting of plans; 
an emotion gives priority for one of a few kinds of action to which it gives a sense 
of urgency - so it can interrupt, or compete with, alternative mental processes or 
actions. Different types of readiness create different outline relationships with 
others. 3. An emotion is usually experienced as a distinctive type of mental state, 
sometimes accompanied or followed by bodily changes, expressions, actions” 
(Oatley & Jenkins, 1996, p.96).
2.2.4 Mood
The term mood refers to a relatively permanent emotional state that may last for 
hours, days or weeks, often at low intensity.
2.2.5 Anxiety
Anxiety, often viewed as objectless in its causality, is generally used to refer to a 
vague unpleasant emotional state with qualities of apprehension, dread or distress.
Although a few studies of events positive in affect have been conducted, i.e., 
events which are pleasant or enjoyable such as the sight of a man holding a baby 
or a beach at sunset (e.g., Bradley et al., 1992), the majority of research on arousal 
or emotion and memory has studied the effects of events negative in affect upon 
memory. Such events are associated with the evocation of some form of 
unpleasant or negative response and tend to include events which if experienced 
personally would be violent, shocking or traumatic to a certain degree, such as car 
accidents or surgical operations (e.g., Heuer & Reisberg, 1990; Christianson and 
Loftus, 1987). As the experience of victimisation is an unpleasant or negative 
experience, the research presented within this thesis also focuses on events which 
are negative in affect and memory for those events.
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Chapter 3
Research Review
This chapter is concerned with critically discussing and evaluating existing 
research in order to consider fully whether memory for negative emotional events 
and neutral events may differ and if so, how they differ. Following this, Chapter 
Four specifically reviews the theoretical mechanisms which have been put forward 
to explain why negatively arousing or emotional information may affect memory.
As a result of the existing research interest and activity in this area, a number of 
literature reviews and books concerning the effects of arousal and emotion upon 
eyewitness memory have already been published (e.g., Christianson, 1992a,
1992b; Deffenbacher, 1983; Deffenbacher, 1991; Egeth, 1994). On the basis of 
these existing reviews, rather than simply regurgitating or being repetitive, this 
research review presents the central literature in this area along with new research 
which has been published since the existing reviews themselves were published. 
Furthermore, rather than consider laboratory, field and archival studies as distinct 
entities, as many existing reviews have done, in this review the distinction is made 
between memory for personally meaningful arousing events, whether manipulated 
within the laboratory or studied in real life, and memory for events and 
information associated with visually-induced arousal, which traditionally have 
tended to be studied within the laboratory. As will be seen, on the basis of 
research conducted since Christianson’s important review paper (Christianson, 
1992a), it is argued that this is an appropriate alternative manner in which to 
present and critically evaluate the research conducted in this area.
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3.1 Eyewitness memory for personally meaningful arousing events
Memory for personally meaningful arousing events refers specifically to an 
arousing or emotional event that has some form of personal significance, whether 
it is a crime or other emotional event. Specifically, this section reviews: 
autobiographical memory; archival and field research that has looked at memory 
for real crimes; and laboratory based simulation studies which have attempted to 
induce victimisation and, therefore, personal involvement.
3.1.1 Autobiographical memory
As the term itself suggests, autobiographical memory refers to an individual’s 
recollection of events in their own life. Principally investigated as a means of 
understanding normal human memory, this was one of the first aspects of memory 
to stimulate research (i.e., Galton, 1883). Since then, a great deal of interesting 
work has investigated the role of emotional affect in autobiographical memory 
(see Rubin, 1996; Thompson, Skowronski, Larsen & Betz, 1996; Winograd & 
Neisser, 1992, for comprehensive reviews). In particular, no account of 
autobiographical memory research is complete without reference to the seminal 
paper in this area published by Brown & Kulik (Brown & Kuiik, 1977).
Brown & Kulik investigated participant’s memories for a number of national news 
events, such as the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, by asking them to 
describe the circumstances in which they first heard of these events and by asking 
them to rate the consequentiality of the event for themselves. Even after an 
intervening period of over 10 years, they found participants’ memories for these 
events to be very vivid. Interestingly, the vividness extended beyond details for 
the event itself to include circumstantial details, such as where the individual was 
when they heard the news or how they heard the news, especially if they rated the 
event as consequential for themselves. As a result. Brown and Kulik coined the 
term ‘flashbulb memory’ suggesting that this type of memory has two principle 
determinants, a high degree of suiprise or emotion, and a high level of 
consequentiality. They concluded that if these deteiminants are present in a given 
situation then a flashbulb memory occurs. Since the publication of Brown and
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Kulik’s paper, many studies have demonstrated similar flashbulb type memory 
effects (Bohannon, 1988; Christianson, 1989; Pillemer, 1984; Rubin & Kozin,
1984; Wright, 1993).
As well as studying memory for national news events, several studies have looked 
at participants’ memories for personal events which are emotional, such as the 
death of a relative or a traffic accident, and found these also appear to exhibit 
flashbulb type memory effects similar to those described by Brown & Kulik 
(1977). For example, Christianson & Loftus (1990) asked participants to describe 
their individual most traumatic memory and rate the affect associated with both 
the original incident and the memory itself. They found that participants’ rated 
emotion was significantly correlated with the number of central details the 
participants rated themselves to remember. Similar results, suggesting that affect 
strength is related to rated memory vividness, have been found in a number of 
other studies (Rubin & Kozin, 1984; Reisberg, Heuer, McLean, &
O’Shaughnessy, 1988; Strongman & Kemp, 1991; Wagenaar & Groeneweg,
1990)
Despite the concordance in findings between the studies of memory for national 
news events and those for personally arousing events, the potential mechanisms 
behind the flashbulb memory phenomena are less clear. It has been suggested that 
biological or neurobiological mechanisms promote the formation of memories for 
emotional or important information (Gold, 1992; Livingston, 1967). For example. 
Brown & Kulik (1977), drew heavily on the work of Livingston (1967) to explain 
their findings. Using Livingston’s theoiy, they argued that when an individual 
experiences an emotional event there is an associated biochemical change in the 
brain activating what Livingston termed a ‘Now print! ’ mechanism which captures 
the details for the event rather like a photographic image. Similar mechanisms 
have been proposed by others (e.g.. Gold, 1986; 1992). These theories are 
discussed in more detail in Chapter Four. Hence, Brown & Kulik (1977) 
suggested that flashbulb memories were different to noraial everyday memories in
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that increased intensity or affect associated with the event results in a more vivid 
subsequent memory due to the enhanced biochemical activation.
In direct contrast, however, it has also been argued that flashbulb memories are 
not special or different from normal memories and that their apparent 
permanence, detail and vividness is due to psychological mechanisms rather than 
biological mechanisms (Christianson, 1989; McCloskey, Wible & Cohen, 1988; 
Weaver, 1993; Wright, 1993). Prominent amongst the psychological arguments is 
the suggestion that the reported vividness of such memories is not a function of 
the incident itself, but rather a function of extensive or continuous rehearsal which 
results in their persistence (Bohannon, 1988; Christianson, 1989). Using a similar 
paradigm to Brown & Kulik (1977), Bohannon (1988) tested participant’s 
memories for the Challenger Space Shuttle disaster and asked participants to rate 
their emotional reaction (calm versus upset) upon hearing of the disaster, and 
whether they recounted the story of hearing the news to others on only a few 
occasions or on many occasions. Frequency of rehearsal was found to be sufficient 
to produce a flashbulb memory type effect, although at a longer retention interval 
the effect appeared to be enhanced when greater rehearsal was reported in 
conjunction with higher emotional affect.
In line with this, it has also been suggested that these vivid memories are 
reconstructions after the event. In a comparison of memories measured shortly 
after the murder of Olaf Palme, the Swedish Prime Minister, with reports obtained 
one year later (double assessment technique), Christianson (1989) found that there 
was a loss of consistent information over the intervening time contradicting the 
idea that flashbulb memories are formed at the time of the incident, but rather are 
reconstructed afterwards. In support of this, Wright (1993) also found systematic 
biases in participants’ recollections of the Hillsborough football disaster over time.
From a slightly different perspective, it has also been argued that the recollection 
of events after several years is not a function of their vividness and 
consequentiality, but a function of the fact that an explicit retrieval aid is provided
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which facilitates the recall of the event itself and concomitant circumstances. 
Critically, if similar prompts were given for non-emotional information or events, 
then detailed and vivid memories might also be reported (Christianson, 1998, 
personal correspondence).
Furthermore, the role of surprise in the formation of these memories has also been 
questioned. Neisser (1982) suggests that events which have been expected for a 
long time can also produce persistent vivid memories, i.e., the awaited news of the 
death of an ill friend or relative can produce persistent memories of where and 
how one heard the news of the death.
One of the only studies to have a baseline record of events, against which to 
compare memory accuracy, was earned out by Larsen (1992) who kept a diary 
collecting news events and everyday personal experiences over a period of 9 
months. In contrast to existing studies, Larsen found that as surprise and 
importance of the news increased, memory of the reception context (where and 
how the news was heard) deteriorated, whilst memory for the news itself 
improved. As will be seen later, this pattern of results is similar to the central and 
peripheral detail distinction found in many laboratory studies of arousal and 
eyewitness memory.
It is clear, then, that the existence of the flashbulb memory phenomena is not 
universally accepted. Indeed, whether flashbulb memories are in fact different 
from other everyday memories is a continuing debate. Furtheimore, the study of 
flashbulb memories is complicated by the same methodological problems as field 
and archival eyewitness memory studies in that for most cases there is no accurate 
record of what actually happened and therefore the accuracy of these memories 
cannot reliably be assessed. Even where studies have tried to overcome this and 
used a measure of memory consistency over time, issues of rehearsal effects 
become paramount.
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3.L2 Archival and field research
Those studies which have examined actual eyewitness performance have utilized 
two main methodologies. One group of studies (archival studies) have looked 
specifically for patterns in the amount and type of information typically reported 
to the police by examining actual eyewitness reports held in police records (e.g., 
Kuehn, 1974; MacLeod & Shepherd, 1986; MacLeod, 1989; Sporer, 1992). Other 
studies (field studies) have measured the consistency of information between that 
which was reported to the police at the time of the incident with that reported 
during subsequent interviews conducted by researchers (e.g., Yuille & Cutshall, 
1986; Cutshall & Yuille, 1989).
5.7.2,1 Archival studies
In the earliest study of actual eyewitness reports, Kuehn (1974) assessed the 
effects of crime type and victim characteristics on the ability of 100 victims of 
violent crimes (rapes, assaults, robberies and homicide) to provide complete 
descriptions of their assailants to the police. Completeness of descriptions was 
assessed on the basis of 9 pre-determined physical characteristics. Whilst 85% of 
all victims reported 6 or more characteristics, Kuehn noted that victims of 
robberies provided more complete accounts than did victims of rape or assault, 
and that uninjured victims provided more complete accounts than did injured 
victims, suggesting that crimes higher in personal violence or threat to one’s 
safety are likely to be associated with less complete accounts of assailants by their 
victims.
An archival study by Sporer (1992) of 139 person descriptions from cases of 
robbery and rape, however, failed to support Kuehn’s conclusion. Specifically, 
Sporer found an almost linear increase in the number of descriptive details as a 
function of the level of stress experienced by a witness. Level of stress had been 
evaluated by classifying incidents on the basis of witnesses’ self-reported anxiety 
in conjunction with weapon presence and injury occurrence. In this study, 
however, only half of the witnesses actually witnessed the incident. The remainder 
had not witnessed the incident per se but had interacted with the perpetrator either
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just before or after the incident occurred. Consequently, it is possible that those 
witnesses who interacted with the perpetrator but did not actually witness the 
incident may have experienced lower levels of stress and attended to the 
perpetrator to a lesser extent than did those who had actually witnessed the 
incident.
In a similar vein, MacLeod and Shepherd (1986) examined action and description 
details reported by victims and bystanders. From a sample of 379 witness 
statements concerning 135 cases of assault, they found that male witnesses 
reported significantly more information than did female witnesses in cases where 
the victim had been injured, whereas no difference was found between males and 
females where the victim had been uninjured. They argued for the possibility that 
females may produce less complete accounts in more arousing incidents (i.e., 
those where the victim had sustained physical injuries). A subsequent analysis of 
the same data set by MacLeod (1989) revealed that victims reported significantly 
more action and description details about the perpetrator than did any other 
witness type. The reasons for these differences may lie in the fact that i) the 
information available to passive observers is likely to differ from the information 
available to those who are actively involved; ii) for bystanders, the victim is a 
competing stimulus which may serve to limit the processing of information about 
other persons and objects; and iii) differential demands may be made on witnesses 
by police officers as a means of providing investigative leads or judicial proof 
(MacLeod, 1985).
Whilst these studies reveal the information typically reported to the police by 
particular witness types (e.g., victim, friend of victim, associate of perpetrator, 
uninvolved bystander) and highlight the need to consider the role of individual 
witnesses when assessing eyewitness testimony, they fail to provide little more 
than educated guesses as to the relationship between arousal and eyewitness 
performance as they include neither a measure of arousal nor of memorial 
accuracy.
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5 .1.2.2 Field studies
An important first step in this regard was taken by Yuille and Cutshall (1986) who 
measured the consistency of 13 witnesses’ memories by comparing statements 
given to the police immediately following a gun store robbery and shooting 
incident, with statements given in intei*views conducted by researchers 4 to 5 
months after the event. The incident involved a single male robbing a gun store, 
after which he ran out to his car", closely followed by the gun store owner who was 
armed with a loaded revolver. The robber fired 2 shots wounding the store owner, 
who subsequently fired six shots killing the robber. The research interviews 
elicited a higher mean number of details than did the police interviews (81.27 and 
49.96 respectively), with over 50% of the details being action based. There was, 
however, considerable inter-witness variability in the number of details reported 
(between 17 and 95.5 details). Consequently, witnesses were grouped according to 
whether they had been centrally or peripherally located whilst witnessing the 
shooting. For both sets of interviews, witnesses who were located centrally 
reported approximately twice the number of details reported by those who were on 
the periphery.
Importantly, Yuille and Cutshall attempted to assess the accuracy of the details 
reported by combining forensic evidence, the reports of all witnesses, police, and
support personnel, and by ‘employing the constraints of logic to reconstmct the
events’ (p. 105). Whilst this provides an account of what most likely occurred, it 
does not provide an unequivocal assessment of what actually happened. Thus, as 
Yuille and Cutshall readily acknowledge, this method permits only an estimate to 
be made rather than an accurate assessment of eyewitness accuracy. Using this 
method they found no difference in overall accuracy between central and 
peripheral witnesses for either interview, and little change in accuracy across all 
witnesses between the police (82.14%) and research (80.66%) interviews. |
Although unable to compare victim with bystander performance (as the only !
victim did not wish to take part), they attempted to explore the impact of stress by |
asking the witnesses to rate retrospectively the level of stress experienced at the j
time of the incident. Those rating themselves as highly stressed were significantly j
i
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more accurate in the police interview than those who only rated themselves as 
having been mildly stressed. However, viewing proximity and level of stress were 
confounded as those witnesses who rated themselves as having been the most 
stressed were those who were most centrally located and, therefore, presumably 
most at risk. There is the additional problem of asking witnesses to judge how 
stressed they had been at the time of the incident after a lapse of up to two years.
Despite the inevitable messiness of such data, Yuille and Cutshall’s study 
represents an important milestone in eyewitness research, not only in terms of 
what it tells us about the reliability of eyewitness testimony but also in the way in 
which it provides contradictory findings to those laboratory studies which 
traditionally emphasize the inherent unreliability of witness memory. Using actual 
witnesses to a violent crime, Yuille and Cutshall found that people’s memories 
were, in fact, surprisingly reliable. Detractors from this position, however, would 
point out that only 13 of the 20 witnesses contactable were prepared to participate 
in their study and therefore it may be that only those who felt confident about the 
reliability of their memories for the event were prepared to come forward and 
participate, thereby inflating reliability estimates. In addition, there is the problem 
that the single incident examined may have been particularly memorable. There is 
little doubt that it was unusual given that the robber’s accomplice (who was 
waiting for him in the getaway car outside the store) locked the doors of the car, 
preventing the robber making his getaway and allowing the store owner to catch 
up with him and shoot the robber dead. Cutshall and Yuille (1989), however, 
subsequently extended their analysis to include two further shooting incidents plus 
a series of bank robberies. In each case, they confirmed their initial findings that 
eyewitness memory was remarkably reliable and that it remained so over 
relatively long periods of time (approximately two years).
A later study by Christianson & Hubinette (1993) also confirmed Yuille and 
Cutshall’s conclusion. They examined a number of bank robberies in which they 
surveyed victims (i.e., those held under gun point) and bystanders (i.e., non-victim 
bank employees and customers) four to fifteen months after the original robberies
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using multiple-choice questionnaires rather than interviews. Witnesses’ responses 
were verified by comparison with available forensic evidence, including police 
reports, reports from all witnesses to each specific robbery and photographs/films 
of the scene of the crime. The results showed that victims provided the more 
accurate information regarding the robbery and the events which led up to it. In 
contrast to other studies in the field, however, they found no effect of rated level 
of original emotional arousal upon memory for robbery details (e.g., number of 
robbers, robber’s weapon, and who collected the money), although it was related 
to memory for circumstances surrounding the robberies (e.g., time of day, number 
of customers, and day of the week). It is worth noting, however, that 44 per cent 
of the questionnaires were not returned which raises the possibility that estimates 
of accuracy may have been truly reflective.
More recently, Tollestrup, Turtle & Yuille (1994) compared witnesses to fraud 
with witnesses to robbery for perpetrator descriptions. The fraud cases mainly 
involved passing bad cheques at various locations and in most cases the witnesses 
were unaware that a crime had actually occurred, which makes this more like a 
study of memory for everyday encounters. This is highlighted by the finding that 
the majority of fraud victims were unable to recall many details regarding the 
appearance of the perpetrator. Victims of robbery provided more detailed 
descriptions than did bystander witnesses to robberies, although once again this is 
possibly because they had a better view, especially of the perpetrator’s face. As a 
measure of accuracy, Tollestrup et al., compared witness statements with details 
of suspects who had confessed their guilt (but who may not necessarily have been 
guilty). Whilst too few fraud victims offered sufficient descriptions to provide a 
reliable score for accuracy, victims and bystanders to robberies were not found to 
have differed in their accuracy for descriptions regarding hair, age and weight, 
although bystanders were more accurate for height. Had they been able to consider 
the accuracy of all details reported, however, a different pattern of results may 
have emerged, especially with regards to memory for action details. Also, the fact 
that there was little homogeneity in the robberies examined (ranging from purse 
snatches to armed robbery) casts doubt on whether aggregation of such diverse
30
cases is warranted. Indeed, Yuille and Cutshall (1986) had earlier made the point 
that while nomological summaries are useful in describing patterns in eyewitness 
recall, we need to take into account the role of ideographic factors if we are to 
gain an improved understanding of eyewitness performance.
In summary, these studies have a number of common features. All provide 
valuable information on actual eyewitness performance which permits much 
needed comparisons with findings derived from laboratory studies. They also, 
however, have a number of common problems: First, there is the problem of self­
selection in that those individuals who decline to participate may do so because 
they feel they have poor memories for the incident which, in turn, inflates 
estimates of eyewitness accuracy. Second, although each incident was witnessed 
by a large number of witnesses, between-witness comparisons are problematic due 
to the considerable variations in witnessing circumstances. Third, the measures of 
accuracy are largely estimates based on police records and what was remembered 
by other witnesses, police, and support personnel, and consistency of information 
between intei-views. Given that Loftus (1997) has amply illustrated how easy it is 
to incorporate false information into a witness’s memory, measures of consistency 
between interviews cannot be taken as an indication of accuracy. Fourth, all of 
these studies have focused on descriptive aspects of the event (e.g., offender’s 
appearance) rather than action details because the latter is difficult to verify. Yet, 
the accuracy of action details (i.e., who did what and to whom) is central to the 
judicial process. Other than deteimining what was said, once identification has 
been established, the remainder of court business often focuses on the actions and 
intent of individuals involved in the incident.
3.1.3 Laboratory studies o f  victims and bystanders
Despite the importance of victim eyewitness performance in the judicial process :|
and the novelty of the victimisation experience, eyewitness testimony research has Iivirtually neglected victim eyewitnesses in favour of bystander eyewitnesses. In i
particular, to date only five published studies have attempted to compare victim 1
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and bystander memory for personally meaningful events under controlled 
laboratory conditions.
The first of these was a laboratory study carried out by Hosch & Cooper (1982).
In their study pairs of participants witnessed a staged event involving either no 
theft (control), the theft of a calculator belonging to the experimenter (bystander 
condition) or the theft of a watch belonging to one of the participant pair (victim 
condition). Consequently, the victims and bystanders were not actually witnesses 
to the same theft. Memorial accuracy, measured using a six-picture identification 
test, was poorest in the no-theft control condition with no significant difference in 
identification accuracy between witnesses to the calculator theft or the watch theft. 
Hosch and Cooper suggested that although care was taken to minimise overall 
stress levels the victims might have been more aroused and upset than the 
bystanders, thus mitigating any effects of attention. As there were no measures of 
physiological or self report arousal, however, there is no way of knowing whether 
the witnesses were differentially aroused. Similarly, the failure to find any 
differences between the participant groups and conditions may have occuiTed as 
identification accuracy was the only form of memory measure taken. More 
extensive memory measures, such as recall or recognition tests, would have 
provided a more detailed assessment of the witnesses’ memories.
A further study (Hosch, Leippe, Marchioni & Cooper, 1984) employed the same 
calculator and watch theft conditions as the earlier Hosch & Cooper (1982) study. 
Interestingly, in this study rather than debriefing participants before test, police 
detectives took witness statements in order to suggest that a real crime had 
occurred until after testing. Unfortunately the witness statements were only taken 
as part of the deception of the experiment and were therefore not analysed. 
Consequently, as with Hosch and Cooper (1982), memory was only assessed using 
a photographic lineup. In contrast to the Hosch and Cooper study, however, the 
results indicated that victim witnesses were least likely to be accurate in their 
identification especially when given biased lineup instructions suggesting that the 
suspect was in the lineup.
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Using a similar personal theft paradigm involving the theft of game money from 
one of a pair of participants, Kassin (1984) measured memorial accuracy via a 
physical description form, requesting specific information about the culprit’s 
physical appearance and clothing, and a photographic lineup. Although Kassin 
attempted to measure the affect of the manipulation, this was done using only a 
single question about participants’ self-reported nervousness during the theft 
which failed to reveal a difference between the victims and bystanders. 
Nevertheless, in line with Hosch et al. (1984) victims were found to be poorer at 
identifying the perpetrator than were bystanders. No significant differences were 
found for the physical descriptions.
Finally, Hosch & Bothwell (1990) conducted two experiments in which they 
attempted to overcome some of the problems of the earlier studies by measuring 
the physiological effect of their manipulation. In their first experiment, however, 
they failed to produce a differential effect of arousal between victims and 
bystanders (measured by skin impedance). This was most probably due to the fact 
that the victims and bystanders had not actually been witness to the same incident, 
specifically, the bystander witnessed a calculator theft whilst the victim witnessed 
the theft of her own purse. Despite failing to find a difference in arousal levels 
between the witness groups, when they conelated arousal with identification 
performance they found that the more aroused witnesses were less likely to 
misidentify the perpetrator. This finding is in contrast with Hosch et al. (1984) 
and Kassin (1984) who found that victims were poorer in accuracy although as 
there were no physiological measures of arousal in these latter studies it is 
questionable whether the experiments are comparable.
In order to overcome problems encountered in the previous study, in the second 
experiment victims and bystanders were run in pairs witnessing the same incident. 
Unfortunately, this time the physiological data (skin impedance) was lost on 7 of 
the 10 victim participants thus making it impossible to say anything conclusive 
about whether the manipulation had actually caused a differential effect of arousal 
between victims and bystanders. In addition to a photographic lineup, in this
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experiment participants were asked to give written descriptions of the participant’s 
appearance. Although there was no significant difference between victims and 
bystanders in terms of identification accuracy, the written descriptions given by 
victims were significantly more accurate than those given by bystanders.
The lack of adequate manipulation checks in all apart from one of these studies 
prevents anything conclusive being said regarding the findings. In addition, the 
memory measures are far from comprehensive and do not provide a detailed 
picture of a victim or bystander’s memory for a personally experienced event. As 
a result, from all of these five studies it is not possible to tell whether differential 
arousal levels occur between victims and bystanders and whether there is a 
subsequent difference in memory.
In addition, two further studies have attempted to study a form of personal threat. 
Peters (1988) involved witnesses personally using an inoculation paradigm. 
Specifically, participants were asked to provide physical descriptions and make 
identifications concerning a nurse who had recently inoculated them and a second 
person they met shortly after inoculation. It was found that when the subjects were 
aroused (measured via heart rate) memory for the nurse was significantly reduced 
in comparison to memory for the second confederate with whom the participants 
interacted. Whilst participants were obviously personally involved with the 
manipulation, it is argued that it differs significantly from the nature of the 
experience of real witnesses. Specifically, it is argued that participants in Peter’s 
study would have been preoccupied with the incident which they knew was about 
to happen. Whilst real witnesses may speculate regarding what is about to happen 
they cannot be sure and may pay more attention to the event in order to monitor 
exactly what is happening.
Using a similar paradigm, Toglia, Payne, Nightingale & Ceci (1989), involved 
participants by informing them either that an inoculation was about to take place 
(high arousal condition) or that one would not take place (low arousal condition). 
When participants were tested for details of an incidental scripted interaction
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between the experimenter and a confederate, however, there were no differences 
in perfonnance, irrespective of whether participants believed they were about to 
be inoculated or not. Furthermore, measures of galvanic skin response revealed no 
significant differences between the two groups, thus questioning the effectiveness 
of the manipulation itself.
3.2 Eyewitness memory and visually-induced arousal
Memory for events and information associated with visually-induced arousal 
specifically refers to visual stimuli that are arousing, such as films of operations, 
but that do not have any immediate and direct personal significance for the 
viewer. Specifically, this section reviews laboratory research in this area including 
work which has made a distinction between memory for details central to an event 
and those peripheral to an event, and the phenomena closely linked to this referred 
to as the weapon focus effect. In addition, this section also discusses positive 
emotional events in order to give a more wholistic view of arousal and memory, 
thus providing an insight into whether the effects of emotion upon memory may 
be confined to negative emotion or whether they may be more generic.
The lack of baseline measures involved in the study of autobiographical memory 
and the study of real eyewitnesses, such as the lack of an account of what actually 
happened, has meant that virtually all eyewitness research has been conducted in 
the laboratory, where internal validity is higher as the eyewitness variables of 
interest can be more accurately controlled and manipulated as required. The 
typical paradigm involves the presentation of material (generally slides or videos) 
to two groups of participants. Using such a design, the experimental group are 
shown negatively-valenced emotional information whilst a control group are 
shown neutrally-valenced information. Consequently, much of what we have 
come to understand about the relationship between arousal and the reliability of 
victim testimony has been derived indirectly from laboratory studies in which 
memory performance for visually-arousing stimuli is compared against memory 
performance for visually-neutral stimuli (e.g., Christianson, 1984; Christianson & 
Loftus, 1987; Burke, Heuer & Reisberg, 1992). Whilst such studies have
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successfully created differences in arousal levels between treatment groups, as will 
be discussed, the physiological reactions experienced remain quite different from 
those experienced by actual victims of crime.
3.2.1 Laboratory based work
The traditional view, supported by early research conducted in this area, suggested 
that arousal has a negative effect upon memory, reducing the amount of 
information remembered. For example, an early study by Clifford & Scott (1978) 
found that recall was much more accurate for the details of a non-violent film than 
for a violent film. They employed a popular paradigm, where the details of the 
two films were identical apart from a middle section which either involved two 
policemen assaulting a bystander (violent film) or the bystander helping the 
policemen look for a criminal (non-violent film). Although this enabled the 
content of the films to be equated as far as possible, a measure of film affect (rated 
on a single 2-point scale) was only taken from participants viewing the violent 
film. Hence, it was not possible to directly compare whether viewing the violent 
film was indeed more emotional than viewing the non-violent film and thus 
whether it may have influenced memory performance.
Similar detrimental memory effects were demonstrated by Clifford & Hollin 
(1981), who found that witnesses shown a videotaped violent mugging 
remembered the film less accurately than did witnesses who saw a non-violent 
videotape involving direction seeking. In particular, as the number of perpetrators 
in the violent condition increased participants’ memorial accuracy decreased.
From this study, however, it is not possible to tell whether the observed decrease 
in accuracy was a function of the arousal itself or whetlier it was simply a function 
of the increase in the number of perpetrators present, and therefore the increased 
information competing for attention. In addition, this explanation holds when one 
considers that the accurate photographic identification of a single peipetrator was 
not found to differ between the violent and non-violent film conditions. 
Furthermore, as with the Clifford & Scott (1978) study, the lack of adequate 
manipulation checks prevents us from knowing whether viewing the violent film
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induced a higher level of negative emotional arousal than viewing the non-violent 
film.
A further series of three experiments which are also commonly cited as showing 
arousal to have a detrimental effect upon memory were conducted by Loftus & 
Bums (1982). They found that when participants where shown a film of a bank 
robbery, in which a young boy is violently shot in the face, they showed poorer 
memory (recall and recognition) for details of the film than when a non-violent 
version was viewed. In addition, they argue that participants failure in the violent 
film condition to recall the number 17, seen on the back of the top worn by the 
young boy, exemplifies a retrograde amnesia effect occurring as a result of the 
following violence. As discussed below, however, such a piece of information is 
particularly peripheral in terms of the whole event and the importance of other 
information. Nevertheless, the authors suggest that this retrograde amnesia, or 
inability to recall the critical detail immediately preceding the violent shooting, is 
due to the emotional nature of the event disrapting memoiy such that information 
is not fully stored. Whilst this remains a possibility, once again there were no 
physiological manipulation checks to confirm that the two versions of the incident 
were in fact differentially arousing.
Furthermore, in contrast to the retrograde amnesia effect demonstrated by Loftus 
& Burns (1982), Christianson & Nilsson (1984) found evidence for an anterograde 
amnesia effect associated with viewing negatively arousing visual stimuli. As the 
violent aspect of the Loftus & Burns (1982) study occurred at the end of the 
stimulus presentation, however, it is not possible to tell whether they may also 
have observed an anterograde amnesia affect in addition to the retrograde amnesia 
effect. In a series of four experiments, Christianson & Nilsson (1984) presented 
participants with a series of slides in which each slide was accompanied by four 
verbal descriptors. Whilst control groups were shown three phases of slides 
depicting all neutral looking faces, the experimental groups were shown a phase of 
‘horribly disfigured’ faces in between two phases of neutral faces. Unlike the 
studies discussed above, however, physiological measurements of skin
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conductance and cardiac activity confirmed that participants viewing the 
disfigured faces were more physiologically aroused. In tests of recall and 
recognition memory for the verbal descriptors attached to each face, however, 
poorer memory was found for the items associated with the traumatic faces 
themselves as well as for the descriptors associated with the neutral items 
following the traumatic faces (anterograde amnesia). It is important to recognise, 
however, that the poorer memory for the descriptors associated with the traumatic 
faces may indicate that the participants devoted more attention to looking at the 
faces themselves. As a result, had they been tested for the faces rather than the 
descriptors they may in fact have shown superior performance. Unfortunately, as 
this was not tested it is not possible to tell whether this was the case.
A similar anterograde amnesia effect was also demonstrated in a study by Kramer, 
Buckhout, Fox, Widman & Tusche (1991). In their study, however, the target 
portion of the slide series was only a single slide, depicting either a scene labeled 
NYPD (emotional condition) or an M.G.M. Studios labeled slide (neutral 
condition). Although they found that participants showed amnesia for the slides 
following the target slide in the emotional condition but not in the neutral 
condition, no mention is made in terms of recall accuracy for the critical slides 
themselves. Using the same type of paradigm, a recent study by Bornstein, Liebel 
& Scarberry (1998) found participants to demonstrate both retrograde and 
anterograde amnesia effects. Participants viewed either a violent film, depicting a 
shooting incident, or a non-violent control version of the same film where the 
violent portion was changed. Following the film, participants made three 
successive attempts to recall details of the event. Although those viewing the 
violent film were better at recalling the details of the event itself, they were poorer 
at recalling the details that preceded or followed the violence. As might be 
expected, both groups recalled significantly more information over successive 
recall attempts.
Although these studies demonstrate retrograde and anterograde amnesia effects, 
little consideration is given to memory performance for the emotional information
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itself, which most likely would be the critical information of interest in an applied 
or practical situation. Despite the variation in methodology and results from these 
laboratory studies, however, as more research has been conducted a theme has 
emerged suggesting that relative to those viewing neutral stimuli, participants 
viewing negatively valenced emotional stimuli show enhanced memory for central 
detail information (Burke et al., 1992; Christianson & Loftus, 1987; Christianson 
& Loftus, 1991; Heuer & Reisberg, 1990; Safer, Christianson, Autry, &
Osterlund, 1998). There is, however, discrepancy in the results with regards to 
whether memory for central information is to the detriment of memory for 
peripheral details (Safer et al., 1998) or not (Heuer & Reisberg, 1990).
3.2.2 Central versus peripheral details
Before discussing research in this area, it is necessary to define clearly the terms 
central and peripheral details. Central details are those which are essential in order 
to make sense of the situation, thus including details related to the source and 
degree of danger or threat, such as the presence or absence of a weapon, or 
number of perpetrators. In contrast, peripheral details are not essential for making 
sense of the situation, including details such as the colour of the perpetrator’s 
clothing and other background details irrelevant to witness safety (see 
Christianson, 1992a, for a discussion). As mentioned above, using these 
definitions the number 17, on the back of the top worn by the young boy in the 
violent film condition of the study conducted by Loftus & Bums (1982), would be 
classified as peripheral as it would not have been essential in order to understand 
what was going on in the film.
Typical of the studies investigating memory for central and peripherally related 
details, Christianson and Loftus (1987) conducted two studies in which they 
presented participants with either a slide sequence consisting of a three phase 
neutral story, or a sequence where the middle phase of the story was altered to be 
an arousal-inducing car accident. From earlier work (Christianson, 1984) it was 
known that those who viewed the car accident version were differentially aroused, 
exhibiting a drop in heart rate during the emotional phase. In the first study,
39
Christianson & Loftus (1987) instmcted participants to write down what they felt 
was the most distinguishing detail of each slide. Participants were then tested for 
their recall of the central details they had written down as well as the contents of 
the pictures themselves. Participants viewing the traumatic slides were better able 
to recall the details they had written down than did those who viewed the neutral 
slides, but were not better able to recognise the specific slides they saw. This 
pattern of results was obtained at long (2 weeks) and short (20 minutes) retention 
intervals. Similarly, they conducted a follow-on experiment which showed that 
participants viewing a videotape of a traumatic bank robbery, involving a young 
boy being shot in the face, were better able to recall the central aspects of the 
event than did those who viewed a non-traumatic version of the robbery even after 
a retention interval of 6 months. The authors interpreted this to suggest that the 
essence or theme of a traumatic event is well retained in memory in contrast to 
other more peripheral details for which memory is impaired. In support of this, 
similar effects were found by Burke, Heuer and Reisberg (1992) who showed that 
recognition memory for gist, basic-level visual information and plot-irrelevant (or 
peripheral) details associated with the central characters of the slides were 
improved in an emotional condition whilst details not associated with the event’s 
centre were poorer. Physiological measures also confirmed that the emotional 
condition were significantly differentially aroused, demonstrating a drop in heart 
rate over the three phases of the slide presentation, in contrast to the neutral story 
group.
In contrast to this, however, Kebeck & Lohaus (1986) found that whilst 
participants shown a neutral or traumatic version of a story were equal in their 
recall of central information, those shown the traumatic version were less able to 
free recall peripheral information at immediate recall or following a 2 week delay. 
The arousing film used in this study, however, was relatively innocuous as it only 
depicted an argument and there were no manipulation checks to see whether it was 
in fact more arousing than the neutral film.
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In a further series of five experiments, Christianson & Loftus (1991) presented 
participants with a slide sequence in which a critical slide varied according to each 
experimental condition. In the emotional condition the critical slide showed a 
woman injured near a bicycle, in the non-emotional condition the critical slide 
showed a woman riding a bicycle. Christianson and Loftus also included an 
unusual condition in order to investigate whether emotion affects memory for 
reasons that go beyond the unusualness or the distinctiveness of an emotional 
situation. This particular aspect of the study, which specifically concerns the 
theoretical mechanisms underlying arousal and memory, is discussed in detail in 
Chapter Four. Results showed that in comparison to the non-emotional condition, 
when the critical slide was emotional the participants were better able to recall or 
recognise a central detail from the critical slide than a peripheral detail. However, 
the only manipulation checks were self-report measures across all slides without 
specific reference to the critical slides. In addition, the designated central and 
peripheral details were the colour of the woman’s coat (central information) and 
the colour of the car (peripheral information). On the basis of the earlier definition 
of central information, it is argued that the colour of the woman’s coat would not 
have been central to understanding what was happening.
A study by Heuer & Reisberg (1990) found memory for information central to an 
event and peripheral detail to be enhanced by emotion after a two week interval. 
Using an incidental-learning paradigm participants were shown slides depicting 
either an emotional or a neutral version of a story, in which only the central phase 
was altered, accompanied by audio-taped sentences. Measurements of heart rate 
taken throughout showed that in contrast to the neutral group, those in the 
emotional condition demonstrated a drop in heart rate across the slide phases. The 
aroused group showed superior recall and recognition accuracy compared to the 
neutral group suggesting that arousal promotes memory for the event’s gist at the 
expense of detail.
A recent series of studies conducted by Safer et al. (1998) similarly suggests that 
participants may extend or narrow scene boundaries depending on the emotional
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nature of the stimulus information. Participants in the studies viewed either a 
visually neutral or emotional series of slides and subsequently completed a 
recognition test for the slides they had seen. After viewing an emotionally 
arousing scene, participants selected slides that tended to narrow the scene’s 
boundaries as well as demonstrating enhanced memory for the critical arousal 
inducing aspects of the scene. Those viewing neutral slides, on the other hand, 
tended to extend the scene’s boundaries and showed no selective memory 
advantage for particular details. Safer et al. (1998) argue that the ‘tunnel’ memory 
phenomenon displayed by the participants was achieved via the more elaborative 
processing of critical details.
3.2.2.1 Weapon focus effect
Pivotal to the issue of memory for central and peripheral information is the 
weapon focus effect (Kramer, Buckhout & Eugenio, 1990; Loftus, Loftus & 
Mezzo, 1987; Maass & Kohnken, 1989). Although discussed in detail in Chapter 
Four, it is pertinent to mention this phenomena here as a weapon would be 
classified as a central piece of information if present in a stimulus array. The 
weapon focus effect itself is a well-documented phenomena within the eyewitness 
literature referring to a witness’s propensity to focus attention on a weapon to the 
extent that other more peripheral details, especially characteristics of the 
perpetrator’s face, are attentionally excluded resulting in poorer memory for them. 
A meta-analysis of the weapon focus effect (Steblay, 1992) revealed its existence 
as a well documented effect within the research literature.
In summary, from these studies it would appear it is possible that where negative 
emotional arousal is shown to reduce identification accuracy it is because of the 
presence of a weapon or some other attention ‘catching’ aspect of the stimulus 
array. Possible attentional and elaborative mechanisms, which may account for 
the existence of these findings, are discussed in detail in Chapter Four.
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3.2.3 Positive visually-induced arousal
In order to understand fully the effects of emotional arousal it is important to 
consider whether the effects observed with negative emotional arousal are also 
observed with positive emotional arousal. For example, an event that is positive in 
affect may also be unusual or incongruous and consequently result in differential 
attention/processing. Although research on memory for positive emotional events 
has received much less attention than research on memory for negative emotional 
events, previous studies have shown that, similarly to negative emotional arousal, 
the critical aspects of positive emotional events are typically well remembered 
whilst memory for surrounding peripheral items is poorer (e.g., Detterman &
Ellis, 1972; Ellis, Detterman, Runcie, McCarver & Craig, 1971; Runcie & 
O’Bannon 1977).
Christianson (1986) conducted two experiments where, instead of being presented 
with emotional slides negative in affect, participants were presented with slides 
positive in affect depicting erotic scenes. Measurement of heart rate and self- 
reported arousal confirmed that the erotic slides induced a higher state of positive 
emotional arousal (characterised by a higher level of heart rate) than did a series 
of neutral slides. In terms of memory, those presented with the erotic slides 
showed poorer memory for verbal descriptors accompanying the slides than those 
presented with neutral slides. This suggests that when presented with erotic scenes 
the participants spent more time looking at or processing the slides than the 
accompanying verbal descriptors. As discussed above with regards to the study by 
Christianson & Nilsson (1984), however, had the participants been tested for 
details of the slides themselves it is possible that those shown the erotic slides 
would have demonstrated superior performance.
In line with this idea, the findings of a study by Bradley, Greenwald, Petry &
Lang (1992) found that pictures rated as highly arousing were remembered better 
than those rated as less arousing. Participants were presented with photographic 
slides depicting various contents along the aiousal continuum, ranging from an 
aimed pistol to a man holding a baby. Participants rated each slide on the
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dimensions of valence and arousal followed by either an immediate or delayed 
(one year) free-recall test in which participants were asked to write down, in any 
order, a word or phrase that described each experimental slide that they could 
remember. Immediate recall results showed that memory for both pleasantly and 
unpleasantly rated slides was greater than for neutral rated slides. The delayed 
recall results showed that, whilst the unpleasantly rated slides were still recalled 
better 1 year later, the superior recall effect of the pleasantly rated slides had 
disappeared, suggesting that high negative arousal may facilitate short and long­
term memory performance, whilst positive emotional arousal may facilitate short­
term memory only.
Together, these studies add further support to the suggestion that it may not be 
something inherent in only negative emotional stimuli that results in differential 
memory performance.
3.2.4 Thematic versus visually-induced arousal
It has been argued that the discrepancy in the results found between laboratory and 
field studies centres around the fact that the majority of laboratory based studies 
have actually looked at visually induced arousal rather than thematically induced 
arousal (Heuer, Reisberg & Rios, 1997). Visually induced arousal, as mentioned 
earlier, is created solely by the visual component of a stimulus array, such as the 
image of a car accident. In contrast, Heuer et al. (1997) argue that thematically 
induced arousal is created by a personal empathy with the event.
Heuer et al. (1997) conducted a laboratory study designed specifically to compare 
the effects of thematically induced arousal with visually induced arousal. 
Participants were presented with a series of slides depicting a male and female on 
their first date within the female’s apartment. A neutral group were shown only 
the slides, whilst a thematically aroused group were played an accompanying 
arousal inducing narrative suggesting that the date had culminated in rape. The 
slide sequences shown to both groups were identical apart from a single slide, thus 
trying to ensure that any arousal induced was a function of the thematic narrative
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rather than the visual content of the slides themselves. The date rape theme was 
chosen specifically because it was a topical issue amongst the students on the 
campus at the time and therefore likely to induce empathy. Heart rate measured 
during stimulus presentation revealed that the two groups were differentially 
aroused, although similar to studies of visually-induced arousal, participants in the 
arousal condition demonstrated a drop in heart rate across the slide presentation 
which only rose at the point of the assault. Results indicated that the thematically 
aroused group was superior in their memory for the central gist of the event in 
comparison to the neutral group but were poorer for more peripheral details. 
Consequently, despite the thematic nature of the manipulation employed, the 
results of this study are in line with previous studies of visually-induced arousal 
(cf. Christianson & Loftus, 1991 - who also employed a single slide difference 
methodology; Burke et al., 1992).
Cahill & McGaugh (1995) found similar results in an earlier experiment where 
they presented participants with identical slides but altered the emotional nature of 
them by presenting different accompanying narratives. Although those viewing 
the emotional story showed enhanced memory for the story, level of emotional 
arousal was measured by emotionality ratings rather than physiological measures.
Critically, then, it is argued that whilst the use of narratives may provide an 
additional sensory dimension to these laboratory studies, as they do not involve 
the witnesses personally, the extent to which these studies, rather than studies of 
visually-induced arousal, reflect the performance of real personally involved or 
threatened witnesses is questionable.
3.3 Conclusions; The role of personal involvement
Whilst laboratoiy studies of thematically-induced arousal purport to be different to 
other laboratory studies, the extent to which they are different remains 
questionable. Traditional laboratory studies strongly suggest that attentional and 
elaborative mechanisms contribute to the selective remembering of central details 
over peripheral details, although the extent to which elaboration plays a part in
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these studies remains questionable. Whilst participants in these studies may have 
experienced a relative degree of empathy or understanding, there is no personal 
involvement when viewing the slides in the sense that the ‘witnesses’ fail to feel 
personally threatened. It is posited that there is an enormous discrepancy between 
the kind of elaborative processing engaged in by uninvolved participants when 
simply viewing ‘emotional’ slides, compared with the kind of elaborative 
processing engaged in by witnesses who find themselves to be personally 
involved. In the latter case, an important feature of processing emotional 
information is whether it has personal relevance or significance. Personally 
involved witnesses may engage in ongoing thoughts concerning aspects of the 
incident and associated short- and long-term consequences for themselves. Should 
this be the case, we need to exercise caution in generalizing results from studies of 
visually-induced arousal to witnesses involved in actual crimes as the 
physiological reactions and psychological experiences may be qualitatively 
different.
In particular, the experience of witnessing a real crime almost certainly results in 
an elevated heart rate which is characteristic of a defensive or aversive 
physiological response. Despite this, many of the studies have failed to take 
measures of the actual level of arousal experienced by those presented with the 
purported emotionally-valenced information relative to those viewing the 
purported neutral information. In particular, an analysis of 50 experiments in this 
aiea revealed: only 10 took both physiological measures of autonomic arousal 
(i.e., heart rate or galvanic skin response) and a self-report measure (e.g., Heuer & 
Reisberg, 1990); 7 took only a physiological measure (e.g., Hosch & Bothwell, 
1990); 19 used only self-report measures (e.g., Christianson & Loftus, 1987), of 
which 8 used only a single self-report question (e.g., Kassin, 1984); and 14 
experiments failed to take any measure of arousal whatsoever (e.g., Hosch et al., 
1984). Consequently, in many of the studies the researchers could not be sure that 
their emotional condition stimulus was indeed more arousing than their neutral 
condition stimulus, and therefore could not validly infer a relationship between 
arousal and any subsequent memory effects. In the few studies of eyewitness
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testimony that have attempted to measure physiological responses during the 
witnessing of an event, however, the physiological effects displayed by 
participants are often orienting responses. In other words, instead of experiencing 
an increase in heart rate whilst viewing a visually traumatic episode, participant 
witnesses typically exhibit a decrease in heart rate. Clearly, while such studies 
purport to say something about the effects of arousal on eyewitness performance, 
they can only tell us part of the story. In fact, they reveal little about the effects of 
victimization on memory performance and, in particular, how defensive 
physiological reactions might affect eyewitness reliability (cf. Christianson, 1984; 
Heuer & Reisberg, 1990). It is argued that existing research has neglected to 
consider the role of personal involvement and perceived threat despite the fact that 
such factors are central to the victimization experience. In doing so, the possible 
mediating effects of arousal upon eyewitness memory have yet to be fully 
explored. Specifically, visually-induced arousal, which tends to result in an 
orienting response, may have different effects upon memory than arousal induced 
through personal involvement with a threatening stimulus.
In addition, the stimulus material viewed by witness groups within the same 
laboratory studies is often considerably different in content. For example, in a 
study conducted by Heuer and Reisberg (1990) witnesses in an emotional 
condition were shown slides depicting a story in which a mother takes her son to 
visit his father at his workplace where he is a surgeon and they see him operating 
on a victim of an accident shown in an earlier slide. Witnesses in the neutral 
condition, however, were shown slides depicting the mother and son visiting the 
father who this time works as a car mechanic and is shown fixing a car. This study 
and many others have tried to equate the material viewed by the groups in some 
way, such as by equating the length of time that the peipetrator or central 
individual is in view, or by changing only the central portion of the slide series 
rather than the whole series (Christianson & Loftus 1987; Clifford & Scott, 1978; 
Heuer & Reisberg, 1990). Whilst this enables an insight into the role of 
physiological arousal and how eyewitness memory may work, no account seems 
to be taken of the fact that, rather than being an effect of physiological arousal,
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any differences in memory performance could simply be due to the fact that the 
witness groups watched stimulus incidents that were different. In particular, it 
could simply be that the emotional stimulus is inherently more interesting than the 
neutral stimulus. For example, slides or a video of a simulated crime or operation 
are likely to be far more interesting than watching a series of slides or a video 
depicting someone mending a car. Indeed, many of the laboratory based studies 
have not employed physiological manipulation checks and so are unable to 
unequivocally say that one group of witnesses were more aroused than another 
group.
To re-cap, participants in laboratory studies typically display orienting 
physiological responses to visually-induced arousal whereas witnesses who 
experience direct personal involvement with actual threatening events will most 
likely display defensive physiological responses characteristic of the ‘fight or 
flight’ response. In order to advance our understanding of the effects of arousal on 
eyewitness memory, therefore, we need to be aware that these two distinct 
physiological responses may affect memoiy perfoimance in different ways or, at 
least, indicate the possibility that different cognitive processes may have been 
engaged. Should this be found to be the case, this distinction may help to explain 
some of the disparity that currently exists in the eyewitnessing literature 
concerning the effects of arousal on memory. While field research has tended to 
find that arousal leads to an improvement in memory performance, the findings 
from laboratory studies remain quite mixed. This diversity in methodology and 
results makes the area very complex to categorise and assimilate.
This chapter highlights the potential importance of the role of personal 
involvement in eyewitness memoiy, including the possibility that mechanisms 
associated with the psychological response, and the defensive nature of the 
physiological response, may be central to subsequent memory effects. The 
following chapter discusses theoretical mechanisms that have been proposed to 
explain the effects of these factors upon eyewitness memory, along with specific 
reseai'ch which has attempted to investigate these mechanisms.
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Chapter 4
iTheoretical Mechanisms i
4,1 Introduction
Whilst Chapter Three was concerned with whether and how negatively arousing or 
emotional information may affect memory, this chapter is specifically concerned with 
reviewing and discussing existing medhanisms and explanations concerning why 
effects may occur. On account of the enormity of the cognitive and physiologically 
based literature concerned with arousal and performance, however, it would be 
inappropriate to review and discuss the whole area here As a result, this review 
specifically focuses on those theoretical mechanisms which have been used to explain 
aspects of eyewitness memory performance.
Whilst some suggest the physiological element of a witness’s response is critical, i.e., 
biological-evolutionary mechanisms are central (e.g.. Brown & Kulik, 1977; Gold, 
1992; Livingston, 1967), others suggest that the psychological element of a witness’s 
response is critical, i.e., cognitive mechanisms are central (e.g., Christianson & 
Loftus, 1991; Christianson, Loftus, Hoffman & Loftus, 1991; Craik & Lockhart, 
1972; Easterbrook 1959). Consequently, the first half of this chapter is divided into 
two sections: i) the role of physiological mechanisms and ii) the role of psychological 
mechanisms. In each section, the major theoretical mechanisms used to explain 
aspects of eyewitness performance are outlined along with a discussion of research 
which has explored the usefulness and robustness of these mechanisms. Following 
this, the final half of the chapter is dedicated to proposing a new theoretical approach
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which takes account of issues arising from the existing theoretical explanations and 
associated research.
4.2 The role of physiological mechanisms
As outlined in Chapter One, most victims and witnesses will experience some form of 
physiological arousal during the experience of an incident itself. This will most likely 
be dependent upon the level of involvement of the witness and the type of incident 
experienced. For example, it is likely that the level of physiological arousal 
experienced by victims will be higher than that experienced by bystanders present, 
although bystander witnesses may also exhibit significant elevation in physiological 
arousal. Similarly, crimes involving weapons or physical threat are likely to be more 
physiologically arousing than crimes involving no threat of physical harm, although 
the latter crimes may still be very arousing (MacLeod et al., 1996).
The nature of the physiological response exhibited by real eyewitnesses facing a 
personally threatening situation is almost certainly an elevation in heart rate 
characteristic of the ‘fight or flight’ response. Specifically, the ‘fight or flight’ 
response is a preparation for action, e.g., as the name suggests, fighting or fleeing, 
which results from increased activation of the sympathetico-adrenal system that 
controls readiness for action. Simplistically, the response is characterised by an 
increase in the level of adrenalin released into the blood stream which quickens the 
speed at which the heart pumps. In conjunction with vasoconstriction, this ensures 
blood is transferred around the body quicker, increasing oxygen provision to the 
muscles and, hence, ensuring readiness for action.
4.2.1 Biological-evolutionary theories
The biochemical change associated with the ‘fight or flight’ response has been viewed 
by many as a central factor affecting subsequent memory for the source of the threat 
or danger itself (Brown & Kulik, 1977; Gold, 1992; Livingston, 1967). The impetus
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behind such a view comes from evolutionary ideas that in order to survive we have an 
innate predisposition not only to respond to (e.g., the fight or flight response), but 
also to process and store information from the event for potential future reference 
(Christianson, 1997; Christianson & Engelberg, 1997). Fundamentally, biological- 
evolutionary theories propose that increased intensity or affect associated with an 
event results in a more vivid subsequent memory due to enhanced biochemical 
activation and assimilation. Two main theories based upon this viewpoint have been 
used in the eyewitness literature (Livingston, 1967; Gold, 1992).
4.2. U  Now print! Theory (Livingston, 1967)
Livingston’s theory proposes that when an individual experiences an emotional event 
the associated biochemical change in the brain activates a ‘Now print! ’ mechanism, 
capturing all the details for the event rather like a photographic image. Livingston 
described the processes leading up to the formation of a ‘photo’ as commencing with 
recognition of novelty or unusualness in the environment. This recognition is made 
by a system known as tlie reticular activating system (RAS) which has been viewed 
by others as a unifying and modulating system of arousal (e.g., Luria, 1981). 
Following recognition, the limbic system, generally thought to be involved in 
emotional and motivational behaviours, becomes involved, discriminating 
biologically meaningful (e.g., associated with pain) and personally significant aspects 
of the stimuli for that particular individual at that particular moment. Livingston 
proposed that this results in limbic discharge into the reticular formation, causing a 
diffusely projecting reticular formation discharge to be distributed throughout both 
hemispheres. This discharge he conceived to be a “Now print!” order for memory, 
resulting in all recent brain events and all recent conduction activities being “printed” 
to facilitate repetition of similar conduction patterns in the future. It is an interesting 
aspect of this theory that, unlike many cognitive based theories (e.g., Easterbrook, 
1959), it is not capacity driven, suggesting that all details can be captured.
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4.2. L2 NeurobiologicalMechanism (Gold, 1992)
The neurobiologically based mechanism which Gold proposes is based upon 
adrenalin and glucose modulation of memory storage. In particular, it suggests that 
adrenalin released into the blood stream promotes the storage of recent information. 
Studies using rats demonstrated that injection with adrenalin produced memory 
enhancement for a wide range of behavioural tasks, e.g., appetitive learned responses 
(McGaugh, 1989; McGaugh & Gold, 1989). Specific support for memory storage 
modulation by adrenalin came from the fact that the effects appeared to be both dose 
and time dependent. In particular, dosage enhanced memory in an inverted-U 
function and was most effective when administered close to training.
Although convincing, there were still gaps in the proposed mechanism because 
adrenalin itself does not cross the blood-brain barrier. Identification of an associated 
increase in circulating blood glucose levels following adrenalin injection, however, 
suggested that glucose may act as an intermediate mechanism (Ellis, Kennedy, Eusebi 
& Vincent, 1967). Subsequently, glucose injection was abo found to enhance 
memory storage in rats (Gold, 1986; Messier & Destrade, 1988; Messier & White, 
1984; White & Messier, 1988). The safety of glucose for humans enabled the effects 
observed in rats to be studied in humans. The findings of several experiments 
indicated that glucose significantly enhanced human memory performance when 
measured using a variety of tests (e.g., logical memory tests involving single 
presentations of taped narrative passages followed by 15 minute delayed recall 
measures; Gold, 1986; Hall, Gonder-Frederick, Chewning, Silveira & Gold, 1989; 
Manning, Hall & Gold, 1990). On the basis of these findings. Gold (1992) proposed 
that flashbulb memories represent a special case of neuroendocrine regulation of the 
biological processes responsible for storing information and that the storage of 
information at the time of an emotional event reflects an instance of physiological 
enhancement of memory.
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4.2.2 Empirical investigations o f physiological mechanisms 
The biological-evolutionary theories outlined above suggest that it is primarily as a 
result of physiological arousal that differences in memory occur. Although specific 
research has contributed to the development of the ideas outlined above, 
unfortunately little research has empirically investigated their direct application to 
memory for more complex information.
Heavily based upon complex neurobiology, Livingston described his theory as a 
visualisation of how these systems may work rather than a prescriptive mechanism 
(Livingston, 1967). As such, there is no direct and conclusive empirical support for 
the whole theory. Indeed, there are a number of aspects which are not fully 
understood, such as how novelty is recognised in the first instance. Nevertheless, as 
discussed in Chapter Two, this mechanism has been cited as a potential explanation 
for the existence of flashbulb memories (Brown & Kulik, 1977). In particular, the 
idea of a flashbulb or Now print! mechanism has been used to explain the fact that in 
addition to remembering the central elements of incidents, individuals also remember 
the concomitant circumstances as if a photograph had been taken of the event. Whilst 
many studies in autobiographical memory have advocated such a biologically-based 
mechanism to account for detailed and vivid memories, they provide little empirical 
support for such mechanisms as little is known about the actual physiological or 
biological effects of the original events for which such vivid and detailed memories 
are reported.
Nevertheless, laboratory research has attempted to investigate separately the effects of 
physiological and psychological arousal upon human memory by studying the 
influence of physiological arousal when it is un-associated with the to-be- 
remembered event. Indeed, there is a large cognitive based literature which has used 
such methods to investigate the effects of arousal. However, such work has generally 
looked at arousal’s effects upon performance on a variety of information processing 
tasks rather than memory per se (e.g., Anderson, 1990; Broadbent, 1954; Eysenck,
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1976; Nâatânen, 1973; Nelss, 1988; Neiss, 1990; Poulton, 1978; Van Gemmert &
Van Galen, 1997).
One study that did measure memory (Brigham et al., 1983), presented participants 
with facial slides whilst either stimulating them with electric shocks (physiological 
arousal group) or not stimulating them (contr ol group). However, in addition to 
finding no differences between the treatment groups in terms of heart rate, skin 
conductance or finger pulse volume, none of the phyaological measures were 
correlated with slide recognition accuracy. A similar study presented subjects with a 
non-violent film (Hollin, 1984). During a small portion of the film, half the 
participants were presented with loud white noise via headphones. Although 
subsequent memory was poorer in the noise group, no physiological measures were 
taken to show whether the manipulation had successfully created differential 
physiological arousal. Hence, both of these studies are of limited use. In particular, 
although such studies allow memory to be investigated when the source of arousal is 
un-associated with the stimulus, the extent to which loud white noise elicits a 
response similar to a fight or flight defensive response is questionable.
However, in line with the increase in blood adrenalin levels associated with a fight or 
flight response, two studies have utilised adrenalin in order to manipulate 
physiological arousal un-associated with the to-be-remembered event (Christianson & 
Mjorndal, 1985; Christianson, Nilsson, Mjorndal, Perris and Tjellden, 1986). 
Christianson & Mjorndal (1985) injected their participants with either adrenalin or 
saline and then presented them with pairs of slides depicting neutral faces, each 
accompanied by 4 verbal descriptors (name, occupation, hobby and a personality 
trait). Participants were asked to recall (exp 1.) or recognise (exp 2.) as many of the 
descriptors they had read aloud during the presentation period as possible. In both 
experiments, although participants injected with adrenalin showed a significantly 
higher heart rate and skin conductance level than those injected with saline, there 
were no differences in memory performance. Although this suggests that increased
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physiological arousal did not serve to enhance memory performance, it would have 
been interesting to consider whether the same results emerged when participants 
memory performance was assessed on the slide contents rather than just the 
descriptors accompanying the slides.
In a further study, Christianson et al. (1986) conducted a slight variation of their 
earlier work. This time, one group of participants were injected with adrenalin and 
shown neutral slides with accompanying verbal descriptors (physiological arousal 
only, as in the earlier study), whilst a second group were injected with saline and 
shown emotional slides (depicting facial injuries) accompanied with verbal 
descriptors (and, therefore, producing the possibility for both physiological and 
psychological arousal in this group). Physiological and sdf-report data showed that 
those injected with adrenalin and those shown the facial injury slides were aroused to 
equivalent levels. Obvious ethical constraints limit the amount of adrenalin that can 
be administered, however, and the subsequent heart rates exhibited by the participants 
were relatively low, a maximum of 91 beats per minute in those given adrenalin 
compared to a maximum of 80 beats per minute in those given saline and presented 
with emotional slides. In addition, heart rates were calculated as the highest value 
reached in each period rather than an average value across each period. Taking this 
into account, when recall memory for verbal descriptors was tested, those shown the 
facial injury slides performed below those injected with adrenalin and shown neutral 
slides. Hence, there was a difference between the two groups even though they were 
not differentially physiologically aroused.
Whilst it appears that memory is poorer for the facial injury slides, however, it is in 
fact poorer for the accompanying verbal descriptors. It is not known whether 
differences would have emerged if memory for the slides had been tested. 
Furthermore, it is quite possible that the poorer performance for those shown the 
facial injury slides was because they spent more time looking at the facial injuries, 
which were probably more interesting, than the descriptors on which they were to be
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tested. Those shown neutral slides, in contrast, would not necessarily have been more 
interested in the slides than the accompanying descriptors.
In conclusion, then, although the biochemically based studies by Gold (1986, 1992) 
and others provide support for physiological mechanisms mediating the effects of 
arousal upon memory, much more research is required in order to firmly establish the 
role of such a mechanism, especially in terms of memory for more complex 
information.
4.3 The role of psychological mechanisms
In addition to the experience of physiological arousal, victims and witnesses to crimes 
with direct personal relevance will experience psychologically related arousal, such as 
fear for one’s personal safety (Carson & MacLeod, 1997; MacLeod et al, 1996). The 
cognitive interpretation involved in producing such arousal, may be central to guiding 
attentional and elaborative resources. Before discussing research which has 
investigated this possibility, the main theories of attention and elaboration used in the 
eyewitness literature are briefly described.
4.3.1 Attentional theories
The explanations most widely cited to explain attentional aspects of arousal’s effect 
upon eyewitness memory are the Yerkes-Dodson Inverted-U Hypothesis (Yerkes & 
Dodson, 1908) and the Cue-Utilization Hypothesis (Easterbrook, 1959).
4.3.1.1 Inverted-U Hypothesis (Yerkes & Dodson, 1908)
Yerkes & Dodson (1908) proposed an invertedU function to account for the effects 
of arousal upon performance. They suggested that as level of arousal increases 
performance also increases, but only up to an optimal task dependent level. Once the 
level of arousal goes beyond the optimal level performance starts to decrease. Indeed, 
many eyewitness memory reports have suggested that the effects of emotional arousal
56
upon eyewitness memory follow the Yerkes-Dodson function (see Deffenbacher, 
1983; Loftus, 1979). Nevertheless, despite being widely cited in the eyewitness 
literature, the Yerkes-Dodson law may not be the most appropriate explanation of the 
effects of arousal upon memory. Indeed, its universal nature enables us to use it as an 
explanation at any stage. Hence, it is often used post-hoc to describe almost any 
effects.
4.3.1.2 Cue-Utilization Hypothesis (Easterbrook, 1959)
Easterbrook (1959) proposed in his Cue-Utilization Hypothesis that as arousal 
changes, the range of cues which an individual may utilise also changes. At low 
levels of arousal attention is unfocussed and the range of cues an individual may 
utilise is wide. As arousal increases, however, the range of attentional cues is more 
narrowly focused onto specific task dependent cues. As arousal increases further, the 
attentional focus may be sufficiently reduced resulting in the exclusion of some task 
dependent cues. Hence, in contrast to the biologically based Now print! theory 
(Livingston, 1967), this hypothesis is capacity driven in that it sugg^ts that not all 
details can be captured because of a finite amount of processing resources. This 
hypothesis is frequently used to explain the relationship between arousal and 
performance proposed by Yerkes and Dodson.
4.3.2 Elaborative theories
The most widely cited tlieoretical work relating to elaboration, both within the 
cognitive and eyewitness literature, centres around the seminal paper by Craik & 
Lockhart (1972).
4.3.2.1 Levels o f Processing (Craik & Lockhart, 1972)
Craik & Lockhart (1972) presented a conceptual framework in which they argue that 
the depth, or number of levels, to which stimulus material is processed is a direct 
determinant of how well it is subsequently remembered. Their Levels of Processing 
Theory proposes that stimulus information is processed through a serifâ of stages at
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which different kinds of information are successively extracted from the stimulus.
They propose that physical or sensory information is extracted first and later stages 
are concerned with matching the input with stored information from previous 
experience, i.e., pattern recognition and the attachment of meaning. Further, the level 
or depth of processing received by a stimulus has a substantial effect upon its 
memorability. In addition, they argue that one of the results of this hiei archy of 
processing stages is the memory trace, arising as a result of the perceptual processing. 
Specifically, they suggest that trace persistence is a function of the depth of analysis, 
with deeper levels of analysis being associated with more elaborate, longer lasting 
and stronger traces.
Later work, however, identified that their original approach was over-simplified 
(Craik & Tulving, 1975). Research showed that in addition to the depth of processing, 
elaboration (the amount of processing of a particular kind) is also important (Craik & 
Tulving, 1975). At the time of Craik & Lockhart’s original work (Craik & Lockhart, 
1972), similar theoretical frameworks, based on stages of processing, also existed 
(e.g.. Bower, 1967; Cermak, 1972; Noiman & Rumelhart, 1970; Posner, 1967). 
Despite these, Craik & Lockhart’s framework has become the most widely cited 
theory in this area. Several studies within the cognitive literature have shown support 
for this framework. For example. Bower & Karlin (197^ demonstrated that memory 
for pictures of faces was superior when participants processed the faces in terms of 
likeableness or honesty than when they processed them for gender.
Despite such support, however, there are a number of criticisms of Levels of 
Processing Theory. From the needs of a pure memory perspective, it is difficult to be 
sure exactly what the level of processing actually engaged in is, not least because of 
the methodological lack of an independent measure of processing depth. In addition, 
levels of processing theory ignores the role of the retrieval environment and the 
demands of memory tests. Similarly, as with many other theories from the cognitive 
psychology literature, it seems to describe the process without providing a real
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explanation for what happens. Nevertheless, from an applied perspective, it provides 
a basis for understanding observations concerning the effects of negative emotional 
arousal upon memory and appears to be the most applicable account currently 
available from the cognitive literature.
4.3.3 Empirical investigations o f psychological mechanisms 
Throughout the eyewitness literature, many studies have been conducted to 
investigate attentional and elaborative elements of eyewitness memory.
4.3.3.1 The weapon focus ffect
As mentioned in Chapter Three, the weapon focus effect is a well-documented 
phenomena within the eyewitness literature (see, Kramer et al., 1990; Loftus, Loftus 
& Mezzo, 1987; Maass & Kohnken, 1989). Weapon focus occurs when a weapon 
“appears to capture a good deal of...attention, resulting in, among other things, a 
reduced ability to recall other details from the environment” (Loftus, 1979). 
Specifically, a witness’s attention is concentrated on the barrel of a gun or the blade 
of a knife during a crime, leaving less attention available for viewing other items such 
as the perpetrator’s face. A meta-analysis of the weapon focus effect (Steblay, 1992) 
revealed its significant existence as a documented effect within the research literature.
The first study providing direct empirical support for this was carried out by Loftus, 
Loftus & Mezzo (1987). Participants were shown a series of slides depicting an 
event in a fast-food restaurant. Half of die participants saw a customer point a gun 
at die cashier (arousing condition) whilst the otiier half saw the same customer hand 
the cashier a cheque (neutral condition). After a short retention interval tlie 
participants completed a recognition questionnaire and attempted to identify the 
target customer from a 12 person photo-graphic lineup. There was no significant 
difference between paiticipants in tlie arousing or neutral conditions on the 
recognition questionnaire (which concerned event information such as “what item 
did die person buy?”). However, the participants in the neutral condition were more
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accurate in tlieir identification of the target customer. Hence, participants in the 
arousing condition may have attended to tlie weapon more than tlie target 
customer’s face. This study suggests, therefore, that for violent crimes where a 
weapon is present, participants may process less peripheral information than when 
no weapon is present.
In a slight variation, Maass and Koehnken (1989) also found that participants who 
feared injections demonstrated reduced accuracy for the facial details of an individual 
holding a syringe, suggesting that their fear of injections may have resulted in the 
syringe being a salient object for them relative to those participants who reported not 
fearing injections. Similar results were found in a live-event study by Peters (1988), 
who measured the accuracy of witnesses’ identification of a nurse who had recently 
administered an inoculation to them and a confederate researcher whom participants 
had interacted with shortly after the inoculation. Pulse rate measures showed that 
witnesses were more aroused during the inoculation than afterwards and witnesses 
subsequently accurately identified the researcher significantly more often than they 
did the nurse.
43.3.2 Eye fixation research
Taking the weapon focus effect further, it has been shown that eye-fixations are made 
more frequently and for longer durations on a gun than on a neutral item (Loftus et 
al, 1987). In a follow-up experiment to their main weapon focus study, Loftus et al. 
(1987) found that participants made eye fixations more often and for longer durations 
on a gun pointed at a cashier than a cheque handed to the cashier. On this basis, if 
physiological arousal is not as important as cognitive mechanisms, it was predicted 
that if an unusual item (unaccompanied by physiological arousal) had been pointed at 
the cashier instead of the gun, such as a banana, similar eye fixation patterns would 
have been observed. In support of this, research has demonstrated that objects which 
are incongruous result in earlier, more frequent, and longer eye fixations than more 
probable or congruous objects do. For example, Loftus & Mackworth (1978)
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demonstrated that participants fixated more often and for a longer duration on an 
octopus in a farm scene than they did usual farm animals.
Altliough it has been shown that people fixate more often and for a longer duration 
on emotional and novel information, further support for cognitive based 
mechanisms is provided by research which suggests that increased attention alone 
may not be sufficient to produce memory effects. Reseai'ch suggests that the 
level/extent of information processing may be equally as important. Christianson, 
Loftus, Hoffman and Loftus (1991) discovered that when üiey equated the number 
of eye fixations made upon aspects of a stimulus, memory was still superior for the 
emotional ratlier than neutral aspects suggesting that the extent to which processing 
occurs may also be important. In line with tliis, Chi'istianson and Loftus (1991) 
found tliat participant’s retrospective reports suggested that differential elaboration 
occurred when people viewed emotional, unusual and neutral events. In support of 
this, a comparison of normal participants witii psychopaths revealed that normal 
participants recalled die central details of emotional slides far better than did 
psychopatiis. The rationale for diis finding is that as psychopaths are unable to 
experience or appreciate the emotional information presented to them, they do not 
experience the same narrowing of attention that tends to be demonstrated by normal 
participants (Christianson, Forth, Hare, Strachan, Lidberg & Thor ell, 1996).
4.3.3.3 Unusualness/novelty research
A small number of studies have specifically set out to explore the effects of the 
unusualness or novelty of information on memory. Central amongst these, 
Christianson and Loftus (1991) conducted a series of studies where participants were 
presented with a slide sequence in which the middle slide varied according to three 
different conditions; a neutral condition, in which the middle slide depicted a woman 
riding a bicycle; an emotional condition, in which the middle slide depicted an 
injured woman lying on the ground beside a bicycle, or an unusual condition, in 
which the middle slide depicted a woman carrying a bicycle upside down on her
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shoulder. In terms of the affective quality of the slides, although self-report measures 
revealed that the emotional series of slides were rated as the most unpleasant, no 
objective physiological measures were taken to support this. Nevertheless, in terms of 
recalling the central details of the slides, participant witnesses performed equally well 
in all three conditions, although this was associated with reduced recall of peripheral 
details in both the emotional and unusual conditions. When participant witnesses’ 
memories were tested for only the different middle slide in each sequence, however, 
the unusual group performed poorer on both central and peripheral information in 
comparison to the emotional group who still performed better on central information 
with an associated reduction in recall for the peripheral information.
Christianson and Loftus interpreted these results to suggest that, in contrast to the 
neutral condition, in both the emotional and unusual conditions attention was drawn 
away from the peripheral or background information in the slides to the central 
information. They suggest that for the critical slide, participants in the unusual 
condition were poorer on central details as well as peripheral details because they 
may have spent more time elaborating on the event itself, such as why someone 
would be carrying a bicycle on their shoulder, whereas the emotional group may have 
elaborated more about the actual woman lying injured on the ground raher than the 
event per se. In support of this, reports provided by participants suggested that 
differential elaboration occurred depending on whether they viewed the emotional, 
unusual or neutral slide sequence. In particular, those viewing the unusual condition 
slid^ indicated that, although they were as concerned about the central action of the 
critical slide as the emotional group were, they were less specific concerning 
elaboration about the woman in the slides.
The memory measures utilised in this study were, however, only focused on recall for 
the colour of coat the woman was wearing (classified as a central detail) and the 
colour of a car in the background (classified as a peripheral detail). Hence, this did 
not enable a detailed measure of memory to be made. In addition, it suggests that the
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colour of the woman’s coat was central detail information. Based upon definitions 
used in other studies this would have been termed peripheral information not central 
to the basic story line (e.g., Heuer & Reisberg, 1990).
Furthermore, support for unusual information attracting attention in a similar manner 
to emotional information was also found by Mitchell, Livorsky and Mather (1998). In 
line with a weapon focus style phenomena, they found that participants who watched 
a videotaped scene in which a stick of celery was brandished were actually poorer at 
remembering details of the perpetrator’s appearance than when participants saw a gun 
brandished, thus showing that it is possible to produce a similar ‘weapon focus effect’ 
by using unusual or novel but non-threatening objects.
4.4 Conclusions
Research conducted to date provides some support for the role of physiologically 
driven mechanisms mediating the effects of arousal upon eyewitness memory. 
However, the amount of research conducted in this area is small, and more research 
needs to be conducted in order to firmly establish the existence of such a mechanism 
within the literature, especially in terms of memory for more complex information.
In contrast, there is currently a great deal of support for psychologically driven 
mechanisms mediating the effects of arousal upon memory. The increased support for 
psychological mechanisms could, however, simply be a function of the fact that much 
more research has been conducted in this particular area. Nevertheless, the research 
does suggest that psychological or cognitive processes influence not only the focus or 
direction of attention resources but also the degree of elaborative processing of 
emotional stimuli.
Fundamentally, whilst research findings support both the influence of physiological 
arousal upon human memory and the influence of psychological arousal upon human
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memory, their relative influence or, indeed, whether one influences memory to the 
mutual exclusion of the other has not yet been demonstrated. In reflection of this, 
existing theoretical explanations have selectively concentrated on either physiological 
mechanisms or psychological mechanisms without cognisance to a potential 
relationship between the two. Furthermore, the potential role for other mediating 
factors have been ignored.
4.5 A new theoretical approach to understanding eyewitness performance :
.1.
In light of the discussions above, it is argued that there is a need for a new theoretical 
approach to provide a fresh direction for eyewitness research. For too long the 
Yerkes-Dodson Inverted-U Hypothesis (Yerkes & Dodson, 1908) and Easterbrook’s I
Cue-Utilisation Hypothesis (Easterbrook, 1959) have been relied upon to account :
retrospectively for memory performance under conditions of stress or arousal (see I
also McCloskey & Egeth, 1983b; Naatanen, 1973; Neiss, 1988, 1990). The continued i
use of these explanations offers little advance on our current understanding of the 1
relationship between arousal and memory performance.
!
Based on the existing theoretical mechanisms and associated research discussed in the ■
first half of this chapter, it is argued that there are two key components to an advance j
on the current theoretical approach to understanding eyewitness performance. Firstly, i
instead of treating physiological and psychological arousal as distinct entities, it is |
suggested that they should be viewed as more dynamic or interactive factors, with the I
potential for both to influence memory and perhaps in a joint manner. Second, it is I
suggested that in understanding eyewitness performance account needs to be taken of Iicompensatory mechanisms such as motivation in mediating the effects of arousal 1
upon memory. I
Î
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4,5,1 An integrated approach to physiological andpsychological arousal 
As set out in the first half of this chapter, existing theories utilised within the 
eyewitness literature have tended to be either physiological or psychological in their 
approach to the influence of arousal upon memory. Furthermore, whilst research 
findings support the influence of physiological or biological arousal upon human 
memory (e.g.. Hall et al., 1989; Manning et al., 1990), a large amount of research 
also supports the influence of psychological arousal upon human memory (e.g, 
Christianson et al, 1991; Loftus et al, 1987). However, whether one influences 
memory to the mutual exclusion of the other has not yet been demonstrated.
Logically, it is posited that rather than being mutually exclusive, their influences 
might be inextricably linked and that any theory of the effects of arousal upon 
eyewitness memory should reflect this possibility. Specifically, it is suggested that 
any comprehensive theory of the influence of arousal upon eyewitness performance 
needs to talce a multi-factor dynamic approach rather than a uni-dimensional 
approach.
A similar attempt has been made by Claik & Watson (1991), who proposed a 
Tripartite Model of Anxiety and Depression in an attempt to overcome diagnostic 
nomenclature which represented the two as conceptually and empirically separate. 
Not unlike the influence of physiological and psychological arousal upon memory, 
the relationship between anxiety and depression has been viewed in varying ways, 
including: differing points along the same continuum, alternative manifestations of a 
common underlying diathesis, and as conceptually and empirically distinct 
phenomena (Clark, 1989). As with existing theories attempting to explain the 
effects of arousal upon eyewitness memory, each of tliese views is supported by 
some research. However, despite tlie support for theories postulatmg anxiety and 
depression as conceptually and empirically distinct phenomena, Clark and Watson 
identified increasing support for a more mixed approach to anxiety-depression 
diagnoses. They reviewed existing psychometric data relevant to this issue in order 
to investigate the extent to which empirical research findings support the existence
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of one or more mixed mood disorders. Gradually, it became clear that rather than 
being conceptually and empirically distmct phenomena, the data were best captured 
by a tripartite structure of a general distress factor and specific factors for anxiety 
and depression, respectively. Their tripartite model implies that a complete 
description of the affective domain requires assessing botli the unique and common 
elements of the syndromes: (1) general distress (non-specific component), (2) the 
physiological tension and hyper-arousal of anxiety, and (3) tlie pervasive anhedonia 
of depression. They argued drat jointly these factors provide a more satisfactory 
diagnostic scheme for the anxiety and depressive disorders and suggested tlie need 
for a diagnosis of anxiety-depression as mixed. Furthermore, they also argued tliat 
the tripartite approach helps to explain why the various views of anxiety and 
depression have developed and represents a framework for their integration.
Although this approach is clinical with a particular emphasis on nosology, it is 
suggested that bringing together the elements of physiological arousal, psychological 
arousal and, as will be discussed below, motivation (compensatory mechanisms) in a 
similar tripartite arrangement, offers reasonable theoretical development on the 
existing uni-dimensional explanations of the effects of arousal upon eyewitness 
memory. On this basis, a more complete understanding of the effects of arousal upon 
eyewitness performance requires understanding the following three elements: (1) 
physiological arousal, (2) psychological arousal, and (3) motivation (compensatory 
mechanisms). As with the anxiety-depression model, jointly these factors may 
provide a more satisfactory explanatory scheme for understanding eyewitness 
performance. This proposed tripartite arrangement is not, however, presented as an 
answer to the theoretical problems associated with understanding eyewitness 
performance, but as a potential step forward in this complex area.
4.5.2 The role o f motivation - a ^cognitive-energeticaV approach
To date, the majority of eyewitness studies have neglected to manipulate personal
involvement and have failed, therefore, to consider the role of motivation in
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mediating the effects of arousal upon memory (e.g., Christianson & Loftus, 1991; 
Heuer & Reisberg, 1990). As a result, theoretical explanations of eyewitness 
performance have tended not to take account of this factor. Of the small number of 
studies that have manipulated personal involvement (e.g., Christianson & Hubinette, 
1993; Hosch et al., 1984; Hosch & Cooper, 1982; Yuille & Cutshall, 1986), 
explanations underpinning the findings have relied upon existing theories used to 
account for the findings of the laboratory based studies where witnesses were not 
personally involved. Hence, it is argued that there is a fundamental gap in existing 
theoretical explanations of the effects of arousal upon eyewitness memory. It is 
suggested that this gap may be bridged by the ‘cognitive-energetical’ approach put 
forward by Hockey (1997) combining energetical processes with information 
processing models.
Hockey’s framework attempts to explain and predict human performance under 
conditions of stress and high workload. Although his framework is grounded in 
ergonomics, taking a longer-term approach to the effects of stress on performance at 
work, it is believed that the underlying elements of this model have direct 
implications for our understanding of the relationship between arousal and eyewitness 
performance. In particular, this model takes account of cognitive control and 
regulatory processes which may serve to protect or maintain performance under 
conditions of stress or arousal.
Until now, theoretical explanations of how arousal affects eyewitness performance 
have tended to be encompassed within capacity models that suggest perceptual 
narrowing occurs because of the allocation of limited cognitive resources to the 
essential aspects of the stimulus array (e.g., Easterbrook’s Cue-Utilization 
Hypothesis). This, in turn, leaves less of the finite resources for more peripheral 
aspects of the stimulus array, resulting in poorer performance for peripheral 
information relative to central details. This explanation has been heavily relied upon 
as it provides a logical explanation for much of the laboratory-based eyewitness
67
research, where participants viewing emotional material have tended to demonstrate 
poorer memory for peripheral details in comparison to those viewing non emotional 
material (e.g., Burke et al, 1992; Christianson & Loftus, 1991; Heuer et al, 1997; 
Kebeck & Lohaus, 1986).
In his ‘cognitive-energetical’ framework, however. Hockey states that through an 
active process of cognitive resource management, via mental effort, individuals may 
choose to protect their performance, although this may occur at the expense of 
increased subjective effort, and behavioural and physiological costs. Alternatively, 
performance stability can be achieved by reducing performance goals without an 
increase in costs (or effort).
Underpinning his framework, is the assumption that behaviour is goal-directed. On 
this basis, behaviour is modified by reference to internal standards or goal 
achievement requirements (through negative feedback) so that currently active goals 
can be maintained and purposive behaviour promoted. Any costs associated with goal 
maintenance may be mental effort and high levels of subjective strain, and 
physiological increased levels of sympathetic dominance - further suggesting that in 
order to understand eyewitness performance, physiological and psychological 
elements should not be viewed as having distinct influences. Control is achieved by 
comparing target output values with current activity (Hockey argues that this occurs 
via an action monitor), and changing the output until the discrepancy is removed (or 
kept within acceptable limits).
On the basis of this approach, then, when the goal of personal safety is tlireatened, it 
is suggested that continuous environmental sensory scanning and elaborative 
processing would enable individuals to compare current target output values 
(readiness to maintain personal safety) with current activity (protective, withdrawing, 
or defensive readiness). In other words, make continuous mental assessments of 
whether and to what extent personal safety is still threatened by changing external
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demands, and thus change their behaviour or response until the discrepancy is 
removed (or kept within acceptable limits; Derry berry & Tucker, 1994). Indeed, from 
an evolutionary perspective it is essential to recognise and remember negative 
emotional events in order to ensure appropriate responses in maintaining protective, 
withdrawing, or defensive behaviour in future situations (Christianson & Engelberg, 
1997).
Research has shown that motivation processes may exert considerable influence over 
information processing (Blaney, 1986). In line with this, under circumstances of 
personal threat, not only may witnesses’ attentional breadth be expanded (Eriksen & 
Yeh, 1985), but the degree of elaboration engaged in is likely to be enhanced 
(Christianson etal., 1991; Craik & Lockhart, 1972; 1975) in order to ensure accurate 
and efficient interpretation, monitoring and response (Derryberry & Tucker, 1994). 
Hence, it is suggested that continuous environmental scanning and elaborative 
processing may result in a compensated memory performance and that it is this which 
reflects the discrepancy between the memory performance of witnesses who are not 
personally involved in the target incident and those who are personally involved. In 
line with this. Hockey argues that in real life settings, people are more likely to show 
high levels of motivational control than is typically shown by participants who are 
asked to perform tasks that have no relevance beyond the laboratory (cf. Yuille,
1993). Hence, any decrement in performance is more likely to occur under laboratory 
conditions than in naturalistic settings.
Hence, in real eyewitness situations when a witness is aware that an incident is taking 
place or that they ai e or might become the victim of crime, they may be more 
motivated to try to understand what is going on and, as a result, may better remember 
details of the incident thereby compensating for any detrimental effects of arousal on 
eyewitness performance. Indeed, research with real witnesses suggests that their 
memory is good, even over long periods of time (e.g.,Christianson & Hubinette,
1993; Yuille & Cutshall, 1986, 1989; Fisher, Geiselman & Amador, 1989).
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In contrast to studio of real witnesses, in laboratory based eyewitness studies where 
participants are not personally involved and there are, therefore, no threats to personal 
goals, there is no actual personal cost associated with reducing performance goals. 
Hence, although participants may be aroused and goals (i.e., memory performance) 
may be threatened, these goals may not be sufficiently personal to motivate goal 
maintenance via increased effort. That is, participants may not be motivated to scan, 
monitor and increase elaborative processing of the target stimulus. This may, explain 
why un-involved participants in laboratory based eyewitness studies, who are 
presented with arousing stimuli have, relative to those shown neutral stimuli, tended 
to demonstrate a trade-off for peripherally related details whilst protecting 
performance for centrally related details (Burke et al, 1992; Christianson, 1984; 
Christianson & Loftus, 1987; Christianson & Loftus, 1991; Heuer et al, 1997; 
Kebeck & Lohaus, 1986). It is possible that the trade-off in memory for peripheral 
details may reflect a reduction in performance goals as there is no motivation or 
energising of additional cognitive resources to maintain performance for them.
It is important to clarify, however, that it is not suggested that whenever witnesses are 
personally involved their memory performance will be enhanced or maintained. 
Indeed, Christianson & Engelberg (1997) describe several case studies where 
traumatic memories are inaccessible. Under such conditions of extremely high 
personal threat (e.g., rape or serious assault), it is possible that, from a biological- 
evolutionary perspective, memory for the incident could be detrimental to future goal 
maintenance (i.e., future happiness and ability to cope with normal everyday 
activities). In such circumstances a cost associated with goal maintenance could be 
repression, at least initially, of memory for the critical incident.
Furthermore, where real witnesses remain unaware that an incident is taking place or 
that it only becomes apparent to them after the incident has finished, it might be 
expected tliat their performance would be more like that of a laboratory witness as
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they are not physiologically or psychologically aroused and do not know their 
personal goals are threatened. Indeed, Tollestrup et al., (1994) found that in 
comparison to robbery witnesses, fraud victims were less able to recall details 
regarding the appearance of the perpetrator.
4.5.3 Performance effectiveness versus performance efficiency 
Critically, when participants are personally involved with the to-be-remembered 
event, especially if it threatens personal goals, performance effectiveness may not be 
reduced. However, this is not to say that performance efficiency is unaffected. Hence, 
Hockey states that performance measurement needs to be concerned not only with 
effectiveness but with the efficiency of behaviour (Hockey, 1996).
The importance of this approach is closely linked to Eysenck & Calvo (1992) in their 
Processing Efficiency Theory which centres around the distinction between 
performance effectiveness and performance efficiency and was designed to provide 
an explanation of the effects of state anxiety on performance. Within this theory, it is 
assumed that it is the level of state anxiety, rather than trait anxiety, which is 
generally crucial in determining individual differences in internal processing and 
performance. Further, worry, (e.g. self-pre-occupation, concern of performance) is 
regarded as forming the cognitive component of state anxiety. According to 
processing efficiency theory, worry has two main effects: (1) a reduction in the 
storage and processing capacity of the working memory system available for a 
concurrent task, and (2) an increment in on-task effort and activities designed to 
improve performance. Hence, in line with Hockey’s cognitive-energetical framework, 
processing efficiency theory argues that worry serves a motivational function leading 
to the allocation of additional processing resources (i.e., effort) and the initiation of 
processing activities (e.g., strategies) designed to improve performance. This control 
or self-regulatory system, which is involved in mediating the effects of anxiety on 
performance, is a central element of the processing efficiency theory. As a result, tlie 
theory specifies a critical difference between performance effectiveness and
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performance efficiency. Whilst performance effectiveness equals the quality of 
performance, performance efficiency is the quality of performance divided by effort 
(additional resources allocated). Hence, in line with Hockey, anxiety or worry 
chaiacteristically impairs efficiency more than effectiveness.
In terms of eyewitness memory, then, it is suggested that when participants are 
personally involved widi tlie to-be-remembered event, especially if it threatens 
personal safely goals, performance effectiveness may not be reduced. Performance 
efficiency, on the otlier hand, would be more likely to show a decrement due to tlie 
increased effort utilised to maintain performance effectiveness (or in Hockey’s 
terms, protect personal goals). Hence, if the performance efficiency of witnesses 
could be accurately measured, it is posited that it is here that differences might lie. 
That is, tliere would be no difference in the performance effectiveness of aroused 
versus non-aroused participants, but what may well differ is their performance 
efficiency as the aroused participants may exert more effort in order to maintain 
personal goals.
Perhaps then, a real life victim witness, who uses effort to maintain memory 
performance could be said to have a lower processing efficiency than a non-victim 
witness who does not utilise as much effort to maintain memory performance. Hence, 
although their performance effectiveness does not differ, their performance efficiency 
may. However, from a practical or applied perspective this is not a problem as it is an 
eyewitn^s’s performance effectiveness which is critical to the judicial process rather 
than their performance efficiency.
4.5,4 A ttipartite model o f arousal and eyewitness memory 
In summary, reliance upon uni-dimensional theories to account for the influence of 
arousal upon eyewitness memory offers little advance on current understanding. 
Instead, it is proposed that a more multi-factor dynamic approach needs to be taken 
which encompasses both physiological and psychological effects, as well as
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acknowledging the potential role of compensatory mechanisms associated with 
motivation to protect personal goals.
On this basis, it is suggested that a better understanding of the effects of arousal upon 
eyewitness performance requires understanding the following three elements: (1) 
physiological arousal, (2) psychological arousal, and (3) motivation (compensatory 
mechanisms). It is posited that jointly these factors may provide a more satisfactory 
explanatory scheme for understanding eyewitness performance. As stated earlier, 
however, this proposed tripartite arrangement is not presented as an answer to the 
theoretical problems associated with understanding eyewitness performance, but as a 
potential step forwaid in this complex area.
4.6 Research aims
Based upon existing research and the theoretical mechanisms discussed and proposed 
in this chapter, the aims of the research presented within this thesis were:
1. To investigate the effects of personal involvement and perceived threat upon 
eyewitness memoiy within the laboratoiy.
As highlighted, research to date has neglected to examine the role of personal 
involvement and perceived threat, in mediating the effects of arousal on 
eyewitness performance. Importantly, investigation of these factors may also 
provide an insight into the potential role of motivation or compensatory 
mechanisms. Furthermore, there is a need for caiefully controlled work in 
which evaluating the success of arousal manipulations should no longer have to 
rely upon indiiect or retrospective inferences based on whether a differential 
eyewitness performance has been obtained or not. The results of two studies, 
which sought to address these issues, are reported within Chapter Five.
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2. To investigate the influence of physiological arousal and differential interest 
upon eyewitness memoiy within the laboratory.
Within this chapter it has been highlighted that only a very small amount of 
research has directly investigated the influence of physiological arousal upon 
eyewitness memory. Furthermore, there is a need for research in which memory 
for the target stimulus is assessed rather than associated verbal descriptors. Hence, 
the study presented within Chapter Six was conducted to investigate whether 
physiological arousal has an effect upon eyewitness memory for complex 
information on its own or whether its effects might be mediated by other factors. 
In addition, as laboratory studies investigating memory for emotional information 
have tended to make comparisons between groups experiencing different stimuli 
(emotional and neutral), it is timely to assess whether memory differences 
observed between such groups are actually a function of ar ousal, as has generally 
been interpreted, or whether they may in fact be a function of an inherent 
difference between the two stimuli.
3. To investigate the accuracy of information reported by real victims and 
witnesses.
As revealed in Chapter Three, the few studies that have examined actual 
eyewitness memory, have been only partially successful in achieving a necessary 
balance between external and internal validity. Fundamentally, they have been 
unable to assess eyewitness accuracy, having instead relied upon measures of tlie 
amount of details or the consistency of reporting as indicators of eyewitness 
performance. In order for further progress to be made in Üiis field, information 
concerning the accuracy of real eyewitnesses is required. The study presented 
within Chapter Seven attempts to address this issue.
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Chapter 5
The Role of Personal Involvement and Perceived Threat: 
Laboratory Investigations
5.1 Introduction
The research presented in this chapter, was conducted in order to investigate the 
effects of personal involvement and perceived threat upon eyewitness memory 
within the laboratory. As discussed within Chapter Three, the majority of 
eyewitness research conducted to date has been laboratory based, where visually- 
induced arousal has been studied rather than arousal induced through personal 
involvement (e.g., Christianson & Loftus, 1987; Christianson & Loftus, 1991). 
Whilst such studies suggest that arousal affects attentional and elaborative 
mechanisms resulting in the selective remembering of central details over 
peripheral details (e.g., Christianson & Loftus, 1991; Loftus et al, 1987), the 
extent to which this is the case remains questionable. Although the participants in 
such studies may have experienced a relative degree of empathy or understanding, 
there is no personal involvement when viewing visually-arousing slides or films in 
the sense that the ‘witnesses’ fail to feel personally threatened. This is particularly 
highlighted by the fact that witnesses experiencing visually-induced arousal have 
tended to demonstrate orienting physiological responses (e.g., Christianson, 1984; 
Christianson & Loftus, 1987; Burke et al, 1992) rather than defensive 
physiological responses which are characteristic of emotional incidents having 
some form of personal involvement.
As a result, it is suggested that there may be a marked discrepancy between the 
attentional and elaborative processing engaged in by uninvolved participants when 
simply viewing ‘emotional’ slides, compared with the attentional and elaborative
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processing engaged in by witnesses who find themselves to be personally 
involved. Should this be found to be the case, such a distinction may help to 
explain some of the disparity that currently exists in the eyewitnessing literature 
concerning the effects of arousal on memoiy.
Consequently, this research examines the effects of defensive physiological 
responses, induced through personal involvement and perceived threat, on 
eyewitness performance under conditions in which both objective and subjective 
measures of arousal have been taken to ensure the effectiveness of manipulations. 
In doing so, it is predicted that there will be not only differences in eyewitness 
performance between the threatening and control conditions, but also between 
victims and bystanders within the threatening condition because of the nature of 
the threat manipulation. In particular, it is predicted that relative to bystanders 
within the threatening condition, threatened victims will be concerned with their 
personal safety. As a result, they may be more motivated to try to understand what 
is going on and may, therefore, scan or monitor the situation such that they 
demonstrate enhanced memory for centrally-related details (e.g., the source of the 
personal threat, such as physical actions or verbalisations related to the chances of 
attack), without the associated trade-off for more peripherally-related details (e.g., 
appearance-related details or verbalisations unrelated to the chances of attack) 
typically found within laboratory studies of visually-induced arousal (e.g., Burke 
et al., 1992; Christianson & Loftus, 1987; Christianson & Loftus, 1991).
Fundamentally, in this area of research there is a need for carefully controlled 
work in which evaluating the success of arousal manipulations should no longer 
have to rely upon indirect or retrospective inferences based on whether a 
differential eyewitness peifoimance has been obtained or not. It is hoped that the 
novel methodology presented here will prove an important step in this direction. 
The results of two studies are reported which have sought to address these 
complex issues.
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5.2 Laboratory Study One
5.2.1 Method
5.2.1.1 Participants
A total of 40 male undergraduate students (aged 18-26 years) from the University 
of St. Andrews participated in pairs (20 victim witnesses and 20 bystander 
witnesses). Each participant was remunerated by entry into a prize raffle (1st prize, 
£30.00). All subjects were naive to the true purpose of the study believing it to 
involve only the completion of ‘questionnaires about yourself and ‘abstract 
thinking tasks’. Informed consent, for the disclosed aspects of the study, was 
obtained from each participant prior to the study. Although participants were also 
informed at this point of their ability to terminate the study at any time, whilst still 
being entered for the prize raffle, none did so.
5.2.1.2 Design
A 2 (threatening or control condition) x 2 (victim or bystander witness) between 
participants design was employed.
5.2.1.3 Apparatus
Measurements of heart rate (HR) were recorded continuously during the study as a 
physiological correlate of the emotional arousal experienced by the participants in 
each condition. Measurements were taken using RM-10 ambulatory recording 
units (Parametric Recorders Ltd.). Three Beckman bipolar thoracic skin 
electrodes, containing a 0.05 molar NaCl electrode jelly, were attached (two on the 
anterolateral portion of the ribcage and one on the upper thorax to serve as a 
ground). The recording module used a 2 microamp continuous alternating current 
to measure resistance with recordings taken at a sample rate of 5Hz. The resulting 
raw heart rate data were checked for recording artefacts and averaged over 5 
second periods to produce the final heart rate figures for analysis.
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5,2.1.4 Procedure
The design of this study was submitted to the University of St Andrews School of 
Psychology Ethics Committee for ethical approval prior to its execution. The 
committee ensured that it met with the ethical guidelines laid down by both the 
British Psychological Society and the American Psychological Association. Using 
a deception paradigm, the participants were led to believe that the purpose of the 
study was to investigate the effects of different tests, ‘questionnaires about 
yourself and ‘abstract thinking tasks’, upon heart rate. Participants, who were all 
unfamiliar with one another, were run in pairs. Upon arrival in the laboratory they 
were randomly seated at separate desks situated approximately 1 metre apart. 
Hence, both participants could easily view the whole interaction including both of 
the intruders. The victim’s desk was located immediately in view of the laboratory 
entrance with the bystanders desk (see Figure 1).
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Figure 1: Layout o f the laboratory during Study One.
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From the moment HR recording commenced, the experimenter independently 
timed the study in order to correspond the incident occurrence with the heart rate 
recording. Immediately following the commencement of heart rate recording, 
participants were asked to complete what they believed were the questionnaires 
about themselves. The first test, the Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety Inventory 
(form Y-1), was administered to measure state-arousal (Spielberger, 1983). Next, 
participants were given Raven’s Progressive Matrices as a distracter task during 
which the stimulus interaction occurred. Participants were led to believe that this 
test was the first of the ‘abstract thinking tasks’. Once this test had been 
administered, the experimenter left the room to collect a forgotten test. 
Approximately 5 minutes after the experimenter had left the laboratory the 
stimulus interaction occurred.
The threatening condition interaction commenced with a male confederate 
bursting into the laboratory (see Appendix 1 for full details of the threatening 
condition). As soon as he saw the strategically positioned ‘victim’ he immediately 
accused him of having been seen with his girlfriend. Moments later a second male 
confederate ran into the laboratory and tried to calm down his irate friend. The 
second confederate then grabbed hold of the irate confederate who, resisting his 
friends grip, picked up a wooden ruler from a side table and waved it threateningly 
at the victim. The second confederate increased his attempt to remove his irate 
friend and managed to convince him that they should leave the laboratory. The 
irate confederate was uncooperatively forced out of the laboratory by his friend, 
who subsequently uttered a warning to the victim as they both left and slammed 
the laboratory door shut. In the Control Condition, the first confederate entered the 
laboratory and realized that the experimenter was not there (see Appendix 2 for 
full details of the control condition). The first confederate asked the ‘victim’ if he 
could leave a message. Moments later the second confederate hurried into the 
laboratory to see if his friend had found the experimenter. Upon realising that he 
hadn’t, he urged the first intiuder to hurry as they were late. The first intmder 
wrote a message down, picking up a wooden ruler from the side as he did so. He 
left the message and dropped the ruler on a side table, asking the victim to point it
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out when the experimenter returned. Both intruders thanked the victim for his help 
and left the laboratory, closing the door quietly behind them.
Each interaction lasted approximately 30 seconds and both conditions were 
matched for detail, especially in terms of actions such as the ruler being picked up. 
In addition, during each interaction both confederates directed all their attention 
solely towards the victim. Consequently, the bystander’s presence was ignored in 
order to minimise any threat he might feel. In both conditions the experimenter 
returned to the laboratory approximately two minutes after the confederates had 
left. In line with ethical appropriateness and to enable further memory and affect 
intensity measurement, participants were immediately informed that the 
interaction was staged, physiological recording was stopped, and the heart rate 
belts were removed. Participants were then informed they were required to 
complete four further tests about themselves and the interaction. This testing stage 
commenced with participants completing the Mackay Mood Adjective Checklist 
(Mackay, Cox, Burrows & Lazzerini, 1978) as a retrospective measure of their 
self-reported arousal during the incident. Following this, participants were taken 
individually, one after the other, to separate interview rooms where they verbally 
answered a single free recall question, asking exactly what had happened during 
the incident, followed by a verbal cued recall test consisting of three questions 
prompting for recall of information on; the physical appearance of the intruders, 
verbal aspects of the incident, and the actions of the intruders (see Appendix 3 for 
full details of the recall measure). Participants responses were audio recorded for 
later transcription. Next, participants completed a questionnaire consisting of 34 
forced-choice recognition questions, and 7 further ratings of how they felt during 
the interaction. The forced-choice recognition test was used to assess memory in a 
more fine grained way, less influenced by the patterns of report bias which can 
occur with recall tests (see Appendices 4 and 5 for full details of the recognition 
questionnaires).
Finally, participants were shown two 6-person, simultaneous, photographic 
lineups, one for each intruder. Both target-present and target-absent lineups were
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used and the position of the intruders within the target-present lineups was 
randomised throughout. Each lineup was constructed following the 
recommendations for properly conducted sequential lineups (Koehnken, Malpass 
and Wogalter, 1996; Lindsay, Lea and Fulford, 1991; Wells, Seelau, Rydell and 
Luss, 1994; Wells, Small, Penrod, Malpass, Fulero, Brimacombe, 1998). On the 
basis of these recommendations, head and shoulder photographs of both intruders 
were shown simultaneously for a 30-second period to five pilot participants. To 
prevent the pilot participants consciously trying to remember the individuals 
shown, they were instructed to “consider what type of person you think each 
individual appears to be, for example do they look friendly, approachable etc.?” 
After the viewing period, the pilot participants were instructed to spend 
approximately 3 minutes writing down what type of person they considered each 
individual to be before finally being asked to recall what the individuals looked 
like and give a written description. From the descriptions given an overall 
composite description was made for each intruder and a lineup constiucted based 
upon that composite. On this basis, each member of the lineup matched the overall 
description given by the five pilot participants for the target intruder for that 
lineup. To ensure the fairness of the lineup, each was shown to a further five pilot 
participants to whom the overall composite description was read. These 
participants were instructed to pick the individual from the lineup that matched the 
composite description. Unfortunately, although a Chi-square test would have been 
an appropriate test to analyse this data, the sample size used to pilot the lineups 
was in fact too small to be reliable. In particular, more than twenty percent of the 
cells within the contingency table have an expected frequency of less than five 
(Dowdy & Wearden, 1991; Howell, 1992). Despite this, for the five pilot 
participants the real intruder was picked no more frequently than the other males 
pictured.
After completion of all experimental tests, participants were thoroughly debriefed 
and informed about the importance of not divulging to anyone what they had been 
asked to do as it could compromise the purpose of the study. Participants were also 
infoimed that if they wished to come back at any point to discuss any aspect of the
8 1
study that worried them they were free to do so. None of the participants 
complained about treatment received during or after the study and no-one returned 
after the study.
5.2,1.5 Recall scoring procedure
The method of scoring employed for the cued and free recall statements is based 
upon the widely used Statement Analysis Procedure described by Yuille &
Cutshall (1986). This method was utilised because it enables statements to be 
analysed in a precise and consistent manner. In particular, once a coder has had 
sufficient training in the procedures the process proves highly reliable. Rigorous 
testing and assessment of this method revealed that separate coders demonstrate 
less than 5% variance in coding (Yuille & Cutshall, 1986; Yuille & Cutshall,
1988; Yuille & McEwan, 1985). Each recall interview was audio-taped, 
transcribed and edited. Editing involved the removal of hesitancies and repetitions 
from each statement. In particular, any details reported during the cued recall 
which had already been reported during the free recall were removed leaving only 
additional new details in the cued recall. Hence, the free and cued recall together 
represented a witness’s total recall absent of any repetition. Following editing, 
each free and cued recall statement was parsed into separate sentences and scored 
according to the statement analysis procedure described by Yuille & Cutshall 
(1986). This method assigns 1 point to every specific item of information. For 
example, the statement “he picked up the ruler and threw it” contains three 
separate items of information; “picked up”, “the ruler” and “threw it”. Similarly, 
the statement “he shouted something about seeing me with his girlfriend down 
Market Street yesterday” would score 5 points - one point for describing ‘seeing 
me with’, and one point each for ‘girlfriend’, ‘Market’, ‘Street’ and ‘yesterday’. 
Although one whole point was assigned for each item reported, in teims of the 
accuracy of details, if an item was vague only half a point was assigned. Using this 
method, each witness statement was classified into one of four categories: (i) 
accurate, (ii) inaccurate, (iii) confabulated, and (iv) unclassifiable (i.e., any 
unknown details, such as a witness’s reply to an intruder) and by grouping all four 
categories together it was possible to calculate a witness’s total recall performance.
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Unclassifiable details were not included in any analyses. In addition, each 
statement was scored in this manner according to four types of information: (a) 
action descriptions, (b) appearance descriptions and, (c) verbal descriptions. In line 
with Yuille & Cutshall (1986), estimates of confidence, i.e., “I think” or “he might 
have” were not weighted. In addition, each incident was classified in terms of the 
number of details that it contained, thus enabling analysis concerning the 
percentage of the available details recalled rather than the actual number. This was 
calculated on the basis that for intruder one there were a larger number of 
available details that could potentially be reported as he was the primary figure 
within the incident, hence there would be a higher probability of recalling a greater 
number of details for intruder 1 than intruder 2. Calculating the percentage of 
available details recalled allows a more valid investigation concerning whether 
intiuder 1 may have been more memorable, salient or attention catching than 
intruder 2. In addition, it allows the existence of possible floor or ceiling effects to 
be observed. Similarly, although the incidents were matched as far as possible, 
there were slightly more details relating to the control incident than the threatening 
incident. Consequently, this method of analysis also ensures valid comparison 
across the incidents.
5.2 h  6 Manipulation checks
Figure 2 shows the mean baseline heart rate (averaged over 2 minutes immediately 
preceding the incident) and the progression of mean heart rates during and 
immediately following the incident (both 30 second periods). Unfortunately, heart 
rate data was lost for both victims and bystanders in 3 of the 10 threatening 
sessions, leaving data available for 7 of the sessions. All physiological data for the 
control sessions was available.
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Figure 2: Mean heart rate progression during and after the incident.
Analysis of covariance, with baseline as the covariate, revealed that witnesses in 
the threatening condition were significantly more aroused than those in the control 
condition both during the incident (F(l,29) = 19.67, p < 0.001), and after the 
incident (F(l,29) = 14.77, p < 0.005; all statistical output for this study is shown in 
Appendix 9). Victims in the threatening condition, however, were not significantly 
more aroused, during or after the incident, than bystanders in the same condition 
Similarly, there were no significant differences between victims and bystanders 
within the control condition.
In terms of self-reported arousal, an ANOVA revealed, as expected, no differences 
in state arousal (STAI, form Y-1) between any of the witness groups before the 
incident occurred (see Table 1). Further, in line with the physiological results 
threatened witnesses’ ratings on the MacKay Mood Adjective Checklist revealed 
that they rated themselves as being more stressed (F(l,36) = 39.28, p < 0.001) and 
more aroused (F(l,36) = 8.36, p < 0.01) than control witnesses during the incident 
Again, there were no differences between victims and bystanders within the
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threatening condition or between victims and bystanders within the control 
condition (see Table 1).
State Arousal 
(STAI, Y-1)
Arousal During 
(Mackay 
Arousal Scale)
Stress During 
(Mackay 
Stress Scale)
Threat Victims 37.20 (7.27) 4.90(1.10) 4.80 (1.93)
Threat Bystanders 38.30(10.78) 5.20(1.14) 5.10(1.60)
Threat Total 37.75 (8.97) 5.05 (1.10) 4.95 (1.73)
Control Victims 35.90(3.48) 2.80 (2.25) 2.10(2.38)
Control Bystanders 38.20(8.66) 4.40(1.58) 0.70 (0.95)
Control Total 37.05 (6.53) 3.60 (2.06) 1.40(1.90)
Table 1: Mean (SD) STAI and Mackay Mood Adjective Checklist scores.
Mean ratings of participant’s emotional responses, from the seven 6-point self- 
rating scales at the end of the recognition questionnaire, are summarised in Table 
2. ANOVAs carried out on these rating data revealed that, in line with the 
physiological results, threatened witnesses rated themselves as; more threatened 
during the incident (F(l,36) = 38.00, p < 0.001); more threatened immediately 
following the incident (F(l,36) = 17.15, p < 0.001); more likely to be attacked 
during the incident (F(l,36) = 25.33, p < 0.001); more angry during the incident 
(F(l,36) = 7.05, p < 0.05); more afraid during the incident (F(l,36) = 34.65, p < 
0.001); and more afraid immediately following the incident (F(l,36) = 9.88, p < 
0.005) than were witnesses in the control condition. The only scale on which the 
threatened witnesses did not rate themselves more highly was the extent to which 
they felt angry immediately following.
Despite no difference between threatened victims and bystanders in terms of 
physiological arousal, one interaction was evident (F(l,36) = 5.10, p < 0.05, see 
Figure 3). A post-hoc Tukey test revealed that threatened victims rated themselves 
as feeling more threatened immediately following the incident than were 
bystanders in the same condition (p < 0.05).
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Tlireat
during
Threat
following
Chance 
of attack 
during
Angry
during
Angry
following
Afraid
during
Afraid
following
Tlireat 3.70 2.70 2.70 2.40 1.80 2.50 2.00
Victims (1.06) (1.42) (1.25) (1.35) (1.14) (1.18) (1.25)
Threat 2.80 1.60 2.10 2.20 1.90 2.70 1.50
Bystanders (1.40) (0.84) (1.10) (1.14) (1.29) (1.25) (0.85)
Tlireat 3.25 2.15 2.40 2.30 1.85 2.60 1.75
Total (1.29) (1.27) (1.19) (1.22) (1.18) (1.19) (1.07)
Control 1.30 1.00 1.10 1.90 1.50 1.00 1.00
Victims (0.67) (0.00) (0.32) (0.99) (0.71) (0.00) (0.00)
Control 1.40 1.10 1.00 1.00 1.10 1.00 1.00
Bystanders (0.52) (0.32) (0.00) (0.00) (0.32) (0.00) (0.00)
Control 1.35 1.05 1.05 1.45 1.30 1.00 1.00
Total (0.59) (0.22) (0.22) (0.83) (0.57) (0.00) (0.00)
(SD) ratings o f emotional responses (6-point scale: 1 =  not at a ll/
6 =  extremely).
I
1 0.5
Tlireal Control
•Victim
- .Bystander
Incident
Figure 3: Mean rated threat immediately following the incident as a function of 
incident and witness type.
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It is important to recognise, however, that individual differences may have played 
a significant part in the effect the manipulation had upon the participants. 
Therefore, in addition to making comparisons across the treatment groups, within 
the threat group {n = 14) the way in which physiological and psychological arousal 
interacted was investigated by correlating physiological arousal with perceived 
threat during the incident and also with the extent to which participants perceived 
they would be attacked during the incident. Thus, enabling consideration of 
arousal on a continuum rather than in discrete groups. Standardized residual values 
of the heart rate data were used for the correlations in order to account for baseline 
variation of participants’ resting heart rate levels. These Spearman correlations 
were not, however, significant.
5.2.2 Results
5.2,2,1 Percentage o f available details recalled
From Table 3 it can be seen that there were no differences between the witness 
groups in terms of the percentage of available details recalled for free recall, cued 
recall or, therefore, recall in total.
Free Recall Cued Recall Total Recall
Threat Victims 
Threat Bystanders
12.45 (4.33) 
11.22(6.57)
10.32(3.84)
8.72(3.39)
22.77 (6.46) 
19.95 (8.19)
Threat Total 11.83 (5.45) 9.52 (3.62) 21.36(7.32)
Control Victims 
Control Bystanders
10.89(3.48) 
11.31 (5.08)
6.39 (3.87) 
8,12(3.68)
17.28(6.10) 
19.42 (6.89)
Control Total 11.10(4.24) 7.25 (3.78) 18.35 (6,43)
Table 3: Mean (SD) percentage o f available details recalled.
In order to investigate whether threatened witnesses might recall a greater 
percentage of available details relating to the threatening or arousing aspects of the 
incident, however, the details were classified according to whether they were 
centrally or peripherally related. This classification was made in line with
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définitions employed in existing studies (Burke et al., 1992; Christianson & 
Loftus, 1991; Heuer & Reisberg, 1990). On this basis, central details comprised 
information required to make sense of the situation (i.e., threatening actions) 
whereas peripheral information was irrelevant to making sense of the situation 
(i.e., clothing colour). ANOVAs conducted on the data classified in this manner, 
however, revealed no differences between the witness groups.
Further, as the incidents in this study involved two intruders, it was chosen to 
consider whether a higher percentage of available details were reported for 
intruder 1 in comparison to intruder 2, particularly as intruder 1 was the main 
aggressor in the threatening condition. For both free recall and total recall 
ANOVA’s revealed an interaction of incident by information type (whether the 
information pertained to intruder 1 or to intmder 2) (F(l,36) = 4.85, p < 0.05, and 
F(l,36) = 4.48, p < 0.05, respectively), see Figures 4 and 5. However, post-hoc 
tests revealed no significant differences between the threat and control groups for 
either interaction (see Table 4).
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Figure 4: Mean percentage o f available details free recalled, as a function o f 
information and incident type.
3 5
g  3 0 -
ja 25 -
- o  It-| 1  20 " 
(2 19 15 -
10 .bû
Litiuder 1 Intruder 2
I— Threat 
I.. .  Control
hilbnnation
Figure 5: Mean percentage o f available details recalled in total as a junction of 
information and incident type.
Free Recall Total Recall
Intruder 1 Intruder 2 Intruder 1 Intruder 2
Threat 13.79
(7.00)
10.00 
(4 85)
23.57
(9.39)
17.17
(6.95)
Control 14.54
(5.28)
7.47 
(4 45)
23.16 
(7 71)
13.28
(6.00)
Table 4: Mean (SD) percentage o f available intruder 1 and intruder 2 details 
recalled.
A third classification method was employed specifically to investigate whether 
threatened witnesses may recall more action, verbal or appearance related details 
in comparison to control witnesses. ANOVAs revealed an interaction of incident 
by information type (action, verbal or appearance detail) for free recall (F(2,72) = 
4.07, p < 0.05; see Figure 6) and total recall (F(2,72) = 9.07, p < 0.001; see Figure 
7). Post-hoc Tukeys tests revealed that in terms of total recall witnesses within the 
threat group reported a significantly higher percentage of available action details 
than did witnesses within the control group, p < 0.005 (see Table 5). For free 
recall, however, no differences between the incidents emerged.
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Figure 6: Mean percentage o f available details free recalled as a function o f 
information and. incident type.
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Figure 7; Mean percentage o f available details recalled in total as a function of
information and incident type.
Action Verbal Appearance
Free Recall Threat
Control
20.48 (11.51) 
15.16(5.69)
11.67 (6.25) 
16.95 (10.54)
6.82 (7.99) 
5.51 (7.24)
Total Recall Threat
Control
30.10(13.03) 
18.71 (5.67)
19.38 (6.20)
22.20 (11.30)
17.27 (8.93) 
16.31 (8.69)
Table 5: Mean (SD) percentage o f available action, verbal and appearance details 
recalled.
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To further analyse whether physiological arousal may have had an impact on the 
percentage of available details reported, Pearson Product-Moment correlations 
were conducted across the 14 threat group witnesses for whom physiological data 
was available. Once again, to take account of baseline heart rate levels 
standardized residual values were used. The results suggest that as physiological 
arousal during the incident rose so did: free recall overall (r = ,620, p < 0.05); free 
recall pertaining to intruder 1 (r = .670, p < 0.05); free recall pertaining to intruder 
2 (r = .582, p < 0.05); total recall overall (r = .700, p < 0.01); total recall 
pertaining to central details (r = .579, p < 0.05); total recall pertaining to 
peripheral details (r = .701, p < 0.01); total recall pertaining to intruder 1 (r = .649, 
p < 0.05); total recall pertaining to intruder 2 (r = .655, p < 0.05); total recall 
pertaining to action details (r=  .572, p < 0.05); and total recall pertaining to 
appearance details (r = .642, p < 0.05). However, inspection of the scatterplots for 
these correlations (see Appendix 9), suggests that virtually all of them may not be 
terribly robust. Application of Ans combe's (Anscombe, 1973) useful mle for 
deciding whether there really is a robust relationship between two variables (i.e., if 
removal of a few observations at random does not alter the shape of the scatterplot 
then there is probably a real relationship), suggests that with the exception of the 
positive correlation between heart rate during the incident and the percentage of 
available peripheral details recalled, the other correlations may be misleading.
Pearson correlations of the percentage of available details reported with residual 
values of heart rate after the incident were not significant. Similarly, Spearman 
correlations (across all 20 threat group witnesses) of perceived threat and 
perceived likelihood of attack during the incident with percentage of available 
details recalled were also not significant.
5.2.2.2 Accuracy o f recall
Accuracy scores were calculated as the percentage of details recalled that were 
correct. Table 6 shows the overall accuracy scores for free recall, cued recall and 
total recall. ANOVA on this data revealed no significant differences.
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Free Recall Cued Recall Total Recall
Threat Victims 
Threat Bystanders
89.21 (8.65) 
88.00(13.48)
75.84(12.16)
74.59(14.84)
82.92 (5.64) 
80.11 (9.99)
Threat Total 88.60 (11.04) 75.22 (13.22) 81.52(8.03)
Control Victims 
Control Bystanders
91.31 (9.00) 
88.15(6.09)
70.34 (19.68) 
69.15(21.19)
82.87 (6.50) 
78.12(9.98)
Control Total 89.73 (7.65) 69.74 (19.92) 80.50 (8,55) 
...  ......Table 6: Mean (SD) percentage free, cued and total recall accuracy.
As with the amount of information recalled, the details reported were classified 
according to three criteria. Firstly, when the data were classified as central or 
peripheral an interaction of incident with information type (F(l,24) = 5.16, p < 
0.05) was obtained for free recall accuracy (see Figure 8). Post-hoc Tukey tests 
revealed that threatened witnesses just missed being significantly lower in 
accuracy for peripheral details than were control witnesses (p = 0.051; see Table 
7).
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Figure 8: Mean percentage free recall accuracy as a function o f information and 
incident type.
When the details were classified according to which intruder they referred to (see 
Table 8), interactions between incident and information type were present for cued 
recall accuracy (F(l,34) = 6.22, p < 0.05; see Figure 9) and total recall accuracy 
(F(l,36) = 7.28, p < 0.05; see Figure 10). Despite these interactions, however,
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post-hoc Tukey tests did not reveal any significant differences between incidents 
or witnesses for either interaction.
Central Peripheral
Threat 96.65 (5.51) 65.91 (16.54)
Control 94.55 (6.45) 77.44(16.75)
Table 7: Mean (SD) percentage free recall accuracy for central and peripheral 
details.
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Figure 9: Mean percentage cued, recall accuracy as a function o f information and 
incident type.
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Figure 10: Mean percentage total recall accuracy as a function o f information and 
incident type.
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Cued Recall Total Recall
Intruder 1 Intruder 2 Intmder 1 Intmder 2
Threat 7Z82
(15.39)
77.72
(16.10)
80.92
(7.49)
82.87
(11.92)
Control 73.18
(19.02)
62.19
(29.97)
83.87
(8.64)
74.77
(14.84)
Table 8: Mean (SD) percentage cued and total recall accuracy for intruder I and 
intruder 2 details.
Finally, when the data were classified according to whether they related to action, 
verbal or appearance details, an interaction between incident and information type 
was obtained for free recall accuracy (F(2,38) = 3.72, p < 0.05; see Figure 11). 
Once again, however, post-hoc Tukey tests revealed no significant differences 
between the incidents (see Table 9).
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Figure 11: Mean percentage free recall accuracy as a function o f information and 
incident type.
Action Verbal Appearance
Threat
Control
99.20 (3.58) 
97.83 (5.44)
91.24(13.01) 
87.07 (12.79)
63.50 (17.88) 
75.80 (16.27)
Table 9: Mean (SD) percentage free recall accuracy for action, verbal and 
appearance details.
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Similarly, although a three-way interaction of incident by witness by information 
type was also obtained for total recall accuracy (F(2,70) = 3.46, p < 0.05; see 
Figure 12), post-hoc tests did not reveal any significant differences between the 
witness groups (see Table 10).
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Figure 12: Mean percentage total recall accuracy as a junction o f information, 
incident and witness type.
Action Verbal Appearance
Threat Victims 
Threat Bystanders
96.03 (6.53) 
98.22(3.21)
86.44 (13.70) 
92.71(11.25)
67.02 (8.36) 
54.69 (16.99)
Total 97.12(5.13) 89.58 (12.62) 61.18(14.25)
Control Victims 
Control Bystanders
98.09 (4.03) 
99.00(3.16)
85.50 (9.39) 
77.34(12.95)
60.84(16.54)
64.99(26.71)
Total 98.55 (3.56) 81.42(11.78) 62.91 (21.72)
Table 10: Mean (SD) percentage total recall accuracy for action, verbal and 
appearance details.
To further analyse whether physiological arousal may have had an impact on recall 
accuracy, Pearson Product-Moment correlations were conducted across the 14 
threat group witnesses. Once again, to take account of baseline heart rate levels 
standardized residual values of the heart rate data were used in the correlations. 
Although the results suggest that as physiological arousal during the incident rose
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the accuracy of action details free recalled drops (r = -.539, p < 0.05), inspection 
of the associated scatterplot (see, Appendix 9) suggests that this is not the case. 
Specifically, only 1 of the 14 threat group witnesses for whom physiological data 
were available was less than 100% accurate for the action details they free 
recalled. Pearson correlations of recall accuracy with residual values of heart rate 
after the incident were also not significant.
Spearman correlations (again across the threat group witnesses) of perceived threat 
and perceived likelihood of attack during the incident with recall accuracy 
suggested that as rated threat during the incident rose so too did the accuracy of 
appearance details cue recalled (/? = 18; r = .540, p < 0.05). In addition, as rated 
perceived chance of attack during the incident rose the accuracy of verbal details 
recalled in total decreased {n = 20; r = -.475, p < 0.05). Once again, however, 
inspection of the scatterplots for these relationships (see Appendix 9) suggests that 
they are not representative of real relationships.
5,2,2.3 Recognition accuracy
The recognition questionnaires for both the threatening and control conditions 
consisted of two-alternative (2AFC) and four-alternative (4AFC) forced choice 
questions. For obvious reasons regarding differences in the probability of guessing 
correctly for these two sets of questions, they were analysed separately. In 
addition, recognition accuracy was calculated as a percentage due to differing 
numbers of question types set between the questionnaires for the threatening 
condition and the control condition. The threatening condition questionnaire 
contained a total of 34 questions (eleven 2AFC and twenty-three 4AFC), whilst 
the control condition questionnaire contained a total of 32 questions (eleven 2AFC 
and twenty-one 4AFC).
Firstly, ANOVA revealed that witnesses within the threatening condition were 
significantly more accurate for 2AFC questions in total than were witnesses within 
the control condition, F(l,36) = 7.07, p < 0.05 (see Table 11). There were.
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however, no significant differences between the groups in terms of accuracy for 
4AFC questions overall.
Using the same criteria as for the recall data, the questions were grouped according 
to whether they concerned central or peripheral detail information (see Table 11). 
In terms of 2AFC questions, an interaction of incident with information type was 
obtained (F(l,36) = 9.19, p < 0.005; see Figure 13). Post-hoc Tukey tests revealed 
that the threat group were higher in accuracy for central detail questions than were 
the control group, p < 0.001. For 4AFC questions a three-way interaction of 
incident by witness by information type just reached significance (F(l,36) = 4.12, 
p = 0.05; see Figure 14). However, post-hoc Tukeys tests revealed no significant 
differences between the witness groups.
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Figure 13: Mean percentage 2AFC recognition accuracy as a function of 
information and incident type.
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Figure 14: Mean percentage 4AFC recognition accuracy as a function o f 
information, incident and witness type.
e
Central
2AFC
Peripheral Total Central
4AFC
Peripheral Total
Threat 96.67 80.00 84.55 54.00 32.77 37.39
Victim (10.54) (8.74) (6.14) (23.19) (6 65) (7.16)
Threat 90.00 75.00 79.09 50.00 3036 34.78
Bystander (16.10) (833) (8.62) (17.00) (14.64) (12.47)
Threat 93.33 77.50 81.82 52.00 3T67 36.09
Total (13.68) (8.70) (7.80) (19.89) (11.13) (9 98)
Control 63.33 73.75 70.91 46.67 37.78 39.05
Victim (24.60) (17.13) (14.08) (23.31) (14.54) (15.02)
Control 76.67 75.00 75.46 6&67 31.11 3639
# Bystander (22.50) (8 33) (10.54) (22.22) (7.03) (5.60)
Control 70.00 7438 73.18 5&67 34.45 3T62
Total (23.94) (13.13) (12.32) (24.43) (11.63) (11.13)
Table 11: Mean (SD) percentage recognition accuracy for central detail, 
peripheral detail and total questions.
Classification of the questions according to which intruder they referred was also 
made but again revealed no significant differences between the witness groups. 
Finally, analysis of data classified according to action, verbal or appearance 
questions was not conducted on 2AFC questions because the absence of verbally
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related 2AFC questions meant that the resulting groups were identical to those of 
the central and peripheral classification. Specifically, all of the action questions 
pertained to central aspects of the incidents and all of the appearance questions 
pertained to peripheral details. Hence, the results of analysis on the data classified 
in this manner would be identical to that shown above for the central and 
peripheral detail classification. Thus, the threat group would be higher in accuracy 
for action details than the control group (p < 0.001). For 4AFC questions, 
however, the classification was made and revealed a three-way interaction of 
incident by witness by information types (action, verbal or appearance details), F 
(2,72) = 3.29, p < 0.05; see Figure 15. Post-hoc Tukey tests, however, revealed no 
significant differences between the witness groups (see Table 12).
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Figure 15: Mean percentage 4AFC recognition accuracy as a junction of 
information, incident and witness type.
As with recall performance, to further analyse whether physiological arousal 
during or after the incident may have had an impact on recognition accuracy, 
Pearson Product-Moment correlations were conducted across the 14 threatening 
condition witnesses for whom physiological data was available. Once again, to 
take account of baseline heart rate levels standardized residual values of the heart 
rate data were used in the correlations. Pearson correlations of accuracy for 2AFC 
questions and the residual values of heart rate both during and after the incident 
were not significant. Interestingly, however, for 4AFC questions significant 
correlation co-efficients were obtained suggesting that as physiological arousal
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during the incident rose, accuracy declined for 4AFC questions; overall (r = -.588, 
p < 0.05); pertaining to peripheral details (r = -.783, p < 0.005), pertaining to 
intruder 2 (r = -.855, p < 0.001), and pertaining to appearance related details (r = - 
.562, p < 0.05). In direct contrast, however, as physiological arousal after the 
incident rose accuracy for 4AFC questions pertaining to central details also rose (r 
= .563, p < 0.05). Once again, however, inspection of the scatterplots for all of 
these correlations (see. Appendix 9) suggests that they do not represent real 
relationships. Further, Spearman correlations (across all 20 threat group witnesses) 
of perceived threat and perceived likelihood of attack during the incident with 
recognition accuracy for both 2AFC and 4AFC questions were not significant.
2AFC 
Action Appearance Action
4AFC
Verbal Appearance
Threat 96.67 80.00 90.00 41.67 53.75
Victims (10.54) (8.74) (21.08) (21.15) (11.86)
Threat 90.00 75.00 60.00 3&33 56.25
Bystanders (16.10) (8 33) (45.95) (15.81) (23.75)
Threat 93.33 77.50 75.00 40.00 55.00
Total (13.68) (8.70) (38.04) (18.26) (18.32)
Control 6T33 73.75 60.00 25.00 40.00
Victims (24.60) (17.13) (31.62) (20.41) (15.07)
Control 76.67 75.00 75.00 27.50 3T33
Bystanders (22.50) (8 33) (35.36) (24.86) (8.89)
Control 70.00 7438 67.50 2&25 3&67
Total (23.94) (13.13) (33.54) (22.18) (12.52)
Table 12: Mean (SD) percentage recognition accuracy for action, verbal and 
appearance detail questions.
5.2.2.4 Identification
Witnesses’ identification decisions for the lineups were classified as being either 
correct or incorrect (see Table 13). A correct decision was either an accurate 
identification from a target present lineup or a correct rejection from a target
100
absent lineup. Consequently, an incorrect decision was a false alarm from either a 
target present or absent lineup, or an incorrect rejection from a target present 
lineup.
In terms of lineup 1 (Intmder 1), the contingency table for incident by witness by 
decision type analysis contains more than 20% of cells with expected cell 
frequencies of less than 5 and is, therefore, too small for reliable analysis to be 
carried out (see Appendix 9). When the data are collapsed across witness type, 
however, it is acceptable to make comparisons. A two-way test of association 
was conducted but did not reveal a significant relationship between incident type 
and decision type.
For lineup 2 (Intmder 2), cell sizes were also too small to conduct further reliable 
analysis across incident, witness and decision types. As can be seen from Table 13, 
when the data are collapsed across witness type it is revealed that across both 
incidents equal numbers of correct and incorrect decision types were made.
Lineup 1 
Correct Incorrect
Lineup 2 
Conect Incorrect
Threat Victims 
Threat Bystanders
7 3 4 6
3 7 5 5
Threat Total 10 10 9 11
Control Victims 
Control Bystanders
5 5 5 5
7 3 4 6
Control Total 12 8 9 11
Table 13: Number o f correct and incorrect identification decisions.
Finally, Point-biserial correlations were conducted across the threatening condition 
witnesses. However, no significant correlation coefficients were revealed when 
heart rate during and after the incident (standardized residual values of the heart 
rate data in order to take account of baseline heart rate values), as well as
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perceived threat or perceived chance of attack were correlated with identification 
decision.
5.2.3 Discussion Study One
Firstly, despite setting up a successful threatening manipulation in this study (i.e., 
a significant difference in physiological arousal between the threatening and 
control conditions both during and after the incident), the use of objective 
manipulation checks showed that a difference in physiological arousal between 
threatened victims and bystanders within the same condition was not successfully 
manipulated during or immediately after the incident. Fundamentally, however, 
unlike all of the previous studies that have attempted to set up similar paradigms 
(e.g., Hosch & Cooper, 1982; Hosch et al., 1984), the use of objective 
manipulation checks enabled clear recognition that this difference was not 
achieved.
As the manipulated threat was clearly directed towards the victim rather than the 
bystander of each pair, it is interesting to consider why the expected difference in 
physiological arousal did not occur. A possible explanation concerns the room in 
which the incidents took place. The laboratory was particularly small and 
consequently bystanders were very close to the incident and may have perceived 
themselves as being in the way. For example, if some form of physical action had 
occurred they would at least have had to move out of the way to avoid physical 
contact and the possibility of being hurt. In addition, the bystander was the only 
other ‘neutral’ individual in the room at the time of the incident. Consequently, 
there may have been an implicit obligation upon them to intervene and try to 
placate the situation if necessary. Indeed, during the debriefing sessions many of 
the bystanders within the threatening condition reported feeling in the midst of it 
all and thinking that they might have to get involved if things escalated out of 
hand. The obligation to intervene in combination with the possibility of being hurt, 
may have caused the bystanders’ arousal to be elevated to a level similar to the 
victims’. Thus, it would seem that, as with the threatened victims, bystanders in
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the same condition may also have experienced a form of personal involvement and 
associated perceived threat during the incident, albeit for different reasons. In line 
with this, there were no differences between the threatened victims and bystanders 
in terms of botli rated threat and perceived chance of attack during the incident.
Interestingly, although there were no differences in physiological arousal, 
threatened victims did report being significantly more threatened immediately 
following the incident than did bystanders in the same condition. Furthermore, j
physiological arousal and the various measures of self-reported psychological J
arousal were not correlated. This is not necessarily as expected as one might |
Ipredict that witnesses perceiving themselves as more threatened, or more likely to j
\be attacked, would also be higher in physiological arousal as a result of the j
associated innate fight or flight response. However, whilst this suggests that I
physiological and psychological arousal differ (i.e., as rated threat or perceived I
chance of attack increased it was not associated with an increase in physiological 
arousal), self-ratings based on Likert-type scales are not necessarily as reliable or 
valid as they are often interpreted to be, especially when used with small sample 
sizes (Wright, Gaskell & O'Muircheartaigh 1997). Unfortunately, measurement of 
psychological affect is reliant upon such introspective self-reports and it is possible 
that the sample size utilised within this study (« = 14, as physiological data was 
only available from 14 threat group witnesses) was not large enough to allow such 
relationships to manifest themselves. Brigham et al., (1983), which appears to be 
the only other eyewitness study which attempted to correlate physiological and 
psychological arousal measures, also failed to find a relationship between three 
different measures of physiological and self-reported arousal with a sample size of 
twenty.
Unfortunately, the extent of this potential measurement issue within the eyewitness 
literature is largely unknown as the majority of studies which have employed both 
physiological and psychological arousal measures have not reported whether they 
found them to be correlated (e.g., Christianson, 1984; Christianson, 1986;
Christianson & Mjomdal, 1985; Christianson & Nilsson, 1984). The question also
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arises as to which is more appropriate to use. Although physiological measures 
may be more objective, self-report measures have, arguably, greater external 
validity than do physiological measures because the judicial system relies upon 
retrospective self-reports in estimating the affect associated with a crime (Brigham 
et al., 1983). Fundamentally, this issue highlights the importance of using both 
objective and self-report measures in the experimental environment in order to 
more fully understand the effects of the experimental manipulation.
S. 2.3,1 Memory performance of victims versus bystanders 
In terms of memory performance, it was predicted that relative to bystanders 
within the same condition, threatened victims would be concerned with their 
personal safety. As a result, they would be more motivated to try to understand 
what was going on and, therefore, scan or monitor the situation such that they 
demonstrate enhanced memory for centrally-related details (e.g., the source of the 
personal threat, such as physical actions or verbalisations related to the chances of 
attack), but without the associated trade-off for more peripherally-related details 
(e.g., appearance-related details or verbalisations unrelated to the chances of 
attack) typically found within laboratory studies of visually-induced arousal (e.g., 
Burke et al., 1992; Christianson & Loftus, 1987; Christianson & Loftus, 1991).
However, as a difference in arousal level between threatened victims and 
bystanders was not successfully manipulated, it is perhaps not surprising that no 
significant differences in memory performance between the two groups were 
observed. In terms of motivation and the potential role of compensatory 
mechanisms, as threatened victims and bystanders rated themselves as equally 
threatened and likely to be attacked during the incident, it is possible that they 
were equally motivated to protect their personal goals and, in so doing, understand 
what was going. As a result, both may have employed compensatory mechanisms, 
thus demonstrating similar memory performance.
Fundamentally, this highlights the importance of manipulation checks and calls 
into question the study by Hosch & Cooper (1982) who also found no differences
104
in memory performance (identification accuracy) between victims and bystanders, 
but failed to assess whether they had successfully manipulated differentially 
aroused (physiological or psychological) witnesses.
There were, however, two interesting non-significant differences within this study 
which are worthy of discussion. Firstly, threatened victims were slightly higher in 
overall recall accuracy, although not recognition accuracy, for appearance related 
details than were bystanders within the same condition. Although it was 
anticipated that threatened victims would not demonstrate poorer memory for 
appearance related details relative to threatened bystanders, it was not expected 
that they might demonstrate a superior memory for such details. In retrospect, 
however, this might reflect the possibility that the threatened victims in this study 
may have spent more time specifically processing the appearance, and perhaps 
faces in particular, of the intruders in order to work out whether they actually 
knew them. They were, after all, being accused of seeing the first intruder’s 
girlfriend and it is not, therefore, unlikely that they would have spent time trying 
to work out if they had seen the intruder before. The bystanders, however, would 
have had no reason to think about whether they actually knew the intruder or had 
seen him before. This interpretation is supported if we look at the mean recall 
accuracy rates for appearance details pertaining to intruder 1 and intruder 2 
separately. Threatened victim’s accuracy for intruder 1 appearance details was 
69% in comparison to bystanders 52%, a difference of 17 percent. For intruder 2 
appearance details, however, threatened victims’ accuracy was 62% and 
bystanders 56%, a difference of only 6 percent. In addition, threatened victims 
were correct in their lineup decision concerning intruder 1 40% more often than 
threatened bystanders. It is interesting, however, that control bystanders correctly 
identified intruder 1 as frequently as did threatened victims, thus suggesting no 
effect of physiological arousal or perceived threat upon identification accuracy. 
However, as the nature of the incidents experienced by these two witness groups 
were different, it remains possible that other factors may have exerted an 
additional influence on the performance of one group relative to the other.
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Although not statistically significant, these results tenuously suggest that relative 
to threatened bystanders, threatened victims may have spent more time attending 
to, or processing, appearance details for intruder 1. Although such a suggestion is 
in line with Hosch & Bothwell (1990), who found laboratory victims to be more 
accurate than bystanders in terms of written descriptions of a perpetrator, in terms 
of identification accuracy it contrasts with the laboratory studies of Hosch et al. 
(1984) and Kassin (1984) who found victims to be poorer at identifying the 
perpetrator of a theft than bystanders. Furthermore, this tentative pattern appears 
to contrast with the work of Tollestrup et al., (1994) who found that real victims 
and bystanders to robberies did not differ in their accuracy for descriptions 
regarding hair, age and weight, with bystanders more accurate for height. In the 
study presented here, however, recall accuracy for appearance details other than 
simply hair, age, weight and height were assessed (e.g., skin tone, eye colour and 
details of clothing). In addition, the victims and bystanders in these existing 
studies would, most likely, not have tried to work out whether they knew the 
perpetrator(s). However, as the pattern observed in the study presented here is only 
tentative, too much emphasis must not be placed upon it at this stage.
A second difference of particular interest concerns the finding that threatened 
victims were considerably higher in 4AFC recognition accuracy for action details 
than were threatened bystanders. Standard deviations were large, however, and 
this difference did not emerge as statistically significant. Nevertheless, this 
tentatively suggests that when prompted the victims were better able to remember 
action details, possibly because these aspects of the incident were most central to 
the source of personal threat. As the victims and bystanders were not differentially 
aroused, at first glance it would seem unlikely that this indicates a significant 
effect of access or retrieval of information concerning arousing events (cf. 
Christianson & Nilsson, 1984). However, it is possible that this difference did not 
emerge as significant simply because differential arousal was not evident.
Unfortunately, the small number of existing laboratory studies comparing the 
performance of victims and bystanders have focused exclusively on witness
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descriptions of perpetrator appearance and identification accuracy. Hence, little is 
known about victim and bystander memory for action details. Although an 
archival study involving the analysis of statements provided by real victims and 
bystanders showed victims to report significantly more action details concerning 
the perpetrator than any other witness type (MacLeod, 1989), little is known about 
the accuracy of such descriptions due to an inability to assess what actually 
happened after the event. This highlights the gap in knowledge concerning real 
witnesses memory for action details. Indeed, this is an important issue highlighted 
by Yuille and Cutshall’s finding that over 50% of details reported during research 
interviews with real witnesses were action based details (Yuille & Cutshall, 
1986).Furthermore, the accuracy of action details (i.e., who did what and to 
whom) is central to the judicial process. Other than determining what was said, 
once identification has been established, the remainder of court business often 
focuses on the actions and intent of individuals involved in the incident. The 
results of a study which attempts to bridge this research gap are presented within 
Chapter Seven.
Whilst acknowledging that the differences discussed above are not statistically 
significant, it is, nevertheless, interesting to consider possible mechanisms 
underlying them as such little is known about the relative perfoirnance of victims 
and bystanders. Firstly, of course, the failure for the differences to reach statistical 
significance may simply be a reflection of meaninglessness. It is possible, 
however, that if arousal is an important factor influencing eyewitness memory, 
then the failure for these differences to reach statistical significance may have been 
because threatened victims arousal levels were not sufficiently higher than 
threatened bystanders to allow such memorial differences to emerge as statistically 
significant. Alternatively, it is possible that rather than reflecting an influence of 
arousal, these differences instead reflect something inherent in the differing nature 
of the roles or positions of the threatened victims and bystanders relative to one 
another (e.g., that the intruders were instructed to direct all attention to the victim 
in each pair). In this regard, patterns of memory performance between control 
victims and bystanders are particularly important. As they were not witness to an
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arousing or threatening incident we would not expect to observe differences 
between the two unless factors directly relating to the different roles of the 
witnesses or instructions to the perpetrators exert an influence. Fundamentally, 
there were no significant differences in memory between the two. Initially, this 
suggests that the tentative differences observed between threatened victims and 
bystanders may have been due to reasons other than something inherent in their 
differing roles or positions. However, although not significant (standard deviations 
were again large), it is interesting that bystanders within the control condition 
appear to be higher in 4AFC recognition accuracy for central details than were 
control victims. Hence, the potential for the different roles of the witnesses or 
experimental instructions to perpetrators to exert an influence upon the witnesses’ 
memory cannot, at this stage, be ruled out.
Alternatively, it is possible that for bystanders within the threatening condition the 
victim could, to a certain extent, be a competing stimulus, serving to limit the 
bystander’s processing of information about other aspects of the stimulus incident. 
For example, it is possible that the bystanders may have attended to the victim in 
an attempt to observe his response to the accusations of the initial intruder, and 
thereby monitor or assess whether they should intervene. In line with this, in the 
control condition victims and bystanders appear to perfoim at a more similar level, 
suggesting that bystanders may not have attended to the victim to the detriment of 
other details or information. This might also have contributed to threatened 
victims tentative superior performance for appearance related details relative to 
threatened bystanders.
Fundamentally, all of the explanations given above are purely speculative as the 
differences discussed did not emerge as statistically significant. The number of 
threatened victims and bystanders in each sample where quite small and it is 
possible that, as a result, these differences were not able to emerge as significant.
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5.2J.2 Correlation of arousal and memory
Although a difference in arousal level between threatened victims and bystanders 
was not successfully manipulated and there were no significant differences in 
memory performance between the two, it is possible that individual differences 
may have played a significant part in the effect the manipulation had upon the 
participants. Therefore, in addition to considering the group based performance of 
threatened victims and bystanders, the way in which arousal and memory |
performance interacted was investigated by correlating physiological arousal, both j
during and after the incident, as well as perceived threat and perceived chance of }
attack during the incident, with the various measures of memory performance. i
Such consideration is important as it may throw much needed light on the 
relationship between arousal and eyewitness memory.
Although it was hypothesised that threatened witnesses would be concerned with i
their personal safety and, as result be more motivated to try to understand what I
was going on, the finding of no significant relationships between rated threat or j
perceived chance of attack and the various measures of memory performance ‘
suggests that psychological arousal is not directly related to memory performance. j
This finding contrasts with existing studies of personally involved witnesses. An Iiautobiographical memory study, in which participants were asked to describe their I
individual most traumatic memory and rate the affect associated with the original 
incident, found participants’ rated emotion to be significantly positively correlated 
with the number of central details that the participants believed themselves to 
remember (Christianson & Loftus, 1990). Furthermore, an archival study of 
victims and bystanders to bank robberies (Christianson & Hubinette, 1993) found 
a significant positive correlation between rated original emotion and memory for 
circumstances sunounding the robberies (e.g., time of day, number of customers, 
and day of the week), although not for specific robbery details (e.g., number of 
robbers, robber’s weapon, and who collected the money). However, their use of 
retrospective self-report measures to assess original emotion, often experienced 
several years prior to the actual research, is questionable and may account for the 
discrepancy between findings (Wright et, al., 1997).
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Caution should, however, be exercised in interpreting the finding of the present 
study to suggest that psychological arousal is not directly related to memory 
performance as it remains possible that the failure for significant correlations to 
emerge may relate to the fact that self-ratings based on Likert-type scales are not 
necessarily as reliable or valid as they are often interpreted to be, especially when 
used with small sample sizes (Wright et al., 1997). This is, of course, a possible 
problem already mentioned regarding the absence of correlations between the 
physiological and psychological arousal measures.
In terms of physiological arousal, however, the finding that as heart rate during the 
incident increased the percentage of available peripheral details recalled increased, 
suggests that physiological arousal either directly influences memory in some way 
or that it may be a parallel indicator of other activity.
Taking the first explanation, if it is the case that physiological arousal facilitates 
memory (e.g., directly facilitates memory storage; Gold, 1992), then it would be 
expected that memory for other details, such as central or action related details, 
would also be found to correlate with physiological arousal. As this was not the 
case, however, it would seem that physiological arousal may not facilitate 
memory. Indeed, existing research suggests that physiological arousal does not 
play a part in mediating the effects of emotion on memory (Christianson et al., 
1996; Christianson & Mjorndal, 1985).
Rather than having a direct influence, then, perhaps physiological arousal is a 
parallel indicator of other activity. Hockey (1997) states that an increase in 
physiological arousal may be a cost associated with goal maintenance. Hence, if 
witnesses’ personal safety is threatened, in monitoring threat levels and chances of 
attack their attentional breadth may increase to take in peripheral details, but at the 
expense of an increase in physiological arousal. Thus, physiological arousal might 
act as a parallel indicator of such activity. If this were the case, however, the 
question arises as to why perceived threat and perceived chance of attack (likely
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indicators of perceived risk to personal safety) were not found to be correlated 
with memory in some way. It is possible that the problem of using Likert-type 
scales to measure psychological processes may underpin this.
The finding that as heait rate during the incident increased so the percentage of 
available peripheral details increased, is also particularly interesting as it contrasts 
with existing laboratory based research which suggests that increases in arousal 
result in a trade-off in terms of memory for peripheral details (e.g., Burke et al., 
1992; Christianson, 1984; Christianson & Loftus, 1987; Christianson & Loftus, 
1991; Heuer et al., 1997; Kebeck & Lohaus, 1986). Most of these studies have, 
however, considered group performance across different incidents rather than 
correlation within the same incident. And, perhaps more importantly, the 
physiological response demonstrated by participants in existing laboratory studies 
has been a drop in heart rate, characteristic of an orienting response rather than an 
elevation in heart rate characteristic of the fight or flight response most likely 
experienced by real witnesses and demonstrated by the personally involved 
participants in the study presented here. This supports the suggestion that visually- 
induced arousal, which tends to result in an orienting response, may have different 
effects upon memory than arousal induced through personal involvement with a 
threatening stimulus. How, then, do the results of the study presented here 
compare with existing studies of participants that have been personally involved 
with the target incident?
Unfortunately, there appear to be no existing published studies which have 
manipulated personal involvement and attempted to correlate physiological arousal 
with memory performance for central or peripheral detail information. The only 
other study to manipulate personal involvement and investigate the correlation 
between physiological arousal and memory performance solely considered 
identification accuracy (Hosch & Bothwell, 1990). They found that as 
physiological arousal increased, identification accuracy decreased. In contrast, 
however, the study presented here did not find a relationship between 
physiological arousal and identification accuracy. However, in Hosch &
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Bothwell’s study, victims and bystanders were not actually witness to the same 
incident. Specifically, the bystander witnessed a calculator theft whilst the victim 
witnessed the theft of her own purse. Hence, it is possible that there may have 
been something qualitatively different about the two incidents which affected 
memory rather than differences in arousal per se. For example, witnesses lower in 
arousal were more likely to be bystanders and there may have been something 
qualitatively different about the incident they experienced which made it less 
likely that they would accurately identify the perpetrator.
Furthermore, although unable to consider the relationship between actual 
physiological arousal and memory performance, Sporer (1992) found an almost 
linear increase in the number of descriptive details reported as a function of the 
level of stress experienced by a witness when he conducted an archival analysis of 
139 person descriptions from cases of robbery and rape. Level of stress was 
evaluated by classifying incidents on the basis of witnesses’ self-reported anxiety 
in conjunction with weapon presence and injury occurrence. Only half of the 
witnesses actually witnessed the incident, however, with the remainder interacting 
with the perpetrator either just before or after the incident occurred. Consequently, 
it is possible that those witnesses who interacted with the perpetrator but did not 
actually witness the incident may have experienced lower levels of stress and 
attended to the perpetrator to a lesser extent than did those who had actually 
witnessed the incident.
Fundamentally, however, there is one basic concern regarding the present study 
which centres around the size of the samples employed. Specifically, it is possible 
that the sample sizes {n = 14 for physiological arousal relationships and « = 20 for 
psychological arousal relationships) were not sufficiently large enough to allow 
relationships to fully emerge. Indeed, 18 significant correlation coefficients were 
obtained but the scatterplots were not indicative of real relationships. Had the 
sample sizes been bigger, it is possible that robust relationships may have 
emerged.
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5.2.3.3 Threat versus control group performance 
Although differential arousal between the threat and control groups was 
demonstrated, the fact that they were viewing different incidents is a confounding 
variable. Hence, it cannot be ruled out that any differences in memory between 
these two groups may not be a function of a difference in physiological arousal or 
perceived threat per se, but may be a function of other factors associated with the 
differing nature of the incidents exerting an influence on the performance of one 
group relative to the other (e.g., differential interest or unusualness; the results of a 
study investigating this possibility are presented within Chapter Six). Nevertheless, 
at this stage any differences are worthy of note as they may be indicative of the 
effects of physiological arousal or perceived threat upon memory.
With this in mind, it was predicted that witnesses within the threatening condition 
would be concerned with their personal safety. As a result, similar to the relative 
performance of threatened victims and bystanders, they would be more motivated 
than witnesses within the control condition to try to understand what was going on 
and, therefore, scan or monitor the situation such that they would demonstrate 
enhanced memoiy for centrally-related details (e.g., the source of the personal 
threat, such as physical actions or verbalisations related to the chances of attack), 
without the associated trade-off for more peripherally-related details (e.g., 
appearance-related details or verbalisations unrelated to the chances of attack) 
typically found within laboratory studies of visually-induced arousal (e.g., Burke 
et al., 1992; Christianson & Loftus, 1987; Christianson & Loftus, 1991).
In line with this, witnesses within the threatening condition recalled a higher 
percentage of available action details in total than did witnesses in the control 
condition, although they did not demonstrate higher recall accuracy for the details. 
Furthermore, witnesses within the threatening condition were higher in 2AFC, but 
not 4AFC, recognition accuracy for action detail questions than were control 
witnesses. This suggests that the aroused witnesses may have attended to and 
elaborated on action details to a greater extent, most likely as they would have 
been the primary source of perceived threat. Based on the differing nature of the
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two incidents, however, it remains possible that such details may have been more 
salient within the threatening condition, even though the incidents were matched, 
as far as possible, for all details.
When central details are considered, however, the only difference to emerge 
concerned 2AFC questions, with threatened witnesses demonstrating higher 
recognition accuracy than control witnesses. In this case, however, the central 
detail grouping happened to be the same as the action detail grouping as there were 
no 2AFC verbal questions, so this difference is a reflection of memoiy for action 
details rather than central details per se.
Hence, there were no central or peripheral detail differences between witnesses 
within the threatening and control groups. This suggests that, depending on the 
precise nature of the incident, it may specifically be actions rather than central 
details as a whole, that witnesses to emotional or arousing material demonstrate 
superior memory for. Unfortunately, existing research has often used static stimuli 
which do not demonstrate actions so readily, and has tended not to make the 
distinction between action details and other information, instead focusing on only 
a central versus peripheral detail distinction (Christianson & Loftus, 1987; 
Christianson, & Loftus, 1991; Heuer & Reisberg, 1990; Safer et. al., 1998).
Further possible support for an influence of threat or arousal upon eyewitness 
memory also comes a posteriori from a non-significant difference. In particular, 
despite a significant interaction between incident and intruder types for cued and 
total recall accuracy, post hoc tests failed to reveal any differences between or 
within the groups, possibly because of a lack of statistical power associated with 
the sample size. However, it appears that the threat group were higher in recall 
accuracy for details pertaining to intruder 2 for both cued and total recall. This was 
not necessarily as expected based upon the prediction that the threatened witnesses 
would attend to the source of the threat, which in this case it was presumed would 
primarily relate to intruder 1. On reflection, however, it is possible that witnesses 
within the threatening condition attended to intruder 2 to a greater extent than did
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witnesses within the control condition as he was directly related to the threatening 
nature of the incident. For example, as intruder 2 came into the room to try and 
remove intruder 1, he may initially have been perceived as an additional aggressor. 
Subsequently, however, it may have become apparent that he was actually present 
in order to placate his friend and remove him from the room. Hence, enhanced 
memory for intruder 2 may have resulted from the fact that his success at 
persuading his friend to leave the room was inextricably linked to the removal of 
the immediate source of perceived threat. In line with the proposition that 
threatened witnesses would make continuous mental assessments of whether and 
to what extent their personal safety is still threatened, this aspect of the 
involvement of intruder 2 might well have been monitored. As post hoc tests failed 
to reveal the location of the significant interaction, however, these possible 
explanations are purely speculative.
5.2.3,4 Memory for peripheral details
Importantly, although it has been shown that threatened witnesses demonstrated 
superior memory for action details in comparison to control witnesses, it was 
predicted that such enhanced performance would not be associated with the 
typically observed laboratory study trade-off in terms of memory for more 
peripherally-related details. Indeed, in contrast with laboratory studies of visually- 
induced arousal (e.g., Christianson & Loftus, 1991; Kebeck & Lohaus, 1986), 
memory for action details does not appear to have occurred at the expense of more 
peripherally related details. In particular, although witnesses within the threatening 
condition recalled a higher percentage of available action details, this superior 
memory was not associated with a reduced recall accuracy or recall for the 
percentage of available verbal or appearance details relative to the control 
witnesses. Interestingly, however, for free recall accuracy threatened witnesses just 
missed being significantly lower in accuracy for peripheral details than were 
control witnesses, although for cued and total recall the difference disappears.
In addition, the finding of a significant correlation suggesting that as heart rate 
during the incident increased so too did the percentage of available peripheral
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details recalled, further suggests that the influence of arousal upon memory for 
peripheral detail information may not be detrimental.
In summary, these results do seem to suggest that, unlike the findings of existing 
laboratory studies of visually-induced arousal, which have tended to suggest that 
enhanced memory for central details is associated with a memorial trade-off for 
more peripheral details (e.g., Burke et al., 1992; Christianson & Loftus, 1987;
1991; Heuer et al, 1997; Safer et al, 1998), when witnesses are personally 
involved this may not be the case. As mentioned previously, however, it cannot be 
ruled out that any differences in memory between these two groups may not be a 
function of the difference in physiological arousal or perceived threat between 
them, but may be a function of other factors associated with the nature of the 
incident itself exerting an influence on the performance of one group relative to 
the other.
5.2.3.5 Conclusions
The failure to manipulate a difference in arousal level between threatened victims 
and bystanders within the same condition, may account for the lack of significant 
memory difference between the two. Some interesting non-significant differences 
suggest that, had the initial manipulation revealed a significant difference in 
arousal between the threatened victims and bystanders, memory differences may 
have been observed. In particular, the results tentatively suggest that relative to 
threatened bystanders, threatened victims may have spent more time attending to, 
or processing, appearance details for intruder 1 and that, when prompted, they 
were also better able to remember action details, possibly because these aspects of 
the incident were most central to the source of personal threat.
In terms of the relationship between arousal and memory, perceived threat and 
perceived chance of attack were not found to be correlated with any of the 
memory measures. On this basis, whilst it was predicted that when witnesses are 
personally involved and their personal goals (e.g., personal safety) are threatened, 
they may be more motivated to understand what is going on and may therefore
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engage in continuous scanning and/or enhanced elaborative processing, the 
absence of significant correlations suggests that this may not be the case.
As physiological arousal rose, however, so too did the percentage of available 
peripheral details recalled suggesting that physiological arousal rather than 
psychological arousal may influence memory. However, this does not explain why 
other details, such as central or action related details, were not found to correlate 
with physiological arousal and suggests that rather than directly influencing 
memory, physiological arousal may instead be a parallel indicator of other activity 
or a cost associated with goal maintenance (Hockey, 1997).Specifically, whilst 
Hockey (1997) argues that through an active process of cognitive resource 
management individuals may choose to protect their performance, he also states 
that this may occur at the expense of physiological arousal. Hence, in line with 
Christianson et al., 1996 and Christianson & Mjorndal, 1985, physiological arousal 
may not play a direct part in mediating the effects of emotion upon memory, but 
may instead be a cost associated with goal maintenance.
In comparison to witnesses within the control condition, witnesses within the {
threatening condition demonstrated superior memory for actions and, importantly, i
they did not demonstrate an associated trade off in terms of memory for more jIperipheral information. Hence, in line with Hockey’s framework (Hockey, 1997), î
it is argued that the decrement in performance for peripheral details typically I
identified in laboratory studies of visually-induced arousal may not necessarily be j
a function of a reduced resource capacity, as previously advocated (Easterbrook, I
1959), but a function of the fact that witnesses to visually-arousing stimuli are not
Ipersonally involved and therefore do not experience changing demands which i
Iresult in sufficient motivation to re-allocate cognitive resources in order to protect j
personal goals (Hockey, 1997). It is possible that as the witnesses in the laboratory I
study presented here were personally involved with the target incident, their 
motivation to protect personal goals was sufficient to result in memory |
performance more similar to real witnesses who are also personally involved. I
Critically, previous laboratory-based research has almost exclusively studied I
117
witnesses detached from the target incident or stimuli and hence, has largely 
ignored the role of motivation in mediating the effects of emotion upon memory.
Fundamentally, however, based on this study alone we cannot know whether the 
observed differences between the threatening and control conditions were due to 
differential arousal levels rather than simply the fact that the two groups 
experienced incidents of a differing interest level or perceived unusualness 
(Christianson & Loftus, 1991; Mitchell et al, 1998).
Hence, in light of the findings of this study, a second study was conducted which 
was specifically designed to take into account the factors that may have led to the 
bystanders within the threatening condition being as aroused as the threatened 
victims. Specifically, the aim of the second study was to produce a difference in 
physiological and psychological arousal levels between threatened victims and 
bystanders in the same condition and therefore enable direct investigation of 
memory differences within the same treatment group rather than between different 
treatment groups.
The design aimed to reduce the bystanders’ feelings of being in the way by making 
them more detached from the incident. Hence, the victims and bystanders within 
each pair were seated further apart and the laboratory used was much larger than 
in Study One. In addition, to further maximise the chances that any effects would 
manifest themselves, especially between threatened victims and bystanders within 
the same condition, the sample sizes were increased. The content of the incidents 
themselves, however, did not change.
On the basis of the results of Study One, then, it is predicted that if physiological 
and psychological arousal are successfully manipulated, and are important factors 
in mediating the effects of emotion upon memory, we might expect to see the 
interesting non-significant differences observed between the threatened victims 
and bystanders in this study emerge as significant. Specifically, enhanced memory 
for appearance and action details would be manifest without detriment to memory
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for more peripherally-related details. In addition, we would expect to see 
differences between threatened victims and bystanders in a similar manner to those 
observed between the differentially aroused threatening and control conditions of 
this study (if the differences were due to arousal rather than an inherent difference 
between the two incidents). In terms of the threatening and control conditions, it is 
expected that the pattern of memory performance would be in line with the 
differences observed between the threatening and control conditions in this study.
5.3 Laboratory Study 2
5.3.1 Method
5.3.1.1 Participants
A total of 64 male undergraduate students (aged 17-25 years) from the University 
of St. Andrews participated in pairs (32 victim witnesses and 32 bystander 
witnesses). Participants were paid £3.50 each. As with the first study, participants 
were naive to the true purpose of the study. Informed consent, for the disclosed 
aspects of the study, was obtained from each participant prior to the study during 
which they were informed of their ability to terminate their involvement at any 
point whilst still being paid. None did so.
S. 3.1.2 Design
A 2 (threatening or control condition) x 2 (victim or bystander witness) between 
participants design was employed.
5.3.1.3 Apparatus
Measurements of heart rate were recorded continuously during the study as a 
physiological correlate of the emotional arousal of the participants in each 
condition. Measurements were taken using Polar Heart Rate Monitors consisting 
of an electrode belt, worn around the chest below the pectoral muscles with 0.05
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molar NaCl electrode gel, and a recording watch worn around the participant’s 
wrist. Raw recording figures (taken each 5 seconds) were used for analysis.
5.3. h  4 Procedure
The procedure was based upon that employed for Study One. The critical 
difference, however, was that the victim and bystander witnesses within each 
participant pair were seated approximately 3 metres apart in order to ensure that 
the bystander would feel less involved than experienced by those in Study One 
where they had been seated only 1 metre apart. Once again, the victim’s desk was 
located immediately in view of the laboratory entrance (see Figure 16).
Door Chairs
Path of Intruder
Ruler
M essage
Laboratory 
Bench
Windows
Victim's desk Bystander's desk
Figure 16: Layout o f laboratory during Study Two.
Participants completed the same self-report measures prior to the incident. The 
content of both the threatening and control conditions was also maintained across 
studies, with the only change being the use of two new confederate actors. 
Following the incident and completion of the MacKay Mood Adjective Checklist,
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as a retrospective measure of their self-reported arousal during the interaction, 
participants completed the initial free and cued recall test as detailed in the method 
for Study One. In terms of the recognition test, however, the questionnaire used 
for this study contained only four-alternative forced-choice questions. It was 
decided to drop the 2AFC questions from this study due to the high probability of 
guessing correctly for these questions in comparison to the 4AFC questions which, 
therefore, enable the assessment of recognition memory in a manner less 
influenced by the probability of guessing correctly (see Appendices 6 and 7 for 
full details of the recognition questionnaires). Finally, participants were shown 
sequential lineups rather than simultaneous lineups as used in Study One. This 
decision was made on the basis that sequential presentation of lineups can reduce 
false identifications by reducing participants’ reliance on relative-judgement 
processes without, importantly, having a detrimental effect upon correct 
identifications (Cutler & Penrod, 1988; Lindsay et al., 1991; Lindsay & Wells, 
1985; Sporer, 1993). As this study was conducted using two new confederate 
actors, new lineups were constructed following the recommendations for properly 
conducted sequential lineups (Koehnken et al., 1996; Lindsay et a l, 1991; Wells et 
al, 1994) and the photographs were pilot tested in the same manner as Study One. 
Once again, although a Chi-square test would have been an appropriate test to 
analyse this data, the sample size used to pilot the lineups was in fact too small to 
be reliable. In particular, more than twenty percent of the cells within the 
contingency table have an expected frequency of less than five (Dowdy & 
Wearden, 1991 ; Howell, 1992). Despite this, for the five pilot participants the real 
intruder was picked no more frequently than the other males pictured. After 
completion of all tests subjects were thoroughly debriefed and sworn to secrecy. 
The recall scoring procedure employed was identical to that described in the 
method section for Study One.
5.3.1.5 Manipulation checks
Figure 17 shows the mean baseline heart rate (averaged over 2 minutes 
immediately preceding the incident) and the progression of mean heart rates 
during and immediately following the incident (both 30 second periods). Unlike
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Study One, where some data was lost during recording, in this study physiological 
data was available for all 64 participants. Interestingly, an analysis of covariance 
(with baseline as the covariate) revealed that during the incident, witnesses in the 
threatening condition were not significantly more aroused than those in the control 
condition. This may be explained by considering the progression of heart rates. As 
can be seen from Figure 17, it appeals that during the incident the threatened 
victims’ heart rate is rapidly rising but does not reach its peak elevation until after 
the incident occurred. In line with this, immediately following the incident, 
witnesses in the threatening condition were significantly more aroused than were 
witnesses in the control incident (F(l, 59) = 20.51, p < 0.001; all statistical output 
for this study is shown in Appendix 10). More importantly, however, unlike Study 
One, an interaction of incident by witness was obtained both during (F(l,59) =
4.17, p < 0.05) and after (F(l,59) = 15.5, p < 0.001) the incident. Post-hoc Tukeys 
tests, conducted using standardized residual values of the heart rate data, in order 
to take account of baseline variation of participants’ resting heart rate levels, 
revealed that both during and after the incident threatened victims were 
significantly more aroused than were bystanders within the same condition (p < 
0.01 and p < 0.001, respectively). There were no significant differences between 
control victims and control bystanders.
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Figure 17: Mean heart rate progression during and after the incident.
As with Study One, an ANOVA conducted on the self-report data revealed, as 
expected, no differences in state arousal (STAI, form Y-1) between any of the 
witness groups before the incident occurred. During the incident, in contrast to the 
physiological results of this study, threatened witnesses rated themselves on the 
MacKay Mood Adjective Checklist as being significantly more stressed than did 
control witnesses (F(l,60) = 67.97, p < 0.001). Whilst on the arousal scale, 
threatened witnesses just missed rating themselves as more aroused during the 
incident than did the control group (p = 0.057). Interestingly, there were no 
differences between the victims and bystanders within the threatening condition 
despite their difference in physiological arousal (see Table 14).
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State Arousal 
(STAI, Y-1)
Arousal During 
(Mackay 
Arousal Scale)
Stress During 
(Mackay 
Stress Scale)
Threat Victims 39.44(10.64) 4.75 (1.24) 5.13(1.36)
Threat Bystanders 36.50 (7.92) 4.25 (2.35) 4.25 (2.02)
Threat Total 37.97 (9.34) 4.50 (1.87) 4.69 (1.75)
Control Victims 34.75 (8.00) 3.94(1.81) 1.31 (1.66)
Control Bystanders 35.31 (7.48) 3.25 (1.91) 1.13 (1.63)
Control Total 35.03 (7,62) 3.59(1.86) 1.21 (1.62)
Table 14: Mean (SD) STAI andMackay Mood Adjective Checklist scores.
ANOVAs conducted on the data from the seven 6-point self-rating scales 
regarding specific emotional responses (see Table 15) revealed that, despite no 
difference in physiological arousal, threatened witnesses rated themselves as: more 
threatened during the incident (F(l,60) = 24.15, p < 0.001); more likely to be 
attacked during the incident (F(l,60) = 26.90, p < 0.001); and more afraid during 
the incident (F(l,60) = 37.53, p < 0.001) than were control witnesses. In line with 
the physiological results, however, threatened witnesses did not rate themselves as 
more angry during the incident than did control witnesses. Immediately following 
the incident, in line with the observed difference in physiological arousal, 
threatened witnesses rated themselves as more afraid (F(l,60) = 5.77, p < 0.05), 
although they did not rate themselves as more threatened or more angry than 
control witnesses.
Interactions between incident type and witness type were also obtained for 
perceived threat during the incident (F(l,60) = 8.36, p < 0.01; see Figure 17) and 
perceived likelihood of being attacked (F(l,60) = 11.55, p < 0.005; see Figure 18). 
In line with the physiological results, post-hoc Tukey tests revealed that threatened 
victims rated themselves as more threatened during the incident and more likely to 
be attacked during the incident than were bystanders in the same condition (p < 
0.001), although they did not rate themselves to be more afraid or more angry 
during the incident.
124
Tlireat
during
Tlireat
following
Chance 
of attack 
during
Angry
during
Angry
following
Afraid
during
Afraid
following
Tlireat 3.38 1.88 2.56 1.81 2.13 2.63 1.75
Victims (0.72) (1.31) (1.03) (1.17) (1.50) (0.81) (1.34)
Threat 1.88 1.63 1.50 1.56 1.56 2.06 1.44
Bystanders (0.89) (0.89) (0.73) (0.73) (0.89) (0.85) (0.81)
Threat 2.63 1.75 2.03 1.69 1.84 2.34 1.59
Total (1.10) (1.11) (1.03) (0.97) (1.25) (0.87) (1.10)
Control 1.69 1.19 1.06 1.56 1.38 1.38 1.06
Victims (1.14) (0.40) (0.25) (0.89) (0.62) (0.62) (0.25)
Control 1.44 1.50 1.19 1.88 1.69 1.19 1.13
Bystanders (0.63) (0.82) (0.54) (1.15) (0.87) (0.40) (0.50)
Control 1.56 1.34 1.13 1.72 1.53 1.28 1.09
Total (0.91) (0.65) (0.42) (1.02) (0.76) (0.52) (0.39)
î  -  not at all/
6 = extremely)
3.5
2.5 ..
'S 0.5 ..
Threat Control
_#—  Mctiiii
Bystander
hicident
Figure 17: Mean rated perceived threat during the incident as a function o f 
incident and witness type.
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Figure 18: Mean rated perceived chance o f attack during the incident as a 
Junction o f incident and witness type.
Correlations were conducted across the threat group witnesses to see whether 
physiological arousal was correlated with the measures of perceived threat during 
the incident and the extent to which witnesses perceived they would be attacked 
during the incident. Standardized residual values of the heart rate data were used 
in order to account for baseline variation of participants’ resting heart rate levels. 
Analyses across the witnesses within the threat group (w = 32) showed significant 
positive Spearman correlations between level of physiological arousal during the 
incident and the extent to which witnesses rated themselves as threatened during 
the incident (r = .553, p < 0.005), and their perceived possibility of attack during 
the incident (r = .396, p < 0.05). In addition, physiological arousal immediately 
after the incident was positively correlated with the extent to which witnesses rated 
themselves threatened during the incident (r = .578, p < 0.005), and their perceived 
possibility of attack during the incident (r = .366, p < 0.05). Inspection of the 
scatterplots associated with these correlations (see Appendix 10), however, 
suggests that they cannot be accepted as demonstrative of real relationships.
5.3.2 Results
5.3.2.1 Percentage o f  available details recalled
Unlike Study One, from Table 16 it can be seen that in tenns of free and total 
recall the threat group reported a higher percentage of available details than the
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control group (F(l,60) = 4.67, p < 0.05, and F(l,60) = 5.38, p < 0.05, 
respectively).
As with Study One, more detailed classification and analysis, according to whether 
the details were centrally or peripherally related were conducted but revealed no 
significant effects or interactions. Furthermore, no significant differences were 
revealed when the details were classified according to whether they pertained to 
intruder 1 or to intruder 2.
Free Recall Cued Recall Total Recall
Threat Victims 
Threat Bystanders
12.61 (4.49) 
10.87 (4.02)
10.79 (2.93) 
11.37(4.87)
23.40 (5.16) 
22.24 (4.95)
Threat Total 11.74(4.28) 11.08(3.97) 22.82 (5.01)
Control Victims 
Control Bystanders
11.03 (5.48) 
7.83 (2.60)
10.99 (4.46) 
9.05 (4.27)
22.02(7.19) 
16.88 (5.68)
Control Total 9.43 (4.52) 10.02 (4.41) 19.45 (6.89)
Table 16: Mean (SD) percentage o f available details recalled.
However, classification according to whether the details were action, appearance 
or verbally related, revealed significant interactions of incident by information 
type for; free recall (F(2,120) = 3.22, p < 0.05; see Figure 19), cued recall 
(F(2,120) = 3.07, p = 0.05; see Figure 20) and, hence, total recall (F(2,120) = 8.21. 
p < 0.001 ; see Figure 21). Post-hoc Tukey tests revealed that the threat group’s 
free and total recall contained a higher percentage of available action details than 
the control group’s (p < 0.001 and p < 0.05, respectively), see Table 17. For cued 
recall, however, differences only emerged within the incident groups.
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Figure 19: Mean percentage o f available details free recalled as a function of 
information and incident type.
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Figure 20: Mean percentage o f available details cue recalled as a function o f 
information and incident type.
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Figure 21: Mean percentage o f a\>ailable details recalled in total as a function o f 
information and. incident type.
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Information Free Cued Total
Type Recall Recall Recall
Action 21.20 (8.85) 11.21 (7.83) 32.40 (9.88)
Threat Verbal 10.48 (4.98) 5.53 (4.48) 16.02 (5.09)
Appearance 6.93 (6.91) 14.42 (5.99) 21.35 (7.40)
Action 16.08 (7.14) 7.10(7.19) 23.18 (10.69)
Control Verbal 10.94 (4.82) 6.25 (4.67) 17.19(7.33)
Appearance 4.41 (6.24) 14.14(6.80) 18.55 (8.79)
____ __ _ ,Table 17: Mean (SD) percentage o f available action, verbal and appearance 
details recalled.
To further analyse whether physiological arousal may have had an impact on the 
percentage of available details reported, Pearson Product-Moment correlations 
were conducted across the 32 threat group witnesses. Again, to take account of 
baseline heart rate levels standardized residual values of the heart rate data were 
used. Although in Study One both the correlation coefficient and the scatterplot 
were suggestive of a significant positive relationship between heart rate during the 
incident and the percentage of available peripheral details reported in total, in this 
study, even with a larger sample size, none of the correlation coefficients proved 
to be significant.
Spearman correlations of perceived threat and perceived likelihood of attack 
during the incident with percentage of available details recalled, however, revealed 
that as rated perceived threat during the incident rose so the percentage of 
available details free recalled pertaining to intruder 2 also rose (r = .397, p < 0.05). 
Furthermore, as the extent to which the threat group witnesses perceived they 
might be attacked increased so did: free recall overall (r = .382, p < 0.05); free 
recall pertaining to peripheral details (r = .451, p < 0.05); free recall pertaining to 
intruder 1 (r = .394, p < 0.05); free recall pertaining to appearance related details 
(r = .422, p < 0.05); total recall overall (r = .356, p < 0.05) and total recall 
pertaining to intmder 2 (r = .380, p < 0.05). Inspection of the scatteiplots for all of
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these correlations (see Appendix 10), however, suggests that they cannot be 
accepted as representative of real relationships.
53,2,2 Accuracy o f recall
Accuracy scores were calculated in the same way as for Study One. Table 18 
shows the overall accuracy scores for free recall, cued recall and total recall. As 
with Study One, there were no significant differences between witness groups for 
free, cued or total recall.
Free Recall Cued Recall Total Recall
Threat Victims 92.02 (6.58) 74.82 (9.11) 83.69 (4.97)
Threat Bystanders 93.16(6.63) 73.68 (10.76) 83.22 (7.11)
Threat Total 92.59 (6.52) 74.25 (9.83) 83.45 (6.04)
Control Victims 88.57(9.56) 76.00 (7.47) 82.50 (5.99)
Control Bystanders 89.26 (8.78) 76.99 (15.54) 82.53 (9.65)
Control Total 88.91 (9.03) 76.50 (12.00) 82.51 (7.90)
Table 18: Mean (SD) percentage free, cued and total recall accuracy.
However, when the data were classified according to whether they related to 
central or peripheral details, an interaction between incident and type of 
information recalled was obtained for free recall accuracy (F(l,44) = 16.70, p < 
0.001; see Figure 22). Post-hoc Tukey’s analysis revealed that whilst there were no 
differences between the groups in terms of accuracy for centrally-related details, 
witnesses in the control group were significantly less accurate in their free recall of 
peripheral details (Mean = 60.64, SD = 31.76) than were witnesses in the threat 
group (Mean = 86.92, SD = 11.31, p < 0.001).
In addition, a three-way interaction of incident type with witness type and type of 
infoimation was obtained for free recall (F(l,44) = 4.54, p < 0.05; see Figure 23). 
Post-hoc Tukeys analysis revealed that control victims were more accurate for 
peripheral details (Mean = 72.91, SD = 22.41) than were control bystanders (Mean
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= 48.37, SD = 35.84), p < 0.01. There were no differences between threat victims 
and threat bystanders.
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Figure 22: Mean percentage free recall accuracy as a function o f information and 
incident type.
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Figure 23: Mean percentage free recall accuracy as a function o f information, 
incident and. witness type.
Additional classification and analysis, according to whether the details reported 
pertained to intruder 1 or 2 revealed no significant differences. Furthermore, 
classification according to whether the details reported pertained to 
action, verbal or appearance related details also revealed no significant differences 
between the witness groups.
131
Once again, to analyse whether physiological arousal may have had an impact on 
recall accuracy, Pearson Product-Moment correlations were conducted across the 
32 threatening condition witnesses, using standardized residual values of the heart 
rate data in order to take account of baseline heart rate levels. However, as with 
Study One, no significant correlations were revealed.
Spearman correlations (again across the 32 threat group witnesses) of perceived 
threat and perceived likelihood of attack during the incident with recall accuracy, 
however, suggested that as rated perceived chance of attack during the incident 
rose so too did; overall free recall accuracy (r = .436, p < 0.05); free recall j
accuracy for intruder 2 details (r = .398, p < 0.05); and cued recall accuracy for i|
intruder 2 details (r = .368, p < 0.05). Inspection of the associated scatterplots (see j
Appendix 10), however, suggests that none can be accepted as representative of I
real relationships. !I
5.3.2.3 Recognition accuracy i
The recognition questionnaires for both conditions consisted of 43 questions, all of î
which were four-alternative forced choice. As with Study One, recognition ;
accuracy was calculated as the percentage of questions accurately answered. |
ANOVA revealed that threatened witnesses were more accurate for recognition 1
questions overall (Mean = 56.76, SD = 8.18) than were control witnesses (Mean = I
46.29, SD = 7.57), F (1,60) = 27.74, p < 0.001. I
Once again, the data were grouped according to whether the questions concerned 
central or peripheral detail infonnation (see Table 19). ANOVA conducted on the 
data classified in this manner revealed an interaction of incident by information 
type (F(l,60) = 15.71, p < 0.001; see Figure 24). Post-hoc Tukey tests indicated 
that threatened witnesses were more accurate than control witnesses on central 
detail questions (p < 0.001).
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Central Peripheral
Threat Victims 
Threat Bystanders
65.63 (14.43) 
59.77(10.94)
52.55 (6.38) 
53.94(13.18)
Threat Total 62.70 (12.94) 53.24 (10.21)
Control Victims 
Control Bystander
43.33 (14.61) 
41.25(11.98)
45.98 (9.92) 
50.89(7.43)
Control Total 42.29 (13.18) 48.44 (8.98)
Table 19: Mean (SD) percentage accuracy for central and peripheral recognition 
questions.
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Figure 24: Mean percentage recognition accuracy as a function o f information 
and. incident type.
Further classification of the questions, according to whether they pertained to 
intruder 1 or to intruder 2 (see Table 20), revealed an interaction of incident by 
information type (F(l,60) = 4.33, p < 0.05; see Figure 25). Post-hoc analysis 
revealed that threatened witnesses were more accurate than control witnesses for 
questions concerning both intruder 1 and intruder 2 (p < 0.001 and p < 0.05, 
respectively).
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Intruder 1 Intruder 2
Threat Victims 60.80 (9.22) 53.87 (7.91)
Threat Bystanders 59.37 (12.02) 52.68 (12.35)
Threat Total 60.09 (10.57) 53.27(10.22)
Control Victims 44.64 (10.56) 45.45 (11.97)
Control Bystanders 47.62(11.13) 47.44 (7.60)
Control Total 46.13 (10.78) 46.45 (9.91)
Table 20: Mean (SD) percentage accuracy for intruder 1 and intruder 2 
recognition questions.
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Figure 25: Mean percentage recognition accuracy as a function o f information 
and. incident type.
Analysis concerning accuracy for questions concerned with action, verbal or 
appearance details (see Table 21) revealed an interaction of incident by 
information type, F (2,120) = 13.72, p < 0.001, see Figure 26). Post-hoc analysis 
revealed that threatened witnesses were more accurate for action details than were 
control witnesses, p < 0.001.
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Action Verbal Appearance
Threat Victims 
Threat Bystanders
78.41 (15.88) 
67.62(35.63)
33.13 (13.02) 
35.63 (14.13)
57.95 (8.22) 
59.66 (15.56)
Threat Total 73.01 (16.41) 34.38(13.43) 58.81 (12.27)
Control Victims 
Control Bystanders
47.73 (16.77) 
46.02(13.88)
31.25 (16.68) 
30.63 (10.63)
50.00 (11.74) 
55,97 (7.91)
Control Total 46.87(15.16) 30.94(13.76) 52.98 (10.30)
Table 21: Mean (SD) percentage accuracy for action, verbal and appearance 
recognition questions.
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Figure 26: Mean percentage recognition accuracy as a function o f information 
and incident type.
Finally, Pearson Product-Moment correlations were conducted across the 32 
threatening condition witnesses, using standardized residual values of the heart 
rate data in order to take account of baseline heart rate values. However, no 
significant correlation coefficients were revealed when heart rate during and after 
the incident were correlated with the various classifications of the percentage of 
available details recalled.
Spearman correlations of perceived threat and perceived likelihood of attack 
during the incident with recognition accuracy, however, suggested that as rated 
threat during the incident rose so too did overall recognition accuracy (r = .391, p
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< 0.05) and recognition accuracy for: central detail questions (r = .374, p < 0.05), 
intruder 2 detail questions (r = .359, p < 0.05) and action detail questions (r = .364, 
p < 0.05). In addition, as rated perceived likelihood of attack during the incident 
rose so too did overall recognition accuracy (r = .387, p < 0.05). Once again, 
however, inspection of the associated scatterplots suggests that these are not 
evidence for the existence of real relationships (see Appendix 10).
5.3.2.4 Identification
In line with Study One, witnesses identification decisions for the lineups were 
classified as correct or incorrect (see Table 22).
In terms of lineup 1 (Intruder 1), whereas cell sizes were too small in Study One to 
make three-way comparisons, in this study it was possible to perfoim a three-way 
log-linear analysis, involving incident, witness, lineup and decision types (see 
Appendix 10). This revealed a significant relationship between incident type and
decision type, x'liketihoodratio = 5.14 (1), p < 0.05 (final model: x%oodness-of-fit= 3.42 (4), 
p = 0.49). As can be seen from the contingency table below, participants within 
the threat condition were correct in their identification decision for lineup 1 
(Intruder 1) significantly more often, and therefore incorrect less often, than were 
participants within the control condition.
Lineup 1 
Correct Incorrect
Lineup 2 
Correct Incorrect
Threat Victims 
Threat Bystanders
8 8 5 11
12 4 2 14
Threat Total 20 12 7 25
Control Victims 
Control Bystanders
7 9 4 12
4 12 4 12
Control Total 11 21 8 24
Table 22: Number o f correct and incorrect lineup decisions.
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In terms of lineup 2 (Intruder 2), cell sizes were too small to conduct reliable 
analysis across incident, witness and decision types. When the data are collapsed 
across witness type, however, it is acceptable to make comparisons. A two-way 
test of association was conducted but did not reveal a significant relationship 
between incident type and decision type.
Finally, Point-biserial correlations were conducted across the 32 threatening 
condition witnesses. However, no significant correlation coefficients were 
revealed when heart rate during and after the incident (standardized residual values 
of the heart rate data in order to take account of baseline heart rate values), as well 
as perceived threat or perceived chance of attack were correlated with 
identification decision.
5.3.3 Discussion Study Two
Firstly, in terms of the effect of the manipulation, a difference in physiological 
arousal between threatened victims and bystanders within the same condition was 
successfully manipulated both during and after the incident. In line with this, 
threatened victims were also higher in psychological arousal, specifically rating 
themselves to be more threatened during the incident and more likely to be 
attacked during the incident, although they did not rate themselves to be more 
afraid or more angiy during the incident. Interestingly, despite the clear difference 
in physiological arousal, the threatened victims did not rate themselves to be more 
stressed or aroused during the incident on the Mackay Mood Adjective Checklist 
(Mackay et al., 1978), once again suggesting physiological and psychological 
arousal differ. Once the incident was over and the intmders had left the room, the 
threatened victims were still more physiologically aroused but, as expected, were 
no longer more psychologically aroused than were bystanders within the same 
condition.
Essentially, unlike Study One, in this study the desired manipulation was created 
where victims experiencing direct personal threat were indeed more
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physiologically and psychologically aroused than bystanders involved with the 
same incident but who did not experience direct personal threat. Critically, unlike 
all of the previous studies that have attempted to set up similar paradigms (Hosch 
& Bothwell, 1990; Hosch & Cooper, 1982; Hosch et al., 1984; Kassin, 1984), this 
is the first reported study to successfully demonstrate a significant difference in 
arousal levels between victims and bystanders within the same condition.
In terms of the different incidents, although the threat condition’s elevated 
physiological arousal was significantly higher than the control condition’s 
immediately after the incident, during the incident the threat condition’s 
physiological arousal did not reach its mean peak elevation until towards the end 
of the incident, thus preventing the difference between the threatening and control 
conditions from reaching statistical significance. Despite this, during the incident 
the manipulation appears to have had greater psychological impact upon the 
threatened witnesses as they rated themselves to be more threatened, more likely to 
be attacked and more afraid than did witnesses within the control condition, 
although they did not rate themselves as more angry during the incident. Similarly, 
during the incident threatened witnesses rated themselves as being significantly 
more stressed on the MacKay Mood Adjective Checklist, although they just 
missed rating themselves to be more aroused than did the control witnesses.
In addition, despite the larger sample size employed within this study, across the 
threat group physiological arousal was again not shown to be correlated with rated 
psychological affect, further suggesting that physiological and psychological 
arousal differ.
5,3.3.1 Memory performance o f  victims versus bystanders 
On the basis of the results of Study One, it was predicted that if physiological and 
psychological arousal were successfully manipulated, and are important factors in 
mediating the effects of emotion upon memory, we might expect to see the 
interesting, although non-significant, differences observed between the threatened 
victims and bystanders in Study One emerge as significant in this study.
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Specifically, enhanced memory for appearance and action details would be 
manifest without detriment to memory for more peripherally-related details. In 
addition, we would expect to see differences between threatened victims and 
bystanders in a similar manner to those observed between the differentially 
aroused threat and control conditions of Study One (if the differences were due to 
arousal rather than an inherent difference between the two incidents).
Surprisingly, however, despite setting up a successful manipulation in this study, 
i.e., differential physiological and psychological arousal between threatened 
victims and bystanders, these groups did not differ in their memory performance, 
suggesting that physiological and psychological arousal do not influence memory.
Indeed, the only significant memory difference obseived was between victims and 
bystanders within the control condition, with control bystanders demonstrating 
poorer performance in terms of free recall accuracy for peripheral details in 
comparison to control victims. This suggests that the control bystanders may not 
have been as motivated to accurately recall details during the free recall exercise as 
the witness groups did not differ in their cued or overall recall accuracy. It is 
interesting that this effect did not manifest itself in Study One and suggests that 
either the increase in sample size or the slight change in room layout allowed the 
difference to reach significance in this study.
Importantly, the interesting, but non-significant, finding within Study One that 
bystanders within the control condition appeared to be considerably higher in 
4AFC recognition accuracy for central details than were control victims was not 
significant in this study, suggesting that neither the different roles of the witnesses 
nor experimental instructions to perpetrators exerted an influence upon 
participants’ memories.
As the threatened victims and bystanders within this study were differentially 
aroused, it is interesting that they did not demonstrate differential memory 
performance in line with the tentative non-significant differences observed in
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Study One. In particular, within Study One, although not significant, threatened 
victims were slightly higher in overall recall accuracy, although not recognition 
accuracy, for appearance related details than were bystanders within the same 
condition, suggesting that they may have spent more time specifically processing 
the appearance, and perhaps faces in particular, of the intruders in order to work 
out whether they knew them. However, in this study the pattern disappears 
completely, with threatened victims actually a few percentage points lower in total 
recall accuracy for appearance details in comparison to threatened bystanders 
(Mean = 69.46, SD = 7.89, and Mean = 73.79, SD = 11.58 respectively). 
Furthermore, for lineup 1, the percentage of correct identification decisions are the 
opposite way to those observed in Study One, with threat bystanders correctly 
identifying intruder 1 25% more often than threatened victims. Hence, the use of 
sequential presentations in this study seems to have increased the number of 
incorrect decisions made. In short, then, although the results of study one 
suggested that threatened victims may have spent more time attending to, or 
processing, appearance details for intruder I, in this study, despite differential 
physiological and psychological arousal, this is not the case and suggests no effect 
of arousal upon memory.
The additional non-significant difference of interest in Study One concerned the 
finding that threatened victims were considerably higher in 4AFC recognition 
accuracy for action details than were threatened bystanders. As standard deviations 
were large, however, this difference did not emerge as statistically significant. In 
this study, however, although threatened victims recognition accuracy is still 
higher than threatened bystanders, the difference is smaller and so too are the 
standard deviations. So, despite a clear difference in arousal, this effect has 
diminished rather than enhanced. Consequently, it would appear that the 
interesting but non-significant differences observed in Study One were not 
tentatively indicative of an influence of arousal upon memory.
In summary, then, despite manipulating a difference in physiological and 
psychological arousal between threatened victims and bystanders within the same
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condition, not only have the interesting non-significant differences found within 
Study One disappeared, but no other differences in memory performance have 
manifest themselves.
This is the first time that detailed results, i.e., recall and recognition memory, of 
this nature have been found, probably not least because it is the first time a 
manipulation of this nature has been used. Unfortunately, few studies have 
considered the performance of victims and bystanders as distinct witness types. 
Indeed, only five published studies have, to date, attempted to compare victim and 
bystander memory for personally meaningful events under controlled laboratory 
conditions. These have all utilised simulated thefts paradigms and have produced 
varying results (see Table 23). In line with the findings of the study presented 
here, Hosch & Cooper (1982) and Hosch & Bothwell (1990, exp. 2) found no 
difference between victims and bystanders in terms of identification accuracy. 
Similarly, Kassin (1984) found no difference in accuracy for physical descriptions. 
In direct contrast, however, Kassin (1984) also found victims to be poorer than 
bystanders at correctly identifying the perpetrator of a theft. Similarly, Hosch et al. 
(1984) found victims less likely to be accurate in their identifications.
Furthermore, Hosch & Bothwell (1990) found that as physiological arousal 
increased identification accuracy decreased (exp. 1), although they also found that 
victims were better in their written descriptions of the perpetrator than were 
bystanders.
Although these studies all purport to compare victims and bystanders, one reason 
for the discrepancy in their findings could be that in 3 of the 5 studies the victim 
and bystander participants viewed different incidents. Specifically, in the studies 
by Hosch & Cooper (1982), Hosch et al. (1984) and Hosch & Bothwell (1990, 
exp. 1), participants witnessed a staged event involving either the theft of a 
calculator belonging to the experimenter (bystander condition) or the theft of a 
watch or purse belonging to one of the participant pair (victim condition). 
Consequently, the victims and bystanders were not actually witness to the same 
theft.
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Study
Victim’s identification 
of target perpetrator 
relative to bystander’s
Laboratorv studies
Hosch & Cooper (1982) <->
Kassin (1984)
Hosch et al., (1984) 4.
Hosch & Bothwell (1990, exp. 1)
Hosch & Bothwell (1990, exp. 2)
Field/archival studies
MacLeod (1989) T
Tollestrup et al., (1994) t
Table 23: Victim’s memory for a target perpetrator relative to bystanders: A 
summary o f results (Key: f  = enhanced; 4- = reduced; = no difference). 
*More aroused witnesses were less likely to misidentify the perpetrator.
Hence, the studies employing a methodology most similar to that employed within 
the study presented here are Kassin (1984), who utilised a personal theft paradigm 
involving the theft of game money from one of a pair of participants, and Hosch & 
Bothwell (1990, exp. 2), who utilised a paradigm in which victims and bystanders 
were run in pairs, both witnessing the victim’s purse theft. Although the results of 
their studies are more in line with the findings of the study presented here, there is 
still some discrepancy. Specifically, Hosch & Bothwell (1990, exp. 2) found no 
difference between victims and bystanders in terms of identification accuracy and 
Kassin (1984) found no difference in accuracy for physical descriptions (based on 
participants’ ability to recall 10 major appearance characteristics), although he did 
find victims to be poorer than bystanders at correctly identifying the perpetrator of 
a theft. It is possible, however, that in Kassin’s study the bystander had a better
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view of the perpetrator during the theft as he was seated across the table from the 
victim. Hence, the bystander may have been in a better position to view the 
perpetrator’s face, rather than just his major appearance characteristics, which 
included gender, hair colour and clothing colour.
Unfortunately, as the memory measures used within existing laboratory studies of 
victims and bystanders are far from comprehensive they do not provide a detailed 
picture of a victim or bystander’s memory for a personally meaningful event 
against which to compare the results of this study. Indeed, with the exception of 
Hosch and Bothwell (1990, exp. 2), who looked at the accuracy of written 
descriptions of the perpetrator, and Kassin (1984) who utilised a physical 
description form, victim and bystander research has focused exclusively on 
identification accuracy. Hence, little is known about victim and bystander memory 
for other information such as action details. It is unfortunate that the witness 
statements taken by police detectives as part of the deception paradigm utilised by 
Hosch et al. (1984) were not subsequently analysed as part of their study. Hence, 
the studies presented in this chapter provide the first detailed assessment (i.e., 
recall and recognition) of laboratory based victim and bystander memory 
performance.
Furthermore, as none of the five existing laboratory studies of victims and 
bystanders have successfully measured arousal, we do not know whether or not 
their participants were differentially. The failure to successfully manipulate a 
difference in arousal between threatened victims and bystanders of Study One 
highlights the importance of manipulation checks. Where existing studies have not 
measured arousal, they may have mistakenly inferred a relationship between 
arousal and memory performance.
An inability to objectively assess level of physiological affect is, of course, an 
unfortunate problem inherent in research with real witnesses. Neveitheless, in 
contrast to the existing laboratory based studies, research with real victims and
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bystanders has considered memory for details other than those pertaining solely to 
the perpetrator.
Interestingly, although the studies presented here found differentially aroused 
victims and bystanders not to differ in their memory performance, the majority of 
archival and field based research with real victims and bystanders have found 
victim witnesses to demonstrate superior memory in comparison to bystander 
witnesses. For example, from an archival analysis of 379 witness statements 
concerning 135 cases of assault, MacLeod (1989) revealed that victims reported 
significantly more action and description details about the perpetrator than did any 
other witness type. Similarly, from field work Christianson & Hubinette (1993) 
found victims provided more accurate information regarding robberies and the 
events which led up to them (accuracy was assessed by comparison with available 
forensic evidence, including police reports, reports from all witnesses to each 
specific robbery and photographs/films of the scene of the crime). Furthermore, 
Tollestrup et al. (1994) also found victims of robbery provided more detailed 
descriptions than did bystander witnesses to robberies. However, when they 
attempted to assess accuracy (by comparing witness statements with details of 
suspects who had confessed their guilt, but, importantly, who may not necessarily 
have been guilty), they found victims and bystanders to robberies did not differ in 
their accuracy for descriptions regarding hair, age and weight, although bystanders 
were more accurate for height. Unfortunately, they were unable to assess accuracy 
for other details.
However, although these studies provide valuable information on actual 
eyewitness performance and permit much needed comparisons with findings 
derived from laboratory studies, there are number of potential caveats that require 
consideration when interpreting their findings.
First, there is the problem of self-selection in that those individuals who decline to 
participate may do so because they feel they have poor memories for the incident 
which, in turn, inflates estimates of eyewitness accuracy. For example, that 44 per
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cent of the multiple-choice questionnaires distributed in the study by Christianson 
& Hubinette (1993) were not returned, which raises the possibility that their 
estimates of accuracy may have been inflated. Second, although each incident was 
witnessed by a large number of witnesses, between-witness comparisons are 
problematic due to the considerable variations in witnessing circumstances. For 
example, the information available to some bystander witnesses may differ from 
the information available to those who are more actively or centrally involved. In 
addition, where attempts to assess accuracy have been made, these are largely 
estimates based on police records and what was remembered by other witnesses, 
police, and support personnel. As differential demands may be made on witnesses 
by police officers as a means of providing investigative leads or judicial proof 
(MacLeod, 1985), the use of such methods of assessing accuracy are questionable.
There are, however, possible reasons why memory differences were not observed 
between the threatened victims and bystanders in the study presented here. First, 
although the threatened victims and bystanders differed in their rated perceived 
threat and perceived chance of attack, it is possible that the sample size utilised 
was not sufficient to allow memory differences to emerge. In particular, at this 
stage it is possible that the similar memory differences observed in this study and 
Study One between differentially psychologically aroused threatened and control 
witnesses could be a function of psychological arousal rather than something 
inherent in the differing nature of the two incidents. If this is the case, then a larger 
sample of threat victims and bystanders may have enabled memory differences 
between them to be observed.
In a similar vein, a further explanation could be that victims may have engaged in 
or experienced a greater level of intrusive thoughts regarding the incident, serving 
to reduce their overall attention to a level similar to the bystanders. Hence, any 
facilitating effects of psychological arousal may have been mitigated.
Of course, neither of these explanations take cognisance of the fact that ipsychological arousal was not found to correlate with any of the memory measures j
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in either this study or Study One. Hence, support for psychological arousal 
exerting an influence on the memories of victims and bystanders appears unlikely, 
but remains to be confirmed.
5.3.3.2 Correlation o f arousal and memory
As individual differences may have played a significant part in the effect the 
threatening manipulation had upon participants, the way in which arousal and 
memory performance interacted was investigated by correlating physiological 
arousal, both during and after the incident, as well as perceived threat and 
perceived chance of attack during the incident, with the various measures of 
memory performance. Although several significant correlation coefficients were 
obtained, even with the larger sample size employed within this study, scatterplots 
revealed that none could be accepted as representative of robust relationships.
As mentioned above, in line with Study One these results suggest that 
psychological arousal does not directly influence memory. Hence, although it was 
hypothesised that threatened witnesses would be concerned with their personal 
safety and, as result of monitoring the extent of any threat to their personal safety 
they would demonstrate enhanced memory for more centrally-related details, this 
does not appear to be the case. This contrasts with the one existing study of real 
witnesses which reported finding a correlation between rated emotion and memory 
(e.g., Christianson & Hubinette, 1993), as well as an archival study which found a 
relationship between rated original emotion and the number of central details that 
participants reported (Christianson & Loftus, 1990). However, their use of 
retrospective self-report measures to assess original emotion, often experienced 
several years prior to the actual research, is questionable and may account for the 
discrepancy between findings (Wright et, al., 1997).
In terms of physiological arousal, although the results of Study One revealed a 
significant positive relationship between heart rate during the incident and the 
percentage of available peripheral details reported in total, in this study, even with 
a larger sample size, this correlation was not replicated. Hence, whilst the results
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of Study One suggest that physiological arousal may either directly influence 
memory or act as a parallel indicator of other memory related activity, in this 
Study this appears not to be the case. This is in line with existing laboratory 
research which found that physiological arousal did not influence memory 
(Christianson et al., 1996; Christianson & Mjorndal, 1985).
5.3.3.3 Threat versus control group performance
The failure to find a difference in memory between differentially aroused victims 
and bystanders within the same condition of this study suggests that neither 
physiological nor psychological arousal directly influences memory. This 
highlights the possibility that the memory performance of differentially aroused 
threat and control witnesses is attributable to factors associated with the differing 
nature of the stimuli they have experienced rather than differential arousal. 
Specifically, although differential psychological arousal was manipulated between 
the threat and control groups of this study, the fact that they witnessed different 
incidents is a confounding variable. Indeed, based on the absence of memory 
differences between differentially aroused threatened victims and bystanders 
within this study, it appears likely that any differences between witnesses within 
the threatening and control conditions is a function of the inherent difference 
between these two incidents rather than psychological arousal.
This confound is prevalent in much of the existing laboratory based research on 
emotion or arousal and memory, as it has tended to employ designs where 
participants view either an emotional or a neutral event which are, at least in the 
critical or central part, different from each other (e.g., Burke etal., 1992; 
Christianson, 1986; Christianson & Loftus, 1987; Christianson & Loftus, 1991; 
Heuer & Reisberg, 1990; Loftus et al., 1987).
Following Study One, it was predicted that the pattern of memory performance i
between the threat and control conditions would be in line with the differences I
observed in Study One. However, if the memoiy differences observed between the 
threat and control witnesses of Study One are a function of physiological arousal
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during the incident, then we would not expect to replicate them in this study where 
a difference in physiological arousal during the incident was not manipulated. 
Indeed, all of the memory differences observed between the threatened and control 
groups of Study One were, replicated within this study, suggesting that, in line 
with the absence of memory differences between threatened victims and 
bystanders, the observed differences are not due to an influence of physiological 
arousal.
Although a few differences emerged in this study which did not manifest 
themselves in Study One (possibly due to the increase in sample size), the memory 
performance of witnesses within the threatening and control conditions was 
directly in line with those observed in Study One. In short, witnesses within the 
threatening condition recalled a higher percentage of available details overall and 
were correct on more 4AFC recognition questions than were witnesses in the 
control group (cf. Study One where threatened victims were higher in 2AFC, but 
not 4AFC, overall recognition accuracy). With regards to memory for specific 
information, in line with Study One, participants within the threatening condition 
recalled a higher percentage of available action details, although again they were 
not higher in accuracy for these details, and were higher in 4AFC recognition 
accuracy for action details (cf. Study One where threatened victims were higher in 
2AFC, but not 4AFC, recognition accuracy for action details). In this study, 
threatened witnesses also correctly answered more recognition questions 
pertaining to intmder 1 and intruder 2 than did control witnesses. In line with this, 
threatened witnesses also correctly identified intruder 1 significantly more often 
than did witnesses within the control group.
Finally, with regards to memory for peripheral details, in line with Study One, 
witnesses within the threatening condition did not demonstrate a trade off in 
memory (recall or recognition) for peripheral details. Indeed, within this study 
threatened witnesses demonstrated higher free recall accuracy for peripheral 
details than did control witnesses. This contrasts with the majority of existing 
laboratory research which suggests that enhanced memory for certain details tends
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to occur at the expense of other more peripheral details (e.g., Christianson &
Loftus, 1987; Christianson & Loftus, 1990; Heuer & Reisberg, 1990; Safer et al.,
1998).
5.3.3.4 Conclusions
Clearly, then, something is having a facilitating effect upon witnesses’ memory in
Ithe threat condition relative to those in the control condition. However, the failure i
jto find memorial differences between differentially aroused threatened victims and i
bystanders of this study, in conjunction with the finding that memory differences !
observed between the differentially aroused threat and control conditions of Study |
IOne were replicated here, where a difference in physiological arousal was not
manipulated between threat and control conditions, suggests that this difference is |
not due to physiological arousal.
!Furthermore, although support for an influence of psychological arousal upon ;
memory is also not directly provided by this study, the possibility for an influence :
of psychological arousal cannot so readily be dismissed on the basis of the results i
presented here. Alternatively, it is also possible that the memorial differences :
between the threat and control conditions may be a function of differences in '
stimulus content, unusualness (Loftus & Mackworth, 1978; Mitchell et al., 1998), 1
or possibly another yet to be identified factor exerting an influence upon memory. ,
5.4 General discussion
In comparison to bystanders within the threatening condition, it was predicted that 
threatened victims would be concerned with their personal safety. As a result, they 
would be more motivated to try to understand what was going on and, therefore, 
scan or monitor the situation such that they would demonstrate enhanced memory 
for centrally-related details (e.g., the source of the personal threat, such as physical 
actions or verbalisations related to the chances of attack), without the associated 
trade-off for more peripherally-related details (e.g., appearance-related details or
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verbalisations un-related to the chances of attack) typically found within 
laboratory studies of visually-induced arousal (e.g., Burke et al., 1992;
Christianson & Loftus, 1987; Christianson & Loftus, 1991).
However, despite manipulating a difference in physiological and psychological 
arousal between threatened victims and bystanders of Study Two, they did not 
differ in their memory performance, suggesting that neither physiological nor 
psychological arousal directly influences memory. In addition, none of the 
memory measures were found to correlate with physiological arousal in Study 
Two. Furthermore, support for physiological arousal not exerting an influence 
upon memory also comes from the finding that memory differences observed 
between the differentially aroused threat and control conditions of Study One were 
replicated within Study Two where a difference in physiological arousal was not 
manipulated between threat and control conditions. Thus, suggesting that the 
memory differences between the threat and control conditions are not a function of 
physiological arousal.
Although the studies presented here suggest that psychological arousal does not 
directly influence memory, the possibility that it may exert an influence upon 
memory cannot, at this stage, so readily be dismissed. Specifically, similar 
memory differences observed between differentially psychologically aroused 
threatened and control witnesses of both Studies One and Two could indicate an 
influence of psychological arousal. On this basis, the failure to manipulate a 
difference between the differentially psychologically aroused threatened victims 
and bystanders of Study Two could either be because the sample size was not 
sufficient to allow differences to emerge or because victims may have engaged in 
or experienced a greater level of intrusive thoughts regarding the incident, serving 
to reduce their overall attention to a level similar to the bystanders. Although 
neither of these explanations would explain why psychological arousal was not 
found to be correlated with any of the memory measures in either Study One or 
Study Two.
150
However, an equally viable alternative explanation for the differential memory 
performance of threatened and control witnesses centres around the fact that they 
witnessed different incidents. Hence, it remains possible that the memory 
differences observed between the threat and control conditions are instead a 
function of inherent differences in stimulus content, unusualness (Loftus & 
Mackworth, 1978; Mitchell et al., 1998), or possibly another yet to be identified 
factor, exerting an influence upon memory.
5.4.1 Physiological arousal
Despite an emphasis in existing literature on physiological arousal as an 
explanatory mechanism underpinning the effects of emotion upon memoiy, little 
research has attempted to empirically investigate its influence upon memory. 
Whilst many studies in autobiographical memory have advocated a biologically- 
based mechanism to account for detailed and vivid memories, they provide little 
empirical support for such mechanisms as little is known about the actual 
physiological or biological effects of the original events for which such vivid and 
detailed memories are reported.
Within the laboratory, a small number of studies have directly attempted to 
investigate the influence of physiological arousal upon eyewitness memory. 
Unfortunately, their use in understanding the relationship between physiological 
arousal and memory is questionable. For example, Brigham et al. (1983), 
presented participants with facial slides whilst either stimulating them with electric 
shocks (physiological arousal group) or not stimulating them (control group). 
However, in addition to finding no physiological differences between the 
treatment groups, none of the physiological measures were correlated with slide 
recognition accuracy. Similarly, Hollin (1984) presented subjects with a non­
violent film during a small portion of which half the participants were presented 
with loud white noise via headphones. Although subsequent memory was poorer 
in the noise group, no physiological measures were taken to show whether the 
manipulation had successfully created differential physiological arousal. 
Furtheraiore, although such a methodology allows memory to be investigated
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when the source of arousal is un-associated with the stimulus, the extent to which 
loud white noise elicits a response similar to a fight or flight defensive response is 
questionable. Hence, both of these studies are of limited use in understanding 
whether physiological arousal influences eyewitness memory.
The results of the studies presented within this chapter are, however, largely 
congruent with the findings of existing studies which have directly sought to 
investigate the influence of physiological arousal upon memory. In line with an 
increase in blood adrenalin levels associated with a fight or flight response, 
Christianson & Mjorndal (1985) and Christianson et al. (1986) utilised adrenalin 
in order to manipulate physiological arousal un-associated with the to-be- 
remembered event and isolated from psychological arousal. The first of the 
studies, Christianson & Mjorndal (1985), injected their participants with either 
adrenalin or saline and then presented them with pairs of slides depicting neutral 
faces, each accompanied by 4 verbal descriptors (name, occupation, hobby and a 
personality trait). Participants were asked to recall (exp 1.) or recognise (exp 2.) as 
many of the descriptors they had read aloud during the presentation period as 
possible. In both experiments, although participants injected with adrenalin 
showed a significantly higher heart rate and skin conductance level than those 
injected with saline, there were no differences in memory performance. However, 
while this suggests that increased physiological arousal did not serve to enhance 
memory performance, it would have been interesting to consider whether the same 
results emerged when participants memory performance was assessed on the slide 
contents rather than just the descriptors accompanying the slides.
In a further study, Christianson et al. (1986) conducted a slight variation of their 
earlier work. This time, one group of participants were injected with adrenalin and 
shown neutral slides with accompanying verbal descriptors (physiological arousal 
only, as in the earlier study), whilst a second group were injected with saline and 
shown emotional slides (depicting facial injuries) accompanied with verbal 
descriptors (and, therefore, producing the possibility for both physiological and 
psychological arousal in this group). Physiological and self-report data showed
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that those injected with adrenalin and those shown the facial injury slides were 
aroused to equivalent levels. Obvious ethical constraints limit the amount of 
adrenalin that can be administered, however, and the subsequent heart rates 
exhibited by the participants were relatively low, a maximum of 91 beats per 
minute in those given adrenalin compared to a maximum of 80 beats per minute in 
those given saline and presented with emotional slides. In addition, heart rates 
were calculated as the highest value reached in each period rather than an average 
value across each period. Taking this into account, when recall memory for verbal 
descriptors was tested, those shown the facial injury slides performed below those 
injected with adrenalin and shown neutral slides. Hence, there was a difference 
between the two groups even though they were not differentially physiologically 
aroused. Whilst it appears that memory is poorer for the facial injury slides, as 
with the earlier study it is in fact poorer for the accompanying verbal descriptors.
It is not known whether differences would have emerged if memory for the slides 
themselves had been tested.
As a result of these studies, Christianson (1992) concluded that “a general increase 
in arousal as induced by an external source, like adrenalin, does not affect memory 
processes in the same way as a source of emotional arousal directly associated 
with the to-be-remembered event” (p. 300). However, the results of both of the 
studies presented in this chapter, suggest that association with the to-be- 
remembered material may not be as important as previously thought.
Furthermore, failure to find support for an influence of physiological arousal upon 
memory in the studies presented here suggests that the nature of the physiological 
response (i.e., defensive versus orienting) is unimportant (cf. with the majority of 
laboratory based studies of visually-induced arousal which have manipulated 
orienting physiological responses, characterised by a drop in heart rate rather than 
an elevation; e.g., Christianson, 1984 and Heuer & Reisberg, 1990).
However, if physiological arousal does not influence memory, then it does not 
explain why research has indicated that glucose significantly enhances human
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memory performance when measured using a variety of tests (e.g., logical memory 
tests involving single presentations of taped narrative passages followed by 15 
minute delayed recall measures; Gold, 1986; Hall, Gonder-Frederick, Chewning, 
Silveira & Gold, 1989; Manning, Hall & Gold, 1990). Gold (1992) proposed that 
flashbulb memories represent a special case of neuroendocrine regulation of the 
biological processes responsible for storing information and that the storage of 
information at the time of an emotional event reflects an instance of physiological 
enhancement of memory. However, although the biochemically based studies by 
Gold (1986, 1992) and others provide support for physiological mechanisms 
mediating the effects of arousal upon memory, much more research is required in 
order to investigate the possible role of such a mechanism in human memory, 
especially in terms of complex stimuli.
In terms of research with real witnesses, it is an unfortunate fact that it is not 
possible to objectively assess original physiological arousal. Despite this, Kuehn 
(1974) found that victims of robberies provided more complete accounts than did 
victims of rape or assault, and that uninjured victims provided more complete 
accounts than did injured victims, suggesting that crimes higher in personal 
violence or threat to one’s safety are likely to be associated with less complete 
accounts of assailants by their victims. In contrast, however, Christianson & 
Hubinette (1993) found no effect of rated level of original emotional arousal upon 
memory for robbery details (e.g., number of robbers, robber’s weapon, and who 
collected the money), although it was related to memory for circumstances 
surrounding the robberies (e.g., time of day, number of customers, and day of the 
week). Furthermore, Sporer (1992) found an almost linear increase in the number 
of descriptive details reported as a fonction of the level of stress experienced by a 
witness when he conducted an archival analysis of 139 person descriptions from 
cases of robbery and rape. Level of stress had been evaluated by classifying 
incidents on the basis of witnesses’ self-reported anxiety in conjunction with 
weapon presence and injury occurrence. In this study, however, only half of the 
witnesses actually witnessed the incident. The remainder had not witnessed the 
incident per se but had interacted with the perpetrator either just before or after the
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incident occurred. Consequently, it is possible that those witnesses who interacted 
with the perpetrator but did not actually witness the incident may have experienced 
lower levels of stress and attended to the perpetrator to a lesser extent than did 
those who had actually witnessed the incident. However, these studies fail to 
provide little more than educated guesses as to the relationship between 
physiological arousal and eyewitness performance as they could not include an 
objective measure of physiological arousal.
Fundamentally, however, although physiological arousal does not appear to have a 
facilitating effect upon memory, it is important to note that as a result of the 
studies presented here, it does not appear to have a debilitating effect.
With regard to physiological arousal’s relationship to psychological arousal, as the 
majority of existing research in the field of eyewitness memory has largely failed 
to utilise objective manipulation checks (e.g., Christianson & Loftus, 1991;
Clifford & Scott, 1978; Hosch & Bothwell, 1990; Hosch & Cooper, 1982; Hosch 
et al., 1984; Kramer et al., 1991), let alone investigate or report the extent to which 
they may be correlated, very little is currently known about the relationship 
between physiological and psychological arousal in terms of eyewitness memory. 
Initially, it would be expected that in line with the innate Tight or flight’ response, 
when faced with threat or danger witnesses would experience an elevation in 
physiological arousal in preparation for action. It does not, of course, necessarily 
follow that an elevation in physiological arousal has to be associated by perceived 
threat. It is interesting that within both of the studies presented here, none of the 
physiological and psychological arousal measures were found to be correlated. It is 
possible that this may be an indication of the widespread problem associated with 
the use of introspective self-ratings based on Likert-type scales to assess 
psychological processes, although the increase in sample size within Study Two 
did not facilitate the emergence of robust relationships.
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5.4.2 Personal involvement
Although the issue of a confound associated with the use of differing incidents is 
common to much of the research on arousal and memory, there is an interesting 
difference between the methodology of the studies presented here and the majority 
of laboratory studies in that the participants in the studies presented here were 
personally involved with the stimulus incident.
Consequently, although comparison with existing research cannot confirm whether 
differences between participants experiencing arousing versus neutral stimuli are 
due to psychological arousal rather than something inherent in the differing nature 
of the stimuli, such comparison may provide insight into how memory for 
personally meaningful incidents may differ from incidents which are not 
personally meaningful.
The results of the studies presented here are in line with existing studies of 
visually-induced arousal which suggest that arousal may enhance memory for 
certain information without detriment to other information (Christianson & Loftus, 
1987; Christianson & Loftus, 1991). However, in the studies presented here, rather 
than enhanced memory for central details per se, superior memory for actions was 
demonstrated (i.e., those key to the threatening aspects of the incident), thus 
suggesting that, where witnesses are personally involved it may specifically be 
actions rather than central details as a whole that they demonstrate superior 
memory for.
In addition, the enhanced memory for actions observed within the studies 
presented here was not associated with a trade-off in memory for peripheral 
details. This contrasts with previous research concerning visually-induced arousal 
which has tended to suggest that there is a trade-off in memory for peripheral 
details associated with emotional material (Burke et al., 1992; Safer et al., 1998). 
Indeed, as can be seen from Table 23, of the laboratory based studies which have 
not manipulated personal involvement only two experiments found that enhanced 
memory for central details was not to the detriment of peripheral details
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(Christianson, 1984; Heuer & Reisberg, 1990). The rest have demonstrated 
detrimental memory effects for peripherally related details (Burke et al., 1992; 
Christianson & Loftus, 1991; Heuer et al., 1997; Rebeck & Lohaus, 1986). In 
particular, with regards to recall memory, 5 out of 6 of the existing experiments 
found emotion to have detrimental effects upon memory for peripheral details 
(e.g., Christianson & Loftus, 1991; Rebeck & Lohaus, 1986). Similarly, in terms 
of recognition memory, 8 out of 10 experiments found detrimental effects of 
emotion upon memory for peripheral details (e.g., Burke et al., 1992; Heuer et al., 
1997). Although the study by Heuer & Reisberg (1990) suggests a memory 
advantage for peripheral details, the enhanced memory was not directly 
attributable to the arousal-inducing aspects of the slide presentation employed, but 
was instead confined to the slides presented after the critical arousal-inducing 
phase.
Hence, while these studies have not specifically made the distinction between 
actions and other detail infonnation, they clearly demonstrate a tendency for a 
trade-off in memory for peripheral details associated with visually-induced 
arousal.
In contrast, the studies presented within this chapter suggest that when an incident 
involves a witness personally there may be enhanced memory for action details 
without an associated trade-off in terms of memory for other details (e.g., verbal 
or appearance details).
In addition to the studies of visually-induced arousal above, research concerning 
the weapon focus effect has demonstrated witnesses’ propensity to focus attention 
onto a weapon to the extent that other more peripheral details, especially 
characteristics of the perpetrator’s face, are attentionally excluded resulting in 
poorer memory for them (see Steblay, 1992). Although this well-documented 
effect appears to contrast with the findings of the present studies, had they 
included a specific weapon a different pattern of results may have emerged. 
Arguably, as no specific weapon was present, the participants in the studies
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presented in this chapter may have scanned or monitored the incident in order to 
assess ongoing threat levels. Clearly, as all crimes do not involve a specific 
weapon such consideration is important.
Study
Recall
Memory
Recognition
Memory
Visuallv/thematicallv induced arousal 
Christianson (1984) C Î P o
Rebeck & Lohaus (1986, test 1) C-e-> - -
Rebeck & Lohaus (1986, test 2) C<-> - -
Christianson & Loftus (1987, exp. 1) c t - - P i
Christianson & Loftus (1987, exp. 3) c t - -
Heuer & Reisberg (1990) c t p t c t P t
Christianson & Loftus (1991, exp. 1) c t C P i
Christianson & Loftus (1991, exp. 2) c t P i c<-> P i
Christianson & Loftus (1991, exp. 3) c t p i c t P i
Christianson & Loftus (1991, exp. 5) - - C o P i
Burke et al., (1992, exp. 1) - - c t P i
Burke et al., (1992, exp. 2) - - c t P i
Heuer et al., (1997) - - c t p i
Safer et al., (1998) - - c t -
Table 24: Memory for central and peripheral details associated with negative 
emotional material in comparison to neutral material: A summary o f results (Key: 
C = central details; P = peripheral details; f  ~ enhanced; 4 = reduced; no
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How do findings of the studies presented here compare with research which has 
specifically manipulated personal involvement? Unfortunately, although little 
research has manipulated personal involvement, most has been conducted with 
children. For example, Rudy & Goodman (1991) conducted a study in which pairs 
of 4 and 7 year olds entered a trailer occupied by an unfamiliar man. One child 
participated in a set of games with the man, and the other sat and watched. In a 
subsequent memory test, 10 to 12 days later, they found that participation lowered 
susceptibility to suggestion and, regardless of age, children evidenced few 
commission errors to false suggestions about actions relevant to child abuse 
allegations. Similarly, Ornstein, Gordon & Lams (1992) studied children’s (3 and 
6 year olds) memory for a personal visit to the doctor for a physical examination. 
They found that children at both ages remembered most of the features of the 
check-up and were quite good at giving accurate responses to misleading 
questions. Although these studies did not make the distinction between central and 
peripheral details, and centre around issues of children’s suggestibility, they both 
suggest that personal involvement does not have a debilitating effect upon 
memory.
In terms of adult memory, with the exception of Peters (1988), and the specific 
studies of victims and bystanders discussed in detail earlier, the role of personal 
involvement has virtually been ignored. Peters (1988) involved witnesses 
personally using an inoculation paradigm in which participants were asked to 
provide physical descriptions and make identifications concerning a nurse who had 
recently inoculated them and a second person they met shortly after inoculation. It 
was found that when the subjects were aroused, memory for the nurse was 
significantly reduced in comparison to memory for the second person. However, 
this study should be interpreted cautiously due to problems with order effects and 
other confounding factors. Furthermore, whilst participants were obviously 
personally involved with the manipulation, it is argued that it differs from the 
nature of the experience of real witnesses. Specifically, it is argued that 
participants in Peters’ study would most likely have been preoccupied with the 
incident they knew was about to happen. In contrast, in the studies presented
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within this chapter, witnesses would not have known exactly what was going to 
happen and, therefore, may have monitored the incident to a greater extent than 
the participants in Peters’ study.
Further studies where personal involvement is clearly a central factor, however, 
are those concerning real witnesses. Unfortunately, as discussed earlier in this 
chapter, such studies have been plagued by a lack of knowledge concerning 
accuracy or level of psychological arousal (e.g., MacLeod & Shepherd, 1986;
Yuille & Cutshall, 1986). Despite these inherent problems, however, their findings 
are largely congruent with the suggestion that personal involvement with an 
incident enhances memory for that incident. Although they have not tended to 
make such a rigorous distinction between central and peripheral details as have 
laboratory studies, analysis of data concerning the amount and type of details 
typically reported by real witnesses supports the idea of enhanced memory 
associated with personal involvement (MacLeod, 1989; Sporer, 1992). In 
particular, Sporer (1992) found an almost linear increase in the number of 
descriptive details as a function of the level of stress experienced (based on self- 
report ratings, weapon presence and injury occurrence). Similarly, MacLeod 
(1989) found that victims reported significantly more action and descriptive details 
about the perpetrator than any other witness, further suggesting a specific role for 
personal involvement. Yuille & Cutshall (1986) also found those rating themselves 
as highly stressed to be significantly more accurate in a police intei-view than those 
who only rated themselves as having been mildly stressed. It is possible, however, 
that level of stress and viewing proximity may have been confounded in this study 
such that those further away may have been not only less stressed but also less able 
to see the incident clearly.
Hence, it would seem that in comparison to studies of visually-induced arousal, 
where participants are personally involved their memory for action details may be 
enhanced without detriment to memory for peripherally related details. However, 
whether this is a function of psychological arousal associated with personal 
involvement remains to be confirmed by future research. In particular, despite the
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general support from research with real witnesses, it remains to be confirmed that 
the differences observed between the personally involved threatening and control 
groups of the studies presented here are due to differences in psychological arousal 
rather than something inherently different between the two incidents themselves. It 
is a fundamental confound that the majority of existing research has used different 
stimuli for emotional and control groups. Specifically, the differences observed 
between emotion and control groups in laboratory studies which have utilised 
relatively innocuous stimuli may be because of differential interest between the 
two group’s stimuli rather than arousal per se (Cahill & McGaugh, 1995). Despite 
such a possibility, the results of these studies have been consistently interpreted to 
suggest that emotional arousal, experienced whilst viewing negatively-valenced 
emotional information, results in a focus of attention to the central details of the 
stimulus and, therefore, enhanced memory for those details.
5.4,3 Theoretical implications
The proposed tripartite model of arousal and memory, put forward within Chapter 
Four, argued that a more complete understanding of the effects of arousal upon 
eyewitness performance may require understanding the following three elements;
(1) physiological arousal, (2) psychological arousal, and (3) motivation 
(compensatory mechanisms). Furthermore, it was also argued that jointly these 
factors may provide a more satisfactoiy explanatory scheme for understanding 
eyewitness performance.
Physiological arousal
However, as a result of the studies presented within this chapter, it appears that 
physiological arousal may not directly influence eyewitness memory. This is 
interesting as one might think that physiological and psychological arousal would 
work together in a complementary manner. For example, in line with Gold’s 
Neuro-Biological theory (Gold, 1986; 1992), an enhanced level of physiological 
arousal and associated adrenergic biochemicals in the blood-stream could result in 
facilitated consolidation or storage of detailed memories resulting from increased 
psychologically-guided event processing, especially with regards to threat-related
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aspects of an incident. On this basis, where heightened psychological processing 
does not facilitate enhanced attentional and elaborative processing, increased 
consolidation or storage of memories may not follow. And in reverse, where 
psychological processing is directed towards and results in enhanced elaboration 
for the threatening aspects of the incident, increased physiological arousal may 
facilitate the consolidation or storage of these memories. On the basis of the 
studies presented here, however, increased physiological arousal does not appear 
to have had a direct facilitating effect upon memory.
However, it remains possible that physiological arousal may be a cost associated 
with goal maintenance. Indeed, whilst Hockey (1997) argues that through an 
active process of cognitive resource management, via mental effort, individuals |
may choose to protect their performance, he also states that this may occur at the 1
expense of physiological arousal. Although the finding of only one correlation 
between physiological arousal and memory is little support for such a mechanism, 
it is possible that the failure to correlate physiological arousal with the other 
memory measures is again an issue of the sample sizes employed in the studies 
presented here.
Psychological arousal
Support for psychological mechanisms influencing memory is also not directly 
provided, although the potential for an influence remains possible if the 
differences viewed between participants within the threat and control conditions 
are due to arousal rather than something inherent in the differing nature of the 
stimulus incidents. Whilst this would not explain why psychological arousal was 
not found to correlate with any of the memory measures or why no differences in 
memory were observed between differentially psychologically aroused threatened 
victims and bystanders, it is again possible that issues concerning sample sizes 
may underlie these.
Alternatively, if psychological mechanisms are important, it remains possible that 
victims may have engaged in or experienced a greater level of intrusive thoughts
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regarding the incident, serving to reduce their overall attention to a level similar to 
the bystanders.
Motivation
In terms of motivation, the failure to observe memory differences between 
threatened victims and bystanders, despite their difference in perceived threat and 
perceived chance of attack, suggests that differential motivation was not manifest. 
For example, victim’s monitoring may have occurred in order to provide answers 
to questions such as; who are these people, do I know them, are they going to 
physically attack me, who is this second intruder, is he after me too, are they 
showing any signs of calming down, will they wait outside for me, is it possible I 
could have been talking to his girlfriend? Bystanders, however, although lower in 
perceived personal threat and chance of attack, may have been motivated to 
monitor what was happening in order to answer a different set of questions, such 
as: who are these people, are they going to attack the victim, what shall I do, who 
is this second intruder, is he after the victim too, now should I do something, are 
they showing any signs of calming down, I wonder if he has been seen with his 
girlfriend? Hence, although the bystander’s motivation may have been less related 
to their own chance of being attacked, they may, nevertheless, have been equally 
motivated to attend to what was going on.
In keeping with an influence of motivation, whether due to psychological arousal 
or differential interest, it appears that participants within the threatening condition 
may have scanned or monitored the incident to a greater extent than the control 
witnesses, resulting in enhanced memory for actions, without, a trade-off in 
memory for other more peripheral details. Hence, in line with Hockey’s Cognitive- 
Energetical framework, it would appear that participants in the threatening 
condition may have been more motivated to understand what was going on than 
participants in the control condition.
Furthermore, in comparison to studies of visually-induced ai'ousal, although 
aroused participants in the studies presented here demonstrated enhanced memory
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for action details, they did not demonstrate a trade-off in memory for peripheral 
details. In line with an influence of motivation, this may reflect that where 
witnesses are personally involved, they are more likely to engage in increased 
monitoring or scanning of the situation in order to understand what is going on and 
to ensure that the behavioural response selected is most efficient (Derryberry & 
Tucker, 1994). Arguably, this adds weight to the idea that participants in 
traditional laboratory studies do not experience changing demands which result in 
sufficient motivation to re-allocate cognitive resources in order to protect personal 
goals (Hockey, 1997).This may go some way towards explaining why memory in 
the field appears to be good (e.g., Yuille & Cutshall, 1986), but in the laboratory 
where participants are not personally involved enhanced memory for central 
details appears to be associated with a trade-off in memory for peripheral details 
(e.g., Christianson & Loftus, 1991).
At this stage, then, it is not suggested that witnesses can or will remember 
everything in a stimulus array. Clearly, this is not the case. What is suggested, 
however, is that whilst laboratory studies have generally argued that emotional 
arousal reduces performance or restricts attentional and elaborative processing, 
this may not be the case where witnesses are personally involved. Critically, it is 
argued that the influence of personal involvement, and therefore motivation, has 
wrongly been ignored within laboratory research to date (e.g. Burke et al., 1992; 
Christianson & Loftus, 1987; 1991; Heuer & Reisberg, 1990). Furthermore, what 
is central and what is peripheral detail will vary from incident to incident and in 
particular from witness to witness depending upon personal goals which are likely 
to be linked to the specific nature of the target incident. There is no doubt that 
selective attention occurs, but at this stage it is argued that to say whether a 
witness will or will not remember central and or peripheral details may be 
misleading, especially if such a judgement is heavily based upon laboratory 
research investigating visually-induced arousal.
In conclusion, since physiological arousal does not appear to exert an influence 
upon memory a tripartite model of arousal, encompassing physiological arousal.
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may not be as useful as previously thought. However, before rejecting 
physiological arousal from the model, further corroborating studies are required in 
order to fully understand whether physiological arousal has a role to play in 
mediating the effects of emotion upon memory.
Similarly, in order to understand the role of psychological arousal and/or 
motivation, the possibility that differences in memory perfonnance may be due to 
differential interest or unusualness requires further investigation.
5.4.4 Methodological issues andfuture research
In considering future research in this area, there are a number of fundamental 
methodological issues associated which warrant specific mention.
Firstly, the employment of manipulation checks is a critical methodological issue 
highlighted by the observed failure to manipulate a difference in physiological or 
psychological arousal between the threatened victims and bystanders within Study 
One. Although the studies presented here suggest that physiological arousal may 
not exert an influence upon eyewitness memory, replication of these results are 
required. If objective manipulation checks had not been used in the studies 
presented here, as with all of the previous studies of victims and bystanders (e.g., 
Hosch & Cooper, 1982; Hosch et al., 1984), inferring an incorrect relationship 
between memory and affect would have been tempting. For example, in the case 
of Study Two, it could have wrongly been inferred that no difference in arousal 
had been manipulated as no differences in memory were manifest. Critically, if 
advances in our understanding of the influence of arousal upon memory are to 
occur, it is essential that future research employs objective manipulation checks.
As with the majority of existing research, the studies presented here suffer, in part, 
from an inherent confound associated with comparing participant’s memory for 
differing incidents. Although comparisons across incidents may be interesting, 
only when we compare participants’ memories for the same stimulus information
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can we really begin to understand what factors may exert an influence upon 
memory and in what way.
In a similar vein, consideration needs to be given to the precise nature of the 
stimulus information presented to participants. Throughout the literature a wide- 
variety of stimuli have been used ranging from slides of a bicycle accident 
(Christianson and Loftus, 1991) to a video of a violent mugging (Clifford &
Hollin, 1981). Clearly, the nature of these stimuli are quite different, and the 
extent to which comparison may be made between participants viewing them is 
questionable. Indeed, as can be seen in Chapter Seven, caution should perhaps be 
exercised regarding conclusions about eyewitness reliability where these 
conclusions are based on the aggregated data derived from a number of cases or 
studies.
Arguably, this is highlighted in the studies presented here. Specifically, as a result 
of the ‘jealous partner’ paradigm, threatened victims may have spent time trying to 
work out whether they knew the intruders. Furthermore, for bystanders the victim 
may been a prominent competing stimulus as they may have monitored the 
victim’s behaviour in order to assess whether to intervene. Arguably, then, the 
cognitive processes engaged in by the participants in these studies may have been 
different from those in the earlier victim and bystander studies utilising live-event 
theft paradigms (e.g., Hosch & Cooper, 1982; Hosch & Bothwell, 1990).
Retrospectively, it would have been interesting to video-tape each run of the live- 
event incidents of the studies presented here in order to assess witnesses’ memoiy 
for what they themselves, including what bystanders remembered about the 
victim’s behaviour and, indeed, whether the victim remembered anything 
regarding the bystanders’ behaviour. Relative to bystanders within the control 
condition, bystanders within the threatening condition may have demonstrated 
superior memory for details pertaining to the victim.
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In addition, memory measures used within existing laboratory studies of victims 
and bystanders are far from comprehensive. Hence, future research should 
consider a more comprehensive assessment of witnesses memory, rather than 
concentrating solely on identification accuracy. Similarly, future research may 
wish to consider classifying details into alternative groups in addition to a central 
and peripheral classification.
Directly related to this, there is a clear need for field based research to make a 
distinction between memory for central and peripheral details to enable more 
direct comparison with laboratoiy based studies. In line with this, investigating 
real witnesses memory for actions details may he particularly informative, as the 
studies presented here suggest that it is for these personal-threat related aspects of 
the incident (i.e. actions) that critical differences may exist.
Finally, measurement of psychological processes is reliant upon introspective self- 
report measures. As already mentioned, self-report measures are not as valid or 
reliable as they are often interpreted to be (Wright et al., 1997). Directly related to 
this, although studies of the nature presented in this chapter are resource intensive, 
as large a sample size as possible should be utlilised in order to facilitate the 
emergence of relationships to emerge where they exist.
One of the implicit aims of this research was to stimulate new theoretical and 
empirical efforts and it is hoped that the interesting findings of the research 
presented here may contribute to this. Critically, theoretical advancement and 
understanding in this area is of applied importance. For a criminal investigator, 
judge or juror a victim may be perceived as the central witness and therefore may 
be perceived as more or less reliable than a bystander witness depending on the 
nature of the original incident. If, as the studies presented here suggest, in certain 
circumstances there may be no difference between the reliability of victim and 
bystander memories for the same incident, this may have implications in terms of 
perceptions concerning witness credibility in court as well as initial decisions by 
investigators with regard to whom they may choose to interview.
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Clearly, before anything film may be advocated, a number of the theoretical 
aspects of this research require further investigation. Importantly, the studies 
reported here are the first two controlled laboratoiy studies to investigate factors 
which are normally associated with field based studies, i.e., personal involvement 
and perceived threat. Although specific findings were manifest, from this research 
it would be foolish, at this stage, to directly advocate whether physiological 
arousal, psychological arousal, motivation, personal involvement or, indeed, none 
these, affect attentional or elaborative processes in an eyewitness situation.
Furthermore, although this research suggests that physiological arousal may not 
exert an influence upon eyewitness memory, the lack of existing research 
concerning its potential effects makes conclusions concerning this tenuous. In 
addition, as highlighted by the studies presented here, research is urgently required 
to investigate the possibility that memorial differences observed between 
participants viewing different incidents are due to inherent differences in the 
stimulus information, rather than arousal per se. The implications for the findings 
of such research are particularly important to interpreting the results of many 
existing laboratory studies which purport to study emotion and memory. The 
study presented within Chapter Six was conducted to directly investigate these 
specific issues.
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Chapter 6
The Role of Physiological Arousal and Differential Interest in
Eyewitness Memo 17
6.1 Introduction
The study presented in this chapter was primarily conducted to directly investigate 
whether physiological arousal has an effect upon eyewitness memory on its own 
(e.g., in the absence of psychological arousal and perceived personal threat).
As discussed in Chapters Three and Four, it is well-documented within both 
cognitive and eyewitness memory literature that emotionally-arousing material is 
remembered differently than neutral material. As a result, it has increasingly been 
suggested that physiological and psychological arousal, or both, are key factors 
mediating the effects of emotion upon memory. However, the precise mechanisms 
and relationships behind such effects are not at all clear.
The tripartite model of arousal and eyewitness memory put forward in Chapter 
Four, proposed that in order to more fully understand eyewitness memory a multi­
factor dynamic approach should be taken, encompassing both physiological and 
psychological effects, as well as acknowledging the potential role of 
compensatory mechanisms associated with motivation to protect personal goals. 
On this basis, it was suggested that a better understanding of the effects of arousal 
upon eyewitness performance requires understanding: (1) physiological arousal,
(2) psychological arousal, and (3) motivation (compensatory mechanisms).
However, as a direct result of the studies presented within Chapter Five, it now 
appears that the role of physiological arousal in mediating the effects of emotion 
upon memory may not be as important as previously thought. Specifically,
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physiological arousal does not appear to have a facilitating effect upon memory. 
Importantly, however, it does not appear to have a debilitating effect either.
Although existing research has directly questioned the influence of physiological 
arousal on its own upon memory (Brigham et al., 1983; Christianson & Mjorndal, 
1985; Christianson et al, 1986; Hollin, 1984), methodological issues associated 
with these studies makes it impossible for them to tell us whether physiological 
arousal directly exerts an influence on memory for complex information.
Furthermore, although research suggests that memory effects are not produced by 
physiological arousal per se, but may be produced by psychological factors 
triggered by the emotional nature of the material to-be-remembered, little regard 
has been given to the possibility that rather than being due to psychological 
arousal, memory differences may be due to the differential nature of the 
‘emotional’ and ‘neutral’ stimuli presented to participants. This fundamental 
confound is prevalent in existing research and, in part, the studies presented 
within Chapter Five. Highlighting this potential problem, existing research has 
suggested that incidents which are unusual or novel, but are not necessarily 
emotional or associated with an elevation in physiological arousal, may also be 
remembered differently than neutral or control incidents (Christianson and Loftus, 
1991; Mitchell et al, 1998). Hence, in addition to considering the role of 
physiological arousal, the study presented in this chapter also addresses the issue 
of whether memory differences between two groups viewing different stimuli 
may be due to something inherent in the differing nature of the two stimuli rather 
than physiological or psychological arousal.
In addition, as a result of this study it is possible to review live-event versus 
video-tape presentational methodologies. For example, comparison of the findings 
of Studies One and Two, where participants experienced the threatening incident 
as a live-event, with the findings of this study, where participants view the 
threatening incident via video-tape, may provide insight into the potential effects 
of personal involvement upon memory performance.
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This study, then, advances previous research in a number of ways. Firstly, rather 
than using static stimuli, such as slides of neutral faces (Christianson & Mjorndal, 
1985), this study utilised video-tapes of the threatening and neutral incidents 
employed in the studies presented within Chapter Five, which were shown to be 
either arousing or un-arousing when experienced first hand as live-events in the 
laboratory. Secondly, unlike the study conducted by Christianson et al. (1986), 
where witnesses injected with adrenalin were shown a different series of slides to 
those not injected with adrenalin, in this study witnesses watched the same films, 
i.e., physiologically aroused witnesses watched the threatening incident and 
physiologically un-aroused witnesses watched the same incident. Such a design 
produced four different witness groups; two groups who watched the video-tape 
of the threatening incident, one group aroused through exercise (cycling on an 
exercise bicycle) the other un-aroused, and two groups who watched the video­
tape of the control video, one group aroused through exercise the other un- 
aroused. Thus, the design enables investigation as to whether effects of 
differential interest or unusualness between the stimuli may influence memory.
As with the studies conducted by Christianson & Mjorndal (1985) and 
Christianson et al. (1986), in order to separate physiological aiousal from 
psychological factors the source of physiological arousal cannot be associated 
with the to-be-remembered material itself. Separation in this manner enables 
specific investigation as to whether something inherent in physiological arousal 
itself, i.e., not associated with the cognitive aspects of viewing stimuli, has an 
effect upon memory. There are a number of methods which have been used to 
induce arousal, including; minor electric shocks (Brigham et al., 1983), white 
noise (Hollin, 1984), and adrenalin (Christianson & Mjorndal, 1985; Christianson 
et al., 1986). Although injecting participants with adrenalin may produce a 
response most similar to the ‘fight or flight response’, ethical constraints may 
prevent the injection of sufficient adrenalin to elevate the physiological response 
to a level akin to that experienced under eyewitnessing conditions. In particular, 
Christianson et al. (1986) only managed to induce heart rates that reached a
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maximum of 91 beats per minute amongst those administered with adrenalin.
Hence, in order to overcome ethical constraints but still manipulate arousal to an 
appropriate level, exercise was chosen as the means of inducing physiological 
arousal. Indeed, exercise has been successfully used as a method of inducing 
physiological arousal in previous psychological research (Féry, Ferry, Vom Hope 
& Rieu, 1997; Kim & Baron, 1988; Tomporowski, Ellis & Stephens, 1987). Kim 
& Baron (1988), for example, used cycling exercise as a method by which to 
study whether arousal heightens stereotypic processing. Similarly, Tomporowski 
et al., (1987) looked at the immediate effects of exercise following a treadmill run 
on free-recall memory. Finally, unlike the studies conducted by Christianson &
Mjorndal (1985) and Christianson et al. (1986), participants’ were tested for the 
content of the film rather than accompanying verbal descriptors, thereby 
providing a more detailed measure of memory performance for the stimuli itself.
In terms of predicted effects, there should be no difference in rated psychological 
arousal between the participant groups. It is, of course, expected that those 
exercising will be higher in physiological arousal than those resting.
Consequently, if physiological arousal is a key factor affecting subsequent 
memory we would expect to observe memorial differences between those groups 
exercising relative to those resting irrespective of which video-taped incident they {
watched. j
!
If, on the other hand, inherent differences between the video-tape incidents, such j
as unusualness or differential interest, exert an influence then we would expect, j
overall, to see memory differences between the groups watching the different 
video-tapes irrespective of their level of physiological arousal. j
Finally, of course, it is possible that both physiological arousal and differential j
'■interest or unusualness may exert an influence. If this is the case, we would expect |
to see interactions of exercise and video, i.e., those exercising whilst watching a j
video-taped incident would show differential memory performance compared to |Îthose resting whilst watching the same video-taped incident and similar effects I
would not be observed between the witnesses viewing the control incident video­
tape.
If memory effects are manifest, in line with existing laboratory research it is 
predicted that whilst there may be enhanced memory for central details, this 
would most likely be associated with a decrement in performance for peripheral 
details as the witnesses are not personally involved.
6.2 Method
6.2.1 Participants
A total of 64 male undergraduate students (aged 17-25 years) from the 
University of St Andrews participated. All participants were naive to the true 
purpose of the experiment, believing it to be a health psychology study to test the 
widely posited suggestion that exercise improves mental functioning. Infoimed 
consent, for the disclosed aspects of the study, was obtained from each participant 
prior to the experiment, during which they were informed of their ability to 
terminate the experiment at any point whilst still being paid.
6.2.2 Design
A 2 (threatening or control video-tape condition) x 2 (exercise or rest condition) 
between participants design was employed.
6.2.3 Apparatus
To achieve the desired level of physiological arousal in the exercise condition, 
participants cycled on a Monark Ergomedic electronic cycle allowing 
experimental control of the workload and therefore manipulation of subsequent 
heart rates. Measurements of heart rate were recorded continuously during the 
experiment as a physiological correlate of the arousal of the participants in each 
condition. Measurements were taken using Polar Heart Rate Monitors consisting 
of an electrode belt worn around the chest below the pectoral muscles with 0.05
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molar NaCl electrode gel, and a recording watch worn around each participant’s 
wrist. Raw recording figures, taken at a five second rate, were used for analysis 
purposes. The incident was displayed on a screen (34cm by 34cm) at a distance of 
60cm from the participant pedaling or resting whilst sitting on the bicycle.
6.2.4 Materials
Participants were shown one of two video-taped incidents. These were filmed 
versions of the incidents used in Studies One and Two. The threatening condition 
involved a male confederate bursting in through a laboratory doorway to accuse 
an individual of seeing his girlfriend (the accused individual is not in view and the 
intruder is in fact talking to the camera as if talking to the viewer of the video­
tape). Moments later a second male confederate mns into the laboratory and tries 
to calm his irate friend who is angrily shouting at the viewer. The second 
confederate grabs hold of the irate confederate who resists his friend’s grip and 
picks up a wooden ruler from a side table which he waves threateningly at the 
viewer. The second confederate increases his attempt to remove his irate friend 
and manages to convince him that they should leave the laboratory. The irate 
confederate is unwillingly forced out of the laboratory by his friend who utters a 
warning to the viewer as both confederates leave and slam the laboratory door 
shut. In the control video-tape condition, the first confederate enters the 
laboratory, realises that the experimenter is not there and consequently asks where 
she is and how long she will be (again directed to the viewer of the video-tape). 
Moments later the second confederate hurries into the laboratory to find his friend 
has not found the experimenter. He warns him that they will be late for a meeting 
if they do not hurry. The first confederate asks if they can leave a message for the 
experimenter. He writes a message down and leaves it on a side table asking the 
viewer of the videotape to point it out when the experimenter returns. Both 
intruders thank the viewer for his help and leave the laboratory quietly closing the 
door. Each video-taped incident lasted approximately 30 seconds and, as for 
Studies One and Two, both conditions were matched for detail. For example, in 
terms of actions such as the ruler being picked up. In addition, during each 
interaction both confederates directed all their attention solely towards the
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camera. Furthermore, each incident was filmed from exactly the same angle, to 
ensure the same viewpoint for both, and from the same distance as would have 
been viewed by the victims within Studies One and Two.
6.2.5 Procedure
Participants were run individually. Upon arrival in the laboratory participants 
were seated at a desk where they were attached to the physiological recording 
apparatus and heart rate recording commenced. At this point the experimenter 
covertly started recording with a stopwatch so that the time at which the 
participant watched the video-taped incident could be coordinated with the 
corresponding point in the recorded heart rate data. After the heart rate monitoring 
equipment had been attached and initial recording commenced, participants were 
allowed between 6 and 7 minutes in which to relax before experimental 
measurements began. Baseline heart rate was calculated as the average heart rate 
over a two minute period immediately following this initial rest period. Following 
this they completed the Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety Inventory, Form Y-1 
(Spielberger et al., 1970), as a measure of state arousal. Next, the participants in 
the exercise condition were asked to get onto the exercise cycle and to cycle at an 
initially allocated low resistance level. Heart rate was monitored and the cycling 
workload gradually increased over a period of approximately 5 minutes until the 
workload was at an appropriate level to create the desired heart rate. Although the 
resistance level required varied from participant to participant, due to differing 
fitness levels, the resistance level was increased gradually to produce a heart rate 
of approximately 140 beats per minute in the exercising group. Once the desired 
heart rate level was reached, participants were requested to continue cycling at 
that resistance level for five more minutes at which point they would be informed 
they could stop. It was explained to the resting group that they were a comparison 
group with those exercising and consequently they were simply asked to sit on the 
bicycle and relax. Whilst the participant was sitting or cycling at the desired level 
the experimenter secretly pressed the play button on the video recorder, covertly 
noted the stopwatch time for later correspondence of incident occurrence and 
heart rate data, and stated that she had to leave the room to “collect some
175
forgotten test sheets”. She promised to be back in a minute, stressed that the 
participant should continue pedaling at the desired level and then left the room. 
Participants in the resting condition were simply informed to remain seated on the 
bicycle. Whilst the experimenter was out of the room, the video-tape was playing 
with nothing showing on the screen initially. Suddenly a noise occurred with an 
accompanying flash of colour from the television screen, to ensure the 
participant’s attention was attracted to it, followed 2 seconds later by the video of 
the relevant incident for that condition. Following the short incident presentation, 
the screen went blank again and the participant was given approximately 2 
minutes further in which to continue pedaling or sitting on the bicycle before the 
experimenter returned and informed the participant that a memory test was about 
to take place. At this point, the participant ceased cycling or sitting on the bicycle 
and dismounted, the electrode belt and wrist receiver were removed, the 
participant was seated back at the original desk and allowed a few moments to 
relax. He was then informed that he was required to complete five further tests 
about himself and the video-taped incident. This final stage of testing commenced 
with the participant completing the MacKay Mood Adjective Checklist (MacKay 
et al., 1978) as a retrospective measure of their self-reported arousal whilst 
watching the video-taped incident. Following this, participants were asked a 
single free recall question regarding exactly what had happened during the video­
taped incident, followed by a cued recall test consisting of three questions 
prompting recall for information on; the appearance of the intruders, verbal 
aspects of the interaction, and the physical behaviour of the intruders.
Participants’ verbal responses were audio-taped for later transcription. This 
measure was identical to that used in Studies One and Two. Next, participants 
completed a questionnaire consisting of forced-choice questions and further 
manipulation checks (i.e., ratings of how they felt whilst watching the video-taped 
incident). These questionnaires were based on those used within Study Two. 
Following this, they were shown two 6-person sequential photographic lineups, 
one for each intruder. Presence or absence of the intmders within each of the 
lineups and the position of the intruders within the target-present lineups were 
completely randomised across all participants. Each lineup was constructed
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following recommendations for properly conducted sequential lineups (Koehnken 
et al., 1996; Lindsay et al., 1991; Wells et al., 1994; Wells et al., 1998). Finally, 
participants completed a self-report questionnaire concerning their experience of 
the cycling in terms of emotions experienced as well as perceived exertion and 
any attentional demands of cycling or sitting on the bicycle whilst watching the 
video (see Appendix 8 for full details of the questionnaire). After completion of 
all of the tests, participants were thoroughly debriefed.
6.2.6 Recall scoring methodology
The recall scoring procedure employed was based upon the widely used Statement 
Analysis Procedure described by Yuille & Cutshall (1986). This procedure was 
identical to that utilised in Studies One and Two and is described in detail in the 
methodology of Study One within Chapter Five.
6.2.7 Manipulation checks
Figure 27 shows the mean baseline heart rate and heart rate progression over the 
periods prior to and during (both 30 second periods) which the participants 
watched the videos and immediately after watching the videos (60 second period).
Ptognsssion of heart rates
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Figure 2 7: Mean heart rate progression during and after watching the videos.
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Across all witness groups, analysis of covariance, with baseline as the covariate, 
revealed that, as expected, during the videos, and immediately after watching the 
videos, the participants who exercised were significantly more aroused than those 
resting (F (1, 59) = 837.14, p < 0.001, and F (1, 59) -  879.09, p < 0.001, 
respectively; all statistical output for this study is shown in Appendix 11). 
Interestingly, both during and after watching the videos, it was also revealed that 
those in the threat video group were significantly more aroused than those in the 
control video group (F (1, 59) = 7.82, p < 0.01, and F (1, 59) = 5.81, p < 0.05, 
respectively).
More importantly, however, during the videos an interaction of video by arousal 
was obtained (F(l,59) = 11.49, p < 0.005). Post-hoc Tukeys tests, conducted 
using standardized residual values of the heart rate data, in order to account for 
baseline variation of participants’ resting heart rate levels, revealed that of the 
participants watching the threatening video those exercising were more aroused 
than those resting (p < 0.001). Similarly, of the participants watching the control 
video those exercising were more aroused than those resting (p < 0.001).
In line with the finding that participants watching the threat video were more 
aroused than those watching the control video, participants exercising whilst 
watching the threat video were more aroused than those exercising whilst 
watching the control video (p < 0.001). There were, however, no differences 
between participants resting whilst watching the threat video and those resting 
whilst watching the control video.
Immediately following the incident, however, an interaction of arousal with video 
just missed significance (p = 0.057).
In terms of self-reported arousal, analysis of variance (ANOVA) revealed that 
participants within the control video group were higher in state arousal (STAI) 
than participants within the threat video group (F(l,60) = 7.61, p < O.OI; see
178
Table 25). There were no differences in state arousal between those exercising 
and those resting overall or within the video groups.
Despite a difference in physiological arousal, no differences were revealed 
between the exercising and resting groups during the experiment on the Stress or 
Arousal Scale of the MacKay Mood Adjective Checklist (see Table 25).
Participants were also required to make retrospective judgments on 6-point rating 
scales regarding how threatened, angry and afraid they felt both whilst they 
watched and immediately after watching the videos. As expected, analyses 
revealed that there were no significant rated differences between any of the 
witness groups.
State Arousal 
(STAI, Y-1)
Arousal During 
(Mackay 
Arousal Scale)
Stress During 
(Mackay 
Stress Scale)
Threat Exercise 
Threat Rest
29.00 (7.25) 
30.69 (5.55)
4.38(1.45)
3.31(1.74)
2.06(2.17)
1.13(1.86)
Threat Total 29.84 (6.41) 3.84(1.67) 1.59(2.05)
Control Exercise 
Control Rest
33.63 (7.00) 
36.44 (9.69)
3.88(1.93)
3.31(1.99)
1.19(1.76) 
1.88 (2.33)
Control Total 35.03 (8.44) 3.59(1.95) 1.53 (2.06)
Table 25: Mean (SD) STAI andMackay Mood Adjective Checklist scores.
Finally, participants also completed a series of rating questions concerning the 
experience of either exercising or sitting on the bike, if they were in the rest 
groups (see Table 26). In support of the physiological results, these revealed that 
the exercising participants rated the experience of being on the bicycle as; 
significantly more arousing (F (1,60) = 23.53, p < 0.001); more difficult 
cycling/sitting (F (1,60) == 44.82, p < 0.001); more stressful (F (1,60) = 25.76, p < 
0.001); more enjoyable (F (1,60) = 11.62, p < 0.005); and more difficult
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cycling/sitting while watching the video (F (1,60) = 17.45, p < 0.001) than the 
resting p articip ants.
Although the exercising participants also reported devoting more attention to the 
bicycle (F (1,60) = 29.92, p < 0.001), importantly they did not consequently rate 
themselves as having devoted less attention to the video in comparison to the 
resting participants.
Question
Exercise
Group
Rest
Group
How arousing sitting / cycling? 2.63 (1.18) 1.38(0.83)
How difficult sitting / cycling? 2.56 (0.98) 1.19(0.64)
How stressful sitting / cycling? 2.06 (0.95) 1.13 (0.42)
How enjoyable sitting / cycling? 2.69(1.12) 1.81 (0.93)
How difficult sitting / cycling & watching? 2.69 (1.64) 1.34 (0.75)
How much attention to sitting / cycling? 3.03(1.18) 1.68 (0.74)
How much attention to video? 3.03 (1.23) 3.44(1.39)
Table 26: Mean (SD) ratings concerning experience o f cycling or sitting on the 
bicycle (I -  not at all/none to 6 = extremely/all).
Finally, correlations were conducted across the exercising witnesses to see 
whether participants’ physiological arousal during the videos was correlated with 
the measures of rated arousal whilst cycling or rated attention devoted to watching 
the video. Standardized residual values of the heart rate data were used in order to 
account for baseline variation of participants’ resting heart rate levels. However, 
none of the correlations proved to be significant.
1 8 0
6.3 Results
6.3.1 Percentage o f available details recalled
From Table 27 it can be seen that there were no differences between the witness 
groups in terms of the mean percentage of available details free recalled, cue 
recalled or, therefore, recalled in total.
In order to investigate whether, in line with the conclusions of earlier studies 
(Burke et al., 1992; Heuer et al., 1997; Safer et al., 1998), aroused witnesses (i.e., 
the participants exercising) might recall a greater percentage of the available 
details relating to the central aspects of the videos, the information recalled was 
grouped into two categories. On the basis of definitions employed in the studies 
presented in Chapter Five and existing studies (Burke et al., 1992; Christianson & 
Loftus, 1991; Heuer & Reisberg, 1990), the details were classified according to 
whether they were central (i.e., information required to make sense of the 
situation, such as threatening actions) or peripheral (i.e., irrelevant information 
not required to make sense of the situation, such as clothing colour). ANOVAs 
conducted on the data classified in this manner revealed no significant differences 
between any of the groups.
Free Recall Cued Recall Total Recall
Threat Exercise 
Threat Resting
10.76(4.54)
10.57(3.52)
8.79 (4.20) 
8.11 (3.09)
19.55 (7.56) 
18.67 (5.37)
Total 10.66 (4.00) 8.45 (3.64) 19.11 (6.46)
Control Exercise 
Control Resting
10.37(3.94) 
13.55 (4.87)
8.87(3.91) 
7.34 (3.85)
19.24 (5.83) 
20,88 (6.44)
Total 11.96(4.65) 8.10(3.90) 20.06(6.10)
Table 27: Mean (SD) percentage o f available details recalled.
As the incidents portrayed in the videos involved two intmders, in line with 
Studies One and Two the percentage of available details recalled were classified 
according to whether they pertained to intmder 1 or intmder 2. This was carried
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out on the basis that intruder 1 was the leading/predominant individual in both of 
the videos and may, therefore, have attracted more of the witnesses attention, 
especially in the video-taped threatening incident. Intruder I ’s greater presence 
does, of course, mean that there were a greater number of details pertaining to 
him. By considering the percentage of available details reported, however, this 
potential bias is counteracted.
For free and total recall interactions of information type (intruder I / intruder 2) 
with video type were obtained F (1,60) = 18.16, p < 0.001, and F (1,60) = 12.29, 
p < 0.005 respectively (see Figures 28 and 29). Post-hoc Tukey tests did not, 
however, reveal significant differences between the witness groups for either 
interaction (see Table 28).
Intruder 1 
Free Cued Total
Intruder 2 
Free Cued Total
Threat
Exercise
Threat
Rest
12.37
(6.15)
11.50
(3.81)
9.24
(4.16)
7.65
(3.28)
21.61
(8.40)
19.15
(5.14)
8.63
(3.87)
9.33
(3.56)
8.19
(5.10)
8.71
(5.05)
16.81
(7.60)
18.05
(7.28)
Threat
Total
11.94
(5.05)
8.44
(3.77)
20.38
(6.96)
8.98
(3.68)
8.45
(5.00)
17.43
(7.35)
Control
Exercise
Control
Rest
12.68
(4.80)
17.26
(5.60)
9.78
(5.17)
6.87
(4.48)
22.46
(7.31)
24.13
(6.76)
6.82
(3.99)
7.86
(5.02)
7.39
(4.14)
8.05
(4.38)
14.21
(5.72)
15.91
(6.95)
Control
Total
14.97
(5.63)
8.32
(4.98)
23.30
(6.98)
7.34
(4.49)
7.71
(4.20)
15.06
(6.32)
Table 28: Mean (SD) percentage o f available details recalledfor intruder 1 & 2.
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Figure 28: Mean percentage o f available details free recalled as a function o f 
information and video type.
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Figure 29: Mean percentage o f available details recalled in total as a function o f 
information and video type.
In addition, for free recall a three-way interaction of information, video and 
arousal type was obtained (F (1,60) = 5.41, p < 0.05; see Figure 30). Despite this, 
post-hoc Tukey tests did not reveal a difference between any of the witness 
groups. Similarly, for cued recall post-hoc tests did not reveal any differences 
between groups despite an interaction of information type and arousal level (F 
(1,60) = 5.38, p < 0.05; see Figure 31).
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Figure 30: Mean percentage o f available details free recalled as a function o f 
information type, arousal level and video type.
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Figure 31: Mean percentage o f available details cue recalled as a function of 
arousal level and. information type.
Finally, classification according to the percentage of available action, verbal or 
appearance related details was made, but revealed no significant main effects or 
interactions.
To further analyse whether physiological arousal during or after watching the 
videos may have had an impact on the percentage of available details reported, 
Pearson Product-Moment correlations were conducted across the witnesses within 
the exercise group {N= 32). These revealed significant correlation coefficients 
suggesting that as physiological arousal during the video rose so too did: cued 
recall pertaining to peripheral details (r = .445, p < 0.05); cued recall pertaining to
184
intruder 2 (r = .393, p < 0.05); cued recall pertaining to appearance details (r = 
.410, p < 0.05); total recall overall (r = .350, p = 0.05); total recall pertaining to 
peripheral details (r = .411, p = 0.05); and total recall pertaining to appearance 
details (r = .384, p = 0.05). Similarly, significant correlation coefficients suggest 
that as physiological arousal after the video rose so too did: cued recall overall (r 
= .359, p < 0.05); cued recall pertaining to peripheral details (r = .474, p < 0.01); 
cued recall pertaining to intruder 2 (r = .439, p < 0.05); cued recall pertaining to 
appearance details (r = .429, p < 0.05); total recall overall (r = .402, p = 0.05); 
total recall pertaining to peripheral details (r = .442, p = 0.05); total recall 
pertaining to intruder 1 (r = .380, p = 0.05); total recall pertaining to intruder 2 (r 
= .358, p = 0.05); and total recall pertaining to appearance details (r = .430, p = 
0.05). However, inspection of the scatterplots for these correlations (see Appendix 
11), suggests that none of them can be accepted as demonstrative of real 
relationships.
Furthermore, Spearman correlations of rated arousal whilst cycling revealed 
significant positive correlation coefficients suggesting that as rated arousal rose so 
did: free recall pertaining to action details (r = .395, p < 0.05); cued recall 
pertaining to peripheral details (r = .360, p < 0.05); cued recall pertaining to 
intruder 2 details (r = .408, p < 0.05); total recall overall (r = .397, p < 0.05); and 
total recall pertaining to intmder 2 (r = .416, p < 0.05). Once again, however, 
inspection of the scatterplots for these correlations (see Appendix 11), suggests 
that none of them can be accepted as demonstrative of real relationships.
However, as can be seen from Tables 27 and 28, the percentage of available 
details that the participants reported was very low. Hence, they may have been 
reporting only the details they felt highly confident on, thus not providing such a 
useful indication of the possible extent of their memories for the event. This is 
fundamentally why the use of recognition tests in addition to recall tests helps to 
tease out differences in such circumstances where participants may be selectively 
reporting recall on the basis of high confidence criterion levels. Although there 
were no significant differences in terms of the percentage of available details
185
. . .J
recalled, it is essential to consider the accuracy of the information recalled in 
order to assess the extent to which there may be memory differences. For 
example, although two participant groups may recall the same percentage of 
available details, one group’s accuracy may have been higher, therefore indicating 
a superior memory for the incident.
6.3.2 Accuracy o f  recall
Accuracy scores were calculated as the percentage of details recalled that were 
correct. Table 29 shows the overall accuracy scores for free recall, cued recall and 
total recall. An ANOVA conducted on this data revealed no significant 
differences between any of the groups.
Free Recall Cued Recall Total Recall
Threat Exercise 
Threat Rest
88.88 (9.94) 
88.57 (10.31)
68.60(16.71) 
67.02 (12.80)
79.50 (8.89) 
78.75 (9.20)
Threat Total 88.72 (9.96) 67.81 (14.67) 80.79 (8.47)
Control Exercise 
Control Rest
90.75 (7.10) 
90.87(6.45)
72.03 (16.06) 
60.33 (16.00)
82.07 (8.11) 
80.32 (8.56)
Control Total 90.81 (6.67) 66.18(16.85) 79.54 (8.78)
Table 29: Mean percentage (SD) recall accuracy for free, cued and total recall.
As with the percentage of available details recalled, the details were grouped 
according to a variety of classification criteria. Firstly, when the data were 
classified as central or peripheral, there were no significant differences. 
Classification of the details according to which intruder they related to, however, 
revealed a three-way interaction for free recall, F (1,60) = 5.76, p < 0.05 (see 
Figure 32). However, post-hoc Tukey tests failed to revealed any differences 
amongst the groups (see Table 30).
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Figure 32: Mean percentage free recall accuracy as a function o f information 
type, arousal level and video type.
Intruder 1 Intruder 2
Threat Exercise 
Threat Rest
91.59 (9.73) 
93.50(8.12)
85.26 (16.07) 
79.42 (18.55)
Threat Total 92.54 (8.87) 82.34(17.33)
Control Exercise 
Control Rest
94.22 (7.06) 
91.83 (6.60)
80.28 (17.56) 
90.54 (13.65)
Control Total 93.02(6.83) 85.41 (16.32)
Table 30: Mean (SD) free recall accuracy for intruder 1 and intruder 2.
Finally, when the data were classified according to whether they related to action, 
verbal or appearance details, no significant interactions were revealed.
Once again, to further analyse whether physiological arousal may have an impact 
on the accuracy of details reported, Pearson Product-Moment correlations were 
conducted. One significant correlation coefficient was revealed suggesting that as 
heart rate after the video dropped, so too did recall accuracy for cued recall 
pertaining to intruder 2. However, inspection of the scatterplot for this correlation 
indicates that it is not representative of a real relationship (see Appendix 11). 
Similarly, Speaman correlations of rated arousal whilst cycling with the various 
measures of recall accuracy were conducted but were not found to be significant.
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6.3.3 Recognition accuracy
The recognition questionnaires for both the threatening and control conditions 
consisted of 43 four-alternative (4AFC) forced choice questions. However, due to 
differences in the number of questions pertaining to different aspects of the 
incidents (i.e., action, verbal and appearance related details), recognition accuracy 
was calculated as a percentage.
In terms of overall accuracy, ANOVA revealed that witnesses watching the 
threatening video were just significantly higher in accuracy (M = 53.42, SD = 
6.83) than those watching the control video (M = 49.71, SD = 7.81), F (1,60) = 
4.10, p <  0.05.
Using the same criteria as for the recall data, we grouped the questions according 
to whether they concerned central or peripheral detail information. The mean 
recognition accuracy for these groups are shown in Table 31. ANOVA on these 
data revealed an interaction of video by information (F (1,60) = 5.62, p < 0.05; 
see Figure 33) for which post-hoc Tukey tests revealed that, although there was 
no difference in terms of peripheral details, participants watching the threatening 
video were more accurate for central detail questions than were those watching 
the control video (p < 0.005).
Central Peripheral
Threat Exercise 
Threat Rest
59.77 (14.25) 
60.55 (13.25)
49.54 (9.74) 
49.31 (9.44)
Threat Total 60.16(13.54) 49.42 (9.44)
Control Exercise 
Control Rest
48.33 (15.11) 
52.50(12.38
47.55 (6.35)
51.12(8.22)
Control Total 50.42 (13.75) 49.33 (7.45)
Table 31: Mean percentage (SD) accuracy o f central and peripheral 4AFC 
recognition questions.
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Figure 33: Mean percentage 4AFC recognition accuracy as a junction o f 
information and incident type.
Further classification, according to which of the two intruders the questions 
referred, revealed no significant differences. Finally, the questions were grouped 
according to whether they related to action, verbal or appearance details (see 
Table 32). ANOVA conducted on these data revealed an interaction of video by 
information type (F (1,60) = 5.78, p < 0.005; see Figure 34). Post-hoc Tukey tests 
revealed that the participants who watched the threat video were more accurate for 
action-related questions than were those who watched the control video (p < 
0 .001).
Action Verbal Appearance
Threat Exercise 
Threat Rest
72.16(15.02)
72.16(14.65)
36.88 (17.02) 
35.63 (10.31)
51.42(11.70) 
52.27 (12.08)
Total 72.16(14.59) 36.25 (13.85) 51.85(11.71)
Control Exercise 
Control Rest
53.98 (18.33) 
61.93(17.32)
34.38 (12.63)
34.38 (8.92)
50.85 (8.82) 
54.26 (8.38)
Total 57.96(18.00) 34.38 (10.76) 52.56 (8.64)
Table 32: Mean percentage (SD) accuracy o f action, verbal, and appearance 
recognition questions
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Figure 34: Mean percentage 4AFC recognition accuracy as a function of 
information and incident type.
Once again, to further analyse whether physiological arousal may have an impact 
upon recognition accuracy, Pearson Product-Moment correlations were 
conducted, but revealed no significant correlations. However, Spearman 
correlations of rated arousal whilst cycling with recognition accuracy revealed 
two significant correlation coefficients suggesting that the lower participants’ 
rated their arousal whilst cycling to be the lower their 4AFC recognition accuracy 
was for peripheral details (r = -.454, p < 0.01) and appearance details (r = -.368, p 
< 0.05). Inspection of the scatterplots associated with these correlations, however, 
reveals that they cannot be accepted as demonstrative or real relationships (see 
Appendix 11).
6.3.4 Identification
In line with Studies One and Two, witnesses’ identification decisions for the 
lineups were classified as correct or incorrect (see Table 33).
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In terms of lineup 1 (Intruder 1), a three-way log-linear analysis involving video, 
arousal and decision types was conducted but revealed no significant relationships 
(see Appendix 10).
In terms of lineup 2 (Intruder 2), cell sizes were too small to conduct reliable 
analysis across incident, witness and decision types. When the data are collapsed 
across arousal type, however, it is acceptable to make comparisons. Consequently, 
a two-way test of association was conducted across video and decision types,
but did not reveal a significant relationship.
Lineup 1 
Correct Incorrect
Lineup 2 
Correct Incorrect
Threat Exercise 
Threat Rest
6 10 7 9
7 9 6 10
Threat Total 13 19 13 19
Control Exercise 
Control Rest
7 9 2 14
6 10 5 11
Control Total 13 19 7 25
Table 33: Number o f correct and incorrect identification decisions.
Finally, Point-biserial correlations were conducted across the exercise witnesses. 
However, no significant correlation coefficients were revealed when heart rate 
during and after the incident (standardized residual values of the heart rate data in 
order to take account of baseline heart rate values), as well as rated arousal whilst 
cycling were conelated with identification decision.
6.4 Discussion
The finding of no significant interaction between level of arousal and either the 
type of video-taped incident viewed or the type of information viewed, suggests 
that level of physiological arousal, as induced via exercise, does not influence
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memory. In addition, physiological arousal was not found to be correlated with 
any of the memory measures, further suggesting that physiological arousal does 
not influence memory.
Whilst physiological arousal does not appear to have influenced memory, those 
watching the video-tape of the threatening incident showed significantly enhanced 
recognition memory for central and action related details in comparison to those 
watching the video-taped control incident, suggesting that something inherent in 
the differing nature of the threatening incident relative to the control incident 
exerted a facilitating effect upon participants’ memories.
6.4.1 Influence of physiological arousal
In terms of the success of the manipulation, objective and self-report checks 
confirmed that exercise was successfully used to create participant groups 
significantly higher in physiological arousal than resting groups, both during and 
immediately after the presentation of the video-taped stimuli. By inducing 
physiological arousal via a source un-associated with the to-be-remembered 
material, it was possible, therefore, to investigate whether physiological arousal 
exerts an influence upon memory in the absence of psychological arousal such as 
perceived threat. On this basis, if physiological arousal may affect memory on its’ 
own, we would have expected to see differences between those exercising and 
those resting, irrespective of whether they watched the video-tape of the 
threatening or control incident.
However, the failure to find any effects of exercise, or physiological arousal, 
across witnesses to both video-taped incidents, suggests that level of physiological 
arousal, as induced via exercise, does not influence memory. Furthermore, in line 
with the findings of Studies One and Two, physiological arousal was not found to 
correlate with any of the memory measures.
A possible counter explanation which could be leveled against this interpretation, 
however, relates to the fact that as the aroused participants were cycling, they may
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have been less able to devote as much attention to the video-taped incidents as 
were the participants sitting on the bicycle but not cycling. On this basis, it could 
be argued that any facilitating effects of physiological arousal might have been 
mitigated, serving to reduce the memory performance of those exercising to a 
level more like that of the resting participants. Although this is a valid alternative 
explanation, in this study whilst the participants cycling rated themselves as 
having devoted more attention to the bicycle, they did not consequently rate 
themselves as having devoted less attention to the video-taped incident.
The finding of no influence of physiological arousal upon memory is directly in 
line with the findings of Study Two presented within Chapter Five and with the 
small amount of existing research investigating this relationship. Specifically, 
Christianson & Mjomdal (1985) found no subsequent memory differences for a 
control series of slides when participants were differentially aroused via injection 
with either adrenalin or saline. Similarly, in a slight variation of their earlier work 
Christianson et al. (1986) found that, whilst physiological and self-report data 
showed participants injected with adrenalin and shown a neutral slide series were 
aroused to an equivalent level as participants injected with saline and shown facial 
injury slides, those shown the facial injury slides and injected with saline 
performed below those injected with adrenalin and shown neutral slides when 
tested using a recall memory test for the verbal descriptors associated with the 
slide sequences.
In short, the results of this study provide further evidence to suggest that 
physiological arousal un-associated with the to-be-remembered event has neither a 
debilitating nor facilitating influence upon memory
6.4.2 Relationship between physiological and psychological arousal 
Despite manipulating a difference in physiological arousal between participants 
exercising and those simply sitting on the bicycle, no differences were revealed on 
the Stress or Arousal Scale of the MacKay Mood Adjective Checklist, suggesting 
that psychological arousal and physiological arousal are not the same.
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Furthermore, correlations were conducted across the exercising witnesses to see 
whether participants’ physiological arousal during the videos was correlated with 
the measures of rated arousal whilst cycling or rated attention devoted to watching 
the video and none of the correlations proved to be significant, further suggesting 
that they are not related.
These findings are directly in line with both Studies One and Two, where patterns 
of psychological arousal among the witness groups were not found to mirror 
patterns of physiological arousal, and measures of the two arousal types were not 
found to correlate. As discussed in Chapter Five, this is not necessarily as 
expected, as one might predict that witnesses rating themselves higher in arousal, 
would also be higher in physiological arousal. Arguably, this highlights the 
problem of using introspective self-reports to measure cognitive affect. The extent 
to which one individual rates affect or places a criterion level between feeling 
aroused or un-aroused, for example, may vary considerably. This highlights the 
importance of using objective manipulation checks.
Brigham et al. (1983), which appears to be the only other eyewitness study which 
has made an attempt to correlate physiological and psychological arousal 
measures, also failed to find a relationship between three different measures of 
physiological and self-reported arousal.
6.4.3 Differential interest
Importantly, those viewing the video-tapes of the threatening and control 
incidents did not differ in terms of their self-reported anger or perceived threat 
experienced whilst viewing the incidents, although they did differ in physiological 
arousal both during and immediately after viewing the video-taped incidents. 
Whilst this is an unfortunate confound manifest in this study, based on the finding 
of no difference between participants exercising and those resting, either within or 
between incidents, it would appear that the memory differences observed between 
participants viewing the two different incidents are not a function of physiological 
arousal.
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Participants in the control condition were, however, found to be higher in state 
arousal than those in the threat condition. Based on the findings that those viewing 
the threat video-tape demonstrated superior memory to those viewing the control 
video-tape, this could mean that the control group’s higher state arousal had a 
debilitating effect upon their memory. However, existing research suggests that 
subjects higher in state anxiety may deploy attention towards threat-related stimuli 
(MacLeod, Mathews & Tata, 1986; MacLeod & Mathews, 1988). As the control 
condition incident was not rated as more threatening or stressful in comparison to 
the threatening condition incident it is argued that in this study state arousal most 
likely had no influence upon the memories of participants within the control 
condition.
Fundamentally, it would appear that in the study presented here the threatening 
video-taped incident may have been inherently more unusual, interesting or 
attention catching in some way relative to the control video-taped incident. This is 
an enlightening finding and calls into question the findings of existing research 
into the effects of emotion upon memory which has presented participant groups 
with stimuli which are, at least in part, different (e.g., Christianson & Loftus,
1987; Christianson & Loftus, 1991; Clifford & Hollin, 1981; Heuer & Reisberg, 
1990; Kebeck & Lohaus, 1986). Where the results of such studies have been 
interpreted to suggest that differences in memory performance reflect differing 
emotion or arousal levels, often without supporting evidence from manipulation 
checks, any differences in memory performance may actually have been due to 
something inherently more unusual, attention catching or simply more interesting 
about the emotional stimuli relative to the neutral stimuli.
Indeed, this may explain why Christianson et al. (1986) found that, despite no 
difference in level of physiological arousal, participants injected with saline and 
presented with slides of facial injuries performed differently than participants 
injected with adrenalin and shown a neutral slide series. Arguably, differential 
interest in the facial injuiy slides may have accounted for the poorer memory
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performance of participants viewing them. Indeed, as memory for verbal 
descriptors accompanying the slides was tested, the results suggest that 
participants may have spent more time looking at the facial injury slides to the 
detriment of the descriptors. Had memory for the facial injury slides been tested, 
participants may have demonstrated a superior memory performance.
In support of the findings of the study presented here, while it has been shown 
that people fixate more often and for a longer duration on emotional information 
(Loftus et al., 1987), research has also demonstrated that objects which are 
incongruous result in earlier, more frequent, and longer eye fixations than more 
probable or congruous objects do. For example, Loftus & Mackworth (1978) 
demonstrated that participants fixated more often and for a longer duration on an 
octopus in a farm scene than they did usual farm animals.
Furthermore, Mitchell et al. (1998) found that, in line with a weapon focus style 
phenomena, participants who watched a videotaped scene in which a stick of 
celery was brandished were actually poorer at remembering details of the 
perpetrator’s appearance than when participants saw a gun brandished, thus 
showing that it is possible to produce a similar ‘weapon focus effect’ by using 
unusual or novel but non-threatening objects.
Christianson & Loftus (1991) specifically set out to explore the effects of the 
unusualness or novelty of information on memory. They conducted a series of 
studies where participants were presented with a slide sequence in which the 
middle slide varied according to three different conditions; a neutral condition, in 
which the middle slide depicted a woman riding a bicycle; an emotional 
condition, in which the middle slide depicted an injured woman lying on the 
ground beside a bicycle, or an unusual condition, in which the middle slide 
depicted a woman carrying a bicycle upside down on her shoulder. In terms of 
recalling the central details of the slides, participant witnesses performed equally 
well in all three conditions, although this was associated with reduced recall of 
peripheral details in both the emotional and unusual conditions.
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When participant witnesses’ memories were tested for only the different middle 
slide in each sequence, however, the unusual group performed poorer on both 
central and peripheral information in comparison to the emotional group who still 
performed better on central information with an associated reduction in recall for 
the peripheral information.
Christianson and Loftus interpreted these results to suggest that, in contrast to the 
neutral condition, in both the emotional and unusual conditions attention was 
drawn away from the peripheral or background information in the slides to the 
central information. They suggest that for the critical slide, participants in the 
unusual condition were poorer on central details as well as peripheral details 
because they may have spent more time elaborating on the event itself, such as 
why someone would be caiTying a bicycle on their shoulder, whereas the 
emotional group may have elaborated more about the actual woman lying injured 
on the ground rather than the event per se. In support of this, reports provided by 
participants suggested that differential elaboration occurred depending on whether 
they viewed the emotional, unusual or neutral slide sequence. In particular, those 
viewing the unusual condition slides indicated that, although they were as 
concerned about the central action of the critical slide as the emotional group 
were, they were less specific concerning elaboration about the woman in the 
slides.
The memory measures utilised in this study were, however, only focused on recall 
for the colour of coat the woman was wearing (classified as a central detail) and 
the colour of a car in the background (classified as a peripheral detail). Hence, this 
did not enable a detailed measure of memory to be made. In addition, it suggests 
that the colour of the woman’s coat was central detail information. Based upon 
definitions used in other studies this would have been termed peripheral 
information not central to the basic story line (e.g., Heuer & Reisberg, 1990).
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Critically, however, what is highlighted by the study presented here and the small 
amount of existing research is that, while emotion may exert an influence upon 
memory, in order to be able to infer whether differences in memory are in fact 
due to the emotional or arousing nature of stimuli rather than other confounding 
factors such as differential interest, future research should take care to ensure that 
confounds associated with the use of different stimuli are removed and that 
comparisons are made within experimental conditions rather than between them.
6.4.4 Personal involvement
As set out at the beginning of this chapter, another facet of this study is the 
possibility to review live-event versus video-tape presentation methodologies. For 
example, comparison of the findings of Studies One and Two, where participants 
experienced the threatening incident as a live-event, with the findings of this 
study, where participants view the threatening incident via video-tape, may 
provide insight into the potential effects of personal involvement upon memory.
Firstly, it was predicted that if memory differences emerged between participants 
viewing the threatening and control video-tapes, these would probably be in the 
form of enhanced memory for central details associated with a decrement in 
performance for more peripheral detail, in line with existing laboratory research, 
as the participants were not personally involved with the incident.
In contrast, while there were no differences concerning the percentage of available 
details recalled or the accuracy of those details, participants viewing the video­
tape of the threatening incident showed superior recognition memory overall as 
well as for central and action details, but without a detriment to their recognition 
memory for peripheral details.
Interestingly, then, even though the participants in this study were not personally 
involved, the results differ from existing studies where participants have also not 
been personally involved (i.e., studies of visually-induced arousal), which have 
tended to demonstrate that enhanced memory for central details is to the detriment
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of memory for peripheral details (Burke et al, 1992; Christianson & Loftus, 1987; 
Safer et al, 1998).
Enhanced memory for central details without detriment to peripheral details has 
only been reported in two other laboratory study of visually-induced arousal 
(Christianson, 1984; Heuer & Reisberg, 1990). However, although Heuer & 
Reisberg (1990) found a memory advantage for peripheral details, it was not 
directly attributable to the arousal-inducing aspects of the slide presentation 
employed, but was instead confined to the slides presented after the critical 
arousal-inducing phase.
A possible explanation for the threat group’s memoiy maintenance for peripheral 
details obsei*ved in the study presented here, is that the style of the incidents was 
somewhat novel and may therefore have attracted the participants’ attention. 
Specifically, the video-taped incidents were novel on that they were both in the 
style of someone speaking to the camera (or to the viewer). As a result, 
participants may have tried to work out what was going on and whether the 
individual on the screen was saying anything of particular relevance for them.
This may have resulted in facilitated memory maintenance for peripheral details.
In terms of comparison to the personally involved participants in Studies One and 
Two, there are two main contrasts. First, is the lack of memory differences 
concerning the percentage of available details recalled. In Studies One and Two 
witnesses within the threatening condition recalled a higher percentage of 
available details overall and a higher percentage of available action details.
This most likely reflects that, as the participants in this study were not personally 
involved with the stimulus incident, their motivation to recall as many details as 
possible was diminished. However, when ‘forced’ to make choices during the 
recognition test, they may have retrieved information they had not been motivated 
to report during the earlier recall test. This highlights the importance of using 
recall tests to measure the content and form of participant’s spontaneous recall as
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well as recognition tests to measure memory in a more detailed form less affected 
by motivation or report bias.
When recognition memory is considered, then, the second difference of interest is 
apparent. Whilst the personally involved participants within the threatening 
condition of Studies One and Two demonstrated superior memory overall and for 
action details, they did not demonstrate superior memory for central details as did 
the participants viewing the threatening video-tape in the study presented here.
This potentially reinforces the suggestion made in Chapter Five that when 
witnesses are personally involved, depending on the precise nature of the incident, 
they may specifically demonstrate superior memory for action details rather than 
central details as a whole, as these may contain the information most important to 
the witness (i.e., ongoing level of threat and chance of attack). As participants in 
the study presented here were not personally involved, they may not have 
concentrated on actions to the same extent as they would not necessarily have 
been the most important information to them. Hence, their superior memory for 
central details as well as action details relative to participants viewing the control 
incident video-tape.
Interestingly, if this postulation proves to be correct, there would appear to be a 
role for psychological mechanisms in mediating an influence of emotion upon 
memory. Specifically, if superior memory for actions, rather than central details 
as a whole, reflects a witness’s attention to the information most important to 
them, this would suggest that a cognitive interpretation is guiding attention and/or 
elaboration.
6.4.5 Theoretical implications
In line with Studies One and Two presented within Chapter Five, it appears that 
physiological arousal may not directly influence eyewitness memory. Further 
questioning the inclusion of a physiological component within the tripartite model 
of arousal and memory proposed in Chapter Four.
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Furtheraiore, the findings of the study presented here provides additional evidence 
to contrast with Gold’s Neuro-Biological theory (Gold, 1986; 1992). Critically, 
the findings of this study do not suggest that an enhanced level of physiological 
arousal results in the storage of more detailed memories.
However, as concluded within Chapter Five, before rejecting physiological 
arousal from the model, ftirther corroborating studies are required in order to fully 
understand whether physiological arousal has a role to play in mediating the 
effects of emotion upon memory. Indeed, future research concerning the effects of 
glucose on human memory may serve to clarify the existing discrepancy in 
research findings concerning the influence of physiological arousal upon memory.
With regards to the roles of psychological arousal and motivation, however, it 
would appear that personal involvement with an incident may influence memory 
in a different manner than when participants are not personally involved. 
Consequently, although this research shows that memory differences may not 
necessarily be due to psychological arousal, it remains possible that psychological 
arousal may directly influence memory. Furthermore, the apparent memory 
difference between participants personally involved with a target stimulus and 
those not personally involved, suggests that motivation may also be an important 
factor.
6.4.6 Methodological considerations andfuture research 
A possible criticism of the present study concerns the fact that the video-taped 
incidents were both in the style of someone speaking to the camera. The rationale 
behind this was to place the participants in this experiment in the same viewing 
position as those who experienced the incidents first-hand in the earlier 
experiments, thus ensuring that we used the same style of stimuli that we knew to 
be threatening or control in affect when experienced first-hand. However, in this 
manner it may have taken the participants a few seconds to understand what was 
happening. While it could be argued that this might have interfered with the 
participants ability to encode the information initially, all participants were
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exposed to the same type of stimulus. Hence, this should not have interfered with 
the observation of significant effects and interactions.
It is suggested that future research would benefit from greater methodological 
variation. In particular, on the basis that the study presented here employed video­
tapes and previous research by Christianson & Mjorndal (1985) and Christianson 
et al. (1986) employed slides, it would be interesting to investigate memory for a 
live-interaction or event where physiological arousal is manipulated via a source 
un-associated with the to-be-remembered event. Similarly, whilst some research 
using eye fixations has considered the aspects of the stimulus an ay witnesses 
attend to, it is argued that further work using this methodology should be 
conducted in order to advance understanding concerning the precise attentional 
and elaborative mechanisms engaged in when experiencing an emotionally 
arousing incident. For example, inducing physiological arousal through exercise 
and adrenalin and measuring the nature of attentional activity through eye-fixation 
methodology.
Critically, if we are to understand the influence of emotion upon memory, more 
research effort needs to be devoted to trying to understand the particular role of 
potential influencing factors.
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Chapter 7
Eyewitness Memory for Actions using CCTV Recordings of 
Actual Crimes: An Exploratory Assessment
7.1 Introduction
As revealed in chapter three, the few studies that have examined actual eyewitness 
memory, have been only partially successful in achieving a necessary balance 
between external and internal validity. Fundamentally, they have been unable to 
assess eyewitness accuracy, having instead relied upon measures of the amount of 
details or the consistency of reporting as indicators of eyewitness performance. 
Clearly, in order for further progress to be made in this field information 
concerning real eyewitness accuracy is required.
It is argued that the present study, which makes use of the latest community 
policing technology (i.e., closed circuit television or CCTV), uniquely attempts to 
address this issue and, in doing so, offers a method which could result in advances 
to our understanding of eyewitness memory. In particular, it is argued that the 
recent implementation of closed-circuit television (CCTV) into many major towns 
and cities provides a potential method of overcoming these fundamental 
problems. CCTV provides visually recorded accounts of real crimes against which 
witnesses’ memories can then be compared, thus enabling eyewitness accuracy to 
be reliably and objectively assessed. In particular, where existing studies on actual 
eyewitness memory struggle to assess accuracy for action details, these in 
particular are preserved on video tape thereby providing an objective record 
against which to score accuracy. By utilizing CCTV recordings it is possible to 
obtain a similar level of control enjoyed by experimental studies of eyewitness 
performance and yet have the external validity traditionally associated only with 
field studies. In addition, given that incidents are captured on video-tape, they can 
also be objectively coded for level of violence. While this does not provide us
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with a measure of how aroused a particular witness was during an incident, it does 
offer for the first time an alternative to retrospective self-report assessments of the 
actual level of violence employed which are based upon memory.
In the study presented here a sample of assault cases were selected (with the 
assistance of Central Scotland Police Force). Each case comprises a set of witness 
statements and a CCTV recording in which all witnesses (victims and bystanders) 
were centrally located. Most importantly, perhaps, the data derived from the 
combined use of actual witness statements and CCTV recordings of actual crimes 
allows the first objective assessment of eyewitness memory for action details in 
real crimes.
7.2 Method
7.2.1 Selection o f cases
Case selection was influenced by a number of factors. First, from a legal 
perspective it was required that cases selected were not sub judice, i.e., not 
pending trial or awaiting further judicial action. Second, in order to allow 
comparison of victims with bystanders, cases where statements had been made by 
at least one victim and one bystander were selected as far as possible. In order to 
maximize the homogeneity and consequent comparability of cases, only 
assault/and or breach of the peace incidents were selected, i.e., incidents which 
involved direct witness threat or intimidation. Importantly, this also allowed us to 
look at witnesses’ accounts of perpetrators which the study of other crime types 
(e.g., property crime) would not have permitted us to do so readily. Searching for 
appropriate target incidents proved to be very time consuming. Limited police 
time and resources meant that the final sample size was constrained to 8 incidents 
of assault and/or breach of the peace as charged by officers of Central Scotland 
Police. The crime type classification given to a particular incident depends on a 
range of factors including the level of proof required in order to bring a successful 
prosecution. Thus, although the 8 target incidents vary in crime classification,
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they all have in common the fact that they involved violent behaviour which was 
directed towards a person or persons.
All the incidents occurred in the town of Stirling during 1996-97. Each comprised 
a CCTV video-tape of the original incident and accompanying witness statements 
taken by the police immediately following the incidents. This provided a total of 
19 statements (9 victim and 10 bystander witnesses) for detailed analysis. This 
compares favourably with other similar studies in the field (e.g., Cutshall &
Yuille, 1989; Yuille & Cutshall, 1986). All of the witnesses in the present study 
were Caucasian and comprised 3 females and 16 males ranging in age from 17 to 
45 years with a mean age of 26.4 years and only four of the witnesses were older 
than 28 years. This reflects the fact that most incidents involving assault or breach 
of the peace tend to involve young males. Information concerning any 
relationships between witnesses (i.e., familial, friend, or no relationship) was also 
recorded.
In order to estimate the degree of affect associated with each incident, details of 
weapon presence (actual or implied) including any details of weapon type were 
documented. Details concerning the extent of any physical injury to the victim 
were also documented by utilizing Doctor’s reports concerning injuries sustained 
by victims (available in four of the eight cases), along with any self-reported 
details about injuries sustained or other psychological or physiological 
consequences of having been a witness to the incident.
As well as this ‘documentary’ evidence, seven independent raters (the researcher 
plus 6 serving police officers, comprising 3 males and 4 females with a mean age 
35.9 years) assessed the degree of affect associated with each incident. After 
viewing each CCTV recording, raters were asked to judge the following: how 
violent they perceived the incident to have been; the overall extent of any injuries; 
whether they thought the incident had any emotional effect upon the victims; and 
whether they thought the incident had any emotional effect upon the non-victim 
witnesses. Each rating was made on a 6-point scale (1 = not at all to 6 =
205
extremely). In addition, after viewing and rating each incident separately, the 
raters were asked to rank all the incidents from most to least serious (see Table 
35). The mean level of agreement across raters was high (r = .81).
Case Rated
violence
Rated 
extent of 
any injuries
Rated 
emotional 
effect upon 
victims
Rated 
emotional 
effect upon 
bystanders
Ranked 
seriousness 
(1 = most, 
8 = least)
1 5.86 4.57 4.57 4.93 1
2 3.57 2.71 3.00 3.25 3
3 2.00 1.14 1.57 1.61 8
4 3.71 2.43 3.34 3.07 4
5 2.43 1.29 1.43 1.61 7
6 3.86 3.00 3.00 2.96 2
7 2.86 3.14 2.86 2.61 5
8 2.57 2.00 2.14 2.14 6
Table 35: Mean ratings o f incident impact and ranked seriousness.
7.2.2 Scoring procedure
First, any referents (i.e., names identifying actual individuals involved in the cases 
were removed from the statements). Each statement was then edited (removal of 
hesitancies, repetitions etc.), parsed into separate sentences and scored according 
to the statement analysis procedure originally set out by Yuille & Cutshall (1986) 
and utilised for Studies One and Two within this thesis. To recap, this method 
assigns 1 point to every specific item of information. For example, the statement 
“picked up the glass and threw it” contains three separate items of information; 
“picked up”, “the glass” and “threw it”. Similarly, the statement “kicked him in 
the head” contains three separate items; “kicked”, “him” and “in the head”. Each 
witness statement was scored in this manner according to four types of 
information: (a) action descriptions, (b) object descriptions (e.g., weapons), (c) 
perpetrator descriptions and, (d) verbal descriptions. Each classifiable item of 
inforaiation was scored as being either accurate, inaccurate or confabulated.
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Consistent with Yuille & Cutshall (1986), estimates of confidence such as “I 
think” or “he might have” were not weighted. As only one incident involved any 
form of weapon (accounting for a total of only 3 reported items), object details 
were included in the analysis of total recall but not included in the more detailed 
analysis conducted for each information category.
Clearly, there are probably as many ways of classifying the content of witness 
statements as there are questions that could be asked of the data. The final choice 
of categories used in any content analysis, therefore, has to maintain a balance 
between reliability and utility. High reliability can be achieved by using simple 
forms of content analysis but this often means that any such coding is essentially 
mechanical. In contrast, the use of more complex units of analysis is likely to 
produce more useful but less reliable results. Thus, when conducting any research 
that involves this level of analysis, one is forced to consider the context of the 
given research question and to strike a balance between the reliability and quality 
of answers desired. While it is acknowledged that the information contained in 
the witness statements could have been coded in a number of different ways, I am 
confident that the scoring procedure adopted in this research and derived from 
Yuille & Cutshall’s (1986) work provides the best balance between these 
competing demands. A full breakdown of the details reported for each case is 
provided in Appendix 12.
7.3 Results |
Psychological research in the field of eyewitness testimony is, for the most part, ^
concerned with the production of normative data about the ‘average’ witness j
(Sheldon and MacLeod, 1991). The criminal courts, in contrast, are concerned I
with issues pertaining to specific cases and specific witnesses. Thus, the probative 
value of much psycholegal research in this field has been questioned by members 
of the legal profession who consider psychology to be ‘ill-equipped for the study 
of the uniqueness of the witness’ (Stone, 1984). In the present study, therefore, 
two kinds of analyses were undertaken: the first is concerned with data from
■I
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individual witnesses to specific incidents while the second takes a more traditional 
nomological approach.
7.3.1 Case by case analysis
7.3.L I  Case 1 
Background
The videotape clip available for analysis (40 seconds duration) started shortly 
after the attack commenced. The incident was rated as being the most violent of 
the 8 cases described in this article and involved an attack by two youths on two 
other youths at 1.30 am in a street in the town centre. At a street corner, one 
perpetrator knocked his victim to the ground, stamped upon his head several times 
and, finally, whilst the victim was still lying on the ground, kicked him sharply in 
the front of his face. Leaving his victim lying on the ground, the perpetrator 
joined his friend in punching and kicking the second victim approximately 4 
metres further down the street in a shop doorway. A bystander went to the aid of 
the victim lying on the ground at the street corner, at which point the police 
arrived. In terms of injury, the individual whose head had been repeatedly kicked 
and stamped upon suffered bruising on both sides of his head as well as a 
fractured nose and was detained in hospital overnight for observation. The second 
victim, attacked in the shop doorway, suffered vomiting and reported not being 
able to remember events either before or after the attack. From the CCTV footage 
it could be seen that the incident was watched by 4 male bystanders plus 1 witness 
who intervened to help the victim lying on the ground. Statements were obtained 
by the police from the 4 male bystander witnesses immediately after the incident 
occurred.
Analysis
From Table 36 it can be seen that in all of the witness statements there was a clear 
emphasis on reporting action details (86.7%). This is most likely because the 
police arrived and arrested the individuals involved. Consequently, they would not 
have required detailed descriptions of the assailants’ appearance. The small
2 0 8
number of appearance related details that were reported, however, were not 
always classifiable because of the colour contrast of the CCTV recording for this 
case. In areas of lower light levels CCTV cameras are monochrome as this 
provides a clearer image than would a colour camera under the same conditions. 
As a result, any descriptions of clothing colour could not be classified (total of 3 
details). All of the classifiable information reported was 100% accurate. All four 
witnesses described the “head stamping” aspect of the incident. Whilst this could 
be attributed to the police specifically probing for information concerning this 
aspect, two witnesses reported specifically focusing their attention on this due to 
its particularly violent nature. For example, one witness reported: “I was paying 
more attention to the fight occurring at the end of the street as it seemed more 
vicious”. A second reported, “I concentrated my attention on the two fighting at 
the comer of the street”. This focus of attention would most likely have been to 
the detriment of details about the other fight occurring in the shop doorway only a 
few yards away. Indeed, both of these witnesses also reported feeling confident 
that they would be able to identify the two fighting at the street comer but not the 
two fighting in the shop doorway.
Case 1 Witnesses Action All
Details Details
1 B 26 31
Total details reported 2 B 37 43
3 B 27 31
4 B 27 30
Mean 29.25 33.75
1 B 46.15 48.39
Per cent unclassifiable 2 B 40.54 48.84
3 B 22.22 29.03
4 B 33.33 33.33
Mean 35.90 40.74
Table 36: Information reported by witnesses to police for case L
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Background
On the way home from a public house at 1.20 am, a family was approached by 
four youths. Both the father and son were physically attacked by the youths whilst 
the mother and son’s girlfriend tried to dissipate the situation. One aggressor 
picked up two pint-sized glasses from the pavement and attacked the son. The son 
moved along the street a few metres and went behind a high wall momentarily out 
of camera shot. The aggressor threw both pint glasses at the son. The son then ran 
out from behind the wall back into the view of the camera. At this point the father 
spotted the CCTV camera and beckoned to it with his arms. Throughout the 
incident one of the three youths didn’t physically attack anyone although a large 
amount of veiy explicit arm waving suggested he was heavily involved in the 
instigation and perpetuation of the situation. At this point the available CCTV 
footage for this incident ended. According to the witness and police statements, 
however, at this point the two main aggressors left the scene in a taxi, leaving the 
non-physical aggressor behind. A few moments later the police arrived and 
arrested this person. Details of witnesses’ statements were obtained by the police 
from the father, son and mother immediately after the incident occurred. In terms 
of injury, a doctor’s report concerning the son’s injuries stated that loose glass 
was found in his hair as well as evidence of facial grazing, bruising and swelling.
Analysis
In this particular case, the mother reported only approximately half the total 
number of details reported by either the father or son (see Table 37). Whilst there 
are a number of reasons for this, it is most likely that the police did not probe for 
further information from her as they also had detailed statements from the primary 
witnesses. As with Case 1, monochrome CCTV recording of the incident 
prevented classification of five appearance details. From the police statements, it 
was also apparent that prior to the assault actually occurring, there was a period of 
verbal interaction concerning whether the father knew the principal perpetrator.
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This appears to have resulted in a slightly higher amount of verbal details reported 
for this particular incident. Whilst the verbal details reported by each of the three 
witnesses corroborated each other, their accuracy could not be assumed on the 
basis of this and they were consequently scored as unclassifiable. Of those details 
that were classifiable, they were assessed as being 100% accurate.
Case 2 Witnesses Action All
Details Details
1 B 23 24
Total details reported 2 V 41 49
3 V 57 77
Mean 40.33 50.00
1 B 34.78 37.50
Per cent unclassifiable 2 V 56.10 63.27
3 V 47.37 55.84
Mean 47.93 55.33
Table 37: Information reported by witnesses to police for case 2.
7.3,1.3 Case 3 
Background.
This incident occurred within a hospital Accident and Emergency department at 
3.30 am. The CCTV footage begun with three individuals sitting in a row in a 
waiting area facing a reception desk and the CCTV camera. A man and woman 
came into view at the left hand side of the camera who were clearly arguing, 
pushing and shoving each other. Two nurses then appeared and attempted to calm 
everyone down. The man and woman had a firm grip upon one another and a 
hospital porter arrived to help separate them. The footage then ended. The taping 
of the incident lasted only 60 seconds and no injuries were sustained. Witness 
statements were obtained from two nurses who viewed the incident from behind
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the reception desk, including the nurse who pushed a panic button specifically set 
up to alert the police to such incidents.
Analysis
The number of details reported for this particular incident was the lowest for all 
the incidents studied (see Table 38). This is most likely because it was very short 
and involved no physical injury. The statements predominantly contained action 
details, specifically those corroborating the information captured in the CCTV 
recording. The level of unclassifiable information recalled by witness 2 was 
particularly high as her statement contained details of pressing the panic button 
which occuned beyond the view of the camera and consequently could not be 
reliably verified. Once again, classifiable details were coded as being 100% 
accurate.
Case 3 Witnesses Action All
Details Details
Total details reported 1 B 10 13
2 B 11 16
Mean 10.50 14.50
Per cent unclassifiable 1 B 20.00 3&46
2 B 72.73 81.25
Mean 47.73 62.07
Table 38: Information reported by witnesses to police for Case 3,
7.5.1.4 Case 4 
Background
The footage starts with a man and a woman standing on a pavement engaged in an 
argument. The female was the main aggressor whilst the male was acting in a 
non-retaliatory manner. The female repeatedly tried to push the male and, having 
not got any response, took hold of his head and repeatedly tried to head butt and 
kick him. Eventually, the female left the man alone and turned around. She 
noticed two young men walking along the pavement towards them. Suddenly the
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female, and the male with whom she was originally fighting, attacked the two 
young men walking along the pavement. They stumbled into the roadway. Victim 
1 managed to push the female off relatively easily and moved over to where his 
friend (victim 2) was rolling around on the ground with the other male. Two male 
passersby came over to intervene and break up the incident. They managed to 
separate the individuals and move them over to the pavement where they 
continued to talk. At this point the videotape ended. The police interviewed the 
two male victims.
Analysis
Of all 8 cases examined in this study, this is the only one in which all the details 
reported pertained to actions (see Table 39). This is most likely because the police 
arrived and arrested both peipetrators. Consequently, when interviewing the 
victims they would simply have required details of actions to corroborate 
information on the CCTV recording in order to ensure that there was sufficient 
evidence to secure a conviction of assault. Once again, accuracy rate for the 
classifiable material was found to be 100%.
Case 4 Witnesses Action All
Details Details
Total details reported 1 V 30 30
2 V 27 27
Mean 28.50 2&50
Per cent unclassifiable 1 V 50.00 50.00
2 V 44.44 44.44
Mean 47.37 47.37
Table 39: Information reported by witnesses to police for case 4.
7.3. L 5 Case 5 
Background
The recording commenced with two young male cousins standing at a bank cash 
machine just before 2.00 am. They were standing with their backs to the machine
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facing two other young men, one of whom is described in the witnesses’ 
statements as allegedly having asked for some money. There was some verbal 
interaction during which one of the young men at the cash machine was punched 
in the jaw. The victim did not respond in any manner, later reporting that he was 
aware of the CCTV cameras. In the statements it appears that the victim was also 
punched at an earlier point in the incident but this could not be verified. The 
incident recording lasted only 20 seconds.
Analysis
The CCTV recording for this case was the shortest of all eight studied. Whilst all 
classifiable details were found to be accurate, a high proportion of the details 
reported were unclassifiable as the recording appeared to have captured only the 
latter half of the incident (see Table 40).
Case 5 Witnesses Action All
Details Details
Total details reported 1 V 19 28
2 B 21 28
Mean 20.00 28.00
Per cent unclassifiable 1 V 63.16 7T43
2 B 61.90 71.43
Mean 62.50 71.43
Table 40: Information reported by witnesses to police for case 5.
As with cases 1 and 2, the CCTV recording was monochrome, against which 
colour of clothing could not be classified. The seven appearance details are 
accounted for by descriptions of both the peipetrator’s shirt and jacket colours 
reported as a means of distinguishing between the two perpetrators.
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7,3.1.6 Case 6 
Background
This incident occurred just after midnight. The CCTV footage started during the 
middle of a fight between two young men. The young men were seen fighting 
behind a low wall and emerged into full view from behind some trees. They 
moved into the centre of what appeared to be a small car park and stumbled to the 
ground where they continued fighting. One male was lying on the ground whilst 
another repeatedly punched him in the head and neck region. A third male was 
present but did not intervene. Whilst the males were on the ground, a male and 
female police officer ran from around the comer and broke up the incident. They 
were closely followed by a police van and two further police officers. Several 
blows to the face and body were sustained by one individual who appeared to be 
trying to fight the other off. The police arrested and interviewed both individuals 
involved in the fight.
Case 6 Witnesses Action All
Details Details
Total details reported 1 V 22 26
2 V 15 19
Mean 18.50 22.50
Per cent unclassifiable 1 V 63.64 6^23
2 V 33J3 47.37
Mean 51.35 60.00
Table 41: Information reported by witnesses to police for case 6.
Analysis
This incident was novel in that the perpetrators were also the victims of their own 
actions. Their data was scored as victims for analysis purposes. The high 
proportion of unclassifiable details for this incident are specifically accounted for 
by aspects which were occluded by a wall and trees during the fight (see Table 
41). Again, all classifiable details were found to be 100% accurate.
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7.5../. 7 7
Background
This incident occurred just before midnight. The footage commenced with 3 
young men at the side of a street. From police statements it appeared that the 
aggressor had asked the victim if he had any cigarettes. The victim indicated that 
he did not have any and the aggressor punched him on the nose, sending him 
backwards clutching his face as if his nose had been broken. The aggressor turned 
around and walked off up the street. Meanwhile the third individual lingered for a 
few moments and then walked off up the street after his friend. The incident 
lasted 60 seconds. The victim received medical treatment for bruising around his 
left eye. The police interviewed the victim and the bystander witness.
Analysis
This incident is the only one in the present article where the accuracy rate for 
classifiable material was not 100% (see Table 42).
Case 7 Witnesses Action All
Details Details
Total details reported 1 B 21 29
2 V 17 19
Mean 19.00 24^0
Per cent unclassifiable 1 B 2&57 4&28
2 V 29.41 36 84
Mean 28 95 4T75
Per cent accurate 1 B 66.67 6&67
2 V 58J3 5833
Mean 62 96 6296
Table 42: Information reported by witnesses to police for case 7.
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The accuracy rate fell to 58.3% for the victim and 66.7% for the bystander. This 
is solely because both the victim and the bystander confabulated aspects of their 
statements. The bystander, as a friend of the perpetrator, clearly had vested 
interests in protecting his friend. Consequently, his statement denied seeing his 
friend punch the victim. The victim, however, embellished the extent of his 
attack, reporting that he had been kicked to the ground and kicked twice in the 
ribs. In addition to the CCTV which clearly showed that this had not been the 
case, a subsequent medical examination indicated no evidence of abdominal 
bruising despite the victim reporting abdominal pain. This incident highlights the 
effects of inter-witness relationships and vested interests upon subsequent 
reporting.
7.3.L8 Case 8 
Background
This incident occurred at 1.30 am. The CCTV footage commenced with a large 
number of people standing at a taxi rank (a total of 19 individuals including 
perpetrators, victims and witnesses). One male was lying on the ground with his 
head hanging over the edge of the pavement. Five people were crouched around 
him trying to lift his upper body. Behind them there were 13 other individuals 
standing around. In this group there was an altercation between two males, one 
male said something to another and turned around as if to walk off. The other man 
appeared to make a response, and the first male turned around and punched the 
second male in the face sending him backwar ds slightly. The aggressor was pulled 
away and placated by two other males. He made a second attempt to attack the 
male he had just hit but was pulled further away by his friends. He started to walk 
away up the street. The footage ends at this point. From the footage it is not 
known how the male ended up lying on the pavement, although from the 
statements it appears that he was hit by a different male than the aggressor 
captured on the CCTV recording. The police inteiviewed the second individual 
who was punched and a bystander witness.
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Analysis
Classifiable details were found to be 100% accurate, with unclassifiable details 
primarily referring to the earlier incident which resulted in the first victim falling 
unconscious on the ground. As can be seen from Table 43, only a small number of 
the details were actually reported and most of these were action-based.
Case 8 Witnesses Action All
Details Details
Total details reported 1 B 9 9
2 V 11 17
Mean 10.00 13.00
Per cent unclassifiable 1 B 44.44 44.44
2 V 45.45 41.18
Mean 45.00 42.31
Table 43: Information reported by witnesses to police for case 8.
7,3,2 Aggregated data analysis
It is apparent from the aggregated data that there are relatively few differences 
between victims and bystanders both in terms of recall performance (Table 44) 
and amount of unclassifiable details reported (Table 45). Interestingly, this is 
directly in line with the findings of Studies One and Two, presented within 
Chapter Five. It is important to acknowledge, however, that this may be a 
reflection of standardised police interviewing and report technique than any 
inherent feature of the witnesses. It was also apparent that, while the CCTV 
recordings for each incident permitted ratings to be made regarding the violence 
associated with each incident and rankings computed as to their overall 
seriousness (Table 35), it proved difficult to interpret how incident violence may 
have affected recall accuracy. The fact that witnesses were performing at virtually 
ceiling level across all incidents may simply suggest that there was no effect of 
incident violence on recall accuracy. On the other hand, the lack of any effect may
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be due to the fact that all the incidents in the present study had involved some 
level of violence and therefore the data may represent some threshold effect. This, 
however, is an unlikely explanation given that a classification of incidents based 
on ratings of perceived seriousness of injury to victim (i.e., comparing incidents 1, 
2, 6 and 7 with incidents 3,4,5 and 8) revealed that significantly more action 
details were recalled in those incidents which were perceived as involving the 
most serious injuries (Mean = 28.18; SD = 11.54) compared to those involving 
the least serious injuries (Mean = 17.25; SD = 8.22), F(l,18) = 5.21, p<.05.
Action Appearance Object Verbal Total
Victims 26.22 1.78 033 4.11 32.44
(13.77) (3.11) (0) (3.69) (19.22)
Bystanders 21.20 1.20 0.00 3.00 25.40
(8.95) (1.48) (0) (3.01) (10.15)
Total 23.58 1.47 0.16 333 28.74
(11.48) (2 34) (0) (3 01) (15.12)
Table 44: Mean (SD) number o f total details reported.
What is certainly clear, is that there is no evidence in the present study (at least, 
on the basis of the criterion employed here for verifiable infonnation) that 
incident violence has any detrimental effect on memory performance. In fact, both 
victims and bystanders performed at very high levels of recall accuracy (96.19% 
and 96.27% respectively). In order to establish whether there is a graded 
relationship between level of violence and recall accuracy or whether there is a 
simple threshold effect, comparisons with witness memory for non-violent 
incidents would also be required. It is also worth noting, however, that despite the 
difficulties of interpretation in the present study the procedure set out may prove 
useful in future research where there is more variation in recall performance 
and/or where comparisons between recall performance for different crime types is 
deemed desirable.
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Action Appearance Verbal Total
Victims 48.39 40.74 100.00 53.29
(11.87) (35.72) (0) (12.40)
Bystanders 40.47 46.67 100.00 48.10
(16.75) (50.55) (0) (16.48)
Total 44.22 44.45 100.00 50.46
(14.81) (42.83) (0) (14.54)
Table 45: Unclassifiable details as a percentage o f total details reported (SD).
7.4 Discussion
This study represents the first reported attempt to assess the accuracy of actual 
eyewitness memory using a method whereby the content of witness statements 
given to the police was compared with target criminal episodes captured on 
CCTV. Despite the apparent homogeneity of the incidents examined (i.e., all 
incidents involved violence or threat of violence against a person or persons), the 
analyses of individual cases indicated considerable variation in both the total 
number of details (minimum 9 in Case 8 to a maximum 77 in Case 2) and the 
overall pattern of information reported (e.g., in Case 4, 100% of the details 
reported concerned actions whereas these made up only 71% of the total number 
of details recalled in Case 5). This case-by-case approach suggests that greater 
caution should perhaps be exercised regarding conclusions about eyewitness 
reliability where these conclusions have been based on the aggregated data 
derived from a number of cases.
In addition to the obvious dissimilarities between the cases examined, there is also 
one striking similarity; the fact that for all but one incident there was a 100% 
accuracy rate for those details that were classifiable (overall mean accuracy was 
96.1% for the combined eight cases). This finding contrasts starkly with that 
indicated by many laboratory studies which illustrate the inherent unreliability of 
eyewitness memory. However, we should be cautious about placing too much 
emphasis on the present finding as the percentage of unclassifiable material in 
witness statements varied from a minimum of 29% up to a maximum of 71.4%
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(mean proportion of unclassifiable details was 50.6%). This is an important 
consideration as the general failure to document the amount of unclassifiable 
material (e.g., Cutshall & Yuille’s restaurant and bread line shooting incidents,
1989) renders it impossible to derive any useful assessment of overall reliability. 
However, if we were to assume in the present study the unlikely event that all 
unclassifiable items were totally erroneous, this would take overall accuracy rate 
down to a mean of 45.5%. This is unlikely, however, given that witnesses were 
performing at virtually ceiling level for those details that were verifiable and that 
the verifiability of any item of information was dependent upon the physical and 
technical limitations of CCTV rather than the witnesses per se. If, however, we 
make a conservative estimate based on the notion that witnesses were performing 
at only chance level for the remaining unclassifiable items, this would take overall 
memory performance to 69.95% which still represents a higher memory 
performance than many laboratory-based studies of witness memory would 
suggest. Indeed, the present study bears a remarkable resemblance to that of other 
field-based studies which report high levels of eyewitness performance, e.g., 
Yuille & Cutshall (1986) and Cutshall & Yuille (Studies 1-3, 1989) reported 
mean accuracy rates ranging from 82.1% to 100% for witness reports given to the 
police immediately after the event (see Table 46).
Clearly, the fact that almost half the details recalled by witnesses in the present 
study were unclassifiable is less than optimal. However, this is largely a result of 
the very strict criterion adopted. Although other studies can claim higher 
proportions of classified details, the verification procedure employed tends to 
have been based upon reconstructions, interpretations, and/or details of suspects 
who had confessed (e.g., Cutshall & Yuille, 1989; Christianson & Hubinette, 
1993; Toliestiup, Turtle & Yuille, 1994; Yuille & Cutshall, 1986). The strict 
classification criterion employed in the present study, in contrast, enabled us to 
provide reliable accuracy rates which could be verified against CCTV recordings. 
Adopting such a procedure removes any potential confound that may arise 
through the inclusion of details which can only be classified on the basis of event 
reconstruction or suspect confession, both of which may be erroneous. Ideally,
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however, one would wish to reduce the proportion of unclassifiable material 
whilst maintaining this strict criterion.
There are also a number of important qualifiers that merit careful consideration. 
First, it could be argued that the high level of performance was related in some 
way to the fact that virtually all the verifiable information concerned action 
details. Actions may simply draw more attention from witnesses than do pallid, 
non-dynamic descriptor information which, in turn, may lead action details to be 
better remembered thereby inflating eyewitness performance. Additionally, the 
fact that CCTV is available as a potential source of evidence may mean that a 
witness’ memory for a perpetrator’s appearance is simply not probed. In the 
present study, for example, only 5% of the total number of details reported to the 
police concerned appearance details. UK Home Office research reports that “the 
information provided by the (CCTV) cameras is used by the police to coordinate 
an appropriate response, and gather evidence that can be used to direct 
investigations and secure a swift conviction of offenders” (Brown, 1995, p. (v)).
STUDY DETAILS; ACTION DESC OBJECT VERBAL TOTAL
Gun store (n=13) 81.9 7 5 3 8 8 3 Not 8 2 1
(Yuille & Cutshall, 1986) reported
Restaurant (n=4) Not
(Cutshall & Yuille, 1989) 100.0 100.0 reported 100.0
Breadline (n=6) 88 3 9 T 0 Not Not 9 2 1
(Cutshall & Yuille, 1989) reported reported
Bank robberies (n=17) 98.9 84.1 Not Not 9 0 3
(Cutshall & Yuille, 1989) reported reported
Current study (n=19) 95.9 100.0 100.0 — 96.21
Table 46: Mean accuracy o f classifiable details reported in police interviews.
As a result, it is most likely that for cases such as those reported in this study, 
officers would concentrate on eliciting action-based details which, in conjunction 
with the CCTV recording, would provide the necessary evidence to secure a
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conviction. Additionally, an examination of the other field-based studies of 
eyewitness memory indicate that the only occasions when memory for descriptors 
feature to any great extent is when the perpetrators are unknown (e.g., Studies 2 & 
3, Cutshall & Yuille, 1989).
Second, it has to be acknowledged that the police play a lai'ge pait in determining 
the kinds of information actually recorded in witness statements both in terms of 
the questions asked and the information actually recorded. As there is an emphasis 
on recording those details that are considered central to securing a prosecution, it 
is argued that the present study potentially represents a more realistic assessment 
of eyewitness memory than is provided by most laboratory studies which include 
memory for items that may have little probative or investigative value.
Third, it is important to acknowledge that while CCTV allows us to verify 
information recorded in witness statements and, as such, provides us with a useful 
tool for researchers, it also has a number of limitations. Specifically, the target 
incident may move out of shot, it may fail to allow verification of verbal 
information, and when conditions for filming are poor, verification of descriptor 
information may prove impossible. Using CCTV recordings incorporates a 
number of technological constraints which fundamentally affect the amount of 
information classifiable. The objectives of CCTV to combat crime require the 
cameras to move around in order to maximise their effectiveness and efficiency. 
As one would expect, the CCTV operators may rotate, tilt and zoom the cameras 
to focus onto the essential aspects of incidents, specifically because the police are 
interested in the most forensically relevant information. Design constraints, 
however, prevent most of the cameras from continuous rotation, i.e., once the 
camera rotates through a clockwise angle of 360° it can only manoeuvre in an 
anti-clockwise manner. Consequently, a few seconds of action may be lost as the 
operator moves the camera back around to focus onto specific aspects of an 
incident. As a result, this can prevent the classification of information occurring 
beyond the view of the camera as it rotates. In addition, for cases of relatively low 
light levels, particularly street lit areas, the video tapes are in monochrome as this
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provides greater clarity than would a colour camera under the same conditions. 
However, as a result it also limits the extent to which the accuracy of details can 
be verified.
As well as the technological constraints inherent in utilising CCTV recordings, 
there were problems specifically associated with the cases selected. Closed circuit 
televisions are mainly used to target public disorder problems (Brown, 1995) of 
which common assaults form a high proportion (Mirlees-Black, Mayhew & Percy, 
1996). From a psychological perspective, using assault cases for research is 
problematic as they often involve some degree of alcohol or drug consumption by 
perpetrators and witnesses (Yuille & Tollestmp, 1990). This is most likely in the 
cases reported in the present article as they all occurred around the time at which 
public bars close, between midnight and 2.00 am. Indeed, one witness reported 
having consumed alcohol prior to the incident. Highlighting this, during 1997 
almost 50% of all detected crimes within the area from which our sample was 
drawn involved some form of intoxication (Central Scotland Police, 1998). Whilst 
the effects of alcohol upon eyewitness memory have not been extensively studied, 
research indicates that alcohol may have a debilitating effect upon memory 
(O’Toole, Yuille, Patrick & lacono, 1994; Yuille & Tollestmp, 1990), although 
this may be mitigated by elevated levels of arousal (Read, Yuille & Tollestmp, 
1992). In this study it was not possible to make any objective assessment as to the 
extent of witness intoxication.
Finally, in comparison to research interviews, statements elicited by the police are 
often short. For example, Yuille & Cutshall (1986) elicited almost twice as many 
details in their research interviews as were elicited by the police for the same 
incident. As already indicated, the existence of CCTV evidence most likely 
reduces the need for an exhaustive description of the incident in order to secure a 
conviction. In addition, the existence of a CCTV recording often results in 
suspects automatically pleading guilty, further reducing the need for the police to 
elicit a large number of details. From a time and efficiency perspective it is 
understandable that the police do not try to elicit every possible item of
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information that a witness may remember. From a research perspective, however, 
short statements provided by police interviews may not give a true indication of 
the full extent of eyewitness memory performance. Thus, future research might 
benefit from a combination of the methodology used in the present study and that 
used in the studies conducted by Yuille and Cutshall (1986). In particular, it is 
argued that, in addition to comparing police interviews with CCTV recordings, an 
in-depth research interview could also be conducted to provide further 
comparisons with available CCTV recordings. This would enable more reliable 
assessments of witness accuracy to be made than is currently provided through 
event reconstruction, as well as providing a more comprehensive account of 
witness memory than can be derived from standard police interviews alone.
Closed Circuit Television is increasingly being used in a variety of locations 
including; banks, shops, schools, car parks and football stadiums, as well as by the 
police (Brown, 1995; Honess & Charmen, 1992). Consequently, there is immense 
potential in employing CCTV to study memory for everyday encounters. In 
addition, it would also be possible in some cases to directly contrast the 
performance of laboratory witnesses with real witnesses by presenting the original 
CCTV recording to laboratory witnesses. This would enable a direct comparison 
between the original witnesses’ performance following the direct experience of 
the event, with the performance of laboratory witnesses experiencing the event 
indirectly. This might throw much needed light on the continuing debate 
concerning which aspects, if any, of laboratory witness performance generalise to 
the performance of real witnesses.
Despite Yuille & Cutshall’s (1986) attempt to attract other researchers to conduct 
ar chival, in situ research, the obsession with laboratory-based studies of 
eyewitness performance persists. The present study, however, highlights an initial 
methodology which is more reliable, internally valid, and less methodologically 
constrained than previous methodologies and therefore provides some direction 
for future research in this area. Consequently, in light of the need for further 
research with real witnesses, it is hoped that the methodology outlined in this
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chapter will be developed and extensively used in order that we might advance 
our understanding of the performance of real eyewitnesses.
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Chapter 8 
Summary and General Discussion
Based upon existing research and the theoretical mechanisms discussed and proposed 
within Chapters Three and Four, the aims of the research presented within this thesis 
were:
1. To investigate the effects of personal involvement and perceived threat upon 
eyewitness memory within the laboratory.
2. To investigate the influence of physiological arousal and differential interest upon 
eyewitness memory within the laboratory,
3. To investigate the accuracy of information reported by real victims and witnesses.
8.1 Personal involvement and perceived threat: laboratoiy live event studies
As the majority of laboratory-based eyewitness research conducted to date has 
investigated visually-induced arousal, where participants are not personally involved 
(e.g., Burke et al., 1992; Christianson & Loftus, 1987, 1991; Heuer & Reisberg,
1990; Heuer et al., 1997; Safer et al., 1998), the two studies presented within Chapter 
Five examine for the first time the effects of defensive physiological responses, 
induced through personal involvement and perceived threat, on eyewitness 
performance under conditions in which both objective and subjective measures of 
arousal have been taken to ensure the effectiveness of manipulations.
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In both experiments, male undergraduates were run in pairs and randomly assigned to 
be the victim of, or bystander to, either a jealous partner paradigm or a control 
paradigm. In the jealous partner paradigm, two male targets interacted briefly with 
the victim accusing him of seeing the girlfriend of one of the target males. The 
control paradigm involved the same male tai*gets briefly interacting with the ‘victim’ 
during they simply wrote a message and left it for the experimenter when she 
returned.
Unfortunately, the use of objective manipulation checks showed that in Study One a 
difference in physiological arousal between threatened victims and bystanders within 
the same condition was not successfully manipulated during or immediately after the 
incident. This most likely occurred because the laboratory was particularly small and 
consequently bystanders were very close to the incident and may have perceived 
themselves as being in the way. Indeed, many of the bystanders within the 
threatening condition reported feeling in the midst of it all and thinking that they 
might have to get involved if things escalated out of hand.
Consequently, a second study was conducted in order to try and produce a difference 
in physiological and psychological arousal levels between threatened victims and 
bystanders in the same condition and therefore enable direct investigation of memory 
differences within the same condition rather than between different conditions. Study 
Two was identical to Study One except for the fact that the victim and bystander 
within each pair were seated further apart, the laboratory used was much larger than 
in Study One and the number of subjects was increased from forty to sixtyfour. The 
content of the incidents themselves did not change.
In comparison to bystanders within the threatening condition, it was predicted that 
threatened victims would be concerned with their personal safety. As a result, they 
would be more motivated to try to understand what was going on and, therefore, scan 
or monitor the situation such that they would demonstrate enhanced memory for
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centrally-related details (e.g., the source of the personal threat, such as physical 
actions or verbalisations related to the chances of attack), without the associated 
trade-off for more peripherally-related details (e.g., appearance-related details or 
verbalisations un-related to the chances of attack) typically found within laboratory 
studies of visually-induced arousal (e.g., Burke et al., 1992; Christianson & Loftus, 
1987; Christianson & Loftus, 1991).
However, despite manipulating a difference in physiological and psychological 
arousal between threatened victims and bystanders of Study Two, they did not differ 
in their memory performance, suggesting that neither physiological nor psychological 
arousal directly influences memory. In addition, none of the memory measures were 
found to correlate with physiological arousal in Study Two. Furthermore, support for 
physiological arousal not exerting an influence upon memory also comes from the 
finding that memory differences observed between the differentially aroused threat 
and control conditions of study One were replicated within Study Two where a 
difference in physiological arousal was not manipulated between threat and control 
conditions. Thus, suggesting that the memory differences between the threat and 
control conditions were not a function of physiological arousal.
Importantly, whilst physiological arousal was not found to have a facilitating effect 
upon memory, it does not appear to have had a debilitating effect either. Furthermore, 
failure to find support for an influence of physiological arousal upon memory in the 
studies presented within Chapter Five suggests that the nature of the physiological 
response (i.e., defensive versus orienting) is unimportant (cf. with the majority of 
laboratory based studies of visually-induced arousal which have manipulated 
orienting physiological responses, characterised by a drop in heart rate rather than an 
elevation; e.g., Christianson, 1984 and Heuer & Reisberg, 1990).
In terms of psychological arousal, although the studies presented within Chapter Five 
suggest that it does not directly influence memory, the possibility that it may exert an
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influence upon memory cannot, at this stage, so readily be dismisæd. Specifically, 
similar memory differences observed between differentially psychologically aroused 
threatened and control witnesses of both Studies One and Two could indicate an j
influence of psychological arousal. On tiiis basis, the failure to manipulate a 
difference between the differentially psychologically aroused threatened victims and 
bystanders of Study Two could either be because the sample size was not sufficient to 
allow differences to emerge or because victims may have engaged in or experienced a 
greater level of intrusive thoughts regarding the incident, serving to reduce their 
overall attention to a level similar to the bystanders.
Although neither of these explanations explain why psychological arousal was not 
found to be correlated with any of the memory measures in either Study One or Study 
Two, it remains possible that the sample size utilised within these studies were not 
large enough to allow such relationships to manifest themselves. Unfortunately, 
measurement of psychological affect is reliant upon introspective self-reports and 
these may not be as reliable or valid as they are often interpreted to be, especially 
when used with small sample sizes (Wright, et al, 1997).
However, an equally viable alternative explanation for the differential memory 
performance of threatened and control witnesses centres around the fact that they 
witnessed different incidents. Hence, it remains possible that the memory differences 
observed between the threat and control conditions are instead a function of inherent 
differences in stimulus content, unusualness (Loftus & Mackworth, 1978; Mitchell et 
al, 1998), or possibly another yet to be identified factor, exerting an influence upon 
memory.
In terms of comparison with existing resear ch, the results of these studies are in line 
with existing studies of visually-induced arousal which suggest that arousal may 
enhance memory for certain information without detriment to other information 
(Christianson & Loftus, 1987; Christianson & Loftus, 1991). However, rather than
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enhanced memory for central details per se, superior memory for actions was 
demonstrated (i.e., those key to the threatening aspects of the incident), thus 
suggesting that where witnesses are personally involved it may specifically be actions 
rather than central details as a whole that they demonstrate superior memory for.
Furthermore, the enhanced memory for action details was not associated with a trade­
off in memory for peripheral details. This contrasts with previous research 
concerning visually-induced arousal, which has tended to suggest that there is a trade­
off in memory for peripheral details associated with emotional material (Burke et al., 
1992; Safer et al., 1998).
Consequently, the studies presented within Chapter Five suggest that when an 
incident involves a witness personally there may be enhanced memory for action 
details without an associated trade-off in terms of memory for other details (e.g., 
verbal or appearance details). However, whether this is a function of psychological 
arousal associated with personal involvement remains to be confirmed by future 
research. In particular, despite the general support from research with real witnesses, 
it remains to be confirmed that the differences observed between the personally 
involved threatening and control groups are due to differences in psychological 
arousal rather than something inherently different between the two incidents 
themselves. It is a fundamental confound that the majority of existing research has 
used different stimuli for emotional and control groups. Specifically, the differences 
observed between emotion and control groups in laboratory studies which have 
utilised relatively innocuous stimuli may be because of differential interest between 
the two group’s stimuli rather tiian arousal per se (Cahill & McGaugh, 1995). Despite 
such a possibility, the results of these studies have consistently been interpreted to 
suggest that emotional arousal, experienced whilst viewing negatively-valenced 
emotional information, results in a focus of attention to the central details of the 
stimulus and, therefore, enhanced memory for those details.
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In terms of motivation, the failure to observe memory differences between threatened 
victims and bystanders, despite their difference in perceived threat and perceived 
chance of attack, suggests that differential motivation was not manifest. For example, 
victim’s monitoring may have occurred in order to provide answers to questions such 
as: who are these people, do I know them, are they going to physically attack me, 
who is this second intruder, is he after me too, are they showing any signs of calming 
down, will they wait outside for me, is it possible I could have been talking to his 
girlfriend? Bystanders, however, although lower in perceived personal threat and 
chance of attack, may have been motivated to monitor what was happening in order 
to answer a different set of questions, such as: who are these people, are they going to 
attack the victim, what shall I do, who is this second intruder, is he after the victim 
too, now should I do something, are they showing any signs of calming down, I 
wonder if he has been seen with his girlfriend? Hence, although the bystander’s 
motivation may have been less related to their own chance of being attacked, they 
may, nevertheless, have been equally motivated to attend to what was going on.
In keeping with an influence of motivation, whether due to psychological arousal or 
differential interest, it appears that participants within the threatening condition may 
have scanned or monitored the incident to a greater extent than the control witnesses, 
resulting in enhanced memory for actions, without, a trade-off in memory for other 
more peripheral details. Hence, in line with Hockey’s Cognitive-Energetical 
framework, it would appear* that participants in the threatening condition may have 
been more motivated to understand what was going on than participants in the control 
condition. This may reflect that where witnesses are personally involved, they are 
more likely to engage in increased monitoring or scanning of the situation in order to 
understand what is going on and to ensure that the behavioural response selected is 
most efficient (Derryberry & Tucker, 1994). Arguably, this adds weight to the idea 
that participants in traditional laboratory studies do not experience changing demands 
which result in sufficient motivation to re-allocate cognitive resources in order to 
protect personal goals (Hockey, 1997). This may go some way towards explaining
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why memory in the field appears to be good (e.g., Yuille & Cutshall, 1986), but in 
the laboratory, where participants are not personally involved, enhanced memory for 
central details appears to be associated with a trade-off in memory for peripheral 
details (e.g., Christianson & Loftus, 1991).
8.2 Physiological arousal and differential interest
Following the studies presented within Chapter Five, the study presented within 
Chapter Six was conducted to investigate whether physiological arousal has an effect 
upon eyewitness memory for complex information on its own or whether its effects 
might be mediated by other factors. In addition, as laboratory studies investigating 
memory for emotional information have tended to make comparisons between groups 
experiencing different stimuli (emotional and neutral), this study enabled an 
assessment as to whether memory differences observed between such groups are 
actually a function of arousal, as has generally been interpreted, or whetlier they may 
in fact be a function of an inherent difference between the two stimuli.
Advancing previous research, which has used static stimuli such as slides of neutral 
faces (Christianson & Mjorndal, 1985), in this third study participants were presented 
with video-tapes of the threatening and neutral incidents employed in the studio 
presented within Chapter Five. Furthermore, unlike existing research (Christianson et 
al., 1986) in this particular study witnesses watched the same films, i.e., 
physiologically aroused witnesses watched the real-life threatening or neutral 
incidents and physiologically un-aroused witnesses watched the same films.
Critically, using exercise as the means of inducing physiological arousal, it was 
possible to isolate physiological arousal from the psychological arousal associated 
with experiencing such events first hand.
If physiological arousal may affect memory on its’ own, we would have expected to 
see differences between tliose exercising and those resting, irrespective of whether
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they watched the video-tape of the threatening or control incident. However, the 
finding of no significant interaction between level of arousal and either the type of 
video-taped incident viewed or the type of information viewed, suggests that level of 
physiological arousal, as induced via exercise, does not influence memory. In 
addition, physiological arousal was not found to be correlated with any of the 
memory measures, further suggesting that physiological arousal does not influence 
memory. This finding is directly in line with the findings of Study Two presented 
within Chapter Five and with the small amount of existing eyewitness research 
investigating this relationship.
Despite manipulating a difference in physiological arousal between participants 
exercising and those simply sitting on the bicycle, no differences were revealed on 
the Stress or Arousal Scale of the MacKay Mood Adjective Checklist, suggesting that 
psychological arousal and physiological arousal are not the same. Furthermore, 
correlations were conducted across the exercising witnesses to see whether 
participants’ physiological arousal during the videos was correlated with the measures 
of rated arousal whilst cycling or rated attention devoted to watching the video and 
none of the correlations proved to be significant, further suggesting that they are not 
related.
Again, these findings are directly in line with both Studies One and Two, where 
patterns of psychological arousal among the witness groups were not found to mirror 
patterns of physiological arousal, and measures of the two arousal types were not 
found to correlate. As discussed in Chapter Five, this is not necessarily as expected, 
as one might predict that witnesses rating themselves higher in arousal, would also be 
higher in physiological arousal. Arguably, this highlights the problem of using 
introspective self-reports to measure cognitive affect. The extent to which one 
individual rates affect or places a criterion level between feeling aroused or un- 
aroused, for example, may vary considerably. This highlights the importance of using 
objective manipulation checks whenever possible.
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Those viewing the video-tapes of tlie threatening and control incidents did not differ 
in terms of their self-reported anger or perceived threat experienced whilst viewing 
the incidents, although they did differ in physiological arousal both during and 
immediately after viewing the video-taped incidents. Whilst this is an unfortunate 
confound manifest in this study, based on the finding of no difference between 
participants exercising and those resting, either within or between incidents, it would 
appear that the memory differences observed between participants viewing the two 
different incidents are not a function of physiological arousal.
Specifically, those watching the video-tape of the threatening incident showed 
significantly enhanced recognition memory for central and action related details in 
comparison to those watching the video-tape of the control incident, suggesting that 
something inherent in the differing nature of the threatening incident relative to the 
control incident exerted a facilitating effect upon participants’ memories.
Fundamentally, it would appear that in the study presented here the threatening 
video-taped incident may have been inherently more unusual, interesting or attention 
catching in some way relative to the control video-taped incident. This is an 
enlightening finding in relation to Studies One and Two and calls into question the 
findings of existing research into the effects of emotion upon memory which has 
presented participant groups with stimuli which are, at least in part, different (e.g., 
Christianson & Loftus, 1987; Christianson & Loftus, 1991; Clifford & Hollin, 1981; 
Heuer & Reisberg, 1990; Kebeck & Lohaus, 1986). Where the results of such studies 
have been interpreted to suggest that differences in memory performance reflect 
differing emotion or arousal levels, often without supporting evidence from 
manipulation checks, any differences in memory performance may actually have 
heen due to something inherently more unusual, attention catching or simply more 
interesting about the emotional stimuli relative to the neutral stimuli.
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Critically, what is highlighted by the study presented within Chapter Six and the 
small amount of existing research (Christianson & Loftus, 1991; Loftus & 
Mackworth, 1978; Mitchell et al, 1998) is that, while emotion may exert an influence 
upon memory, in order to be able to infer whether differences in memory are in fact 
due to the emotional or arousing nature of stimuli rather than other confounding 
factors such as differential interest, future research should take care to ensure that 
confounds associated with the use of different stimuli are removed and that 
comparisons are made within experimental conditions rather than between them.
In terms of personal involvement, even though the participants in this study were not 
personally involved, the results differ from existing studies where participants have 
also not been personally involved (i.e., studies of visually induced arousal), which 
have tended to demonstrate that enhanced memory for central details is to the 
detriment of memory for peripheral details (Burke et al, 1992; Christianson &
Loftus, 1987; Safer et al, 1998). Specifically, participants viewing the video-tape of 
the threatening incident showed superior recognition memory overall as well as for 
central and action devils, but without a detriment to their recognition memory for 
peripheral details.
A possible explanation for the threat group’s memory maintenance for peripheral 
details observed in the study presented here, however, is that the style of the incidents 
was somewhat novel and may therefore have attracted the par ticipants’ attention. 
Specifically, the video-taped incidents were both in the style of someone speaking to 
the camera (or to the viewer). As a result, participants may have tried to work out 
what was going on and whether the individual on the screen was saying anything of 
particular relevance for them. This may have resulted in memory maintenance for 
peripheral details.
In terms of comparison to the personally involved participants in Studies One and 
Two, there are two main contrasts. First, is the lack of memory differences
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concerning the percentage of available details recalled. In Studies One and Two 
witnesses within the threatening condition recalled a higher percentage of available 
details overall and a higher percentage of available action details. This most likely 
reflects that, as the participants in this study were not personally involved with the 
stimulus incident, their motivation to recall as many details as possible was 
diminished. However, when ‘forced’ to make choices during the recognition test, they 
may have retrieved information they had not been motivated to report during the 
earlier recall test.
When recognition memory is considered, then, the second difference of interest is 
apparent. Whilst the personally involved participants within the threatening condition 
of Studies One and Two demonstrated superior memory overall and for action 
details, they did not demonstrate superior memory for central details as did the 
participants viewing the threatening video-tape in the study presented here. This 
potentially reinforces the suggestion made in Chapter Five that when witnesses are 
personally involved, depending on the precise nature of the incident, they may 
specifically demonstrate superior memory for action details, rather than central 
details as a whole, as these may contain the information most important to the witness 
(i.e., ongoing levd of threat and chance of attack). As participants in the study 
presented here were not personally involved, they may not have concentrated on 
actions to the same extent as they would not necessarily have been the most important 
information to them. Hence, their superior memory for central details as well as 
action details relative to participants viewing the control incident video-tape.
Interestingly, if this postulation proves to be correct, there would appear to be a role 
for psychological mechanisms in mediating an influence of emotion upon memory. 
Specifically, if superior memory for actions, rather than central details as a whole, 
reflects a witness’s attention to the information most important to them, this would 
suggest that the cognitive interpretation of the incident/stimulus guides attention 
and/or elaboration.
237
8.3 Victimisation and eyewitness memoiy in the field
Investigating real witnesses memory for action details may be particularly 
informative as Studies One and Two presented in this thesis suggest that it is for these 
aspects of an incident that critical memory differences may exist. Consequently, in an 
attempt to address the methodological issues which have constrained this particular 
area of research, closed-circuit television was identified as a potential methodological 
tool providing visually recorded accounts of real crimes against which to compare 
witnesses’ memories, thus potentially enabling eyewitness accuracy to be more 
reliably and objectively assessed. Most importantly, perhaps, the data derived from 
the combined use of actual witness statements and CCTV recordings of actual crimes 
allowed the first attempt at objective assessment of eyewitness memory for action 
details in real crimes.
With regards to the relative eyewitness performance of real victims and bystanders, 
then, from the aggregated data there were no obvious differences between victims 
and bystanders both in terms of recall performance and the amount of unclassifiable 
details reported. Hence, this is directly in line with the findings of Studies One and 
Two, presented within Chapter Five. It is important to acknowledge, however, that 
this may be a reflection of standardised police interviewing and report technique than 
any inherent feature of the witnesses.
Despite the apparent homogeneity of the incidents examined (i. e., all incidents 
involved violence or threat of violence against a person or persons), however, the 
analyses of individual cases indicated considerable variation in both the total number 
of details and the overall pattern of information reported. Specifically, in addition to 
the obvious dissimilarities between the cases examined, for all but one incident there 
was a 100% accuracy rate for those details that were classifiable. This finding 
contrasts starkly with that indicated by many laboratory studies which illustrate the
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inherent unreliability of eyewitness memory (Clifford & Hollin, 1981; Clifford & 
Scott, 1978; Loftus & Burns, 1982). However, due to the large variation in the 
percentage of unclassifiable material in witness statements we should be cautious 
about placing too much emphasis on the present finding.
Nevertheless, the present study bears a remarkable resemblance to that of other field- 
based studies which report high levels of eyewitness performance, e.g., Yuille & 
Cutshall (1986) and Cutshall & Yuille (Studies 1-3, 1989) reported mean accuracy 
rates ranging from 82.1% to 100% for witness reports given to the police 
immediately after the event. Although, the fact that almost half the details recalled by 
witnesses in the present study were unclassifiable is less than optimal, this is largely a 
result of the very strict criterion adopted.
8.4 Theoretical issues
Within Chapter Four it was suggested that a reliance upon uni-dimensional theories to 
account for the influence of ai ousal upon eyewitness memory offers little advance on 
current understanding. Instead, it was proposed that a more multi-factor dynamic 
approach needs to be taken which encompasses both physiological and psychological 
effects, as well as acknowledging the potential role of compensatory mechanisms 
associated with motivation to protect personal goals.
On this basis, it was suggested that a better understanding of the effects of arousal 
upon eyewitness performance requires understanding the following three elements; 
(1) physiological arousal, (2) psychological arousal, and (3) motivation 
(compensatory mechanisms). It was posited that, jointly, these factors may provide a 
more satisfactory explanatory scheme for understanding eyewitness performance.
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It was also suggested, however, that this proposed tripartite arrangement is not 
presented as an answer to the theoretical problems associated with understanding 
eyewitness performance, but as a potential step forward in this complex area.
8.4.1 Physiological arousal
As a result of the studies presented within this thesis, it appears that physiological 
arousal may not directly influence eyewitness memory, which questions the inclusion 
of a physiological component within the proposed tripartite model of arousal and 
memory.
This is interesting as one might think that physiological and psychological arousal 
would work together in a complementary manner. For example, in line with Gold’s 
Neuro-Biological theory (Gold, 1986; 1992), an enhanced level of physiological 
arousal and associated adrenergic biochemicals in the blood-stream could result in 
facilitated consolidation or storage of detailed memories resulting from increased 
psychologically-guided event processing, especially with regards to threat-related 
aspects of an incident On this basis, where heightened psychological processing does 
not facilitate enhanced attentional and elaborative processing, increased consolidation 
or storage of memories may not follow. On contrast, where psychological processing 
is directed towards and results in enhanced elaboration for the threatening aspects of 
the incident, increased physiological arousal may facilitate the consolidation or 
storage of these memories. On the basis of the studies presented here, however, 
increased physiological arousal does not appear to have had a direct facilitating effect 
upon memory.
However, before rejecting physiological arousal from the model, further studies are 
required in order to fully understand whether physiological arousal has a role to play 
in mediating the effects of emotion upon memory. Indeed, future research concerning 
the effects of glucose on human memory may serve to clarify the existing
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discrepancy in research findings concerning the influence of physiological arousal 
upon memory.
8.4.2 Psychological arousal
Support for psychological mechanisms influencing memory is also not directly 
provided, although the potential for an influence remains possible. In particular, 
although the study presented within Chapter Six demonstrated that the memory 
differences observed between participants within the threat and control conditions 
appear to be due to something inherent in the differing nature of the stimulus 
incidents, this may not mean that psychological arousal has no influence.
Whilst psychological arousal was not found to correlate with any of the memory 
measures within the laboratory studies, and no differences in memory were observed 
between differentially psychologically aroused threatened victims and bystanders 
Study Two, it is again possible that issues concerning sample sizes may underlie 
these.
Critically, it remains possible that victims within Studies One and Two may have 
engaged in or experienced a greater level of intrusive thoughts regarding the incident, 
serving to reduce their overall attention to a level more similar to that of the 
bystanders. Similar effects may occur with real witnesses, hence the finding of no 
difference in victim and bystander memories within Chapter Seven. Although it has 
been mentioned that this pattern may be a reflection of standardised police 
interviewing and report technique rather than any inherent feature of the witnesses.
Fundamentally, although this research shows that memory differences may not 
necessarily be due to psychological arousal, it remains possible that psychological 
arousal may directly influence memory.
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8,4,3 Motivation
In terms of motivation, the failure to observe memory differences between threatened 
victims and bystanders within Study Two, despite their difference in perceived threat 
and perceived chance of attack, suggests that differential motivation may not have 
been manifest. For example, victim’s monitoring may have occurred in order to 
provide answers to questions such as: who are these people, do I know them, are they 
going to physically attack me, who is this second intruder, is he after me too, are they 
showing any signs of calming down, will they wait outside for me, is it possible I 
could have been talking to his girlfriend? Bystanders, however, although lower in 
perceived personal threat and chance of attack, may have been motivated to monitor 
what was happening in order to answer a different set of questions, such as: who are 
these people, are they going to attack the victim, what shall I do, who is this second 
intruder, is he after the victim too, now should I do something, are they showing any 
signs of calming down, I wonder if he has been seen with his girlfriend? Hence, 
although the bystander’s motivation may have been less related to their own chance 
of being attacked, they may, nevertheless, have been equally motivated to attend to 
what was going on.
Furthermore, whether due to psychological arousal or differential interest, it appears 
that participants within the thr eatening condition may have scanned or monitored the 
incident to a greater extent than the control witnesses, resulting in enhanced memory 
for actions, without, a trade-off in memory for other more peripheral details. Hence, 
in line with Hockey’s Cognitive-Energetical framework, it would appear that 
participants in the threatening condition may have been more motivated to understand 
what was going on than participants in the control condition.
In comparison to studies of visually-induced arousal, although aroused participants in 
Studies One and Two demonstrated enhanced memory for action details, they did not 
demonstrate a trade-off in memory for peripheral details. This may reflect that where 
witnesses are personally involved, they ar e more likely to engage in increased
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monitoring or scanning of the situation in order to understand what is going on and to 
ensure that the behavioural response selected is most efficient (Derryberry & Tucker, 
1994). Ar guably, this adds weight to the idea that participants in traditional 
laboratory studies do not experience changing demands which result in sufficient 
motivation to re-allocate cognitive resources in order to protect personal goals 
(Hockey, 1997). This may go some way towards explaining why memory in the field 
appears to be good (e.g., Yuille & Cutshall, 1986), but in the laboratory where 
participants are not personally involved enhanced memory for central details appears 
to be associated with a trade-off in memory for peripheral details (e.g., Christianson 
& Loftus, 1991).
At this stage, it is not suggested that witnesses can or will remember everything in a 
stimulus array. Clearly, this is not the case. What is suggested, however, is that whilst 
laboratory studies have generally argued that emotional arousal reduces performance 
or restricts attentional and elaborative processing, this may not be the case where 
witnesses are personally involved. Critically, it is argued that the influence of 
personal involvement, and therefore motivation, has wrongly been ignored within 
laboratory research to date (e.g. Burke et al., 1992; Christianson & Loftus, 1987; 
1991; Heuer & Reisberg, 1990), Furthermore, what is central and what is peripheral 
detail will vary from incident to incident and in particular from witness to witness 
depending upon personal goals which are likely to be linked to the specific nature of 
the target incident. There is no doubt tliat selective attention occurs, but at this stage 
it is argued that to say whether a witness will or will not remember central and or 
peripheral details may be misleading, especially if such a judgement is heavily based 
upon laboratory research investigating visually-induced arousal.
8,4.4 Is there a future fo r  a tripartite model o f arousal and memory?
In conclusion, since physiological arousal does not appear to exert an influence upon 
memory a tripartite model of arousal, encompassing physiological arousal, may not 
be as useful as previously thought. However, before rejecting physiological aiousal
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from the model, further corroboraing studies are required in order to fully 
understand whether physiological arousal has a role to play in mediating the effects 
of emotion upon memory. Similarly, although support for psychological mechanisms 
influencing memory is also not directly provided by the studies presented within this 
thesis, the potential for an influence remains possible. Furthermore, although 
motivation was not directly manipulated or measured in the studies presented within 
this thesis, where witnesses are personally involved memory performance appears to 
be slightly different than when witnesses are not personally involved. Motivational 
influences may underlie this difference.
As stated earlier, the proposed tripartite arrangement is not presented as an answer to 
the theoretical problems associated with understanding eyewitness performance, but 
as a potential step forward in this complex area. Fundamentally, as research evidence 
accumulates, so theoretical explanations may be refined. Hence, until there is a 
sufficient body of evidence from which to conclude that physiological arousal, 
psychological arousal or motivational mechanisms do not influence eyewitness 
memory, it is argued that a tripartite model of aiousal and memory cannot be entirely 
rejected. Critically, reliance upon uni-dimensional theories to retrospectively account 
for memory performance under conditions of stress or arousal (see also McCloskey & 
Egeth, 1983b; Naatanen, 1973; Neiss, 1988, 1990) offers little advance on our 
understanding. On this basis, it is hoped that future research will endeavour to 
continuously test and advance theoretical models, such as that proposed within this 
thesis, in order that we may move forward in terms of our understanding of this 
complex area.
8.5 Methodological issues
It is argued that the research presented in this thesis identifies two main 
methodological issues. Firstly, the importance for highly controlled experimentation.
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and secondly, the need for a research approach to eyewitness issues which places a 
greater emphasis upon the use of multiple methodologies.
8.5.1 The importance o f controlled experimentation
A fundamental criticism of existing research concerns the lack of manipulation 
checks incorporated into the design of the studies. A large number of studies 
concerning arousal and eyewitness memory have failed to measure the effect of their 
manipulations upon participant arousal levels. Similarly, of the five studies 
investigating differences between victims and bystanders, not one of the studies 
successfully measured the physiological effects of the manipulation (e.g., Hosch & 
Cooper, 1982; Hosch et al., 1984). Despite not knowing the extent to which the 
participants in these studies were physiologically and psychologically aroused, 
inferences were made concerning the effects of arousal upon memory to the extent 
that where differences in memory were observed they were generally attributed to a 
difference in arousal between those viewing neutral and those viewing emotional 
stimuli. Furthermore, the nature of the manipulation appears to influence whether an 
orienting or a defensive response is displayed (Christianson, 1984; Heuer & Reisberg,
1990). Although the research in this thesis suggests that physiological arousal does 
not influence memory and that, therefore, the nature of the response may be 
unimportant, if we are to fully understand whether there is a relationship between 
arousal and memory it is necessary to investigate or at least know the nature of the 
response exhibited.
Although such research has often concluded the existence of relationships between 
arousal and memory, the studies presented in this thesis clearly demonstrate that such 
links should not be drawn without clear empirical support. In particular, the findings 
of Study Two demonstrated tliat despite manipulating witness groups who were 
differentially aroused there were no differences in subsequent memory performance. 
Similarly, in Study Three although witnesses viewing the different videotaped 
stimuli remembered the incidents differently they were not differentially aroused. In
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these studies manipulation checks were employed and therefore prevent such 
speculation concerning potential relationships as has occurred with studies which 
have not utilised manipulation checks. Critically, the evaluation of the success of 
arousal manipulations should not rely upon indirect or retrospective inferences based 
on whether a differential eyewitness performance has been obtained.
With regards to memory performance, as with previous research, the res^ch  
presented within this thesis has highhghted the need to use recall to measure the 
content and form of participants spontaneous recall as well recognition in order to 
measure memory in a more detailed form less affected by report bias.
In terms of archival and field based studies, the measurement of memorial accuracy is 
a continuing problem inherent in the very nature of such studies. It is suggested, 
however, that the use of CCTV may provide an alternative methodology serving to 
increase the controllability of such research. Unfortunately, despite Yuille &
Cutshall’s (1986) attempt to attract other researchers to conduct archival, in situ 
research, the obsession with laboratory-based studies of eyewitness performance 
persists. It is hoped that CCTV as an additional methodological tool for studying real 
witness behaviour may encourage researchers to consider more field and archival 
based research.
8.5.2 The importance o f a multi-methodological approach
As shown by the research presented within this thesis archival and laboratory based 
research are each characterised by a number of advantages and disadvantages over 
one another. It is argued that for research in this area to be of use, a combined 
approach should be adopted where ideas and hypotheses are investigated both in a 
controlled laboratory environment and in a real-eyewitnessing situation. 
Fundamentally, there is no reason to believe that there is only one correct way in 
which memory should be studied (Tulving, 1991). A variety of methods may provide 
a may ‘rounded’ picture. Arguably, this is of paramount importance if we are to
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investigate the effects of personal involvement, as ethical factors clearly constrain the 
level of personal threat that may be manipulated within the laboratory. Consequently, 
in order to fully investigate the potential influence of such factors it is essential 
researchers look to the field in order to try and replicate laboratory based findings.
8.6 Future applications and research
In terms of future eyewitness research, it is important to bear in mind that the aim of 
resear ch in this area is to try and understand how real witnesses perform. It is argued, 
therefore, that generalising the results of laboratory studies to real eyewitness 
performance is problematic. For example, in terms of cognitive processes there are an 
enormous number of factors which may have an effect upon the memory of victim or 
witness of a real crime, such as level of involvement or relationships between 
witnesses. Each of these may affect what is important to a particular victim or 
bystander and therefore affect the direction of attention, elaborative processing, and 
subsequent memory for the incident. Fundamentally, it is argued that the findings of 
laboratory studies should be quality assured by study in the field to see whether the 
effects and findings are up held. Whilst it is acknowledged that there are 
methodological constraints inherent in the study of real witnesses it is argued that to 
date not enough use has been made of field studies. Arguably, the field study by 
Brigham et al. (1982) demonstrated how it is possible to study ‘real witness effects’ 
in a more controlled manner than archival studies and a more valid manner than the 
majority of laboratory based studies.
In addition, more work on the use of retrospective self-report measures as potential 
indicators of cognitive behaviour and event affect would be useful as, over and above 
witness memory reports, this is the only information that the judiciary has available 
to them concerning the psychological effect of the incident upon witnesses.
Ultimately, self-report methods could elucidate such things as; the relationships
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between witnesses; whether a witness has experienced an incident of this nature 
previously; personality factors; and in light of the research presented here, the 
cognitive behaviour engaged in during and after the incident (in retrospect, such 
information would have been particularly useful in the Studies presented within
Chapter Five). j
!
!Although we are a long way from being able to compose a ‘witness profile’, research j
in this area should, perhaps, endeavour to work towards this. At the very least, in I
order to advance knowledge in this area it is suggested that future research must |
explore further the cognitive processes by which eyewitnesses process information. I
It is important to remember that the principle applied aim of eyewitness r^earch can 
be conceptualised in terms of assisting the judicial system to effectively and 
efficiently (i) identify those who have committed crimes, and (ii) contribute to 
preventing mistaken convictions of innocent people. In working towar ds this, a wide 
variety of factors influencing eyewitness memory have been investigated. Some of 
the most fundamental variables affecting witnesses during the actual incident have, 
however, largely been ignored. These factors concern the effects of victimisation, in 
particular arousal and perceived threat, upon eyewitness memory. There is a large 
gap in the research literature concerning the effects of these variables upon 
eyewitness memory despite their prevalence during most criminal incidents. For 
example, although the term ‘weapon focus’ has been relatively well-documented in 
laboratory research, the principles and mechanisms underlying this effect are little 
understood (see Steblay, 1992, for a review and meta-analysis of the weapon focus 
effect).
Finally, while field research has tended to find that arousal leads to an improvement 
in memory performance, the findings from laboratory studies remain quite mixed. 
Critically, if we are to understand the influence of emotion upon memory, more 
research effort needs to be devoted to trying to untangle the complex interaction
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between biologically based processes and psychologically driven processes. 
Consequently, it is hoped that future r^earch may take a more cross-disciplinary 
approach in trying to understand the factors that mediate the effects of emotion upon 
memory.
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THREATENING CONDITION SCRIPT
Throughout the ‘act’ do not look at B - direct all interaction to V
PI ascends laboratory stairs very angrily saying;
PI: “Where is he? I’m sure they came in here.”
He reaches the laboratory and sees V;
PI: “Ah, there you are - what the hell do you think you’ve been playing at,
hanging around my girlfriend?”
P2 starts to ascend stairs. It is expected, that V will say something here, 
nevertheless P I continues;
PI: “I’ve seen you several times - 1 saw you yesterday as I was driving
along Market Street.”
P2 reaches the top o f the stairs and says;
P2: “Justin, what the hell are you doing? You should be talking to Rebecca
about this instead of throwing your weight around in here. ”
PI turns his head to see P2 and says;
PI : “Yeh, you’d be angry if it was your girlfriend!”
PI continues his ranting and raving, and turns his attention back to V saying;
PI: “Just bloody stay away from her, right? ”
P2 gives the impression o f being aware o f how angry PI is and tries to 
encourage him to leave by taking hold o f his left arm;
P2: “Justin, come on, we’ll be late for Dr Williams. ”
PI, however, has clearly not had enough, he wrenches his arm out o fP 2 ’s 
hold and continues angrily. He picks up a strategically placed, wooden ruler 
on top o f a piece o f paper on a table nearby and points it at V;
PI: “You know what I’m talking about - just stay away from her.”
PI is now at his peak anger, and 'throws* ' the wooden ruler onto the table.
P2 appears worried about what PI might do next, sensing the urgency o f
removing PI from the laboratory, he tries to calm PI;
P2: “Hey, calm down.”
However, P I has to have the final word, pointing his finger directly at V he 
says;
PI: “You so much as go near her again and I’ll kill you! ”
P2 is worried now, he takes hold o f PI '5  arm more firmly than before and 
pulls him towards the laboratory doorway at the top o f the stairs;
P2: “Come on, we’re late.”
As they leave the laboratory P2 says over his shoulder to V;
P2: “You’d better leave his girlfriend alone.”
PI and P2 descend the stairs with P I still very angry;
PI: “I’ll kill him.”
P2 tries to calm PI:
P2: “Come on, relax, forget about it.”
PI and P2 leave the bottom laboratory door, leaving Vand B alone in the 
laboratory, they close the laboratory door noticeably loudly on the way out.
* The ruler throwing needs to be of the same magnitude as the throw in the control
condition.
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CONTROL CONDITION SCRIPT
Throughout the ‘act’ do not look at B - direct all interaction to V
II walks towards the open laboratory door, as he reaches the door he says (as 
i f  he is expecting to see Penny);
II: “Penny?”
Upon seeing subjects in the room, and no Penny, he goes on to say to V and to |
V only (it is important all interaction is directed to V); j
II: “Oh, hi there, I was actually looking for Penny Woolnough, is she |
around?”
It is expected that V will reply something along the lines o f "No, she's just ;
gone out for a few minutes”, so PI can continue; \
II: “Ah, I really need to see her - do you have any idea how long she will |
be?” j
Again V is expected to reply but the script simply continues. As V is probably \
speaking 12 comes in through the door and says; ;
12: “Justin, have you found her?” j
II  turns his head to see 12 coming in and says; ■
II: “No, she’s not here” !
II continues to talk to V, |
II: “Um, I’m in a bit of a hurry, if I write a message down could you make |
sure she gets it when she comes back?” I
11 turns to 12 and says; 1
II: Have you got a pen? Cheers. |
12 hands II  a pen from his pocket. I I  picks up a strategically placed j
wooden ruler to expose a scrap o f paper on a table next to him (holds the |
ruler in his non-dominant hand) and quickly scribbles a message.. |
While II  is writing the message 12 looks at his watch and says; |
12 “Justin, you’d better hurry or we’ll be late for Dr Williams” |
II puts the message onto the side, and picks up a biscuit from the tin placed |
right next to the paper, as he does this he says; I
II: “Ah, biscuits. I’m starving!” j
II ‘throws’ the wooden ruler back down onto the desk, as he does this 12 j
says; i
12: “Oh, give us one” j
11 hands 12 a biscuit. He then turns to V and says; |
II: “Um, she’ll know who the message is from, if you could point it out to :
her ” !
12 lightly thumps II on the arm and says; :
12: “Come on, we’re late”
As they leave the laboratory 12 says to V; I
12: “See yer ” j
As they are both leaving II  asks 12; ]
II : “So where is this office we’ve got to go to?” |
12 replies to II: j
12: “Somewhere on the third floor I think” ;III and 12 leave the laboratory, closing the door behind them, leaving the j
subjects alone in the laboratory. \
276 I
Appendix 3: Free Recall Measure
277
FREE RECALL MEASURE
“I want you to think about the interaction that just occurred. I am going to ask you 
some questions - please try as hard as possible to recall as much information as you 
can - if you are not sure about something please still mention it, but make it clear that 
you are not sure. I emphasise that I want you to tell me as much as you can. If at any 
point you think of something you wish to add please do so. Most importantly I want 
you to tell me as much as you can”.
I. Please describe in as much detail as you can exactly what happened?
2. Next I want you to concentrate on the appearance of the aggressors. You may 
find it easiest to think about and describe one at a time. Please try and recall 
bodily characteristics, facial characteristics and details of clothing.
3. Now I would like you to think about what was said during the interaction. 
What did the aggressors say to you and to each other? What did you say in 
return? Did the other subject say anything or get involved?
4. Now I would like you to think about the physical behaviour of the actors. 
Please describe any type of actions or behaviour which occurred during the
interaction.
5. Finally, is there anything else that you remember or wish to add that you or I
haven’t mentioned?
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QUESTIONNAIRE MEASURE - T
DATE............................... SUBJECT NUMBER.
SUBJECT NAME.................................................
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this questionnaire is to assess the sort of information processed from 
brief interactions such as the one you have just experienced. In this questionnaire you 
are required to answer forced-choice questions and make judgments regarding various 
aspects of the interaction.
In order for this questionnaire to be useful I need you to be as honest and truthful as 
possible in all of your answers. You are assured that all materials from this 
experiment will remain completely confidential. Your cooperation is greatly 
appreciated.
Please always write your answer on the dotted lines, or in the appropriate place 
provided. If you make a mistake cross it out and make your answer in a suitable place 
on the sheet, carefully indicating where the answer is.
To begin with I would like you to consider the following question and then work your 
way through the questionnaire at your own pace, being as truthful and honest as 
possible. If you do not understand anything, please do not hesitate to ask. Thank you 
for your cooperation.
1) How long do you think the interaction lasted, from the moment the first 
intruder entered the laboratory to the moment both intruders left?
....................Hours....................Minutes.................... Seconds
How confident are you in your estimation? Indicate your confidence by circling the appropriate 
number below..
1 2 3 4  5 6
Very.... Unsure Sliglitly Slightly Confident Absolutely
Unsure Unsure Confident Certain
The rest of this questionnaire is divided up into sections, please read all instructions 
carefully.
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For the purpose of the rest of this questionnaire intruder One' refers to the first 
individual entering the laboratory, whilst intruder Two' refers to the second 
individual entering the laboratory.
SECTION ONE: INTRUDER APPEARANCE
Please take a few moments to recall as much of the appearance of INTRUDER 
ONE as you possibly can, then estimate the following characteristics:
2) Height:........ ................................... .......................................................................
How confident are you in your estimation? Indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3 4 5 6
Very Unsure Slightly Slightly Confident Absolutely
Unsure Unsiure Confident Certain
3) Weight:................................. .................................................................................
How confident are you in your estimation? Indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3 4 5 6
Very.............Unsure............. Slightly.............. Slightly...........Confident.............Absolutely
Unsure Unsure Confident Certahi
4) Build/body shape: Please circle the letter of your choice...
a. Slim-lean b. Stocky-heavy build c. Overweight-fat 
d. Athletic-fit e. other (please specify)....................................................
How confident are you in your estimation? Indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3 4 5 6
Very.............Unsure............. Slightly.............. Slightly...........Confident.............Absolutely
Unsure Unsure Confident Certam
5) Age:...................................................................................................... ........................
How confident are you in your estimation? Indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3 4 5 6
Very............. Unsure............Slightly............... Slightly...........Confident.............Absolutely
Unsure Unsure Confident Certain
Still concentrating on the appearance of intruder one, please answer the 
following forced-choice questions by circling the letter next to your chosen 
answer:
6) What nationality do you think he was?
a. Scottish b. English c. Welsh d. Irish
How confident are you in your answer? Indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3 4 5 6
Very.............Unsure............Slightly............... Slightly...........Confident.............Absolutely
Unsure Unsure Confident Certain
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7) Did he wear spectacles? a. Yes b. No
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3 4 5 6 j
Very Unsure Slightly Slightly Confident Absolutely j
Unsure Unsure Confident Certam !
8) What colour was his hair? 
a. Light brown b. Dark brown c. Blonde d. Black
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below..
I
1 2 3 4  5 6
Very...........Unsure............ Slightly.............. Slightly............ Confident...........Absolutely
Unsure Unsure Confident Certain iI9) Did he have any facial hair? a. Yes b. No
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3 4  5 6 I
Very...........Unsure............ Slightly.............. Slightly............ Confident...........Absolutely |
Unsure Unsure Confident Certam I
10) What colour were his eves? 
a. Dark brown b. Light brown c. Blue d. Grey
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3 4 5 6
Very Unsure Slightly Slightly Confident Absolutely
Unsure Unsure Confident Certain
11) What colour was his T-shirt? 
a. White b. Blue c. Green d. Yellow
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3 4 5 6
Very............ Unsure............. Slightly...............Slightly...........Confident..............Absolutely
Unsure Unsme Confident Certain
12) Was there any writing on his T-shirt? a. Yes b. No
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3 4  5 6
Very............Unsure............. Slightly.............. Slightly...........Confident........... ...Absolutely
Unsure Unsure Confident Certam
13) What colour was his cardigan? 
a. Dark Brown b. Black c. Grey d. Navy Blue
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3 4 5 6
Very............Unsure............. Slightly...............Slightly...........Confident.............. Absolutely
Unsme Unsure Confident Certam
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14) What colour trousers was he wearing? 
a. Brown b. Blue c. Black d. Green
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3 4  5 6
Very.............Unsure.............Slightly............... Slightly...........Confident............. Absolutely
Unsure Unsure Confident Certain
15) What type of footwear was he wearing? 
a. Boots b. Shoes c. Training shoes d. Baseball boots
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3 4 5 6
Very............ Unsure.............Slightly............... Slightly...........Confident..............Absolutely
Unsure Unsure Confident Certain
16) What colour was his footwear? 
a. Black b. Dark brown c. Dark yellow d. Dark red
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3 4  5 6
Very............ Unsure.............Slightly............... Slightly...........Confident..............Absolutely
Unsme Unsure Confident Certain
17) Was he wearing any jewellery? a. Yes b. No
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3 4  5 6
Very............Unsure.............Slightly............... Shglitly...........Confident.............. Absolutely
Unsure Unsure Confident Certain
Please now take a few moments to recall as much of the appearance of 
INTRUDER TWO as you possibly can, then estimate the following 
characteristics:
18) Height;........................................................ ........................... ............ ......... .........
How confident are you in your estimation? Indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3 4  5 6
Very Unsure Slightly Slightly Confident Absolutely
Unsure Unsure Confident Certain
19) Weight:................. .......................... .....................................................................
How confident are you in your estimation? Indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3 4 5 6
Very Unsure Slightly Slightly Confident Absolutely
Unsure Unsure Confident Certam
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20) Build/body shape: Please circle the letter of your choice...
a. Slim-lean b. Stocky-heayy build c. Oyerweight-fat 
d. Athletic-fit e. other (please specify)......................................................
How confident are you in your estimation? Indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3 4 5 6
Very   .Unsure Slightly Slightly Confident Absolutely
Unsure Unsure Confident Certain
21) Age:....................................... ...................................................................................
How confident are you in your estimation ? Indicate your confidence below.. [
1 2 3 4 5 6 1
Veiy Unsure Slightly.  Slightly Confident Absolutely ]
Unsure Unsure Confident Certain !
Still concentrating on the appearance of intruder two, please answer the j
following forced-choice questions by circling the letter next to your chosen j
answer: I
22) What nationality do you think he was?
a. Scottish b. English c. Welsh d. Irish
How confident are you in your answer? Indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3 4  5 6
Very Unsure Slightly Slightly Confident Absolutely
Unsure Unsure Confident Certain
23) Did he wear spectacles? a. Yes b. No
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3 4 5 6
Very.............Unsure..............Slightly............. Slightly..............Confident.......... Absolutely
Unsure Unsure Confident Certain
24) What colour was his baseball cap? 
a. Red b. White c. Blue d. Black
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3 4 5 6
Very............ Unsure..............Slightly............. Slightly..............Confident.......... Absolutely
Unsure Unsure Confident Certain
25) Did he haye any facial hair? a. Yes b. No
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3 4 5 6
Very Unsure Slightly Slightly Confident Absolutely
Unsure Unsure Confident Certain
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26) What colour were his eyes? 
a. Dark brown b. Light brown c. Blue d. Grey
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3 4 5 6
Veiy............Unsure.............. Slightly...............Slightly.............Confident...........Absolutely
Unsure Unsure Confident Certain
27) What colour was his top?
a. Bottle green b. Nay y blue c. Dark Red d. Black
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3 4 5 6
Very........... Unsure.............. Slightly...............Slightly............ Confident...........Absolutely
Unsure Unsure Confident Certain
28) Was there any writing on his top? a. Yes b. No
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3 4 5 6
Very...........Unsure.............. Slightly...............Slightly.............Confident...........Absolutely
Unsure Unsure Confident Certain
29) What colour trousers was he wearing? 
a. Brown b. Blue c. Black d. Gray
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below..
32) Was he wearing any jewellery? a. Yes b. No
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3 4 5 6
Very Unsure Slightly Slightly Confident Absolutely
Unsure Unsure Confident Certain
1 2 3 4 5 6  1
Very............ Unsure............... Slightly............. Slightly...........Confident.............Absolutely !
Unsure Unsure Confident Certain j
!30) What type of footwear was he wearing? j
a. Boots b. Shoes c. Training shoes d. Baseball boots
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3 4 5 6  !
Very............Unsure............... Slightly............. Slightly...........Confident.............Absolutely |
Unsure Unsure Confident Certam ■
31) What colour was his footwear? 
a. Black b. Dark brown c. Dark yellow d. Dark red
How confident are you in your ansM>er? Please indicate your confidence below.. *
I
1 2 3 4 5 6  :
Very............Unsure............... Slightly............. Slightly...........Confident.............Absolutely i
Unsure Unsure Confident Certam Î
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SECTION TWO: ACTIONS & OBJECTS
33) Did Intruder One bring anything into the room with him? a. Yes b. No
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3 4 5 6
Very............ Unsure............ Slightly................Slightly............. Confident..........Absolutely
Unsure Unsure Confident Certahi
34) What object did Intruder One pick up from beside the laboratory computer?
a. Plastic ruler b. Plastic letter opener
c. Wooden ruler d. Metal letter opener
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3 4 5 6
Very............Unsure............ Slightly................Slightly.............Confident..........Absolutely
Unsure Unsure Confident Certain
35) Which hand did Intruder One hold the object with?
a. Left Hand b. Right Hand
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3 4 5 6
Very............Unsure............. Slightly................Slightly............. Confident..........Absolutely
Unsuie Unsure Confident Certain
36) Where did Intruder One throw the object?
a. Onto the floor b. Onto the accused’s desk
c. Next to the computer d. At the accused
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3 4 5 6
Very........... Unsure............. Slightly................Slightly.............Confident..........Absolutely
Unsure Unsure Confident Certain
37) Did Intruder Two bring anything into the room with him? a. Yes b. No
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3 4 5 6
Very...........Unsure............. Slightly................Slightly............. Confident..........Absolutely
Unsure Unsure Confident Certain
SECTION THREE: VERBAL INTERACTION
38) What name did Intruder Two call Intruder One?
a. James b. Justin c. Jamie d. Johnny
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3 4 5 6
Veiy Unsiue Slightly Slightly Confident Absolutely
Unsure Unsure Confident Certain
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39) When did Intruder One say that he had seen you/the other participant with 
his girlfriend?
a. Last night b. Yesterday c. Saturday d. Today
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3 4 5 6
Very.............Unsure............Slightly................Slightly.............Confident........... Absolutely
Unsure Unsure Confident Certain
40) Where did Intruder One say that he had seen you/the other participant with 
his girlfriend?
a. North Street b. Market Street c. South Street d. Bell Street
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3 4 5 6
Very............ Unsure............Slightly................Slightly.Confident   ..Absolutely
Unsure Unsure Confident Certain
41) What did Intruder One say he was doing when he saw you with his 
girlfriend?
a. He was driving b. He was in a friend s car
c. He was in a shop d. He was cycling
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3
Very............ Unsure..............Slightly.
Unsure Unsure
4 5 6
 Slightly Confident Absolutely
Confident Certain
42) What was the name of Intruder One’s girlfriend ?
a. Rachel b. Rhona c. Rebecca d. Ruth
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3 4 5
Very Unsure Slightly Slightly Confident......
Unsure Unsure Confident
...Absolutely
Certain
43) Who did Intruder Two say they would be late for a meeting with?
a. Dr Watson b. Dr Wilson c. Dr Williams d. Dr Wallis
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3
Very............Unsure..............Slightly.
Unsure Unsure
4 5 6
 Slightly Confident Absolutely
Confident Certain
SECTION FOUR; GENERAL
44) How threatened did you feel durins the interaction?
1 2 3 4 5
Not at all Very slightly Mildly Significantly Very. .Extremely
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45) How threatened did you feel immediately followins the interaction?
1 2 3 4 5 6
Not at all Very slightly Mildly Significantly Very Extremely
46) During the interaction to what extent did you perceive that you might be 
physically attacked?
1 2 3 4 5 6  i
Not at all Very slightly Mildly Significantly Very Extremely
47) How angry did you feel durins the interaction?
1 2 3 4 5 6
Not at all Very slightly Mildly Significantly Very Extremely
48) How angry did you feel immediately followins the interaction?
1 2 3 4 5 6
Not at all Very slightly Mildly Significantly Very Extremely
49) How afraid did you feel during the interaction?
1 2 3 4 5 6
Not at all Very slightly Mildly Significantly Very Extremely
50) How afraid did you feel immediately followins the interaction?
1 2 3 4 5 6
Not at all Very slightly Mildly Significantly Very Extremely
51) Did you detect any bodily sensations(i.e. an increase in heart rate, sweating, 
or shaking) during the interaction, please give details...
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52) Was there any particular information asked about in this questionnaire that 
you feel you are unable to recall because you could not see it during the 
interaction? Please give details.................  ».................... ................
53) Were you suspicious of the nature or purpose of the experiment at any 
point?
a. Yes b. No
54) If you were suspicious of the experiment, please give details of when and why 
you became suspicious
55) Have you ever been accused of anything like this in this manner before? If 
*yes’ please give details
56) Which aspect(s) of the interaction do you find most vivid/easiest to recall? 
Please give details
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57) Which aspect(s) of the interaction did you find most attention catching? 
Please giye details
58) How tall are you?.
59) How much do you weigh?.
60) What build /body shape would you class yourself as?
a. Slim-lean b. Stocky-heavy build c. Overweight-fat
d. Athletic-fit e. other (please specify)  ........... .................
Thank you for completing this questionnaire 
If there are any other comments you would like to make please do 
so.....................
Please make sure that you have answered ALL the questions. 
Thank you.
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Appendix 5: Recognition Questionnaire
Control Condition - Study One
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QUESTIONNAIRE MEASURE - C
DATE............................... SUBJECT.NUMBER........ ...............................................
SUBJECT NAME.........................................................................................................
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this questionnaire is to assess the sort of information processed from 
brief interactions such as the one you have just experienced. In this questionnaire you 
are required to answer forced-choice questions and make judgments regarding various 
aspects of the interaction.
In order for this questionnaire to be useful I need you to be as honest and truthful as 
possible in all of your answers. You are assured that all materials from this 
experiment will remain completely confidential. Your cooperation is greatly 
appreciated.
Please always write your answer on the dotted lines, or in the appropriate place 
provided. If you make a mistake cross it out and make your answer in a suitable place 
on the sheet, carefully indicating where the answer is.
To begin with I would like you to consider the following question and then work your 
way through the questionnaire at your own pace, being as truthful and honest as 
possible. If you do not understand anything please do not hesitate to ask. Thank you 
for your cooperation.
1) How long do you think the interaction lasted, from the moment the first 
intruder entered the laboratory to the moment both intruders left?
   Hours................... Minutes.................... Seconds
How confident are you in your estimation? Indicate your confidence by circling the appropriate 
number below..
1 2 3 4 5 6
Very Unsure Slightly Slightly Confident Absolutely
Unsure Unsure Confident Certain
The rest of this questionnaire is divided up into sections, please read all instructions 
carefully.
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For the purpose of the rest of this questionnaire ^Intruder One’ refers to the first 
individual entering the laboratory, whilst ^Intruder Two  ^ refers to the second 
individual entering the laboratory.
SECTION ONE: INTRUDER APPEARANCE
Please take a few moments to recall as much of the appearance of INTRUDER 
ONE as you possibly can, then estimate the following characteristics:
2) Height:..................................................................................................................
How confident are you in your estimation? Indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3 4 5 6
Very Unsure Slightly Slightly Confident Absolutely
Unsure Unsure Confident Certain
3) Weight:................................................................... ........................................ .......
How confident are you in your estimation? Indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3 4 5 6
Very.............Unsure............Slightly...............Slightly........... Confident.............Absolutely
Unsure Unsure Confident Certain
4) Build/body shape: Please circle the letter of your choice...
a. Slim-lean b. Stocky-heavy build c. Overweight-fat
d. Athletic-fit e. other (please specify)............................... .................
How confident are you in your estimation? Indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3 4 5 6
Very.............Unsure............Slightly...............Slightly........... Confident.............Absolutely
Unsure Unsure Confident Certain
5) Age:......................................... ..................................................... .........................
How confident are you in your estimation? Indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3 4 5 6
Very Unsure Slightly Slightly Confident Absolutely
Unsure Unsure Confident Certam
Still concentrating on the appearance of intruder one, please answer the 
following forced-choice questions by circling the letter next to your chosen 
answer:
6) What nationality do you think he was?
a. Scottish b. English c, Welsh d. Irish
How confident are you in your answer? Indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3 4 5 6
Very Unsure Slightly Slightly Confident Absolutely
Unsure Unsure Confident Certam
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7) Did he wear spectacles? a. Yes b. No
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below.
1 2  3 4
Very Unsure Slightly Slightly.
Unsure Unsure Confident
.Confident. ...Absolutely
Certain
8) What colour was his hair?
a. Light brown b. Dark brown c. Blonde d.
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below..
Black
1 2 3 4 5 6
Very Unsure Slightly Slightly Confident Absolutely
Unsure Unsure Confident Certain
9) Did he have any facial hair? a. Yes b. No
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below.
1 2  3 4
Very Unsure Slightly Slightly.
Unsure Unsure Confident
.Confident. ...Absolutely
Certain
10) What colour were his eves?
a. Dark brown b. Light brown c. Blue d.
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below..
Grey
1 2 3
Very Unsure Slightly.
Unsure Unsure
4 5 6
 Slightly Confident Absolutely
Confident Certam
11) What colour was his T-shirt?
a. White b. Blue c. Green d. Yellow
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3
Very............Unsure..............Slightly.
Unsure Unsure
4 5 6
 Slightly Confident Absolutely
Confident Certain
12) Was there any writing on his T-shirt? a. Yes b. No
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below.
1 2  3 4
Very Unsure Slightly Slightly.
Unsme Unsure Confident
.Confident. ...Absolutely
Ceilain
13) What colour was his cardigan?
a. Dark Brown b. Black c. Grey d. Navy Blue
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3
Very............Unsure..............Slightly.
Unsure Unsure
4 5 6
 Slightly Confident Absolutely
Confident Certain
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14) What colour trousers was he wearing?
a. Brown b. Blue c. Black d. Green
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3
Very Unsure Slightly.
Unsure Unsure
4  5 6
 Slightly Confident Absolutely
Confident Certain
15) What type of footwear was he wearing?
a. Boots b. Shoes c. Training shoes d. Baseball boots
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below..
1 2  3 4
Very Unsure Slightly Slightly.
Unsure Unsure Confident
5 6
.Confident Absolutely
Certam
16) What colour was his footwear?
a. Black b. Dark brown c. Dark yellow d. Dark red
How confident are you in your ans^ver? Please indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3 4 5 6
Very Unsure Slightly Slightly Confident Absolutely
Unsure Unsure Confident Certain
17) Was he wearing any jewellery? a. Yes b. No
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3 4 5
Very Unsure Slightly Slightly Confident....
Unsure Unsme Confident
...Absolutely
Certam
Please now take a few moments to recall as much of the appearance of 
INTRUDER TWO as you possibly can, then estimate the following 
characteristics:
18) Height:.................................... ........... ................... ................
How confident are you in your estimation? Indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3
Very Unsure Slightly.
Unsure Unsure
4  5 6
 Slightly Confident Absolutely
Confident Certain
19) Weight:............................................ .................. ....................
How confident are you in your estimation? Indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3
Very Unsure Slightly.
Unsure Unsure
4 5 6
 Slightly Confident Absolutely
Confident Certain
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20) Build/body shape: Please circle the letter of your choice...
a. Slim-lean b. Stocky-heavy build c. Overweight-fat 
d. Athletic-fit e. other (please specify).........................................
How confident are you in your estimation? Indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3
Very........... Unsure.............Slightly.
Unsure Unsure
4 5 6
 Slightly Confident Absolutely
Confident Certain
21) Age:..... ................................................ .....................................
How confident are you in your estimation? Indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3
Very Unsure Slightly.
Unsure Unsure
4 5 6
 Slightly Confident............Absolutely
Confident Certain
Still concentrating on the appearance of intruder two, please answer the 
following forced-choice questions by circling the letter next to your chosen 
answer:
22) What nationality do you think he was?
a. Scottish b. English c. Welsh d.
How confident are you in your answer? Indicate your confidence below..
Irish
1 2 3
Very Unsure Slightly.
Unsure Unsure
4  5 6
 SUghtly Confident Absolutely
Confident Certain
23) Did he wear spectacles? a. Yes b. No
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below.
1 2  3 4
Very Unsure Slightly Slightly.
Unsure Unsure Confident
.Confident ...Absolutely
Certam
24) What colour was his baseball cap?
a. Red b. White c. Blue d. Black
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below..
1 2  3
Very........... Unsure.............Slightly.
Unsure Unsure
4 5 6
 Slightly Confident Absolutely
Confident Certam
25) Did he have any facial hair? a. Yes b. No
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3 4 5 6
Very Unsure Sliglitly Slightly Confident Absolutely
Unsure Unsure Confident Certam
296
26) What colour were his eyes? 
a. Dark brown b. Light brown c. Blue d. Grey
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3 4 5 6
Very Unsure Slightly Slightly Confident Absolutely
Unsure Unsure Confident Certain
27) What colour was his top? 
a. Bottle green b. Navy blue c. Dark Red d. Black
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3 4  5 6
Very........... Unsure............Sliglitly...............Slightly..........Confident............Absolutely
Unsure Unsure Confident Certain
28) Was there any writing on his top? a. Yes b. No
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3 4  5 6
Very...........Unsure............Slightly...............Slightly..........Confident............Absolutely
Unsure Unsure Confident Certain
29) What colour trousers was he wearing? 
a. Brown b. Blue c. Black d. Gray
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below..
1 2  3 4  5 6
Very...........Unsure............Slightly...............Shghtly..........Confident............Absolutely
Unsure Unsure Confident Certain
30) What type of footwear was he wearing? 
a. Boots b. Shoes c. Training shoes d. Baseball boots
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3 4  5 6
Very...........Unsure............Slightly...............Slightly..........Confident............Absolutely
Unsure Unsure Confident Certam
31) What colour was his footwear? 
a. Black b. Dark brown c. Dark yellow d. Dark red
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3 4 5 6
Very.......... Unsure............Slightly...............Slightly..........Confident............Absolutely
Unsure Unsure Confident Certain
32) Was he wearing any jewellery? a. Yes b. No
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3 4 5 6
Veiy...........Unsure.............Slightly................Slightly...........Confident........... Absolutely
Unsure Unsure Confident Certain
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SECTION TWO: ACTIONS & OBJECTS
33) Did Intruder One bring anything into the room with him? a. Yes b. No
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3 4  5 6
Very............ Unsure............Slightly...............Slightly......... Confident............Absolutely
Unsure Unsure Confident Certam
34) What object did Intruder One pick up from beside the laboratory 
computer?
a. Plastic ruler b. Plastic letter opener
c. Wooden ruler d. Metal letter opener
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3 4 5 6
Very............Unsure............Slightly.............. Slightly......... Confident............Absolutely
Unsure Unsure Confident Certain
35) Which hand did Intruder One hold the object with?
a. Left Hand b. Right Hand
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3 4  5 6
Veiy........... Unsure............Slightly...............Slightly......... Confident............Absolutely
Unsure Unsure Confident Certain
36) Where did Intruder One throw the object?
a. Onto the floor b. Onto the other participant s desk
c. Next to the computer d. At the other participant
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3 4  5 6
Very............ Unsure............Slightly............. Slightly.......... Confident............Absolutely
Unsure Unsure Confident Certain
37) Did Intruder Two bring anything into the room with him? a. Yes b. No
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3 4  5 6
Veiy............Unsure............Slightly............. Slightly.......... Confident............Absolutely
Unsure Unsme Confident Certain
38) What colour was the pen which Intruder One handed to Intruder 
Two? 
a. Black b. Blue c. Red d. Green
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3 4 5 6
Very.............Unsure............ Slightly.............. Slightly........... Confident............ Absolutely
Unsme Unsme Confident Certain
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39) Did both Intruder One and Intruder Two both eat a biscuit?
a. Yes b. No
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3 4 5 6
Very Unsure Sliglitly Slightly Confident Absolutely
Unsure Unsure Confident Certain
SECTION THREE: VERBAL INTERACTION
40) What name did Intruder Two call Intruder One? 
a. James b. Justin c. Jamie d. Johnny
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3 4  5 6
Very........... Unsure............Slightly...............Slightly..........Confident.............Absolutely
Unsure Unsure Confident Certam
41)After ascertaining that Penny Woolnough was not around Intruder One said:
“Ah, I really need to see her - do you have any idea............................. ?”
Please select the phrase Intruder One said which fits into the space 
a. Where she is? b. How long she will be?
c. What she is doing? d. When she is coming back?
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3 4 5 6
Very...........Unsure........... Slightly...............Sliglitly..........Confident.............Absolutely
Unsme Unsme Confident Certam
42) Who did Intruder Two say they would be late for a meeting with? 
a. Dr Watson b. Dr Wilson c. Dr Williams d. Dr Wallis
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3 4  5 6
Very..............Unsure.............Slightly.............Sliglitly........... Confident..............Absolutely
Unsme Unsme Confident Certam
43) Where did Intruder Two say that they had to go to for their meeting?
a. 1st floor b. 2nd floor c. 3rd floor d. basement
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3 4 5 6
Very..............Unsure.............Slightly.............Slightly........... Confident.............. Absolutely
Unsme Unsme Confident Certain
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SECTION FOUR: GENERAL
44) How threatened did you feel durins the interaction?
1 2 3 4  5 6
Not at all Very slightly Mildly Significantly Very Extremely
45) How threatened did you feel immediately followins the interaction?
1 2 3 4  5 6 -
Not at all Very slightly Mildly Significantly Very Extremely
46) During the interaction to what extent did you perceive that you might be 
physically attacked?
1 2 3 4  5 6
Not at all...... Very slightly.......Mildly......... Significantly..... Very....... Extremely
47) How angry did you feel durins the interaction?
1 2 3 4  5 6
Not at all...... Very slightly.......Mildly......... Significantly..... Very....... Extremely
48) How angry did you feel immediately followins the interaction?
1 2 3 4  5 6
Not at all...... Very slightly.......Mildly......... Significantly..... Very....... Extr emely
49) How afraid did you feel durins the interaction?
1 2 3 4 5 6
Not at all......Very slightly.......Mildly......... Significantly..... Very....... Extremely
50) How afraid did you feel immediately followins the interaction?
1 2 3 4 5 6
Not at all......Very slightly.......Mildly......... Significantly..... Very....... Extremely
51) Did you detect any bodily sensations(i.e. an increase in heart rate, sweating, 
or shaking) during the interaction, please give details...
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52) Was there any particular information asked about in this questionnaire that 
you feel you are unable to recall because you could not see it during the 
interaction? Please give details  .............................................................................
53) Were you suspicious of the nature or purpose of the experiment at any 
point?
a. Yes b. No
53) If you were suspicious of the experiment, please give details of when and why 
you became suspicious
54) Which aspect(s) of the interaction do you find most yiyid/easiest to recall? 
Please give details
55) Which aspect(s) of the interaction did you find most attention catching? 
Please give details
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56) How tall are you?.
57) How much do you weigh?.............................      !
58) What build /body shape would you class yourself as?
a. Slim-lean b. Stocky-heavy build c. Overweight-fat
d. Athletic-fit e. other (please specify)......................................
Thank you for completing this questionnaire 
If there are any other comments you would like to make please do 
so.....................
Please make sure that you have answered ALL the questions. 
Thank you.
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QUESTIONNAIRE MEASURE - T
DATE.................   SUBJECT NUMBER.
SUBJECT NAME.................................................
Please complete ALLTHE QUESTIONS that follow even if you have to MAKE
A GUESS
If you do not understand anything, do not hesitate to ask. Thank you.
1) How long do you think the interaction lasted, from the moment the first intrader entered the I
laboratory to the moment both intraders left? !
I....................Hours....................Minutes.................... Seconds
How confident are you in your estimation? Indicate your confidence by circling the appropriate |
number below.. j
1 2 3 4 5 6  I
Very Unsure Slightly Slightly Confident Absolutely |
Unsure Unsure Confident Certain ;
For the purpose of the rest of this questionnaire 'Intruder One* refers to the first 
individual entering the laboratory, whilst 'Intruder Two  ^ refers to the second 
individual entering the laboratory.
Please turn over.
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APPl - Please take a few moments to recall as much of the appearance of 
INTRUDER ONE as you possibly can, then estimate the following
characteristics;-______________ __ ________
UHelght:................................................................................................ ................................................
How confident are you in your estimation? Indicate your confidence below..
1  2  3 4 5 6
Very............. Unsure............Sliglitly...............Slightly............ Confident........... Absolutely
Unsure Unsure Confident Certam
2)Weight :.................................................................................................................................................
How confident are you in your estimation? Indicate your confidence below..
1  2  3 4 5 6
Very.............Unsure............Slightly...............Slightly............ Confident........... Absolutely
Unsure Unsure Confident Certain
3)BuiId/body shape: Please ciicle the letter of your choice...
a. Slim-lean b. Stocky-heavy build c. Overweight-fat 
d. Athletic-fit e. other (please specify)  .............................................................
How confident are you in your estimation? Indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3 4 5 6
Very............ Unsure............ Slightly...............Slightly............ Confident........... Absolutely
Unsure Unsure Confident Certam
4) Age:..................................................................... .......................................................
How confident are you in your estimation? Indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3 4 5 6
Very............ Unsure............Slightly...............Slightly............ Confident........... Absolutely
Unsure Unsure Confident Certam
Still considering the appearance of INTRUDER 1 please answer the following 
questions:-
1) What were his glasses like?
a. Silver metal b. He wasn’t wearing glasses
c. Gold metal d. Brown torioiseshell
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3 4 5 6
Very.............Unsure............. Slightly.............. Slightly.............Confident...........Absolutely
Unsme Unsure Confident Certain
2) Wliat colour was his hair?
a. Ginger b. Dark Browne. Blonde d. Black
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3 4 5 6
Very.............Unsure............. Slightly.............. Slightly.............Confident...........Absolutely
Unsure Unsure Confident Certam
3) What colour was his sweatshirt?
a. White b. Blue c. Green d. Yellow
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3 4 5 6
Veiy.............Unsure............. Slightly.............. Slightly.............Confident...........Absolutely
Unsure Unsure Confident Certam
4) What colour was his Jacket?
a. Brown b. Black c. Grey d. Blue
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3 4 5 6
Veiy........... Unsure.............Slightly...............Slightly............ Confident..........Absolutely
Unsure Unsure Confident Certam
5) What type of material was his jacket made of?
a. Wool b. Denim c. Leather d. waterproof
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3 4  5 6
Very...........Unsure............ Slightly...............Slightly............ Confident..........Absolutely
Unsure Unsure Confident Certain
6) What colour trousers was he wearing?
a. Dark Brown b. Light Blue c. Black d. Dark Green
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3 4  5 6
Very...........Unsure............ Slightly...............Slightly............Confident..........Absolutely
Unsure Unsure Confident Certam
7) What type of trousers was he wearing?
a. Casual (i.e., chinos) b. Jogging bottoms c. Jeans d. formal (i.e., suit trousers)
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3 4  5 6
Very...........Unsure.............Slightly...............Slightly............ Confident..........Absolutely
Unsure Unsure Confident Certain
8) Where was he wearing an earring?
a. Right ear b. Left ear c. Nose d. He wasn’t wearing an earring
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3 4  5 6
Very.......... Unsure.............Slightly...............Slightly............ Confident..........Absolutely
Unsure Unsure Confident Certam
9) What colour footwear was he wearing?
a. Brown b. Blue c. Black d. Green
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3 4  5 6
Very.......... Unsure.............Slightly...............Slightly............ Confident..........Absolutely
Unsure Unsure Confident Certam
10) What type of footwear was he wearing?
a. Boots b. Training shoes c. Shoes d. Baseball boots
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3 4  5 6
Very.......... Unsure.............Slightly...............Slightly............ Confident..........Absolutely
Unsure Unsure Confident Certain
11) What colour was his baseball can?
a. White b. Blue c. Black d. He wasn’t wearing a baseball cap
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3 4 5 6
Very...........Unsure............. Slightly................Slightly.............Confident.......... Absolutely
Unsure Unsure Confident Certain
306
APP2 - Now please take a few moments to recall as much of the appearance of 
INTRUDER TWO as you possibly can, then estimate the following 
characteristics
1) Height:.....................................................................................................................................
How confident are you in your estimation? Indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3 4 5 6
Very Unsure Slightly Slightly Confident Absolutely
Unsure Unsure Confident Certain
2) Weight:..................................................................................................
How confident are you in your estimation? Indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3
Very........... Unsure.............Slightly.
Unsure Unsure
4 5 6
 Slightly Confident Absolutely
Confident Certam
3) Build/body shape: Please circle the letter of your choice...
a. Slim-lean b. Stocky-heavy build c, Ovenveight-fat
d. Athletic-fit e. other (please specify)............ ........... ........ .
How confident are you in your estimation? Indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3
Very........... Unsure.............Slightly.
Unsure Unsure
4 5 6
 Slightly Confident Absolutely
Confident Certam
4) Age:..........................................................................................................................................
How confident are you in your estimation? Indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3 4 - 5 6
Very Unsure Slightly Slightly Confident Absolutely
Unsme Unsure Confident Certain
Still considering the appearance of INTRUDER 2 please answer the following 
questions:-
1) What were his glasses like?
a. Silver metal b. He wasn’t wearing any
c. Gold metal d. Brown tortoiseshell
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3
Very........... Unsure.............Slightly.
Unsure Unsure
4 5 6
 Slightly Confident Absolutely
Confident Certain
2) What colour was his hair?
a. Ginger b. Dark Browne. Brown/Blond d. Black
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3 4 5 6
Veiy Unsure Slightly Slightly Confident Absolutely
Unsme Unsme Confident Certain
3) What colour was the T-shirt he was wearing underneath his overshirt?
a. Green b. Blue c. White d. Black
How confident are you in your ansM>er? Please indicate your confidence below..
1 2  3 4
Very Unsure Slightly Slightly.
Unsure Unsme Confident
.Confident. ...Absolutely
Certam
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4) What was the patteni of his overshiii:?
a. Horizontal Stripes b. Vertical stripes c. Plain d. Checked
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3 4 5 6
Very Unsure Slightly Slightly Confident Absolutely
Unsure Unsure Confident Certain
5) What was the colour of his overshirt?
a. Black and white b. Red and blue c. green and blue d. White and Blue
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below.. I
1 2 3 4 5 6 i
Very............Unsure............. Slightly..............Slightly......... Confident............Absolutely 1
Unsure Unsure Confident Certain
6) What colour trousers was he wearing?
a. Green b. Blue c. Black d. Grey |
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below.. j
1 2 3 4 5 6 I
Very........... Unsure.  Slightly...............Slightly......... Confident............Absolutely |
Unsure Unsure Confident Certain i
1
7) What type of trousers was he wearing? j
a. Casual (he., chinos) b. Jogging bottoms c. Jeans d. formal (i.e., suit trousers)
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below.. i
1 2 3 4 5 6 i
Very...........Unsure............. Slightly..............Slightly......... Confident............Absolutely j
Unsure Unsure Confident Certain |
8) Where was he wearing an earring? I
a. Right ear b. Left ear c. Nose d. He wasn’t wearing an earring 1
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below.. |
1 2 3 4 5 6 }
Very...........Unsure............. Slightly..............Slightly......... Confident............Absolutely :
Unsure Unsure Confident Certain i
!9) What colour footwear was he wearing? ’
a. Brown b. Blue c. Black d. Green
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below.. ji
1 2 3 4 5 6 i
Very.......... Unsure............. Slightly..............Slightly......... Confident............Absolutely I
Unsure Unsure Confident Certain \
10) What type of footwear was he wearing? j
a. Boots b. Trainers c. Shoes d. Baseball boots
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below.. j
1 2 3 4 5 6 I
Veiy.......... Unsure............. Slightly.Slightly   Confident....................... Absolutely I
Unsure Unsure Confident Certam
11) What colour was his baseball cap?
a. White b. Blue c. Black d. He wasn’t wearing a baseball cap
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3 4 5 6 I
Very...........Unsure.............. Slightly.............. Slightly..........Confident.............Absolutely I
Unsure Unsure Confident Certam
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ACTIONS - Now, please take a few moments to think about the ACTIONS of the 
intruders, then answer the following questions
1) What did Intmder One have in his hand when he came into the room? 
a. A ruler b. Nothing c. A folder d. A book
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below..
1 2  3 4
Very Unsure Slightly Slightly.
Unsure Unsure Confident
5 6
.Confident Absolutely
Certam
2) What object did Intruder One pick mi from the side?
a. Plastic ruler b. Plastic letter opener
c. Wooden niler d. He didn’t pick up anything
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3
Very............Unsure..............Slightly.
Unsure Unsure
4 5 6
 Slightly Confident Absolutely
Confident Certain
3) Where did Intruder One throw the object?
a. Onto the floor b. Onto the accused subject’s desk
c. Back onto the side d. He didn’t throw an object
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3 4 5
Very Unsure Slightly Slightly Confident.
Unsure Unsure Confident
4) What object did Intrader One uick up from the floor?
a. Plastic rale: b. Nothing
c. Wooden i*uler d. Piece of paper
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below.
...Absolutely
Certam
.Confident.
1 2  3 4
Very Unsure Slightly Slightly.
Unsure Unsure Confident
5) What did Intruder Two drop on the floor?
a. Plastic ruler b. Nothing
c. Wooden ruler d. Piece of paper
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below.
...Absolutely
Certam
.Confident.
1 2  3 4
Very Unsure Slightly Slightly.
Unsure Unsure Confident
6) What did Intrader Two pick uu from the floor?
a. Plastic ruler b. Nothing
c. Wooden raler d. Piece of paper
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below.
1 2 3 4 5
Very Unsuie Slightly Slightly Confident..
Unsure Unsure Confident
...Absolutely
Certain
...Absolutely
Certam
7) What did Intruder Tu o have in his hand when he came into the room? 
a. A raler b. Nothing c. A folder d. A book
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below.
1 2 3 4 5
Veiy Unsure Slightly Slightly Confident.
Unsure Unsure Confident
...Absolutely
Certain
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8) What did Intmder One have in his hand when he left the room? 
a. A ruler b. Nothing c. A folder d. A book
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below.
1 2  3 4
Very Unsure Slightly Slightly,
Unsure Unsure Confident
.Confident. ...Absolutely
Certain
9) How did Intmder Two tiT and remove Intmder One from the room?
a. He grabbed his left aim b. He grabbed his right arm 
c. He didn’t t:-y and remove him d. He pulled both arms from behind
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below..
1 2  3 4
Very Unsure Slightly Slightly.
Unsure Unsure Confident
5 6
.Confident Absolutely
Certahi
10) What did Intmder Two have in his hand when he left the mom? 
a. A mler b. Nothing c. A folder d. A book
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below.
1 2  3 4
Very Unsure Slightly Slightly.
Unsure Unsure Confident
Confident. ...Absolutely
Certain
11) What did Intmder Two do when he left the room?
a. Nothing b. dropped a piece of paper c. left the door open d. Slammed the door
How confident are you in your ans\ver? Please indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3
Very Unsure Slightly.
Unsure Unsure
4  5 6
 Slightly Confident Absolutely
Confident Certam
VERBAL - Now, please take a few moments to think about what was said during 
the interaction, then answer the following questions
1) What name did Intmder Two call Intmder One?
a. He didn’t call him anything b. Charlie c. Charles
How confident are you in your ans^ver? Please indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3 4 5
Very Unsure Slightly Slightly Confident.
Unsuie Unsure Confident
d. Carl
...Absolutely
Certain
2) What name did Intmder One call Intmder Two?
a. He didn’t call him anything b. Charlie c. Charles
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below..
d. Carl
1 2 3
Very............Unsure..............Slightly.
Unsure Unsure
4  5 6
 Slightly Confident Absolutely
Confident Certain
3) When did Intmder One sav that he had seen vou/the other nariicinant with 
his girlfriend?
a. Last night b. Yesterday c. Sunday d. Today
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below..
1 2  3 4
Veiy Unsure Slightly Slightly.
Unsure Unsure Confident
.Confident. ...Absolutely
Certam
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4)  Where did Intmder One say that he had seen vou/the other participant with 
his girlfriend?
a. North Street b. Market Street c. South Street d. He didn’t say
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3 4  5 6
Very Unsure Slightly Slightly Confident Absolutely
Unsure Unsure Confident Certain
5) What did Intmder One sav he was doing when he saw vou with his girlfriend?
a. He was driving b. He was in a friend’s car 
c. He didn’t say d. He was cycling
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3 4  5 6
Very.............Unsure.............Slightly............Slightly............ Confident.......... Absolutely
Unsure Unsure Confident Certain
6) What was the name of Intmder One’s girlfriend ?
a. Rachel b. He didn’t say c. Rebecca d. Ruth
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3 4  5 6
Veiy.............Unsure.............Slightly............Slightly............ Confident.......... Absolutely
Unsure Unsure Confident Certain
7) What did Intmder two sav Intmder one should do?
a. He didn’t say b. Speak to his girlfriend 
c. go and see his girlfriend d. phone his girlfriend
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3 4  5 6
Very.............Unsure.............Slightly............Slightly............ Confident.......... Absolutely
Unsure Unsure Confident Certain
8) Who did Intmder Two sav they would be late for a meeting with?
a. He didn’t say a name b. Dr Wilson c. Dr Williams d. Dr Wallis
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3 4  5 6
Very............ Unsure.............Slightly............Slightly............ Confident.......... Absolutely
Unsure Unsure Confident Certain
9) What did Intmder One sav vou/the other participant had been doing with his girlfriend?
a. Chatting her up b. Talking to her
c. Hanging out with her d. He didn’t say
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3 4  5 6
Very............ Unsure.............Slightly............Slightly............ Confident.......... Absolutely
Unsure Unsure Confident Certam
10) What did Intmder One sav as he walked out of the room and down the corridor?
a. I’ll have him b. I’ll kill him
c. I’m warning him d. He didn’t say anything
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3 4 5 6
Veiy.............Unsure..............Slightly.............Slightly............. Confident........... Absolutely
Unsure Unsure Confident Certain
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GENERAL - Now, please take a final few moments to the answer the following 
questions:-
1) How threatened did you feel during  the interaction?
1 2 3 4  5 6
Not at all........ Very slightly......Mildly..........Significantly......Very........Extremely
2) How threatened did you feel immediately following  the interaction?
1 2 3 4  5 6
Not at all........Very slightly......Mildly..........Significantly......Very........ Extremely
3)Durmg the interaction to what extent did you perceive that you might be 
physically attacked?
1 2 3 4  5 6
Not at all Very slightly Mildly Significantly Very Extremely
4) How angry did you feel during the interaction?
1 2 3 4  5 6
Not at all Very slightly Mildly Significantly Very Extremely
5) How angiw did you feel immediately following the interaction?
1 2 3 4  5 6
Not at all Very slightly Mildly Significantly Very Extremely
6) How afraid did you feel during  the interaction?
1 2 3 4  5 6
Not at all Very slightly Mildly Significantly Very Extremely
7) How afraid did you feel immediately following  the interaction?
1 2 3 4  5 6
Not at all Very slightly Mildly Significantly Very Extremely
8) Did you detect any bodily sensations(i.e. an increase in heart rate, sweating, or shaldng) during 
the interaction, please give details...
9) Was there any particular information asked about in this questionnaire that you feel you are 
unable to recall because you could not see it during the interaction? Please give 
details......................................................................................... ........................................................... .
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10) How authentic do you feel the experiment
was?............................................ .................................................. ..........................................................
11) Were you suspicious of the nature or purpose of the experiment at any point?
a. Yes b. No
12) If you were suspicious of the experiment, please give details of when and why you became 
suspicious
13 Have vou ever been accused of anything like this in this manner before? If ‘yes’ please give 
details
14) Which aspect(s) of the interaction do vou find most vivid/easiest to recall? Please give details
15) Which aspectfs) of the interaction did you find most attention catching? Please give details
16) How tall are you?..............................................................................................
17) How much do you weigh?.................................................................................
18) What build /body shape would you class yourself as?
a. Slim-lean b. Stocky-heavy build c. Overweight-fat
d. Athletic-fit e. other (please specify)...................................
Thankyou for completing this questionnaire 
If there are any other comments you would like to make please do so
overleaf......
Thankyou fo r  helping
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Appendix 7: Recognition Questionnaire
Control Condition - Study Two
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QUESTIONNAIRE MEASURE - C
DATE................    SUBJECT NUMBER.
SUBJECT NAME........................................ .........
Please complete ALLTHE QUESTIONS that follow even if you have to MAKE
A GUESS
If you do not understand anything, do not hesitate to ask. Thank you.
1) How long do you think the interaction lasted, from the moment the first 
intruder entered the laboratory to the moment both intruders left?
............... .....Hours....................Minutes....................Seconds
How confident are you in your estimation? Indicate your confidence by circling the appropriate 
number below..
1 2 3 4 5 6
Very Unsure Slightly Slightly Confident Absolutely
Unsure Unsure Confident Certain
For the purpose of the rest of this questionnaire * Intruder One* refers to the first 
individual entering the laboratory, whilst * Intruder Two  ^ refers to the second 
individual entering the laboratory.
Please turn over......
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APPl - Please take a few moments to recall as much of the appearance of 
INTRUDER ONE as you possibly can, then estimate the following 
characteristics
DHeight:........................................................................................................................................
How confident are you in your estimation? Indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3 4  5 6
Very Unsure Slightly Slightly Confident Absolutely
Unsure Unsure Confident Certain
2)Weight :...................................................................................... .................................................
How confident are you in your estimation? Indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3 4  5 6
Very........... Unsure............Slightly...............Slightly..........Confident.............Absolutely |
Unsure Unsure Confident Certain 1
3)Build/body shape; Please circle tlie letter of your choice...
a. Slim-lean b. Stocky-heavy build c. Ovenveight-fat
d. Athletic-fit e. other (please specify)  ....................................................   |
Hom> confident are you in your estimation? Indicate your confidence below.. i
1 2 3 4  5 6  Ï
Very...........Unsure............Slightly...............Slightly..........Confident.............Absolutely |
Unsure Unsure Confident Certain |
4) Age:..........................................................................................................    j
How confident are you in your estimation ? Indicate your confidence below.. \
1 2 3 4  5 6  i
Very...........Unsure............Slightly...............Slightly..........Confident.............Absolutely
Unsure Unsure Confident Certain
Still considering the appearance of INTRUDER 1 please answer the following 
questions:-
1) What were his glasses like? 1
a. Silver metal b. He wasn’t wearing glasses
c. Gold metal d. Brown torioiseshell
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below.. \
1 2 3 4 5 6
Very............ Unsure..............Slightly..............Slightly............Confident.............Absolutely
Unsure Unsure Confident Certain
i2) What colour was his hair? |
a. Ginger b. Dark Brown c. Blonde d. Black i
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below.. !
1 2 3 4 5 6 I
Very............ Unsure..............Slightly..............Slightly............Confident.............Absolutely !
Unsure Unsure Confident Certain 1
3) What colour was his sweatshirt? i
a. White b. Blue c. Green d. Yellow i
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below.. \
1 2 3 4 5 6 I
Very............Unsure..............Slightly.............. Slightly............Confident.............Absolutely
Unsure Unsure Confident Certain
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4) What colour was his Jacket?
a. Brown b. Black c. Grey d. Blue
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3 4 5 6
Very...........Unsure.............Slightly...............Slightly............ Confident..........Absolutely
Unsure Unsure Confident Certain
5) What type of material was his jacket made of?
a. Wool b. Denim c. Leather d. waterproof
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3 4 5 6
Very...........Unsure.............Slightly............... SUghtly............ Confident..........Absolutely
Unsure Unsure Confident Certain
6) What colour trousers was he wearing?
a. Dark Brown b. Light Blue c. Black d. Dark Green
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3 4 5 6
Very.......... Unsure.............Slightly...............Slightly............ Confident..........Absolutely
Unsure Unsuie Confident Certain
7) What type of trousers was he wearing?
a. Casual (i.e., chinos) b. Jogging bottoms c. Jeans d. formal (i.e., suit trousers)
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3 4 5 6
Very..........Unsure.............Slightly...............SUghtly............ Confident..........Absolutely
Unsure Unsure Confident Certain
8) Where was he w earing an earring?
a. Right ear b. Left ear c. Nose d. He wasn’t wearing an earring
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3 4 5 6
Very..........Unsure.............Slightly...............Slightly............ Confident..........Absolutely
Unsure Unsure Confident Certain
9) What colour footwear was he wearing?
a. Brown b. Blue c. Black d. Green
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3 4 5 6
Very..........Unsure.............Slightly   Slightly...............Confident..........Absolutely
Unsure Unsure Confident Certain
10) What type of footwear was he wearing?
a. Boots b. Training shoes c. Shoes d. Baseball boots
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3 4 5 6
Very..........Unsure.............Slightly...............Slightly............ Confident..........Absolutely
Unsure Unsure Confident Certain
11) What colour was his baseball cap?
a. White b. Blue c. Black d. He wasn’t wearing a baseball cap
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3 4 5 6
Very.......... Unsure............. Slightly................ SUglitly.............Confident.......... Absolutely
Unsure Unsure Confident Certain
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APP2 - Now please take a few moments to recall as much of the appearance of 
INTRUDER TWO as you possibly can, then estimate the following 
characteristics
1) Height:......... ...............................................................................................................................
How confident are you in your estimation? Indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3 4 5 6
Very............ Unsure............. Slightly..........Slightly............ Confident.............Absolutely
Unsure Unsure Confident Certain
2) Weight:............................................................ ................. .........................................................
How confident are you in your estimation? Indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3 4  5 6
Very............Unsure............. Slightly..........Sliglitly............ Confident.............Absolutely
Unsure Unsure Confident Certain
3) Build/body shape: Please circle the letter of your choice...
a. Slim-lean b. Stocky-heavy build c. Overweight-fat
d. Athletic-fit e. other (|)lease specify)...............................................
How confident are you in your estimation? Indicate your confidence below..
1 2  3 4 5 6
Very............Unsure..............Slightly..........Slightly............ Confident.............Absolutely
Unsure Unsure Confident Certain
4)  A g e :.......................................................................................................................................................................................... .
How confident are you in your estimation? Indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3 4  5 6
Very Unsure Slightly Slightly Confident Absolutely
Unsure Unsure Confident Certain
Still considering the appearance of INTRUDER 2 please answer the following 
questions
1) What were his glasses like?
a. Silver metal b. He wasn’t wearing any
c. Gold metal d. Brown tortoiseshell
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3 4  5 6
Very............Unsure............. Slightly............ Slightly.............Confident.......... Absolutely
Unsure Unsure Confident Certain
2) What colour was his hair?
a. Ginger b. Dark Browne. Brown/Blond d. Black
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3 4 5 6
Very............Unsure............. Slightly............ Slightly.............Confident.......... Absolutely
Unsure Unsuie Confident Certain
3) What colour was the T-shirt he was wearing underneath his overshirt?
a. Green b. Blue c. White d. Black
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3 4 5 6
Very............ Unsure..............Slightly.............Slightly............. Confident...........Absolutely
Unsure Unsure Confident Certain
318
4) What was the pattem of his overshirt?
a. Horizontal Stripes b. Vertical stripes c. Plain d. Checked
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3 4 5 6
Very.............Unsure............. Slightly............Slightly.............Confident......... Absolutely
Unsure Unsure Confident Certain
5) What was the colour of his overshirt?
a. Black and white b. Red and blue c, green and blue d. White and Blue
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3 4 5 6 I
Very.............Unsure............. Slightly............Slightly.............Confident......... Absolutely t
Unsure Unsure Confident Certain I
I
6) What colour trousers was he wearing? i
a. Green b. Blue c. Black d. Grey 1
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below.. |
1 2 3 4 5 6
Very............ Unsure............. Slightly............Slightly.............Confident......... Absolutely
Unsure Unsure Confident Certain |
T
7) What type of trousers was he wearing? |
a. Casual (i.e., chinos) b. Jogging bottoms c. Jeans d. formal (i.e., suit trousers) j
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below.. |
1 2 3 4 5 6
Very............Unsure............. Slightly............Slightly.............Confident......... Absolutely
Unsure Unsure Confident Certain j
8) Where was he wearing an earring? j
a. Right ear b. Left ear c. Nose d. He wasn’t wearing an earring |
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below.. \I
1 2 3 4 5 6 I
Very............Unsure............. Slightly............Slightly.............Confident......... Absolutely j
Unsure Unsure Confident Certain !I9) What colour foofyvear was he wearing? I
a. Brown b. Blue c. Black d. Green |
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below.. ;
11 2 3 4 5 6 j
Very........... Unsure............. Slightly............Slightly.............Confident......... Absolutely J
Unsure Unsure Confident Certain i
10) What type of footwear was he wearing? ;
a. Boots b. Trainers c. Shoes d. Baseball boots j
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below.. i
1 2 3 4 5 6
Very............Unsure............. Slightly............ Sli^itly.......... Confident............Absolutely
Unsure Unsure Confident Certain
11) What colour was his baseball cap?
a. White b. Blue c. Black d. He wasn’t wearing a baseball cap
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3 4 5 6
Very.............Unsure.............. Slightly............. Slightly...........Confident.............Absolutely
Unsure Unsure Confident Certain
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ACTIONS - Now, please take a few moments to think about the ACTIONS of the 
intruders, then answer the following questions
1) What did Intmder One have in his hand when he came into the room? 
a. A mler b. Nothing c. A folder d. A book
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3
Very Unsure Sliglitly.
Unsure Unsure
4 5 6
 SUghtly Confident Absolutely
Confident Certain
2) What ob ject did Intmder One pick up from the side?
a. Plastic mler b. Plastic letter opener
c. Wooden mler d. He didn’t pick up an object
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3
Very........... Unsure............. Slightly.
Unsure Unsure
4 5 6
 SUghtly Confident Absolutely
Confident Certain
3) What did hitnider One do with the object?
a. Dropped it onto the floor b. Held it in his right hand
c. Held it in his left hand d. He didn’t do anything with an object
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below..
.Confident.
1 2  3 4
Very Unsure Slightly SUghtly.
Unsure Unsure Confident
4) What object did Intmder One pick up from the floor?
a. Plastic ruler b. Nothing
c. Wooden luler d. Piece of paper
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below..
...Absolutely
Certain
.Confident.
1 2  3 4
Very Unsure SUghtly SUghtly.
Unsure Unsuie Confident
5) What did Intmder Two drop on the floor?
a. Plastic luler b. Nothing
c. Wooden luler d. Piece of paper
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below.
...Absolutely
Certain
1 2 3
Very........... Unsure............. SUghtly.
Unsure Unsure
4
 SUghtly.
Confident
.Confident. ...Absolutely
Certain
6) What did Intmder Two pick up from the floor?
a. Plastic luler b. Nothing
c. Wooden ruler d. Piece of paper
How confident are you in your ansM>er? Please indicate your confidence below.
.Confident.
1 2  3 4
Very Unsure Slightly SUghtly.
Unsure Unsure Confident
7) What did Intruder Two have in his hand when he came into the room? 
a. A mler b. Nothing c. A folder d. A book
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below..
...Absolutely
Certain
1 2  3 4
Very Unsure Slightly SUghtly.
Unsure Unsure Confident
Confident. ...Absolutely
Certain
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8) What did Intmder One have in his hand when he left the room? 
a. A mler b. Nothing c. A folder d. A book
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3 4 5 6
Very ....Unsure Slightly Slightly Confident Absolutely
Unsure Unsure Confident Certain
9) What colour was the pen which Intmder One handed to Intmder Two?
a. Black b. Blue c. Red d. He didn’t hand him a pen
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below..
1 2  3 4
Very Unsure Slightly Slightly.
Unsme Unsure Confident
.Confident. ...Absolutely
Certain
10) What did Intmder Two have in his hand when he left the room? 
a. A mler b. Nothing c. A folder d. A book
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below.
1 2 3
Very Unsure Slightly.
Unsure Unsure
4 5 6
 Slightly Confident Absolutely
Confident Certain
11) What did Intmder Two do when he left the room?
a. Nothing b. dropped a piece of paper c. left the door open d. closed the door
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3
Very Unsure Slightly.
Unsure Unsure
4 5 6
 Slightly Confident Absolutely
Confident Certain
VERBAL - Now, please take a few moments to think about what was said during 
the interaction, then answer the following questions
1) What name did Intmder Two call Intmder One?
a. He didn’t call him anything b. Charlie c. Charles
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below..
d. Carl
1 2 3 4 5 6
Very Unsure Slightly Slightly Confident Absolutely
Unsure Unsure Confident Certain
2) What name did Intmder One call Intmder Two?
a. He didn’t call him anything b. Charlie c. Charles
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below.
d. Carl
1 2 3
Very........... Unsure............. Slightly.
Unsure Unsuie
4 5 6
 Slightly Confident Absolutely
Confident Certain
3) What did Intruder Two say when he entered the room? 
a. Hurry up b. Have you found her? c. Where is she d. Something else
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3 4 5 6
Very Unsure Slightly Slightly Confident Absolutely
Unsure Unsure Confident Certain
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4) Who did Intmder Two say they would be late for a meeting with?
a. He didn’t say a name b. Dr Wilson c. Dr Williams d. Dr Wallis
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3 4 5 6
Very Unsure Slightly Slightly Confident Absolutely
Unsure Unsure Confident Certain
5) Where did Intruder Two say that they had to go to for their meeting? 
a. 1st floor b. 2nd floor c. 3rd floor d. basement
How confident are you in your answer? Please indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3 4 5 6
Very........... Unsure............Slightly.............. Shghtly.......... Confident............ Absolutely
Unsure Unsure Confident Certain
6) After ascertaining that Penny Woolnough was not around Intruder One said;
“Ah, I really need to see her - do you have any idea............................. ?”
Please select the phrase Intruder One said which fits into the space 
a. Where she is? b. How long she will be? 
c. He didn’t say the above phrase d. When she is coming back?
How confident are you in your answ’er? Please indicate your confidence below..
1 2 3 4 5 6
Very...........Unsure............Slightly.............. Slightly.......... Confident........... Absolutely
Unsure Unsure Confident Certain
GENERAL - Now, please take a final few moments to the answer the following 
questions
1) How threatened did you feel during  the interaction?
1 2 3 4 5 6
Not at all........Very slightly.......Mildly........Significantly......Very........Extremely
2) How threatened did you feel immediately follomng  the interaction?
1 2 3 4 5 6
Not at all........Very slightly....... Mildly........Significantly......Very........Extremely
3)During the interaction to what extent did you perceive that you might be 
physically attacked?
1 2 3 4 5 6
Not at all Very slightly Mildly Significantly Very Extremely
4) How angiy did you feel during  the interaction?
1 2 3 4 5 6
Not at all....... Very slightly.......Mildly........Significantly......Veiy........ Extremely
5) How angiy did you feel immediately follomng  the interaction?
1 2 3 4 5 6
Not at all....... Very slightly.......Mildly........Significantly......Very........ Extremely
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6) How afraid did you feel during the interaction?
1 2 3 4 5 6
Not at all Very slightly Mildly Significantly Very Extremely
7) How afraid did you feel immediately following  the interaction?
1 2 3 4 5 6
Not at all Very slightly Mildly Significantly Veiy Extremely
8) DidyoM detect any bodily sensations(i.e. an increase in heart rate, sweating, or shaldng) during 
the interaction, please give details...
9) Was there any particular infoimation asked about in this questionnaire that you feel you are 
unable to recall because you could not see it during the interaction? Please give 
details................................................................................................. ......................................................
10) How authentic do you feel the experiment was?
11) Were you suspicious of the nature or purpose of the experiment at any point?
a. Yes b. No
12) If you were suspicious of the experiment, please give details of when and why vou became 
suspicious
13) Which aspect(s) of the interaction do you find most vivid/easiest to recall? Please give details
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14) Which asi)ect(s) of the interaction did you find most attention catching? Please give details
15) How tall are you?..............................................................................................
16) How much do you weigh?.................................................................................
17) What build /body shape would you class yourself as?
a. Slim-lean b. Stocky-heavy build c. Overweight-fat
d. Athletic-fit e. other (please specify)........... .......................
Thank you for completing this questionnaire 
If there are any other comments you would like to make please do so
overleaf......
Thankyou fo r  helping
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Appendix 8: Cycling Questionnaire
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CYCLING QUESTIONNAIRE
DATE............................... SUBJECT NUMBER.
SUBJECT NAME.................................................
Please circle your ratings on the scales below each question - thankyou
1) How arousing did you find the cycling?
1 2 3 4 5 6
Not at all...... Very slightly.........Mildly........Significantly.......Very........ Extremely
2) How difficult did you find the cycling?
1 2 3 4 5 6
Not at all...... Very slightly.........Mildly........Significantly.......Very........ Extremely
3) How stressful did you find the cycling?
1 2 3 4 5 6
Not at all......Very slightly.........Mildly........Significantly.......Very.........Extremely
4) How enjoyable did you find the cycling?
I 2 3 4 5 6
Not at all......Very slightly.........Mildly........Significantly.......Very........ Extremely
5) How difficult did you find watching the video and cvcling at the same time?
1 2 3 4 5 6
Not at all......Very slightly........ Mildly........Significantly.......Very........ Extremely
****** Please note the change in rating scale for the next two questions ******
6) How much of your attention do you think was devoted to the cycling?
1 2 3 4 5 6
None...............A little............ A fair bit........Quite a lot.......Most................All
7) How much of your attention do you think was devoted to watching the video?
1 2 3 4 5 6
None...............A little............ A fair bit........Quite a lot.......Most............... All
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Appendix 9: Statistical Output - Study One
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PHYSIOLOGICAL AROUSAL
HEART RATE DURING: UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE (WITH 
BASELINE AS CO-VARIATE)
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Dependent Variable: DURING
Source
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F SIg.
Corrected Model 5557.603® 4 1389.401 11.894 .000
Intercept 83.176 1 83.176 .712 .406
BASELINE 2224.093 1 2224.093 19.039 .000
INCIDENT 2298.292 1 2298.292 19.674 .000
WITNESS 281.585 1 281.585 2.410 .131
INCIDENT* WITNESS 162.497 1 162.497 1.391 .248
Error 3387.684 29 116.817
Total 263049.500 34
Corrected Total 8945.286 33
a- R Squared = .621 (Adjusted R Squared = .569)
HEART RATE AFTER: UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE (WITH 
BASELINE AS CO-VARIATE)
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Dependent Variable: AFTER
Source
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F SIg.
Corrected Model 2493.826® 4 623.456 6.700 .001
Intercept 784.732 1 784.732 8.433 .007
BASELINE 758.390 1 758.390 8.150 .008
INCIDENT 1374.272 1 1374.272 14.768 .001
WITNESS 8.169 1 8.169 .088 .769
INCIDENT* WITNESS 6.420 1 6.420 .069 .795
Error 2698.666 29 93.057
Total 255453.934 34
Corrected Total 5192.492 33
a- R Squared = .480 (Adjusted R Squared = .409)
SELF-REPORTED AROUSAL
STAI: UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE
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Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Dependent Variable: stai state
Source
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Corrected Model 37.400® 3 12.467 .195 .899
Intercept 55950.400 1 55950.400 873.391 000
INCIDENT 4.900 1 4.900 .076 .784
WITNESS 28.900 1 28.900 .451 .506
INCIDENT* WITNESS 3.600 1 3.600 .056 .814
Error 2306.200 36 64.061
Total 58294.000 40
Corrected Total 2343.600 39
a R Squared = .016 (Adjusted R Squared = -.066)
MACKAY AROUSAL SCALE: UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Dependent Variable: mackay arousal
Source
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Corrected Model 34.275® 3 11.425 4.545 .008
Intercept 748.225 1 748.225 297.636 .000
INCIDENT 21.025 1 21.025 8.364 .006
WITNESS 9.025 1 9.025 3.590 .066
INCIDENT* WITNESS 4.225 1 4.225 1.681 .203
Error 90.500 36 2.514
Total 873.000 40
Corrected Total 124.775 39
a. R Squared = .275 (Adjusted R Squared = .214)
MACKAY STRESS SCALE: UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Dependent Variable: mackay stress
Source
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Corrected Model 136.275® 3 45.425 14.158 .000
Intercept 403.225 1 403.225 125.681 .000
INCIDENT 126.025 1 126.025 39.281 .000
WITNESS 3.025 1 3.025 .943 .338
INCIDENT* WITNESS 7.225 1 7.225 2.252 .142
Error 115.500 36 3.208
Total 655.000 40
Corrected Total 251.775 39
a R Squared = .541 (Adjusted R Squared = .503)
THREAT DURING: UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE
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Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Dependent Variable: threatened during
Source
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Corrected Model 40.200® 3 13.400 14.105 .000
Intercept 211.600 1 211.600 222.737 .000
INCIDENT 36.100 1 36.100 38.000 .000
WITNESS 1.600 1 1.600 1.684 .203
INCIDENT * WITNESS 2.500 1 2.500 2.632 .113
Error 34.200 36 .950
Total 286.000 40
Corrected Total 74.400 39
a R Squared = .540 (Adjusted R Squared = .502)
THREAT IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING: UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF 
VARIANCE
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Dependent Variable: threatened immediately following
Source
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Corrected Model 18.200® 3 6.067 8.598 .000
Intercept 102.400 1 102.400 145.134 .000
INCIDENT 12.100 1 12.100 17.150 .000
WITNESS 2.500 1 2.500 3.543 .068
INCIDENT* WITNESS 3.600 1 3.600 5.102 .030
Error 25.400 36 .706
Total 146.000 40
Corrected Total 43.600 39
a R Squared = .417 (Adjusted R Squared = .369)
THREAT IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING: POSTHOC TUKEY'S TEST FOR 
INTERACTION OF EICIDENT BY WITNESS
threatened immediately following
Tukey HSCf'^
group N
Subset
1 2
control victim 10 1.0000
control bystander 10 1.1000
threat bystander 10 1.6000
threat victim 10 2.7000
Sig. .393 1.000
Means for groups in homogeneous subsets are displayed.
Based on Type III Sum of Squares
The error term is Mean Square(Error) = .706.
a. Uses Harmonic Mean Sample Size = 10.000.
b Alpha = .05.
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Multiple Comparisons
Dependent Variable: threatened Immediately following
(1) group (J) group
Mean
Difference
(l-J) std. Error Sig.
95% Confidence Interval
Lower Bound Upper Bound
threat victim threat bystander 1.1000* .3756 .029 8.629E-02 2.1117
control victim 1.7000* .3756 .000 .6863 2.7117
control bystander 1.6000* .3756 .001 .5883 2.6117
threat bystander threat victim -1.1000* .3756 .029 -2.1117 -8.8286E-02
control victim .6000 .3756 .393 -.4117 1.6117
control bystander .5000 .3756 .550 -.5117 1.5117
control victim threat victim -1.7000* .3756 .000 -2.7117 -.6883
threat bystander -.6000 .3756 .393 -1.6117 .4117
control bystander -.1000 .3756 .993 -1.1117 .9117
control bystander threat victim -1.6000* .3756 .001 -2.6117 -.5883
threat bystander -.5000 .3756 .550 -1.5117 .5117
control victim .1000 .3756 .993 -.9117 1.1117
Based on observed means.
*• The mean difference Is significant at the .05 level.
PERCEIVED ATTACK DURING: UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Dependent Variable: perceived attack during
Source
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Corrected Model 20.075® 3 6.692 9.301 .000
Intercept 119.025 1 119.025 165.440 .000
INCIDENT 18.225 1 18.225 25.332 .000
WITNESS 1.225 1 1.225 1.703 .200
INCIDENT* WITNESS .625 1 .625 .869 .358
Error 25.900 36 .719
Total 165.000 40
Corrected Total 45.975 39
a R Squared = .437 (Adjusted R Squared = .390)
ANGRY DURING: UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE
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Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Dependent Variable: angry during
Source
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Corrected Model 11.475® 3 3.825 3.732 .020
Intercept 140.625 1 140.625 137.195 .000
INCIDENT 7.225 1 7.225 7.049 .012
WITNESS 3.025 1 3.025 2.951 .094
INCIDENT* WITNESS 1.225 1 1.225 1.195 .282
Error 36.900 36 1.025
Total 189.000 40
Corrected Total 48.375 39
a R Squared = .237 (Adjusted R Squared = .174)
ANGRY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING: UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF 
VARIANCE
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Source
Type 111 Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Corrected Model 3.875® 3 1.292 1.458 .242
Intercept 99.225 1 99.225 111.978 .000
INCIDENT 3.025 1 3.025 3.414 073
WITNESS .225 1 .225 .254 .617
INCIDENT * WITNESS .625 1 .625 .705 .407
Error 31.900 36 .886
Total 135.000 40
Corrected Total 35.775 39
a R Squared = .108 (Adjusted R Squared = .034)
AFRAID DURING: UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Dependent Variable: afraid during
Source
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Corrected Model 25.800® 3 8.600 11.639 .000
Intercept 129.600 1 129.600 175.398 .000
INCIDENT 25.600 1 25.600 34.647 ,000
WITNESS 1.000E-01 1 1.000E-01 .135 ,715
INCIDENT* WITNESS .100 1 .100 .135 .715
Error 26.600 36 .739
Total 182.000 40
Corrected Total 52.400 39
a. R Squared = .492 (Adjusted R Squared = .450)
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AFRAID IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING: UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF 
VARIANCE
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Dependent Variable: afraid immediately following
Source
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Corrected Model 6.875® 3 2.292 4.024 .014
Intercept 75.625 1 75.625 132.805 .000
INCIDENT 5.625 1 5.625 9.878 .003
WITNESS .625 1 .625 1.098 .302
INCIDENT* WITNESS .625 1 .625 1.098 .302
Error 20.500 36 .569
Total 103.000 40
Corrected Total 27.375 39
a R Squared = .251 (Adjusted R Squared = .189)
CORRELATION OF PHYSIOLOGICAL & PSYCHOLOGICAL AROUSAL
HEART RATE DURING: SPEARMAN CORRELATIONS (ACROSS THE 
THREAT GROUP WITNESSES) OF ‘RATED PERCEIVED THREAT DURING 
THE INCIDENT’ AND ‘RATED PERCEIVED ATTACK DURING THE 
INCIDENT’ WITH THE ‘ STANDARDIZED RESIDUAL (TO TAKE ACCOUNT 
OF BASELINE VARIATION) OF HEART RATE DURING THE INCIDENT’
Correlations
threatened
during
perceived 
ttack during
Standardized
Residual
Spearm an's rh threatened during Correlation Coeffic 1.000 .736*' .255
Sig. (2-tailed) .003 .378
N 14 14 14
perceived attack durCorrelation Coeffic .736*' 1.000 .048
Sig. (2-tailed) .003 .871
N 14 14 14
Standardized ReslduCorrelation Coeffic .255 .048 1.000
Sig. (2-tailed) .378 .871
N 14 14 14
**■ Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed).
HEART RATE AFTER: SPEARMAN CORRELATIONS (ACROSS THE THREAT 
GROUP WITNESSES) OF RATED PERCEIVED THREAT DURING THE 
INCIDENT’ AND RATED PERCEIVED ATTACK DURING THE INCIDENT’ 
WITH THE STANDARDIZED RESIDUAL (TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF 
BASELINE VARIATION) OF HEART RATE AFTER THE INCIDENT’
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Correlations
threatened
during
perceived 
attack during
Standardized
Residual
Spearman's rhothreatened during Correlation Coefficii 1.000 .736*’ .162
Sig. (2-tailed) .003 .580
N 14 14 14
perceived attack duri Correlation Coefficii ! .736*' 1.000 .410
Sig. (2-tailed) .003 .145
N 14 14 14
Standardized Residu Correlation Coefficii > .162 .410 1.000
Sig. (2-tailed) .580 .145
N 14 14 14
**• Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed).
PERCENTAGE OF AVAILABLE DETAILS RECALLED
FREE RECALL: UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Dependent Variable: total free recall
Source
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Corrected Model 13.754® 3 4.585 .184 .907
Intercept 5259.913 1 5259.913 210.671 .000
INCIDENT 5.410 1 5.410 .217 .644
WITNESS 1.612 1 1.612 .065 .801
INCIDENT* WITNESS 6.732 1 6.732 .270 .607
Error 898.828 36 24.967
Total 6172.495 40
Corrected Total 912.582 39
3 R Squared = .015 (Adjusted R Squared = -.067)
FREE RECALL: UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE 
PERIPHERAL DETAILS
CENTRAL VS.
Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts
Measure: MEASURE 1
Source INFO
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
INFO Linear 2925.780 1 2925.780 51.176 .000
INFO * INCIDENT Linear .730 1 .730 .013 .911
INFO* WITNESS Linear 27.308 1 27.308 .478 .494
INFO* INCIDENT Linear 9.398 1 9.398 .164 .688ErVMlüiNFëÿ Linear 2058.153 36 57.171
334
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Measure: MEASURE_1 
Transformed Variable: Average
Source
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Intercept 11943.828 1 11943.828 234.296 .000
INCIDENT 17.354 1 17.354 .340 .563
WITNESS 6.183 1 6.183 .121 .730
INCIDENT* WITNESS 17.039 1 17.039 .334 .567
Error 1835.194 36 50.978
FREE RECALL: UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE - INTRUDER 1 VS. 
INTRUDER 2 DETAILS
Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts
Measure: MEASURE 1
Source INFO
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
INFO Linear 589.644 1 589.644 53.273 .000
INFO * INCIDENT Linear 53.645 1 53.645 4.847 .034
INFO * WITNESS Linear 40.912 1 40.912 3.696 .062
INFO * INCIDENT Linear 16.083 1 16.083 1.453 .236
ÈrVî l^(l|NF©)> Linear 398.462 36 11.068
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Measure: MEASURE_1 
Transformed Variable: Average
Source
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Intercept 10490 261 1 10490.261 208.862 .000
INCIDENT 15.798 1 15.798 .315 .578
WITNESS 3.745 1 3.745 .075 .786
INCIDENT* WITNESS 14.973 1 14.973 .298 .588
Error 1808.133 36 50.226
FREE RECALL: POSTHOC TUKEY'S TEST - INTERACTION OF INFO 
(INTRUDER 1 VS INTRUDER 2 DETAIL) BY INCIDENT
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INFO
Tukey HSCf ■'
Subset
GROUP N 1 2
control intruder 2 20 7.4730
threat intruder 2 20 9.9995 9.9995
threat intruder 1 20 13.7915
control intruder 1 20 14.5405
Sig. .468 .051
Means for groups in homogeneous subsets are displayed. 
Based on Type III Sum of Squares 
The error term is Mean Square(Error) = 30.030. 
a- Uses Harmonic Mean Sample Size = 20.000.
b. Alpha = .05.
Multiple Comparisons
Dependent Variable: INFO 
Tukey HSD
(1) GROUP (J) GROUP
Mean
Difference
(l-J) Std. Error Sig.
95% Confidence Interval
Lower Bound Upper Bound
threat Intruder 1 control intruder 1 -.7490 1.7329 .973 -5.3011 3.8031
threat intruder 2 3.7920 1.7329 .136 -.7601 8.3441
control intruder 2 6.3185* 1.7329 .003 1.7664 10.8706
control intruder 1 threat intruder 1 .7490 1.7329 .973 -3.8031 5.3011
threat intruder 2 4.5410 1.7329 .051 -1.1086E-02 9.0931
controi intruder 2 7.0675* 1.7329 .001 2.5154 11.6196
threat intruder 2 threat intruder 1 -3.7920 1.7329 .136 -8.3441 .7601
controi intruder 1 -4.5410 1.7329 .051 -9.0931 1.109E-02
controi intruder 2 2.5265 1.7329 .468 -2.0256 7.0786
controi intruder 2 threat Intruder 1 -6.3185* 1.7329 .003 -10.8706 -1.7664
controi intruder 1 -7.0675* 1.7329 .001 -11.6196 -2.5154
threat intruder 2 -2.5265 1.7329 .468 -7.0786 2.0256
Based on obsen/ed means.
*• The mean difference Is significant at the .05 level.
FREE RECALL: UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE - ACTION VS. 
VERBAL VS. APPEARANCE DETAILS
Measure: MEASURE 1
Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts
Source
type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
INFÜ 2860.31 2 1430.16 20.SÔ .ÔÔO
INFO * INCIDENT 573.46 2 286.73 4.07 .021
INFO * W it n e s s 57.04 2 28.52 .40 .669
INFO * INCIDENT * WIT 24.93 2 12.46 .18 .838
Erl!M(TNEG)S 5078.22 72 70.53
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Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Measure: MEASURE_1 
Transformed Variable: Average
Source
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F SIg.
Intercept 19553.682 1 19553.682 235.691 .000
INCIDENT 6.017 1 6.017 .073 .789
WITNESS 10.133 1 10.133 .122 .729
INCIDENT‘ WITNESS 37.330 1 37.330 .450 .507
Error 2986.680 36 82.963
FREE RECALL; POSTHOC TUKEY'S TEST - INTERACTION OF 
INFORMATION (ACTION VS VERBAL VS APPEARANCE) BY INCIDENT
Tukey HSCf
FREEAVA
GRPAVA N
Subset
1 2 3
Control Appearance 20 5.5115
Threat Appearance 20 6.8185
Threat Verbal 20 11.6670 11.6670
Control Action 20 15.1605 15.1605
Control Verbal 20 16.9515 16.9515
Threat Action 20 20.4815
SIg. .204 .365 .358
Means for groups In hom ogeneous subsets are displayed.
Based on Type III Sum of Squares
The error term Is Mean Square(Error) = 71.880.
3 Uses Harmonic Mean Sample Size = 20.000. 
b. Alpha = .05.
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M ultiple C o m p ariso n s
Dependent Variable: FREEAVA
(1) GRPAVA (J) GRPAVA
Mean
Difference
(l-J) Std. Error
95% Confidence Interval
SIg. Lower Bound Upper Bound
Threat Action Control Action 5.3210 2.6810 .358 -2.4508 13.0928
Threat Verbal 8.8145* 2.6810 .017 1.0427 16.5863
Control Verbal 3.5300 2.6810 .775 -4.2418 11.3018
Threat Appearance 13.6630* 2.6810 .000 5.8912 21.4348
Control Appearance 14.9700* 2.6810 .000 7.1982 22.7418
Control Action Threat Action -5.3210 2.6810 .358 -13.0928 2.4508
Threat Verbal 3.4935 2.6810 .783 -4.2783 11.2653
Control Verbal -1.7910 2.6810 .985 -9.5628 5.9808
Threat Appearance 8.3420* 2.6810 .028 .5702 16.1138
Control Appearance 9.6490* 2.6810 .006 1.8772 17.4208
Threat Verbal Threat Action -8.8145* 2.6810 .017 -16.5863 -1.0427
Control Action -3.4935 2.6810 .783 -11.2653 4.2783
Control Verbal -5.2845 2.6810 .365 -13.0563 2.4873
Threat Appearance 4.8485 2.6810 .465 -2.9233 12.6203
Control Appearance 6.1555 2.6810 .204 -1.6163 13.9273
Control Verbal Threat Action -3.5300 2.6810 .775 -11.3018 4.2418
Control Action 1.7910 2.6810 .985 -5.9808 9.5628
Threat Verbal 5.2845 2.6810 .365 -2.4873 13.0563
Threat Appearance 10.1330* 2.6810 .003 2.3612 17.9048
Control Appearance 11.4400* 2.6810 .001 3.6682 19,2118
Threat Appearance Threat Action -13.6630* 2.6810 .000 -21.4348 -5.8912
Control Action -8.3420* 2.6810 .028 -16.1138 -.5702
Threat Verbal -4.8485 2.6810 .465 -12.6203 2.9233
Control Verbal -10.1330* 2.6810 .003 -17.9048 -2.3612
Control Appearance 1.3070 2.6810 .997 -6.4648 9.0788
Control Appearance Threat Action -14.9700* 2.6810 .000 -22.7418 -7.1982
Control Action -9.6490* 2.6810 .006 -17.4208 -1.8772
Threat Verbal -6.1555 2.6810 .204 -13.9273 1.6163
Control Verbal -11.4400* 2.6810 .001 -19.2118 -3.6682
Threat Appearance -1.3070 2.6810 .997 -9.0788 6.4648
Based on observed means.
*• The mean difference is significant at the .05 level.
CUED RECALL: UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Dependent Variable: total cued recall
Source
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F SIg.
Corrected Model 79.1483 3 26.383 1.925 .143
Intercept 2813.000 1 2813.000 205.209 .000
INCIDENT 51.484 1 51.484 3.756 .061
WITNESS 4.225E-02 1 4.225E-02 .003 .956
INCIDENT‘ WITNESS 27.622 1 27.622 2.015 .164
Error 493.488 36 13.708
Total 3385.636 40
Corrected Total 572.636 39
a- R Squared = .138 (Adjusted R Squared = .066)
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CUED RECALL: UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE - CENTRAL VS.
PERIPHERAL DETAILS
Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts
Measure: MEASURE 1
Source INFO
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F SIg.
INFO Linear 335.749 1 335.749 12.488 .001
INFO‘ INCIDENT Linear 2.922 1 2.922 .109 .744
INFO * WITNESS Linear 2.517 1 2.517 .094 .761
INFO * INCIDENT Linear 9.025 1 9.025 .336 .566
Linear 967.907 36 26.886
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Measure: MEASURE_1 
Transformed Variable: Average
CUED RECALL: UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE 
INTRUDER 2 DETAILS
INTRUDER 1 VS.
Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts
Measure: MEASURE 1
Source INFO
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F SIg.
INFO Linear 147.370 1 147.370 25.514 .000
INFO * INCIDENT Linear .196 1 .196 .034 .855
INFO‘ WITNESS Linear 5.387 1 5.387 .933 .341
INFO‘ INCIDENT Linear 5.544 1 5.544 .960 .334ÈrVWtdiNWGf Linear 207.939 36 5.776
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Measure: MEASURE_1 
Transformed Variable: Average
Source
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F SIg.
Intercept 4921.326 1 4921.326 163.493 .000
INCIDENT 31.702 1 31.702 1.053 .312
WITNESS 1.670 1 1.670 .055 .815
INCIDENT‘ WITNESS 41.386 1 41.386 1.375 .249
Error 1083.644 36 30.101
Source
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F SIg. :
Intercept 5293.770 1 5293 770 204.358 .000
INCIDENT 102.129 1 102.129 3.943 .055
WITNESS 1.891 E-02 1 1.891 E-02 .001 .979
INCIDENT‘ WITNESS 50.165 1 50.165 1.937 .173
Error 932.559 36 25.904
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CUED RECALL; UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE - ACTION VS.
VERBAL VS. APPEARANCE DETAILS
Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts
Measure: MEASURE 1
Source
type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
INhO 447.58 2 223.79 S.45 .ÔÔ6
INFO * INCIDENT 206.44 2 103.22 2.52 .088
INFO‘ WITNESS 21.60 2 10.80 .26 .769
INFO ‘ INCIDENT * WIT 16.90 2 8.45 .21 .814
ErMMltTNES^ 2954.29 72 41.03
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Measure: MEASURE_1 
Transformed Variable: Average
Source
Type 11! Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F a g .
Intercept 7479.565 1 7479.565 231.564 .000
INCIDENT 223.505 1 223.505 6.920 .012
WITNESS .859 1 .859 .027 .871
INCIDENT‘ WITNESS 62.165 1 62.165 1.925 .174
Error 1162.806 36 32.300
TOTAL RECALL (FREE + CUED): UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Dependent Variable: total both recall
Source
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Corrected Model 153.094a 3 51.031 1.055 .380
Intercept 15766.061 1 15766.061 326.087 .000
INCIDENT 90.390 1 90.390 1.870 .180
WITNESS 1.126 1 1.126 .023 .880
INCIDENT‘ WITNESS 61.578 1 61.578 1.274 .267
Error 1740.574 36 48.349
Total 17659.730 40
Corrected Total 1893.668 39
3 R Squared = .081 (Adjusted R Squared = .004)
TOTAL RECALL (FREE + CUED): UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE 
CENTRAL VS. PERIPHERAL DETAILS
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Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts
Measure: MEASURE 1
Source INFO
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
INFO Linear 1279.440 1 1279.440 32.138 .000
INFO * INCIDENT Linear 6.584 1 6.584 .165 .687
INFO‘ WITNESS Linear 46.467 1 46.467 1.167 .287
INFO* INCIDENT Linear 3.781 E-03 1 3.781 E-03 .000 992
ÊrYÜtüïNlF^ Linear 1433.173 36 39.810
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Measure: MEASURE_1 
Transformed Variable: Average
Source
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Intercept 33143.232 1 33143.232 334.901 .000
INCIDENT 203.490 1 203.490 2.056 .160
WITNESS 5.497 1 5.497 .056 .815
INCIDENT * WITNESS 125.576 1 125.576 1.269 .267
Error 3562.719 36 98.964
TOTAL RECALL (FREE + CUED): UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE 
INTRUDER 1 VS. INTRUDER 2 DETAILS
Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts
Measure: MEASURE 1
Source INFO
Type 111 Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
INFO Linear 1327.065 1 1327.065 98.375 .000
INFO ‘ INCIDENT Linear 60.465 1 60.465 4.482 .041
INFO‘ WITNESS Linear 76.226 1 76.226 5.651 .023
INFO* INCIDENT Linear 40.598 1 40.598 3.010 .091
Linear 485.634 36 13.490
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Measure: MEASURE__1 
Transformed Variable: Average
Source
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Intercept 29784.148 1 29784.148 290.056 .000
INCIDENT 92.171 1 92.171 .898 .350
WITNESS .413 1 .413 .004 .950
INCIDENT‘ WITNESS 106.284 1 106.284 1.035 .316
Error 3696.628 36 102.684
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TOTAL RECALL (FREE + CUED): POSTHOC TUKEY'S TEST - INTERACTION 
OF INFO (INTRUDER 1 VS INTRUDER 2) BY INCIDENT
INFO
Tukey HSCf''’
GROUP N
Subset
1 2 3
control intruder 2 20 13.2795
threat intruder 2 20 17.1650 17.1650
control intruder 1 20 23.1640 23.1640
threat intruder 1 20 23.5720
Sig. .377 .069 .998
Means for groups in hom ogeneous subsets are displayed. 
Based on Type III Sum of Squares 
The error term is Mean Square(Error) = 57.971. 
a Uses Harmonic Mean Sample Size = 20.000. 
b. Alpha = .05.
Multiple Comparisons
Dependent Variable: INFO
(1) GROUP (J) GROUP
Mean
Difference(1-J) Std. Error Sig.
95% Confidence Interval
Lower Bound Upper Bound
threat intruder 1 control intruder 1 .4080 2.4077 .998 -5.9166 6.7326
threat intruder 2 6.4070* 2.4077 .046 8.238E-02 12.7316
control intruder 2 10.2925* 2.4077 .000 3.9679 16.6171
control intruder 1 threat intruder 1 -.4080 2.4077 .998 -6.7326 5.9166
threat intruder 2 5.9990 2.4077 .069 -.3256 12.3236
control intruder 2 9.8845* 2.4077 .001 3.5599 16.2091
threat intruder 2 threat intruder 1 -6.4070* 2.4077 .046 -12.7316 -8.2375E-02
control intruder 1 -5.9990 2.4077 .069 -12.3236 .3256
control intruder 2 3.8855 2.4077 .377 -2.4391 10.2101
control intruder 2 threat intruder 1 -10.2925* 2.4077 .000 -16.6171 -3.9679
control intruder 1 -9.8845* 2.4077 .001 -16.2091 -3.5599
threat intruder 2 -3.8855 2.4077 .377 -10.2101 2.4391
Based on observed means.
*• The mean difference Is significant at the .05 level.
TOTAL RECALL (FREE + CUED): UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE 
ACTION VS. VERBAL VS. APPEARANCE DETAILS
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Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts
Measure: MEASURE 1
Source
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.INI-U U è Ô .1 8 2 58 0 .0 9 à.72 .0 0 0
INFO * INCIDENT 1 0 8 2 .4 4 2 5 4 1 .2 2 9 .0 7 .0 0 0
INFO‘ WITNESS 1 0 4 .0 7 2 5 2 .0 3 .87 .4 2 2
INFO ‘ INCIDENT * WIT 12 .0 7 2 6 .0 3 .1 0 .9 0 4
ErhWIOTNBSjS 4 2 9 5 .4 4 72 5 9 .6 6
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Measure: MEASURE_1 
Transformed Variable: Average
Source
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Intercept 51216.966 1 51216.966 346.658 .000
INCIDENT 302.863 1 302.863 2.050 .161
WITNESS 16.890 1 16.890 .114 .737
INCIDENT ‘ WITNESS 195.841 1 195.841 1.326 .257
Error 5318.813 36 147.745
TOTAL RECALL (FREE + CUED): POSTHOC TUKEY'S TEST - INTERACTION 
OF INFORMATION (ACTION VS VERBAL VS APPEARANCE) BY INCIDENT
BOTHAVA
Tukey HSCf-*"
Subset
GRPAVA N 1 2
Control Appearance 20 16.3065
Threat Appearance 20 17.2730
Control Action 20 18.7100
Threat Verbal 20 19.3750
Control Verbal 20 22.1955 22.1955
Threat Action 20 30.0960
Sig. .352 .088
Means for groups in homogeneous subsets are displayed.
Based on Type III Sum of Squares
The error term is Mean Square(Error) = 87.220,
3- Uses Harmonic Mean Sample Size = 20.000.
b. Alpha = .05.
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M ultiple C o m p ariso n s
Dependent Variable; BOTHAVA
(1) GRPAVA (J) GRPAVA
MeanDifference
(l-J) Std. Error
95% Confidence Interval
Sig. Lower Bound Upper Bound
Threat Action Control Action 11.3860* 2.9533 .003 2.8250 19.9470
Threat Verbal 10.7210* 2.9533 .006 2.1600 19.2820
Control Verbal 7.9005 2.9533 .088 -.6605 16.4615
Threat Appearance 12.8230* 2.9533 .000 4.2620 21.3840
Control Appearance 13.7895* 2.9533 .000 5.2285 22.3505
Control Action Threat Action -11.3860* 2.9533 .003 -19.9470 -2.8250
Threat Verbal -.6650 2.9533 1.000 -9.2260 7.8960
Control Verbal -3.4855 2.9533 .845 -12.0465 5.0755
Threat Appearance 1.4370 2.9533 .997 -7.1240 9.9980
Control Appearance 2.4035 2.9533 .964 -6.1575 10.9645
Threat Verbal Threat Action -10.7210* 2.9533 .006 -19.2820 -2.1600
Control Action .6650 2.9533 1.000 -7.8960 9.2260
Control Verbal -2.8205 2.9533 .931 -11.3815 5.7405
Threat Appearance 2,1020 2.9533 .980 -6.4590 10.6630
Control Appearance 3.0685 2.9533 .904 -5.4925 11.6295
Control Verbal Threat Action -7.9005 2.9533 .088 -16.4615 .6605
Control Action 3.4855 2.9533 .845 -5.0755 12.0465
Threat Verbal 2.8205 2.9533 .931 -5.7405 11.3815
Threat Appearance 4.9225 2.9533 .556 -3.6385 13.4835
Control Appearance 5.8890 2.9533 .352 -2.6720 14.4500
Threat Appearance Threat Action -12.8230* 2.9533 .000 -21.3840 -4.2620
Control Action -1.4370 2.9533 .997 -9.9980 7.1240
Threat Verbal -2.1020 2.9533 .980 -10.6630 6.4590
Control Verbal -4.9225 2.9533 .556 -13.4835 3.6385
Control Appearance .9665 2.9533 .999 -7.5945 9.5275
Control Appearance Threat Action -13.7895* 2.9533 .000 -22.3505 -5.2285
Control Action -2.4035 2.9533 .964 -10.9645 6.1575
Threat Verbal -3.0685 2.9533 .904 -11.6295 5.4925
Control Verbal -5.8890 2.9533 .352 -14.4500 2.6720
Threat Appearance -.9665 2.9533 .999 -9.5275 7.5945
Based on observed means.
*■ The mean difference is significant at the .05 level.
CORRELATION OF PHYSIOLOGICAL & PSYCHOLOGICAL AROUSAL 
WITH PERCENTAGE OF AVAn.ABLE DETAILS RECAI.I.ED
PEARSON & SPEARMAN CORRELATIONS (ACROSS THE THREAT GROUP 
WITNESSES) OF THE VARIOUS MEASURES OF PROPORTION OF DETAILS 
RECALLED WITH: THE ‘ STANDARDIZED RESIDUALS (TO TAKE 
ACCOUNT OF BASELINE VARIATION) OF HEART RATE DURING THE 
INCIDENT AND HEART RATE IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE 
INCIDENT’ AND ‘RATED PERCEIVED THREAT DURING THE INCDENT’ 
AND ‘RATED PERCEIVED ATTACK DURING THE INCDENT'
Percentage of Available Details: 
Free Recall
Heart Rate 
During 
(Residual 
Values) 
PEARSON
Heart Rate 
After 
(Residual 
Values) 
PEARSON
Rated Tlireat 
During
SPEARMAN
Rated 
Perceived 
Attack During
SPEARMAN
Overall Correlation .620* .323 .178 .116
344
Sig. (2-tailed) .018 .260 .453 .627
N 14 14 20 20
Central Correlation .469 .487 .057 .142
Sig. (2-tailed) .090 .078 .810 .550
N 14 14 20 20
Peripheral Correlation .459 .013 .183 .142
Sig. (2-tailed) .099 .964 .440 .551
N 14 14 20 20
hitmder 1 Correlation .607* .339 .162 .120
Sig. (2-tailed) .021 .235 .495 .615
N 14 14 20 20
Intruder 2 Correlation .582* .273 .091 .052
Sig. (2-tailed) .029 J46 .704 .829
N 14 14 20 20
Action Correlation .449 .491 .160 .218
Sig. (2-tailed) .107 .074 .501 .357
N 14 14 20 20
Verbal Correlation .466 .348 -.353 -.253
Sig. (2-tailed) .093 .223 .127 .283
N 14 14 20 20
Appearance Correlation .401 -.060 .226 .155
Sig. (2-tailed) .155 .838 .339 .514
N 14 14 20 20
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)
Heart Rate Heart Rate Rated Threat Rated
Percentage of Available Details: During After During Perceived
Cued Recall (Residual (Residual Attack During
Values) Values)
PEARSON PEARSON SPEARMAN SPEARMAN
Overall Correlation .476 .047 -.099 -.220
Sig. (2-tailed) .085 .874 .679 .352
N 14 14 20 20
Central Correlation .347 .037 -.046 -.070
Sig. (2-tailed) .224 .899 .846 . ' .769
N 14 14 20 20
Peripheral Correlation .367 .034 .016 -.026
Sig. (2-tailed) .196 .908 .945 .913
N 14 14 20 20
Intruder 1 Correlation .459 .019 .145 -.091
Sig. (2-tailed) .099 .949 .542 .704
N 14 14 20 20
Intruder 2 Correlation .419 .082 -.342 -.316
Sig. (2-tailed) .136 .781 .140 .175
N 14 14 20 20
Action Correlation .269 -.020 -.141 -.187
Sig. (2-tailed) .352 .947 .553 .431
N 14 14 20 20
Verbal Correlation -.117 .127 .056 .123
Sig. (2-tailed) .690 .666 .814 .604
N 14 14 20 20
Appearance Correlation .458 .033 .010 -.051
Sig. (2-tailed) .099 .910 .968 .832N 14 14 20 1 20
Heart Rate Heart Rate Rated Tlireat Rated
345
Percentage of Available Details: 
Total Recall
During
(Residual
Values)
PEARSON
After
(Residual
Values)
PEARSON
During
SPEARMAN
Perceived 
Attack During
SPEARMAN
Overall Correlation .700** .265 .065 -.061
Sig. (2-tailed) .005 .360 .786 .799
N 14 14 20 20
Central Correlation .579* .440 -.019 .003
Sig. (2-tailed) .030 .115 .938 .990
N 14 14 20 20
Peripheral Correlation .701** .037 .193 .025
Sig. (2-tailed) .005 .901 .415 .915
N 14 14 20 20
hitmder 1 Correlation .649* .253 .104 -.040
Sig. (2-tailed) .012 .383 .661 .868
N 14 14 20 20
hitmder 2 Correlation .655* .236 -.045 -.147
Sig. (2-tailed) Oil .417 .851 .537
N 14 14 20 20
Action Correlation .572* .445 .140 .071
Sig. (2-tailed) .033 .111 .557 .766
N 14 14 20 20
Verbal Correlation .386 .421 -.212 -.040
Sig. (2-tailed) .173 .134 .369 .866
N 14 14 20 20
Appearance Correlation .642* -.026 .134 -.021
Sig. (2-tailed) .013 .929 .573 .930
N 14 14 20 20
** Correlation is significant at tlie O.Ollevel (2-tailed)
SCATTERPLOT OF HEART RATE DURING (STANDARDIZED RESIDUAL) 
WITH TOTAL FREE RECALL
o  0
-1 0 1 
standardized Residual
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SCATTERPLOT OF HEART RATE DURING (STANDARDIZED RESIDUAL) 
WITH FREE RECALL FOR INTRUDER 1
-1 0 1 
Standardized Residual
SCATTERPLOT OF HEART RATE DURING (STANDARDIZED RESDUAL) 
FREE RECALL FOR INTRUDER 2
-1 0 1 
Standardized Residual
SCATTERPLOT OF HEART RATE DURING (STANDARDIZED RESIDUAL) 
WITH TOTAL RECALL
347
-1 0 1 
standardized Residual
SCATTERPLOT OF HEART RATE DURING (STANDARDIZED RESIDUAL) 
WITH TOTAL RECALL FOR CENTRAL DETAILS
-1 0 1 
standardized Residual
SCATTERPLOT OF HEART RATE DURING (STANDARDIZED RESIDUAL) 
WITH TOTAL RECALL FOR PERIPHERAL DETAILS
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CL 10
O  0
standardized Residual
SCATTERPLOT OF HEART RATE DURING (STANDARDIZED RESIDUAL) 
WITH TOTAL RECALL FOR INTRUDER 1
-1 0 1 
standardized Residual
SCATTERPLOT OF HEART RATE DURING (STANDARDIZED RESIDUAL) 
WITH TOTAL RECALL FOR INTRUDER 2
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.£  10
-1 0 1 
standardized Residual
SCATTERPLOT OF HEART RATE DURING (STANDARDIZED RESDUAL) 
WITH TOTAL RECALL FOR ACTION DETAILS
to 3 0
O 10
-1 0 1 
Standardized Residual
SCATTERPLOT OF HEART RATE DURING (STANDARDIZED RESIDUAL) 
WITH TOTAL RECALL FOR APPEARANCE DETAILS
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standardized Residual
ACCURACY OF RECALL
FREE RECALL: UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Dependent Variable: total free recall
Source
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Corrected Model 70.051* 3 23.350 .249 .861
Intercept 318039.072 1 318039.072 3397.407 .000
INCIDENT 12.713 1 12.713 .136 .715
WITNESS 47.764 1 47.764 .510 .480
INCIDENT‘ WITNESS 9.575 1 9.575 .102 .751
Error 3370.042 36 93.612
Total 321479.166 40
Corrected Total 3440.094 39
9 R Squared = ,020 (Adjusted R Squared = -.061)
FREE RECALL: UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE 
PERIPHERAL DETAILS
CENTRAL VS.
Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts
Measure: MEASURE 1
Source INFO
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
INFO Linear 7998.694 1 7998.694 55.399 .000
INFO‘ INCIDENT Linear 744.624 1 744.624 5.157 .032
INFO‘ WITNESS Linear 351.122 1 351.122 2.432 .132
INFO‘ INCIDENT Linear 101.887 1 101.887 .706 .409Ér)^ I(iiN#ëÿ .... Linear 3465.211 24 144.384
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Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Measure: MEASURE_1 
Transformed Variable: Average
Source
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Intercept 371039.831 1 371039.831 2167.496 .000
INCIDENT 406.994 1 406.994 2.378 .136
WITNESS 428.566 1 428.566 2.504 .127
INCIDENT‘ WITNESS 5.420 1 5.420 .032 .860
Error 4108.406 24 171.184
FREE RECALL: POSTHOC TUKEY'S TEST - INTERACTION OF JNFO 
(CENTRAL VS PERIPHERAL) BY INCIDENT
INFO
Tukey
GROUP N
Subset
1 2 3
threat peripheral 13 65.9062
control peripheral 15 77.4427
control central 20 94.5460
threat central 20 96.6485
Sig. 1.000 1.000 .954
Means for groups in homogeneous subsets are displayed.
Based on Type III Sum of Squares 
The error term is Mean Square(Error) = 134.033. 
a- Uses Harmonic Mean Sample Size = 16.421.
b. The group sizes are unequal. The harmonic mean of the group 
sizes is used. Type I error levels are not guaranteed.
c. Alpha = .05.
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M ultiple C o m p a r iso n s
D ependent Variable: INFO
(1) GROUP (J) GROUP
Mean
Difference
(l-J) Std. Error Sig.
95% Confidence Interval
Lower Bound Upper Bound
threat central control central 2.1025 3.6611 .939 -7.5549 11.7599
threat peripheral 30.7423* 4.1245 .000 19.8623 41.6224
control peripheral 19.2058* 3.9544 .000 8.7747 29.6370
control central threat central -2.1025 3.6611 .939 -11.7599 7.5549
threat peripheral 28.6398* 4.1245 .000 17.7598 39.5199
control peripheral 17.1033* 3.9544 .000 6.6722 27.5345
threat peripheral threat central -30.7423* 4.1245 .000 -41.6224 -19.8623
control central -28.6398* 4.1245 .000 -39.5199 -17.7598
control peripheral -11.5365 4.3870 .051 -23.1088 3.582E-02
control peripheral threat central -19.2058* 3.9544 .000 -29.6370 -8.7747
control central -17.1033* 3.9544 .000 -27.5345 -6.6722
threat peripheral 11.5365 4.3870 .051 -3.5815E-02 23.1088
Based on observed means.
*. The mean difference is significant at the .05 level.
FREE RECALL: UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE - INTRUDER 1 VS. 
INTRUDER 2 DETAILS
Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts
Measure: MEASURE 1
Source INFO
Type ill Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
INFO Linear 254.184 1 254.184 3.059 .089
INFO ‘ INCIDENT Linear 53.595 1 53.595 .645 .427
INFO‘ WITNESS Linear 28.322 1 28.322 .341 .563
INFO * INCIDENT
........
Linear 15.629 1 15.629 .188 .667
Linear 2991.241 36 83.090
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Measure: MEASURE_1 
Transformed Variable: Average
Source
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Intercept 631304.151 1 631304.151 3075.477 .000
INCIDENT 8.791 1 8.791 .043 837
WITNESS 106.076 1 106.076 .517 .477
INCIDENT‘ WITNESS 22.134 1 22.134 .108 7 4 5
Error 7389.732 36 205.270
FREE RECALL: UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE - ACTION VS. 
VERBAL VS. APPEARANCE DETAILS
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Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts
Measure; MEASURE 1
Source
Type III Sum” 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
INFU 1ÔÔ3Ô.7i 2 Sôib.ôô èô.ôâ .ôôô
INFO * INCIDENT 1332.77 2 666.38 3.72 .033
INFO * WITNESS 232.68 2 116.34 .65 .528
INFO * INCIDENT * WIT 570.28 2 285.14 1.59 .217
ErWW(lNBS)B 6805.42 38 179.09
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Measure: MEASURE_1 
Transformed Variable: Average
Source
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Intercept 489386.925 1 489386.925 3438.553 .000
INCIDENT 41.001 1 41.001 .288 .598
WITNESS 338.788 1 338.788 2.380 .139
INCIDENT‘ WITNESS 79.281 1 79.281 .557 .465
Error 2704.147 19 142.324
FREE RECALL: POSTHOC TUKEY'S TEST - INTERACTION OF 
INFORMATION (ACTION VS VERBAL VS APPEARANCE) BY INCIDENT
INFOAVA
GRPAVA N
Subset
1 2 3 4
Threat Appearance 12 63.5017
Control Appearance 11 75.7982
Control Verbal 20 87.0740 87.0740
Threat Verbal 19 91.2363 91.2363
Control Action 20 97.8330 97.8330
Threat Action 20 99.2000
Sig. 1.000 .080 .108 .396
Means for groups in homogeneous subsets are displayed.
Based on Type III Sum of Squares
The error term is Mean Square(Error) = 136.724.
9 Uses Harmonic Mean Sample Size = 15.920.
b. The group sizes are unequal. The harmonic mean of the group sizes is used. 
Type I error levels are not guaranteed.
c. Alpha = .05.
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M ultiple C o m p ariso n s
Dependent Variable: INFOAVA
Tukey HSD
(1) GRPAVA (J) GRPAVA
MeanDifference
(l-J) Std. Error Sig.
95% Confidence interval
Lower Bound Upper BoundThreat Action Control Action 1.3670 3.6976 .999 -9.3861 12.1201
Threat Verbal 7.9637 3.7460 .283 -2.9300 18.8574
Control Verbal 12.1260* 3.6976 .018 1.3729 22.8791
Threat Appearance 35.6983* 4.2696 .000 23.2817 48.1150
Control Appearance 23.4018* 4.3893 .000 10.6373 36.1663
Control Action Threat Action -1.3670 3.6976 .999 -12.1201 9.3861
Threat Verbal 6.5967 3.7460 .496 -4.2970 17.4904
Control Verbal 10.7590* 3.6976 .050 5.890E-03 21.5121
Threat Appearance 34.3313* 4.2696 .000 21.9147 46.7480
Control Appearance 22.0348* 4.3893 .000 9.2703 34.7993
Threat Verbal Threat Action -7.9637 3.7460 .283 -18.8574 2.9300
Control Action -6.5967 3.7460 .496 -17.4904 4.2970
Control Verbal 4.1623 3.7460 .876 -6.7314 15.0560
Threat Appearance 27.7346* 4.3116 .000 15.1961 40.2732
Control Appearance 15.4381* 4.4301 .009 2.5550 28.3213
Control Verbal Threat Action -12.1260* 3.6976 .018 -22.8791 -1.3729
Control Action -10.7590* 3.6976 .050 -21.5121 -5.8905E-03
Threat Verbal -4.1623 3.7460 .876 -15.0560 6.7314
Threat Appearance 23.5723* 4.2696 .000 11.1557 35.9890
Control Appearance 11.2758 4.3893 .115 -1.4887 24.0403
Threat Appearance Threat Action -35.6983* 4.2696 .000 -48.1150 -23.2817
Control Action -34.3313* 4.2696 .000 -46.7480 -21.9147
Threat Verbal -27.7346* 4.3116 .000 -40.2732 -15.1961
Control Verbal -23.5723* 4.2696 .000 -35.9890 -11.1557
Control Appearance -12.2965 4.8809 .129 -26.4907 1.8977Control Appearance Threat Action -23.4018* 4.3893 .000 -36.1663 -10,6373
Control Action -22.0348* 4.3893 .000 -34.7993 -9.2703
Threat Verbal -15.4381* 4.4301 .009 -28.3213 -2.5550
Control Verbal -11.2758 4.3893 .115 -24.0403 1.4887
Threat Appearance 12.2965 4.8809 .129 -1.8977 26.4907
Based on observed means.
*• The mean difference is significant at the .05 level.
CUED RECALL: UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE
3 3 5
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Dependent Variable; total cued recall
Source
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Corrected Model 314.428* 3 104.809 .348 .791
Intercept 210134.016 1 210134.016 697.620 .000
INCIDENT 299.537 1 299.537 .994 .325
WITNESS 14.884 1 14.884 .049 .825
INCIDENT‘ WITNESS 6.250E-03 1 6.250E-03 .000 .996
Error 10843.762 36 301.216
Total 221292.206 40
Corrected Total 11158.190 39
3. R Squared = .028 {Adjusted R Squared = -.053)
CUED RECALL: UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE - CENTRAL VS. 
PERIPHERAL DETAILS
Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts
Measure: MEASURE 1
Source INFO
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
INFO Linear 14435.184 1 14435.184 47.903 .000
INFO * INCIDENT Linear 35.256 1 35.256 .117 .735
INFO‘ WITNESS Linear 1.102 1 1.102 .004 .952
INFO‘ INCIDENT Linear 426.547 1 426.547 1.415 243
Ê r # N i : ë ÿ Linear 9341.691 31 301.345
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Measure: MEASURE_1 
Transformed Variable: Average
Source
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F a g .Intercept 392150.212 1 392150.212 851.017 .000
INCIDENT 810.060 1 810.060 1.758 .195
WITNESS 207.648 1 207.648 .451 .507
INCIDENT * WITNESS 48.499 1 48.499 .105 .748
Error 14284.853 31 460.802
CUED RECALL: UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE - INTRUDER 1 VS. 
INTRUDER 2 DETAILS
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Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts
Measure; MEASURE 1
Source INFO
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
INFO Linear 115.479 1 115.479 .665 .420
INFO * INCIDENT Linear 1079.626 1 1079.626 6.222 .018
INFO‘ WITNESS Linear 1207.189 1 1207.189 6.957 .013
INFO‘ INCIDENT Linear 4.856 1 4.856 .028 .868
Linear 5899.911 34 173.527
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Measure: MEASURE_1 
Transformed Variable: Average
Source
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Intercept 383104.314 1 383104.314 542.614 .000
INCIDENT 1381.350 1 1381.350 1.956 .171
WITNESS 126,113 1 126.113 .179 .675
INCIDENT* WITNESS 185.220 1 185.220 .262 .612
Error 24005.200 34 706.035
CUED RECALL: POSTHOC TUKEY'S TEST - INTERACTION OF INFO 
(INTRUDER 1 VS INTRUDER 2) BY INCIDENT
INFO
Tukey HSCf
Subset
GROUP N 1
control intruder 2 19 62.1932
threat intruder 1 20 72.8235
control intruder 1 20 73.1755
threat intruder 2 19 77.7242
Sig. .102
Means for groups in homogeneous subsets are displayed. 
Based on Type III Sum of Squares 
The error term is Mean Square(Error) = 435.181. 
a- Uses Harmonic Mean Sample Size = 19.487.
b. The group sizes are unequal. The harmonic mean 
of the group sizes is used. Type I error levels are 
not guaranteed.
c. Alpha = .05.
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M ultiple C o m p a r iso n s
D ependent Variable: iNFO
Tukey HSD
(t) GROUP (J) GROUP
Mean
Difference
(l-J) Std. Error Big.
95% Confidence Interval
Lower Bound Upper Bound
threat intruder 1 control intruder 1 -.3520 6.5968 1.000 -17.6912 16.9872
threat intruder 2 -4.9007 6.6831 .883 -22.4666 12.6652
control intruder 2 10.6303 6.6831 .390 -6.9355 28.1962
control intruder 1 threat intruder 1 .3520 6.5968 1.000 -16.9872 17.6912
threat intruder 2 -4.5487 6.6831 .904 -22.1146 13.0172
control intruder 2 10.9823 6.6831 .361 -6.5835 28.5482
threat intruder 2 threat intruder 1 4.9007 6.6831 .883 -12.6652 22.4666
control intruder 1 4.5487 6.6831 .904 -13.0172 22.1146
control Intruder 2 15.5311 6.7682 .109 -2.2586 33.3207
control intruder 2 threat intruder 1 -10.6303 6.6831 .390 -28.1962 6.9355
control intruder 1 -10.9823 6.6831 .361 -28.5482 6.5835
threat intruder 2 -15.5311 6.7682 .109 -33.3207 2.2586
Based on observed means.
CUED RECALL: UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE - ACTION VS. 
VERBAL VS. APPEARANCE DETAILS
Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts
Measure: MEASURE 1
Source
type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
iNhU 13827.47 2 éô ià .73 jà .5 l .000
INFO * INCIDENT 2569.24 2 1284.62 2.51 .098
INFO * WITNESS 1088.96 2 544.48 1.06 .358
INFO * INCIDENT * WIT 580.48 2 290.24 .57 .573
ErhMI(TNB8^ 15357.69 30 511.92
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Measure: MEASURE_1 
Transformed Variable: Average
Source
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Intercept 258170.032 1 258170.032 291.817 .000
INCIDENT 1612.083 1 1612.083 1.822 .197
WITNESS 188.412 1 188.412 .213 .651
INCIDENT * WITNESS 20.141 1 20.141 .023 .882
Error 13270.458 15 884.697
TOTAL RECALL (FREE + CUED); UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE
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Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Dependent Variable: total both recall
Source
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Corrected Model 162.487* 3 54.162 .792 .506
Intercept 262480.502 1 262480.502 3839.032 .000
INCIDENT 10.373 1 10.373 .152 .699
WITNESS 142.695 1 142.695 2.087 .157
INCIDENT * WITNESS 9.419 1 9.419 .138 .713
Error 2461.375 36 68.372
Total 265104.364 40
Corrected Total 2623.863 39
a R Squared = .062 (Adjusted R Squared = -.016)
TOTAL RECALL (FREE + CUED): UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE 
CENTRAL VS. PERIPHERAL DETAILS
Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts
Measure: MEASURE 1
Source INFO
Type III Sum  
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
INFO Linear 18036.619 1 18036.619 112.979 .000
INFO * INCIDENT Linear 1.081 1 1.081 .007 ^ 3 5
INFO‘ WITNESS Linear 15.435 1 15.435 .097 .758
INFO ‘ INCIDENT Linear 337.267 1 337.267 2.113 .155irW^ fiNPW......... . Linear 5747.261 36 159.646
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Measure: MEASURE_1 
Transformed Variable: Average
Source
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Intercept 498430.322 1 498430.322 2565.200 .000
INCIDENT 107.416 1 107.416 .553 .462
WITNESS 34.611 1 34.611 .178 .675
INCIDENT * WITNESS 12.784 1 12.784 .066 .799
Error 6994.967 36 194.305
TOTAL RECALL (FREE + CUED): UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE - 
INTRUDER 1 VS. INTRUDER 2 DETAILS
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Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts
Measure: MEASURE 1
Source INFO
Type 111 Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
INFO Linear 255.756 1 255.756 3.047 .089
INFO * INCIDENT Linear 610.955 1 610.955 7.279 .011
INFO * WITNESS Linear 114.242 1 114.242 1.361 .251
INFO * INCIDENT Linear 36.504 1 36.504 .435 .514
Linear 3021.451 36 83.929
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Measure: MEASURE„1 
Transformed Variable: Average
Source
Type III Sum  
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Intercept 519773.282 1 519773.282 3159.034 .000
INCIDENT 132.612 1 132.612 .806 .375
WITNESS 232.017 1 232.017 1.410 .243
INCIDENT * WITNESS 39.480 1 39.480 240 .627
Error 5923.279 36 164.536
TOTAL RECALL (FREE + CUED): POSTHOC TUKEY’S TEST - INTERACTION 
OF INFO (INTRUDER 1 VS INTRUDER 2) BY DECIDENT
INFO
Tukey HSCf
Subset
GROUP N 1
control intruder 2 20 74.7660
threat intruder 1 20 80.9170
threat intruder 2 20 82.8680
control intruder 1 20 83.8690
8 ^ . .054
Means for groups In hom ogeneous subsets are displayed.
Based on Type III Sum of Squares
The error term Is Mean Square(Error) = 123.250.
a. U ses Harmonic Mean Sample Size = 20.000.
b. Alpha = .05.
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M ultiple C o m p a riso n s
D ependent Variable: INFO
Tukey HSD
(0 GROUP (J) GROUP
Mean
Difference
(l-J) Std. Error Sig.
95% Confidence Interval
Lower Bound Upper Bound
threat intruder 1 control intruder 1 -2.9520 3.5107 .835 -12.1740 6.2700
threat intruder 2 -1.9510 3.5107 .945 -11.1730 7.2710
control intruder 2 6.1510 3.5107 .304 -3.0710 15.3730
control intruder 1 threat intruder 1 2.9520 3.5107 .835 -6.2700 12.1740
threat intruder 2 1.0010 3.5107 .992 -8.2210 10.2230
control intruder 2 9.1030 3.5107 .054 -.1190 18.3250
threat intruder 2 threat intruder 1 1.9510 3.5107 .945 -7.2710 11.1730
control intruder 1 -1.0010 3.5107 .992 -10.2230 8.2210
control intruder 2 8.1020 3.5107 .105 -1.1200 17.3240
control intruder 2 threat intruder 1 -6.1510 3.5107 .304 -15.3730 3.0710
control intruder 1 -9.1030 3.5107 .054 -18.3250 .1190
threat intruder 2 -8.1020 3.5107 .105 -17.3240 1.1200
Based on observed means.
TOTAL RECALL (FREE + CUED): UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE 
ACTION VS. VERBAL VS. APPEARANCE DETAILS
Measure: MEASURE 1
Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts
Source
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
INhU 25855.71 2 12927.85 ÔÔ.4j .(300
INFO * INCIDENT 591.90 2 295.95 1.84 .166
INFO * WITNESS 148.92 2 74.46 .46 .631
INFO * INCIDENT * WIT 1112.03 2 556.01 3.46 037
Ert#(TNB9)B 11254.66 70 160.78
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Measure: MEASURE_1 
Transformed Variable: Average
Source
Type III Sum  
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
intercept 778488.883 1 778488.883 4292.715 .000
INCIDENT 56.470 1 56.470 .311 .580
WITNESS 51.666 1 51.666 .285 .597
INCIDENT‘ WITNESS 2.542 1 2.542 .014 .906
Error 6347.291 35 181.351
TOTAL RECALL (FREE + CUED): POSTHOC TUKEY'S TEST - INTERACTION 
OF INFORMATION (ACTION VS VERBAL VS APPEARANCE) BY INCIDENT 
BY WITNESS
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information Both Recall Act Verb App
Tukey HSD'a.b.c
Group both recall 
act verb app N
Subset
1 2 3 4 5
TBAP 9 54.6933
CVAP 10 60.8380 60.8380
CBAP 10 64.9880 64.9880
TVAP 10 67.0160 67.0160 67.0160
CBV 10 77.3390 77.3390 77.3390
CVV 10 85.5040 85.5040 85.5040
TVV 10 86.4420 86.4420
TBV 10 92.7140 92.7140
TVA 10 96.0330 96.0330
CVA 10 98.0910
TBA 10 98.2150
CBA 10 99.0000
SIg. .600 .171 .073 .067 .457
Means for groups in homogeneous subsets are displayed. 
Based on Type III Sum of Squares 
The error term is Mean Square(Error) = 165.089. 
a. Uses Harmonic Mean Sample Size = 9.908.
b. The group sizes are unequal. The harmonic mean of the group sizes is used. Type I error 
levels are not guaranteed.
c. Alpha = .05.
Multiple C om parisons
Dependent Variable: Information Both Recall Act Verb App 
Tukey HSD
Mean 
Difference (1- 
J)
Std. Error SIg. 95%
Confidence
Interval
(1) Group 
both recall 
act verb app
(J) Group 
both recall 
act verb app
Lower Bound Upper Bound
TVA TBA -2.1820 5.7461 1.000 -21.3833 17.0193
CVA -2.0580 5.7461 1.000 -21.2593 17.1433
CBA -2.9670 5.7461 1.000 -22.1683 16.2343
TVV 9.5910 5.7461 .878 -9.6103 28.7923
TBV 3.3190 5.7461 1.000 -15.8823 22.5203
CVV 10.5290 5.7461 .796 -8.6723 29.7303
CBV 18.6940 5.7461 .064 -.5073 37.8953
TVAP 29.0170 5.7461 .000 9.8157 48.2183
TBAP 41.3397 5.9036 .000 21.6122 61.0671
CVAP 35.1950 5.7461 .000 15.9937 54.3963
CBAP 31.0450 5.7461 .000 11.8437 50.2463
TBA TVA 2.1820 5.7461 1.000 -17.0193 21.3833
CVA .1240 5.7461 1.000 -19.0773 19.3253
CBA -.7850 5.7461 1.000 -19.9863 18.4163
TVV 11.7730 5.7461 .659 -7.4283 30.9743
TBV 5.5010 5.7461 .998 -13.7003 24.7023
CVV 12.7110 5.7461 .545 -6.4903 31.9123
CBV 20.8760 5.7461 .021 1.6747 40.0773
TVAP 31.1990 5.7461 .000 11.9977 50.4003
TBAP 43.5217 5.9036 .000 23.7942 63.2491
CVAP 37.3770 5.7461 .000 18.1757 56.5783
CBAP 33.2270 5.7461 .000 14.0257 52.4283
CVA TVA 2.0580 5.7461 1.000 ■17.1433 21.2593
TBA -.1240 5.7461 1.000 -19.3253 19.0773
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CBA -.9090 5.7461 1.000 -20.1103 18.2923
TW 11.6490 5.7461 .674 -7.5523 30.8503
TBV 5.3770 5.7461 .999 -13.8243 24.5783
CVV 12.5870 5.7461 .560 -6.6143 31.7883CBV 20.7520 5.7461 .022 1.5507 39.9533
TVAP 31.0750 5.7461 .000 11.8737 50.2763TBAP 43.3977 5.9036 .000 23.6702 63.1251CVAP 37.2530 5.7461 .000 18.0517 56.4543CBAP 33.1030 5.7461 .000 13.9017 52.3043CBA TVA 2.9670 5.7461 1.000 -16.2343 22.1683TBA .7850 5.7461 1.000 -18.4163 19.9863CVA .9090 5.7461 1.000 -18.2923 20.1103TW 12.5580 5,7461 .564 -6.6433 31.7593TBV 6.2860 5.7461 .994 -12.9153 25.4873CVV 13.4960 5.7461 .450 -5.7053 32.6973CBV 21.6610 5.7461 .014 2.4597 40.8623TVAP 31.9840 5.7461 .000 12.7827 51.1853TBAP 44.3067 5.9036 .000 24.5792 64.0341CVAP 38.1620 5.7461 .000 18.9607 57.3633CBAP 34.0120 5.7461 .000 14.8107 53.2133TVV TVA -9.5910 5.7461 .878 -28.7923 9.6103TBA -11.7730 5.7461 .659 -30.9743 7.4283CVA -11.6490 5.7461 .674 -30.8503 7.5523CBA -12.5580 5.7461 .564 -31.7593 6.6433TBV -6.2720 5.7461 .994 -25.4733 12.9293CVV .9380 5.7461 1.000 -18.2633 20.1393CBV 9.1030 5.7461 .911 -10.0983 28.3043TVAP 19.4260 5.7461 .045 .2247 38.6273TBAP 31.7487 5.9036 .000 12.0212 51.4761CVAP 25.6040 5.7461 .001 6.4027 44.8053CBAP 21.4540 5.7461 .015 2.2527 40.6553TBV TVA -3.3190 5.7461 1.000 -22.5203 15,8823TBA -5.5010 5.7461 .998 -24.7023 13.7003CVA -5.3770 5.7461 .999 -24.5783 13.8243CBA -6.2860 5.7461 .994 -25.4873 12.9153TVV 6.2720 5.7461 .994 -12.9293 25.4733CVV 7.2100 5.7461 .983 -11.9913 26.4113CBV 15.3750 5.7461 .253 -3.8263 34.5763TVAP 25.6980 5.7461 .001 6.4967 44.8993TBAP 38.0207 5.9036 .000 18.2932 57.7481CVAP 31.8760 5.7461 .000 12.6747 51.0773CBAP 27.7260 5.7461 .000 8.5247 46.9273CVV TVA -10.5290 5.7461 .796 -29.7303 8.6723TBA -12.7110 5.7461 .545 -31.9123 6.4903CVA -12.5870 5.7461 .560 -31.7883 6.6143CBA -13.4960 5.7461 .450 -32.6973 5.7053TVV -.9380 5.7461 1.000 -20.1393 18.2633TBV -7.2100 5.7461 .983 -26.4113 11,9913CBV 8.1650 5.7461 .957 -11.0363 27.3663TVAP 18.4880 5.7461 .070 -.7133 37.6893TBAP 30.8107 5.9036 .000 11.0832 50.5381CVAP 24.6660 5.7461 .002 5.4647 43.8673CBAP 20.5160 5.7461 .025 1.3147 39.7173CBV TVA -18.6940 5.7461 .064 -37.8953 .5073TBA -20.8760 5.7461 .021 -40.0773 -1.6747CVA -20.7520 5.7461 .022 -39.9533 -1.5507CBA -21.6610 5.7461 .014 -40.8623 -2.4597TVV -9.1030 5.7461 .911 -28.3043 10.0983TBV -15.3750 5.7461 .253 -34.5763 3.8263CVV -8.1650 5.7461 .957 -27.3663 11.0363TVAP 10.3230 5.7461 .816 -8.8783 29.5243TBAP 22.6457 5.9036 .011 2.9182 42.3731CVAP 16.5010 5.7461 .166 -2.7003 35.7023CBAP 12.3510 5.7461 .589 -6.8503 31.5523TVAP TVA -29.0170 5.7461 .000 -48.2183 -9.8157TBA -31.1990 5.7461 .000 -50.4003 -11.9977CVA -31.0750 5.7461 .000 -50.2763 -11.8737
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CBA -31.9840 5.7461 .000 -51.1853 -12.7827
TVV -19.4260 5.7461 .045 -38.6273 -.2247
TBV -25.6980 5.7461 .001 -44.8993 -6.4967
CVV -18.4880 5.7461 .070 -37.6893 .7133
CBV -10.3230 5.7461 .816 -29.5243 8.8783
TBAP 12.3227 5.9036 .633 -7.4048 32.0501
CVAP 6.1780 5.7461 .995 -13.0233 25.3793
CBAP 2.0280 5.7461 1.000 -17.1733 21.2293
TBAP TVA -41.3397 5.9036 .000 -61.0671 -21.6122
TBA -43.5217 5.9036 .000 -63.2491 -23.7942
CVA -43.3977 5.9036 .000 -63.1251 -23.6702
CBA -44.3067 5.9036 .000 -64.0341 -24.5792
TVV -31.7487 5.9036 .000 -51.4761 -12.0212
TBV -38.0207 5.9036 .000 -57.7481 -18,2932
CVV -30.8107 5.9036 .000 -50.5381 -11.0832
CBV -22.6457 5.9036 .011 -42.3731 -2.9182
TVAP -12.3227 5.9036 .633 -32.0501 7.4048
CVAP -6.1447 5.9036 .996 -25.8721 13.5828
CBAP -10.2947 5.9036 .844 -30.0221 9.4328
CVAP TVA -35.1950 5.7461 .000 -54.3963 -15.9937
TBA -37.3770 5.7461 .000 -56.5783 -18.1757
CVA -37.2530 5.7461 .000 -56.4543 -18.0517
CBA -38.1620 5.7461 .000 -57.3633 -18.9607
TVV -25.6040 5.7461 .001 -44.8053 -6.4027
TBV -31.8760 5.7461 .000 -51.0773 -12.6747
CVV -24.6660 5.7461 .002 -43.8673 -5.4647
CBV -16.5010 5.7461 .166 -35.7023 2.7003
TVAP -6.1780 5.7461 995 -25.3793 13.0233
TBAP 6.1447 5.9036 .996 -13.5828 25.8721
CBAP -4.1500 5.7461 1.000 -23.3513 15.0513
CBAP TVA -31.0450 5.7461 .000 -50.2463 -11.8437
TBA -33.2270 5.7461 .000 -52.4283 -14.0257
CVA -33.1030 5.7461 .000 -52.3043 -13.9017
CBA -34.0120 5.7461 .000 -53.2133 -14.8107
TVV -21.4540 5.7461 .015 -40.6553 -2.2527
TBV -27.7260 5.7461 .000 -46.9273 -8.5247
CVV -20.5160 5.7461 .025 -39.7173 -1.3147
CBV -12.3510 5.7461 .58S -31.5523 6.8503
TVAP -2.028C 5.7461 1.000 -21.2293 17.1733
TBAP 10.2947 5.9036 .844 -9.4326 30.0221
CVAP 4.150C 5.7461 1.000 -15.0513 23.3513
Based on observed means.
* The mean difference is significant at the .05 level.
CORRELATION OF PHYSIOLOGICAL & PSYCHOLOGICAL AROUSAL 
WITH RECALL ACCURACY
PEARSON & SPEARMAN CORRELATIONS (ACROSS THE THREAT GROUP 
WITNESSES) OF THE VARIOUS MEASURES OF RECALL ACCURACY WITH: 
THE ‘STANDARDIZED RESIDUALS (TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF BASELINE 
VARIATION) OF HEART RATE DURING THE INCIDENT AND HEART RATE 
IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE INCIDENT’ AND ‘RATED PERCEIVED 
THREAT DURING THE INCIDENT’ AND RATED PERCEIVED ATTACK 
DURING THE INCIDENT’
Heart Rate Heart Rate Rated Tlueat Rated
Free Recall Accuracy During After During Perceived
(Residual (Residual Attack During
Values) Values)
PEARSON PEARSON SPEARMAN SPEARMAN
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Overall Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
N
-1.24
.673
14
.339
.236
14
-.123
606
20
-.028
.906
20
Central Correlation .091 .043 .077 .005
Sig. (2-taUed) .757 .883 .747 .982
N 14 14 20 20 ■
Peripheral Correlation .426 .545 -.029 .026
Sig. (2-tailed) .220 .103 .925 .932
N 10 10 13 13
Intruder 1 Correlation -.244 .243 -.193 -.080
Sig. (2-tailed) .400 .402 .415 .739
N 14 14 20 20
Intruder 2 Correlation .002 .376 -.221 -.014
Sig. (2-tailed) .995 .185 .349 .954
N 14 14 20 20
Action Correlation -.539* -.205 -144 .062
Sig. (2-tailed) .046 .481 .545 .796
N 14 14 20 20
Verbal Correlation .485 .134 .001 -.210 ■
Sig. (2-tailed) .093 .662 .997 .388
N 13 13 19 19 ,Appearance Correlation .271 .522 -.217 .106 ;
Sig. (2-tailed) .448 .121 .497 .743
N 10 10 12 12
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)
-
Heart Rate Heart Rate Rated Threat Rated ■Cued Recall Accuracy During After During Perceived
(Residual (Residual Attack Dining
Values) Values)
PEARSON PEARSON SPEARMAN SPEARMAN ;Overall Correlation -.214 .019 .129 .121
Sig. (2-tailed) .463 .949 .587 .612
N 14 14 20 20
Central Correlation -.045 .163 -.241 -.126
Sig. (2-tailed) .879 .578 J20 .608
N 14 14 19 19
Peripheral Correlation -.202 -.043 .295 .083 ■
Sig. (2-tailed) .488 .885 .220 .735 *
N 14 14 19 19
Intruder 1 Correlation -.088 -.112 .339 .163
Sig. (2-tailed) .765 .703 .143 .492
N 14 14 20 20
Intruder 2 Correlation -.381 .085 -.076 -.064
Sig. (2-tailed) .200 .784 .758 .794
N 13 13 19 19
Action Correlation -.024 .273 -.015 .115
Sig. (2-tailed) ^38 .367 .954 .650
N 13 13 18 18
Verbal Correlation -.392 -.588 -.512 -.438
Sig. (2-tailed) .233 .057 .051 .102
N 11 11 15 15
Appearance Correlation .067 -.088 .540* .330 ■
Sig. (2-tailed) .829 .775 .021 .181
N 13 13 18 18
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Heart Rate Heart Rate Rated Tlneat RatedTotal Recall Accuracy During After During Perceived
(Residual (Residual Attack During
Values) Values)
PEARSON PEARSON SPEARMAN SPEARMAN
Overall Correlation -.133 .402 -.027 .141Sig. (2-tailed) .649 .154 .909 .553N 14 14 20 20
Central Correlation -.172 .120 -.039 -.052Sig. (2-tailed) .556 .684 .871 .827N 14 14 20 20
Peripheral Correlation .027 .307 .112 .111Sig. (2-tailed) .928 .285 .639 j43N 14 14 20 20Intruder 1 Correlation -.093 .305 .149 .116Sig. (2-tailed) .752 .289 .530 .627N 14 14 20 20Intruder 2 Correlation -.190 .364 -.113 465Sig. (2-tailed) .515 .201 .635 .784N 14 14 20 20Action Correlation -.515 .172 -.052 .203Sig. (2-tailed) 059 .557 .829 .391N 14 14 20 20Verbal Correlation .095 -.233 -.298 -.475*Sig. (2-tailed) .747 .422 .202 .034N 14 14 20 20Appearance Correlation .371 .280 .077 .177Sig. (2-tailed) .212 .354 .755 .468N 14 13 19 19
SCATTERPLOT OF HEART RATE DURING (STANDARDIZED RESIDUAL) 
WITH FREE RECALL ACCURACY FOR ACTION DETAILS
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SCATTERPLOT OF RATED THREAT DURING THE INCIDENT WITH CUED 
RECALL ACCURACY FOR APPEARANCE DETAILS
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SCATTERPLOT OF PERCEIVED ATTACK DURING THE INCIDENT WITH 
TOTAL RECALL ACCURACY FOR VERBAL DETAILS
367
110
100
w 901■a
1
8
“  70
oX I
80
60
D □ □
D D
□
B □
1:1 1:1 
a
a
a
perceived attack during
RECOGNITION ACCURACY
2AFC QUESTIONS: UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Dependent Variable: accuracy for all 2AFC questions
Source
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Corrected Model 997.866» 3 332.622 3.157 .036
Intercept 240262.400 1 240262.400 2280.287 .000
INCIDENT 745.805 1 745.805 7.078 .012
WITNESS 2.061 1 2.061 .020 .890
INCIDENT* WITNESS 250.000 1 250.000 2.373 .132
Error 3793.139 36 105.365
Total 245053.405 40
Corrected Total 4791.005 39
a- R Squared = .208 (Adjusted R Squared = .142)
2AFC QUESTIONS: UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE - CENTRAL VS. 
PERIPHERAL DETAILS
368
Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts
Measure: MEASURE 1
Source INFO
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
INFO Linear 656.658 1 656.658 2.956 .094
INFO * INCIDENT Linear 2041.816 1 2041.816 9.191 .004
INFO* WITNESS Linear 135.668 1 135.668 .611 .440
INFO * INCIDENT Linear 236.328 1 236.328 1.064 .309
É rM flN P ^ Linear 7997.529 36 222.154
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Measure: MEASURE_1 
Transformed Variable: Average
Source
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Intercept 496786.721 1 496786.721 1803.959 .000
INCIDENT 3500.129 1 3500.129 12.710 .001
WITNESS 10.643 1 10.643 .039 .845
INCIDENT* WITNESS 861.328 1 861.328 3.128 .085
Error 9913.929 36 275.387
2AFC QUESTIONS: POSTHOC TUKEY’S TEST 
(CENTRAL VS PERIPHERAL) BY INCIDENT
INTERACTION OF INFO
INFO
Tukey HSCf
GROUP N
Subset
1 2
control central 20 70.0010
control peripheral 20 74.3750
threat peripheral 20 77.5000
threat central 20 93.3340
Sig. .446 1.000
Means for groups In hom ogeneous subsets are displayed. 
Based on Type III Sum of Squares 
The error term Is Mean Square(Error) = 252.045. 
a. Uses Harmonic Mean Sample Size = 20.000. 
h Alpha — .05.
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M ultiple C o m p a r iso n s
D ependent Variable: INFO
Tukey HSD
(1) GROUP (J) GROUP
Mean
Difference
(l-J) Std. Error Sig.
95% Confidence Interval
Lower Bound Upper Bound
threat central control central 23.3330* 5.0204 .000 10.1453 36.5207
threat peripheral 15.8340* 5.0204 ,012 2.6463 29.0217
control peripheral 18.9590* 5.0204 .002 5.7713 32.1467
control central threat central -23.3330* 5.0204 .000 -36.5207 -10.1453
threat peripheral -7.4990 5.0204 .446 -20.6867 5.6887
control peripheral -4.3740 5.0204 .820 -17.5617 8.8137
threat peripheral threat central -15.8340* 5.0204 .012 -29.0217 -2.6463
control central 7.4990 5.0204 .446 -5.6887 20.6867
control peripheral 3.1250 5.0204 .925 -10.0627 16.3127
control peripheral threat central -18.9590* 5.0204 .002 -32.1467 -5.7713
control central 4.3740 5.0204 .820 -8.8137 17.5617
threat peripheral -3.1250 5.0204 .925 -16.3127 10.0627
Based on observed means.
*■ The mean difference Is significant at the .05 level.
2AFC QUESTIONS: UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE - INTRUDER 1 
VS. INTRUDER 2 DETAILS
Tests of Withln-Subjects Contrasts
Measure; MEASURE 1
Source INFO
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
INFO Linear 420.261 1 420.261 2.147 .152
INFO * INCIDENT Linear 6.774 1 6.774 .035 .853
INFO* WITNESS Linear 3.461 1 3.461 .018 .895
INFO * INCIDENT Linear 16.781 1 16.781 .086 .771
ÈrVWmiNWGÿ Linear 7046.511 36 195.736
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Measure: MEASURE_1 
Transformed Variable: Average
Source
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Intercept 483082.661 1 483082.661 2058.954 .000
INCIDENT 1473.014 1 1473.014 6.278 .017
WITNESS 3.461 1 3.461 .015 ,904
INCIDENT* WITNESS 483.341 1 483.341 2.060 .160
Error 8446.511 36 234.625
4AFC QUESTIONS: UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE
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Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Dependent Variable: accuracy for all 4AFC questions
Source
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Corrected Model 98.319» 3 32.773 .283 .838
Intercept 54325.744 1 54325.744 468.662 .000
INCIDENT 23.470 1 23.470 .202 .655
WITNESS 74.693 1 74.693 .644 .427
INCIDENT * WITNESS .156 1 ,156 .001 .971
Error 4173.001 36 115.917
Total 58597.065 40
Corrected Total 4271.321 39
a- R Squared = ,023 (Adjusted R Squared = -.058)
4AFC QUESTIONS: UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE - CENTRAL VS. 
PERIPHERAL DETAILS
Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts
Measure: MEASURE 1
Source INFO
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
INFO Linear 9055.066 1 9055.066 36.836 .000
INFO * INCIDENT Linear 17.842 1 17.842 .073 .789
INFO* WITNESS Linear 774.266 1 774.266 3.150 ,084
INFO * INCIDENT Linear 1011.469 1 1011.469 4.115 .050
ErVMIClNP©^ Linear 8849.651 36 245.824
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Measure: MEASURE_1 
Transformed Variable: Average
Source
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Intercept 152738.494 1 152738.494 436.465 .000
INCIDENT 277.215 1 277.215 .792 .379
WITNESS 63.261 1 63.261 .181 .673
INCIDENT* WITNESS 478.046 1 478.046 1.366 .250
Error 12597.988 36 349.944
4AFC QUESTIONS: POSTHOC TUKEY'S TEST - INTERACTION OF 
INFORMATION (CENTRAL VS PERIPHERAL) BY INCIDENT BY WITNESS
371
GRPINFO
Tukey HSCf’*"
group central peripheral N
Subset
1 2
threat bystander 
peripheral 10 30.5560
control bystander 
peripheral 10 31.1120
threat victim peripheral 10 32.7770
control victim peripheral 10 37.7780
control victim central 10 46.6670 46.6670
threat bystander central 10 50.0000 50.0000
threat victim central 10 54.0000 54.0000
control bystander central 10 66.6680
Sig. .062 .176
Means for groups in hom ogeneous subsets are displayed. 
Based on Type III Sum of Squares 
The error term is Mean Square(Error) = 297.884. 
a- Uses Harmonic Mean Sample Size = 10.000. 
b. Alpha = .05.
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Multiple Comparisons
D ependent Variable: GRPINFO
(1) group central 
peripheral
(J) group central 
peripheral
Mean
Difference 95% Confidence interval
(i-j) Std. Error Sig. Lower Bound Upper Bound
th rea t victim peripheral th rea t bystander 
peripheral 2.2210 7.7186 1.000 -21.8752 26.3172
control victim peripheral -5.0010 7.7186 .998 -29.0972 19.0952
control bystander 
peripheral 1.6650 7.7186 1.000 -22.4312 25.7612
th reat victim central -21.2230 7.7186 .125 -45.3192 2.8732
th reat bystander central -17.2230 7.7186 .346 -41.3192 6.8732
control victim central -13.8900 7.7186 .622 -37.9862 10.2062
control bystander central -33.8910* 7.7186 .001 -57.9872 -9.7948
th rea t bystander th rea t victim peripheral •2.2210 7.7186 1.000 -26.3172 21.8752
peripheral control victim peripheral -7.2220 7.7186 .981 -31.3182 16.8742
control bystander 
peripheral -.5560 7.7186 1.000 -24.6522 23.5402
th rea t victim central -23.4440 7.7186 .062 -47.5402 .6522
th rea t bystander central -19.4440 7.7186 .204 -43.5402 4.6522 .
control victim central -18.1110 7.7186 .433 -40.2072 7.9852 ■
control bystander central -36.1120* 7.7186 .000 -60.2082 -12.0158
control victim peripheral th rea t victim peripheral 5.0010 7.7186 .998 -19.0952 29.0972
th rea t bystander 
peripheral 7.2220 7.7186 .981 -16.8742 31.3182
control bystander 
peripheral 6.6660 7.7186 .988 -17.4302 30.7622
th reat victim central -16.2220 7.7186 .424 -40.3182 7.8742
th reat bystander central -12.2220 7.7186 .758 -36.3182 11.8742
control victim central -8.8890 7.7186 .943 -32.9852 15.2072
control bystander central -28.8900* 7.7186 .008 -52.9862 -4.7938
control bystander 
peripheral
th rea t victim peripheral 
th reat bystander 
peripheral
-1.6650
.5560
7.7186
7.7186
1.000
1.000
-25.7612
-23.5402
22.4312
24.6522
control victim peripheral -6.6660 7.7186 .988 -30.7622 17.4302
th rea t victim central -22.8880 7.7186 .075 -46.9842 1.2082
th rea t bystander central -18.8880 7.7186 .235 -42.9842 5.2082
control victim central -15.5550 7.7186 .479 -39.6512 8.5412
control bystander central -35.5560* 7.7186 .000 -59.6522 -11.4598
th rea t victim central th rea t victim peripheral 21.2230 7.7186 .125 -2.8732 45.3192
th reat bystander 
peripheral 23.4440 7.7186 .062 -.6522 47.5402 :
control victim peripheral 16.2220 7.7186 .424 -7.8742 40.3182
control bystander 
peripheral 22.8880 7.7186 .075 -1.2082 46.9842
th reat bystander central 4.0000 7.7186 1.000 -20.0962 28.0962
control victim central 7.3330 7.7186 .980 -16.7632 31.4292
control bystander central -12.6680 7.7186 .724 -36.7642 11.4282
th rea t bystander central th rea t victim peripheral 17.2230 7.7186 .346 -6.8732 41.3192
th rea t bystander 
peripheral 19.4440 7.7186 .204 -4.6522 43.5402 :
control victim peripheral 12.2220 7.7186 .758 -11.8742 36.3182
control bystander 
peripheral 18.8880 7.7166 .235 -5.2082 42.9842
th rea t victim central -4.0000 7.7186 1.000 -28.0962 20.0962
control victim central 3.3330 7.7186 1.000 -20.7632 27.4292
control bystander central -16.6680 7.7186 .388 -40.7642 7.4282
control victim central th rea t victim peripheral 13.8900 7.7186 .622 -10.2062 37.9862
th rea t bystander 
peripheral 16.1110 7.7186 .433 -7.9852 40.2072
control victim peripheral 8.8890 7.7186 .943 -15.2072 32.9852
control bystander 
peripheral 15.5550 7.7186 .479 -8.5412 39.6512
th reat victim central -7.3330 7.7186 .980 -31.4292 16.7632
th reat bystander central -3.3330 7.7186 1.000 -27.4292 20.7632
control bystander central -20.0010 7.7186 .176 -44.0972 4.0952 '
control bystander central th reat victim peripheral 33.8910* 7.7186 .001 9.7948 57.9872
th reat bystander 
peripheral 36.1120* 7.7186 .000 12.0158 60.2082
control victim peripheral 28.8900* 7,7186 .008 4.7938 52.9862
control bystander 
peripheral 35.5560* 7.7186 .000 11.4598 59.6522
th reat victim central 12.6680 7.7186 .724 -11.4282 36.7642 ,
th reat bystander central 16.6680 7.7186 .388 -7.4282 40.7642
control victim central 20.0010 7.7186 .176 -4.0952 44.0972
B ased  on observed m eans.
* The m ean difference is significant a t  the  .05 level.
373
4AFC QUESTIONS; UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE
VS. INTRUDER 2 DETAILS
INTRUDER 1
Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts
Measure: MEASURE 1
Source INFO
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
INFO Linear 1557.436 1 1557.436 6.627 .014
INFO * INCIDENT Linear 50.849 1 50.849 216 .645
INFO* WITNESS Linear 64.548 1 64.548 .275 .603
INFO* INCIDENT Linear 6.396 1 6.396 .027 .870
ËrVWWNWG? Linear 8460.719 36 235.020
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Measure: MEASURE_1 
Transformed Variable: Average
Source
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Intercept 105093.102 1 105093.102 443.390 .000
INCIDENT 31.702 1 31.702 .134 .717
WITNESS 177.846 1 177.846 .750 .392
INCIDENT* WITNESS .907 1 .907 .004 .951
Error 8532.779 36 237.022
4AFC QUESTIONS: UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE 
VERBAL VS. APPEARANCE DETAILS
ACTION VS.
Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts
Measure: MEASURE 1
Source
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
iNFU 50147.61 2 15573.81 25.38 .ÔÔÔ
INFO * INCIDENT 591.39 2 295.69 .50 .610
INFO * w it n e s s 274.35 2 137.18 .23 .794
INFO* INCIDENT*WIT 3910.86 2 1955.43 3.29 .043
Erk&H(rNB8p 42764.94 72 593.96
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Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Measure; MEASURE__1 
Transformed Variable: Average
Source
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.Intercept 300832.577 1 300832.577 430.195 .000
INCIDENT 5222.449 1 5222.449 7.468 .010
WITNESS 333.267 1 333.267 .477 .494
INCIDENT* WITNESS 1446.713 1 1446.713 2.069 .159
Error 25174.572 36 699.294
4AFC QUESTIONS: POSTHOC TUKEY'S TEST - INTERACTION OF 
INFORMATION (ACTION VS VERBAL VS APPEARANCE) BY INCIDENT BY 
WITNESS
INFO
Tukey HSCf■*'
GROUP N
Subset
1 2 3
CVV 10 25.0000
CBV 10 27.5000
CBAP 10 33.3340
TBV 10 38.3330 38.3330
CVAP 10 40.0000 40.0000
TVV 10 41.6650 41.6650
TVAP 10 53.7500 53.7500 53.7500
TBAP 10 56.2500 56.2500 56.2500
TBA 10 60.0000 60.0000 60.0000
CVA 10 60.0000 60.0000 60.0000
CBA 10 75.0000 75.0000
TVA 10 90.0000
Sig. .091 .061 .068
Means for groups in homogeneous subsets are displayed. 
Based on Type III Sum of Squares 
The error term is Mean Square(Error) = 629.070. 
a- Uses Harmonic Mean Sample Size = 10.000. 
b. Alpha = .05.
Multiple C om parisons
Dependent Variable: INFO
Mean 
Difference (1- 
J)
Std. Error Sig. 95%
Confidence
Interval(1) GROUP (J) GROUP Lower Bound Upper BoundTVA TBA 30.0000 11.2167 .253 -7.4741 67.4741CVA 30.0000 11.2167 .253 -7.4741 67.4741CBA 15.0000 11.2167 .972 -22.4741 52.4741TVV 48.3350 11.2167 .002 10.8609 85.8091TBV 51.6670 11.2167 .001 14.1929 89.1411
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CVV 65.0000 11.2167 .000 27.5259 102.4741CBV 62.5000 11.2167 .000 25.0259 99.9741TVAP 36.2500 11.2167 .068 -1.2241 73.7241TBAP 33.7500 11.2167 .120 -3.7241 71.2241CVAP 50.0000 11.2167 .001 12.5259 87.4741CBAP 56.6660 11.2167 .000 19.1919 94.1401TBA TVA -30.0000 11.2167 .253 -67.4741 7.4741CVA .0000 11.2167 1.000 -37.4741 37.4741CBA -15.0000 11.2167 .972 -52.4741 22,4741TVV 18.3350 11.2167 .892 -19.1391 55.8091TBV 21.6670 11.2167 .737 -15.8071 59.1411CVV 35.0000 11.2167 .091 -2.4741 72.4741CBV 32.5000 11.2167 .157 -4.9741 69.9741TVAP 6.2500 11.2167 1.000 -31.2241 43.7241TBAP 3.7500 11.2167 1.000 -33.7241 41.2241CVAP 20.0000 11.2167 .823 -17.4741 57.4741CBAP 26.6660 11.2167 .430 -10.8081 64.1401CVA TVA -30.0000 11.2167 .253 -67.4741 7.4741TBA .0000 11.2167 1.000 -37.4741 37.4741CBA -15.0000 11.2167 .972 -52.4741 22.4741TVV 18.3350 11.2167 .892 -19.1391 55.8091TBV 21.6670 11.2167 .737 -15.8071 59.1411CVV 35.0000 11.2167 .091 -2.4741 72.4741CBV 32.5000 11.2167 .157 -4.9741 69.9741TVAP 6.2500 11.2167 1.000 -31.2241 43.7241TBAP 3.7500 11.2167 1.000 -33.7241 41.2241CVAP 20.0000 11.2167 .823 -17.4741 57.4741CBAP 26.6660 11.2167 .430 -10.8081 64.1401CBA TVA -15.0000 11.2167 .972 -52.4741 22.4741TBA 15.0000 11.2167 .972 -22.4741 52.4741CVA 15.0000 11.2167 .972 -22.4741 52.4741TVV 33.3350 11.2167 .132 -4.1391 70.8091TBV 36.6670 11.2167 .061 -.8071 74.1411CVV 50.0000 11.2167 .001 12.5259 87.4741CBV 47.5000 11.2167 ,003 10.0259 84.9741TVAP 21.2500 11.2167 .760 -16.2241 58.7241TBAP 18.7500 11.2167 .877 -18.7241 56.2241CVAP 35.0000 11.2167 .091 -2.4741 72.4741CBAP 41.6660 11.2167 .016 4.1919 79.1401TVV TVA -48.3350 11.2167 .002 -85.8091 -10.8609TBA -18.3350 11.2167 .892 -55.8091 19.1391CVA -18.3350 11.2167 .892 -55.8091 19.1391CBA -33.3350 11.2167 .132 -70.8091 4.1391TBV 3.3320 11.2167 1.000 -34.1421 40.8061CVV 16.6650 11.2167 .941 -20.8091 54.1391CBV 14.1650 11.2167 .982 -23.3091 51.6391TVAP -12.0850 11.2167 .995 -49.5591 25.3891TBAP -14.5850 11.2167 .977 -52.0591 22.8891CVAP 1.6650 11.2167 1.000 -35.8091 39.1391CBAP 8.3310 11.2167 1.000 -29.1431 45.8051TBV TVA -51.6670 11.2167 .001 -89.1411 -14.1929TBA -21.6670 11.2167 .737 -59.1411 15.8071CVA -21.6670 11.2167 .737 -59.1411 15.8071CBA -36.6670 11.2167 .061 -74.1411 .8071TVV -3.3320 11.2167 1.000 -40.8061 34.1421CVV 13.3330 11.2167 .989 -24.1411 50.8071CBV 10.8330 11.2167 .998 -26.6411 48.3071TVAP -15.4170 11.2167 .966 ■52.8911 22.0571TBAP -17.9170 11.2167 .906 -55.3911 19.5571CVAP -1.6670 11.2167 1.000 -39.1411 35.8071CBAP 4.9990 11.2167 1.000 -32.4751 42.4731CVV TVA -65.0000 11.2167 .000 -102.4741 -27.5259TBA -35.0000 11.2167 .091 -72.4741 2.4741CVA -35.0000 11.2167 .091 -72.4741 2.4741CBA -50.0000 11.2167 .001 -87.4741 -12.5259TVV -16.6650 11.2167 .941 -54.1391 20.8091TBV -13.3330 11.2167 .989 -50.8071 24.1411
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CBV -2.5000 11.2167 1.000 -39.9741 34.9741TVAP -28.7500 11.2167 .314 -66.2241 8.7241TBAP -31.2500 11.2167 .201 -68.7241 6.2241CVAP -15.0000 11.2167 .972 -52.4741 22.4741CBAP -8.3340 11.2167 1.000 -45.8081 29.1401CBV TVA -62.5000 11.2167 .000 -99.9741 -25.0259TBA -32.5000 11.2167 .157 -69.9741 4.9741CVA -32.5000 11.2167 .157 -69.9741 4.9741CBA -47.5000 11.2167 .003 -84.9741 -10.0259TW -14.1650 11.2167 .982 -51.6391 23.3091TBV -10.8330 11.2167 .998 -48.3071 26.6411CVV 2.5000 11.2167 1.000 -34.9741 39.9741TVAP -26.2500 11.2167 .455 -63.7241 11.2241TBAP -28.7500 11.2167 .314 -66.2241 8.7241CVAP -12.5000 11.2167 .993 -49.9741 24.9741CBAP -5.8340 11.2167 1.000 -43.3081 31.6401TVAP TVA -36.2500 11.2167 .068 -73.7241 1.2241TBA -6.2500 11.2167 1.000 -43.7241 31.2241CVA -6.2500 11.2167 1.000 -43.7241 31.2241CBA -21.2500 11.2167 .760 -58.7241 16.2241TVV 12.0850 11.2167 .995 -25.3891 49.5591TBV 15.4170 11.2167 .966 -22.0571 52.8911CVV 28.7500 11.2167 .314 -8.7241 66.2241csV 26.2500 11.2167 .455 -11.2241 63.7241TBAP -2.5000 11.2167 1.000 -39.9741 34.9741CVAP 13.7500 11.2167 .986 -23.7241 51.2241CBAP 20.4160 11.2167 .803 -17.0581 57.8901TBAP TVA -33.7500 11.2167 .120 -71.2241 3.7241TBA -3.7500 11.2167 1.000 -41.2241 33.7241CVA -3.7500 11.2167 1.000 -41.2241 33.7241CBA -18.7500 11.2167 .877 -56.2241 18.7241TVV 14.5850 11.2167 .977 -22.8891 52.0591TBV 17.9170 11.2167 .906 -19.5571 55.3911CVV 31.2500 11.2167 .201 -6.2241 68.7241CBV 28.7500 11.2167 .314 -8.7241 66.2241TVAP 2.5000 11.2167 1.000 -34.9741 39.9741CVAP 16.2500 11.2167 .951 -21.2241 53.7241CBAP 22.9160 11.2167 663 -14.5581 60.3901CVAP TVA -50.0000 11.2167 .001 -87.4741 -12.5259TBA -20.0000 11.2167 .823 -57.4741 17.4741CVA -20.0000 11.2167 .823 -57.4741 17.4741CBA -35.0000 11.2167 .091 -72.4741 2.4741TVV -1.6650 11.2167 1.000 -39.1391 35.8091TBV 1.6670 11.2167 1.000 -35.8071 39.1411CVV 15.0000 11.2167 .972 -22.4741 52.4741CBV 12.5000 11.2167 .993 -24.9741 49.9741TVAP -13.7500 11.2167 .986 -51.2241 23.7241TBAP -16.2500 11.2167 .951 -53.7241 21.2241CBAP 6.6660 11.2167 1.000 -30.8081 44.1401CBAP TVA -56.6660 11.2167 .000 -94.1401 -19.1919TBA -26.6660 11,2167 .430 -64.1401 10.8081CVA -26.6660 11.2167 .430 -64.1401 10.8081CBA -41.6660 11.2167 .016 -79.1401 -4.1919TVV -8.3310 11.2167 1.000 -45.8051 29.1431TBV -4.9990 11.2167 1.000 -42.4731 32.4751CVV 8.3340 11.2167 1.000 -29.1401 45.8081CBV 5.8340 11.2167 1.000 -31.6401 43.3081TVAP -20.4160 11.2167 .803 -57.8901 17.0581TBAP -22.9160 11.2167 .663 -60.3901 14.5581CVAP -6.6660 11.2167 1.000 -44.1401 30.8081
The mean difference is significant at the .05 ievel.
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CORRELATION OF PHYSIOLOGICAL & PSYCHOLOGICAL AROUSAL 
WITH RECOGNITION ACCURACY
PEARSON & SPEARMAN CORRELATIONS (ACROSS THE THREAT GROUP 
WITNESSES) OF THE VARIOUS MEASURES OF RECOGNITION ACCURACY 
WITH: THE ‘STANDARDIZED RESIDUALS (TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF 
BASELINE VARIATION) OF HEART RATE DURING THE INCIDENT AND 
HEART RATE IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE INCIDENT' AND ‘RATED 
PERCEIVED THREAT DURING THE INCIDENT’ AND RATED PERCEIVED 
ATTACK DURING THE INCIDENT’
Heart Rate Heart Rate Rated Threat Rated
2 AFC Recognition Accuracy During After During Perceived
(Residual (Residual Attack Dming
Values) Values)
PEARSON PEARSON SPEARMAN SPEARMAN
Overall Correlation -.174 -.247 .230 212,
Sig. (2-taüed) .552 .395 .328 .244
N 14 14 20 20
Central Correlation .107 .117 -.045 .022
Sig. (2-tailed) .715 .691 .851 j%5
N 14 14 20 20
Peripheral Correlation -.212 -.285 .341 336
Sig. (2-tailed) .468 .324 .142 T48
N 14 14 20 20
Intruder 1 Correlation .250 -.094 .224 .022
Sig. (2-tailed) .390 .750 .342 325N 14 14 20 20
Intruder 2 Correlation -.274 -.193 .167 336
Sig. (2-tailed) .344 .509 .482 .148
N 14 14 20 20
Action Correlation .107 .117 -.045 .022
Sig. (2-tailed) .715 .691 .851 .925
N 14 14 20 20
Verbal Correlation No2AFC No2AFC No2AFC No2AFC
Sig. (2-tailed) Verbal Verbal Verbal VerbalN Questions Questions Questions Questions
Appearance Correlation -.212 -.285 341 .336
Sig. (2-tailed) .468 .324 .142 .148
N 14 14 20 20
4 AFC Recogitition Accuracy
Heart Rate 
During 
(Residual 
Values) 
PEARSON
Heart Rate 
After 
(Residual 
Values) 
PEARSON
Rated Tlireat 
During
SPEARMAN
Rated 
Perceived 
Attack During
SPEARMAN
Ch^ erall Correlation -.588* .235 -.110 -.033
Sig. (2-tailed) .027 .419 .645 .890N 14 14 20 20
Central Correlation -.004 .566* .023 .162
Sig. (2-tailed) .990 .035 .924 .494
N 14 14 20 20
Peripheral Correlation -.738** -.026 -.101 -.115
Sig. (2-tailed) .003 .929 .673 .630
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N 14 14 20 20
Intruder 1 Correlation .030 .412 -.081 -.173
Sig. (2-tailed) .918 .144 .735 .466
N 14 14 20 20
Intruder 2 Correlation -.855** -.060 -.129 -.010
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .839 .588 .966
N 14 14 20 20
Action Correlation -.105 .176 .150 193
Sig. (2-taüed) .720 .546 329 .415
N 14 14 20 20
Verbal Correlation -.380 .142 -.017 .016
Sig. (2-tailed) .180 .628 .944 .946
N 14 14 20 20
Appearance Correlation -.562* .150 -.338 .-.272
Sig. (2-tailed) .036 .609 .144 .246
N 14 14 20 20
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
** Correlation is significant at tlie O.Ollevel (2-taüed)
SCATTERPLOT OF HEART RATE DURING (STANDARDIZED RESIDUAL) 
WITH RECOGNITION ACCURACY FOR 4AFC QUESTIONS OVERALL
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380
standardized Residual
SCATTERPLOT OF HEART RATE AFTER (STANDARDIZED RESIDUAL) 
WITH RECOGNITION ACCURACY FOR CENTRAL 4AFC QUESTIONS 
OVERALL
90
80
g  70 
1  eoj3cr
50
$
2IP  30
ro 20 J
10
-2
Standardized Residual
IDENTmCATION
381
LINEUP ONE
CONTINGENCY TABLE: INCIDENT BY WITNESS BY DECISION
witness type * decision type * Incident type Crosstabulation
incident type
decision type
Totalcorrect incorrect
threat witness victim Count 7 3 10
type Expected Count 5.0 5.0 10.0
bystander Count 3 7 10
Expected Count 5.0 5.0 10.0
Total Count 10 10 20
Expected Count 10.0 10.0 20.0
control witness victim Count 5 5 10
type Expected Count 6.0 4.0 10.0
bystander Count 7 3 10
Expected Count 6.0 4.0 10.0
Total Count 12 8 20
Expected Count 12.0 8.0 20.0
CONTINGENCY TABLE: INCIDENT BY DECISION
incident type * decision type Crosstabulation
decision type
Totalcorrect incorrect
incident threat Count 10 10 20
type Expected Count 11.0 9.0 20.0
control Count 12 8 20
Expected Count 11.0 9.0 20.0
Total Count 22 18 40
Expected Count 22.0 18.0 40.0
CHI-SQUARE TEST: INCIDENT BY DECISION
382
Chi-Square Tests
Value df
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided)
Exact Sig. 
(2-sided)
Exact Sig. 
(1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square .404*) 1 .525
Continuity Correctiorf .101 1 .751
Likelihood Ratio .405 1 .525
Fisher's Exact Test .751 3 7 6
Linear-by-Llnear
Association .394 1 .530
N of Valid C ases 40
a Computed only for a 2x2 table
b. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count Is 
9.00.
LINEUP TWO
CONTINGENCY TABLE: INCIDENT BY WITNESS BY DECISION
witness type * decision type * incident type Crosstabulation
incident type
decision type
Totalcorrect incorrect
threat witness victim Count 4 6 10
type Expected Count 4.5 5.5 10.0
bystander Count 5 5 10
Expected Count 4.5 5.5 10.0
Total Count 9 11 20
Expected Count 9.0 11.0 20.0
control witness victim Count 5 5 10
type Expected Count 4.6 5.5 10.0
bystander Count 4 6 10
Expected Count 4.5 5.5 10.0
Total Count 9 11 20
Expected Count 9.0 11.0 20.0
CONTINGENCY TABLE: INCIDENT BY DECISION
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incident type * decision type Crosstabulation
decision type
Totalcorrect Incorrect
incident threat Count 9 11 20
type Expected Count 9.0 11.0 20.0
control Count 9 11 20
Expected Count 9.0 11,0 20.0
Total Count 18 22 40
Expected Count 18.0 22.0 40.0
CORRELATION OF PHYSIOLOGICAL & PSYCHOLOGICAL AROUSAL 
WITH IDENTIFICATION DECISION
POINT-BISERIAL CORRELATIONS (ACROSS THE THREAT GROUP 
WITNESSES) OF IDENTIFICATION ACCURACY WITH; THE 
STANDARDIZED RESIDUALS (TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF BASELINE 
VARIATION) OF HEART RATE DURING THE INCIDENT AND HEART RATE 
IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE INCIDENT’ AND ‘RATED PERCEIVED 
THREAT DURING THE INCIDENT’ AND ‘RATED PERCEIVED ATTACK 
DURING THE INCIDENT’
Identification Decision Lineup 1 
(Intinder 1)
Lineup 2 
(Intruder 2)
Tlireat During Correlation -.040 .179
Sig. (2-tailed) .868 .449
N 20 20
Perceived Attack During Correlation .000 .399
Sig. (2-tailed) 1.000 .081
N 20 20
Heart Rate During Correlation -.447 -.382
Sig. (2-tailed) .109 .178
N 14 14
Heart Rate After Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
N
.026
.930
14
..310
281
14
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Append ix 10: Statistical Output - Study Two
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PHYSIOLOGICAL AROUSAL 
Heart Rate During 
• Univariate Analysis of Variance (with baseline as co-variate)
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Dependent Variable; DURING
Source
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Corrected Model 6036.340» 4 1509.085 45.310 .000
Intercept 228.916 1 228.916 6.873 .011
BASELINE 5838.268 1 5838.268 175.292 .000
INCIDENT 73.021 1 73.021 2.192 .144
WITNESS 244.918 1 244.918 7.354 .009
INCIDENT* WITNESS 138.924 1 138.924 4.171 .046
Error 1965.049 59 33.306
Total 420035.395 64
Corrected Total 8001.390 63
a- R Squared = .754 (Adjusted R Squared = .738)
• Posthoc Tukey’s Test - Interaction of incident by witness (computed using 
standardized residual values of the heart rate data in order to take account for 
baseline of participant’s resting heart rate levels)
RESIDUR
Tukey HSCf■'
GROUP N
Subset
1 2
threat bystander 16 -.3607
control bystander 16 -.2135
control victim 16 -3.43E-02 -3.43E-02
threat victim 16 .8563
Sig. .798 .071
Means for groups in hom ogeneous subsets are displayed. 
Based on Type III Sum of Squares 
The error term is Mean Square(Error) = 1.022. 
a. Uses Harmonic Mean Sample Size = 16.000. 
b Alpha — .05.
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Multiple Comparisons
Dependent Variable: RESIDUR 
Tukey HSD
(1) GROUP (J) GROUP
Mean
Difference
(l-J) Std. Error Sig.
95% Confidence Interval
Lower Bound Upper Bound
threat victim threat bystander 1.2170* .3574 .006 .2727 2.1614
control victim .8905 .3574 .071 -5.3823E-02 1.8349
control bystander 1.0698* .3574 .020 .1254 2.0142
threat bystander threat victim -1.2170* .3574 .006 -2.1614 -2727
control victim -.3265 .3574 .798 -1.2709 .6179
control bystander -.1472 .3574 .976 -1.0916 .7972
control victim threat victim -.8905 .3574 .071 -1.8349 5.382E-02
threat bystander .3265 .3574 .798 -.6179 1.2709
control bystander .1793 .3574 .958 -.7651 1.1236
control bystander threat victim -1.0698* .3574 .020 -2.0142 -.1254
threat bystander .1472 .3574 .976 -.7972 1.0916
control victim -.1793 .3574 .958 -1.1236 7651
Based on observed means.
*• The mean difference is significant at the .05 level.
Heart Rate After
• Univariate Analysis of Variance (with baseline as co-variate)
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Dependent Variable: AFTER
Source
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Corrected Model 6646.767® 4 1661,692 18.719 .000
Intercept 952.211 1 952.211 10.727 .002
BASELINE 4545.242 1 4545.242 51.203 .000
INCIDENT 1820.674 1 1820.674 20.510 .000
WITNESS 451.658 1 451.658 5.088 028
INCIDENT* WITNESS 1375.940 1 1375.940 15.500 .000
Error 5237.421 59 88.770
Total 488239,522 64
Corrected Total 11884.187 63
a- R Squared = .559 (Adjusted R Squared = .529)
• Posthoc Tukey’s Test - Interaction of incident by witness (computed using 
standardized residual values of the heart rate data in order to take account for 
baseline of participant’s resting heart rate levels)
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RESIDAFT
Tukey HSCf’'’
GROUP N
Subset
1 2
control victim 16 -.4979
control bystander 16 -.1353
threat bystander 16 -9.44E-03
threat victim 16 1.2760
Sig. .356 1.000
Means for groups in homogeneous subsets are displayed.
Based on Type III Sum of Squares
The error term is Mean Square(Error) = .696.
Uses Harmonic Mean Sample Size = 16.000.
b. Alpha = .05.
Multiple Comparisons
Dependent Variable; RESIDAFT 
Tukey HSD
(1) GROUP (J) GROUP
Mean
Difference
(l-J) Std. Error Sig.
95% Confidence Interval
Lower Bound Upper Bound
threat victim threat bystander 1.2854* .2949 .000 .5061 2.0647
control victim 1.7739* .2949 - .000 .9946 2.5532
control bystander 1.4113* .2949 .000 .6320 2.1906
threat bystander threat victim -1.2854* .2949 .000 -2.0647 -.5061
control victim .4885 .2949 .356 -.2908 1.2678
control bystander .1259 .2949 .974 -.6534 .9052
control victim threat victim -1.7739* .2949 .000 -2.5532 -.9946
threat bystander -.4885 .2949 .356 -1.2678 .2908
control bystander -.3626 .2949 .611 -1.1419 .4167
control bystander threat victim -1.4113* .2949 .000 -2.1906 -.6320
threat bystander -.1259 .2949 .974 -.9052 .6534
control victim .3626 .2949 .611 -.4167 1.1419
Based on observed means.
*• The mean difference is significant at the .05 level.
SELF-REPORTED AROUSAL
STAI
Univariate Analysis of Variance
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Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Dependent Variable: stai state
Source
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Corrected Model 209.625® 3 69.875 .945 .425
Intercept 85264.000 1 85264.000 1153.158 .000
INCIDENT 138.063 1 138.063 1.867 .177
WITNESS 22.563 1 22.563 .305 .583
INCIDENT* WITNESS 49.000 1 49.000 .663 .419
Error 4436.375 60 73.940
Total 89910.000 64
Corrected Total 4646.000 63
a- R Squared = .045 (Adjusted R Squared = -.003)
MacKay Arousal Scale 
• Univariate Analysis of Variance
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Dependent Variable: mackay arousal
Source
Type ill Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Corrected Model 18.922® 3 6.307 1.803 .156
Intercept 1048.141 1 1048.141 299.558 .000
INCIDENT 13.141 1 13.141 3.756 .057
WITNESS 5.641 1 5.641 1.612 .209
INCIDENT* WITNESS .141 1 .141 .040 .842
Error 209.938 60 3.499
Total 1277.000 64
Corrected Total 228.859 63
a R Squared = .083 (Adjusted R Squared = .037)
MacKay Stress Scale
• Uniyariate Analysis of Variance
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Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Dependent Variable: mackay stress
Source
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Corrected Model 198.922® 3 66.307 23.411 .000
Intercept 558.141 1 558.141 197.063 .000
INCIDENT 192.516 1 192.516 67.972 .000
WITNESS 4.516 1 4.516 1.594 .212
INCIDENT* WITNESS 1.891 1 1.891 .668 .417
Error 169.938 60 2.832
Total 927.000 64
Corrected Total 368.859 63
a- R Squared = .539 (Adjusted R Squared = .516)
Threat during 
• Univariate Analysis of Variance
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Dependent Variable: threatened during
Source
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Corrected Model 36.563® 3 12.188 16.295 .000
Intercept 280.563 1 280.563 375.125 .000
INCIDENT 18.063 1 18.063 24.150 .000
WITNESS 12.250 1 12.250 16.379 .000
INCIDENT* WITNESS 6.250 1 6.250 8.357 .005
Error 44.875 60 .748
Total 362.000 64
Corrected Total 81.438 63
a R Squared = .449 (Adjusted R Squared = .421 )
• Posthoc Tukey's Test - Interaction of incident by witness
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threatened during
Tukey HSCf '
Witnessing group N
Subset
1 2
Control Bystander 16 1.4375
Control Victim 16 1.6875
Threat Bystander 16 1.8750
Threat Victim 16 3.3750
Sig. .485 1.000
Means for groups In homogeneous subsets are displayed.
Based on Type III Sum of Squares
The error term is Mean Square(Error) = .748.
3- Uses Harmonic Mean Sample Size = 16.000. 
b. Alpha = .05.
Multiple Comparisons
Dependent Variable: threatened during 
Tukey HSD
(1) witnessing group (J) witnessing group
Mean
Difference
(l-J) Std. Error Sig.
95% Confidence Interval
Lower Bound Upper Bound
Threat Victim Threat Bystander 1.5000* .3058 .000 .6920 2.3080
Control Victim 1.6875* .3058 .000 .8795 2,4955
Control Bystander 1.9375* .3058 .000 1.1295 2.7455
Threat Bystander Threat Victim -1.5000* .3058 .000 -2.3080 -.6920
Control Victim .1875 .3058 .927 -.6205 .9955
Control Bystander .4375 .3058 .485 -.3705 1.2455
Control Victim Threat Victim -1.6875* .3058 .000 -2.4955 -.8795
Threat Bystander -.1875 .3058 .927 -.9955 .6205
Control Bystander .2500 .3058 .846 -.5580 1.0580
Control Bystander Threat Victim -1.9375* .3058 .000 -2.7455 -1.1295
Threat Bystander -.4375 .3058 .485 -1.2455 .3705
Control Victim -.2500 .3058 .846 -1.0580 .5580
Based on observed means.
*• The mean difference is significant at the .05 level.
Threat immediately following 
• Univariate Analysis of Variance
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Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Dependent Variable; threatened immediately following
Source
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Corrected Model 3.922® 3 1.307 1.571 .206
Intercept 153.141 1 153.141 183.999 .000
INCIDENT 2.641 1 2.641 3.173 .080
WITNESS 1.563E-02 1 1.563E-02 .019 .891
INCIDENT * WITNESS 1.266 1 1.266 1.521 .222
Error 49.938 60 .832
Total 207.000 64
Corrected Total 53.859 63
3' R Squared = .073 (Adjusted R Squared = .026)
Perceived attack during 
• Univariate Analysis of Variance
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Dependent Variable: perceived attack during
Source
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Corrected Model 22.297® 3 7.432 15.213 .000
Intercept 159.391 1 159.391 326.258 .000
INCIDENT 13.141 1 13.141 26.898 .000
WITNESS 3.516 1 3.516 7.196 .009
INCIDENT* WITNESS 5.641 1 5.641 11.546 .001
Error 29.313 60 .489
Total 211.000 64
Corrected Total 51.609 63
3. R Squared = .432 (Adjusted R Squared = .404)
• Posthoc Tukey's Test » Interaction of incident by witness
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perceived attack during
Tukey HSCf’*'
witnessing group N
Subset
1 2
Control Victim 16 1.0625
Control Bystander 16 1.1875
Threat Bystander 16 1.5000
Threat Victim 16 2.5625
Sig. .298 1.000
Means for groups in homogeneous subsets are displayed. 
Based on Type III Sum of Squares 
The error term is Mean Square(Error) = .489. 
a- Uses Harmonic Mean Sample Size = 16.000. 
b. Alpha = .05.
Multiple Comparisons
Dependent Variable; perceived attack during 
Tukey HSD
(1) witnessing group (J) witnessing group
Mean
Difference
(l-J) Std. Error Sig.
95% Confidence Interval
Lower Bound Upper Bound
Threat Victim Threat Bystander 1.0625* .2471 .000 .4095 1.7155
Control Victim 1.5000* .2471 .000 .8470 2.1530
Control Bystander 1.3750* .2471 .000 .7220 2.0280
Threat Bystander Threat Victim -1.0625* .2471 .000 -1.7155 -.4095
Control Victim .4375 .2471 .298 -.2155 1.0905
Control Bystander .3125 .2471 .589 -.3405 .9655
Control Victim Threat Victim -1.5000* .2471 .000 -2.1530 -.8470
Threat Bystander -.4375 .2471 .298 -1.0905 .2155
Control Bystander -.1250 .2471 .957 -.7780 .5280
Control Bystander Threat Victim -1.3750* .2471 .000 -2.0280 -.7220
Threat Bystander -.3125 .2471 .589 -.9655 .3405
Control Victim .1250 .2471 .957 -.5280 .7780
Based on observed means.
*■ The mean difference is significant at the .05 level.
Angry during
» Univariate Analysis of Variance
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Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Dependent Variable: angry during
Source
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Corrected Model 1.297® 3 .432 .432 .731
Intercept 185.641 1 185.641 185.447 .000
INCIDENT 1.563E-02 1 1.563E-02 .016 .901
WITNESS 1.563E-02 1 1.563E-02 .016 .901
INCIDENT * WITNESS 1.266 1 1.266 1.264 .265
Error 60.063 60 1.001
Total 247.000 64
Corrected Total 61.359 63
3. R Squared = .021 (Adjusted R Squared = -.028)
Angry immediately following 
• Univariate Analysis of Variance
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Dependent Variable: angry immediately following
Source
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Corrected Model 4.875® 3 1.625 1.551 .211
Intercept 182.250 1 182.250 173.917 .000
INCIDENT 1.563 1 1.563 1.491 .227
WITNESS .250 1 .250 .239 .627
INCIDENT* WITNESS 3.063 1 3.063 2.922 .093
Error 62.875 60 1.048
Total 250.000 64
Corrected Total 67.750 63
a- R Squared = .072 (Adjusted R Squared = .026) 
Afraid during
• Univariate Analysis of Variance
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Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Dependent Variable: afraid during
Source
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Corrected Model 20.875® 3 6.958 14.459 .000
Intercept 210.250 1 210.250 436.883 ,000
INCIDENT 18.063 1 18.063 37.532 .000
WITNESS 2.250 1 2.250 4.675 .035
INCIDENT* WITNESS .563 1 .563 1.169 .284
Error 28.875 60 .481
Total 260.000 64
Corrected Total 49.750 63
a R Squared = .420 (Adjusted R Squared = .391)
Afraid immediately following 
• Univariate Analysis of Variance
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Dependent Variable: afraid immediately following
Source
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Corrected Model 4.812® 3 1.604 2.312 .085
Intercept 115.563 1 115.563 166.577 .000
INCIDENT 4.000 1 4.000 5.766 .019
WITNESS .250 1 .250 .360 .551
INCIDENT* WITNESS .563 1 .563 .811 .371
Error 41.625 60 .694
Total 162.000 64
Corrected Total 46.437 63
a R Squared = .104 (Adjusted R Squared = .059)
CORIUELATION OF PHYSIOLOGICAL & PSYCHOLOGICAL AROUSAL 
Heart Rate During
• Spearman Correlations (across the threat group witnesses) of rated perceived 
threat during the incident and rated perceived chance of attack during the 
incident with the standardized residual (to take account of baseline variation) of 
heart rate during the incident
395
C orrelations
StandardizedResidual threatenedduring perceived attack duringSpearman's rho Standardized Residual Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .553** .396*
Sig. (2-taiied) .001 .025
N 32 32 32
threatened during Correlation Coefficient .553** 1.000 .773*’
Sig. (2-tailed) .001 .000
N 32 32 32
perceived attack during Correlation Coefficient .396* .773** 1.000
Sig. (2-tailed) .025 .000
N 32 32 32
“ • Correlation is significant at the .01 levei (2-taiied).
*• Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed).
Scatterplots for significant correlations from above:
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• Spearman Correlations (across the threat group witnesses) of rated perceived 
threat during the incident and rated perceived chance of attack during the 
incident with the standardized residual (to take account of baseline variation) of 
heart rate after the incident
Correlations
StandardizedResidual threatenedduring
perceived attack duringSpearman's rho Standardized Residual Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .578** .366*
Sig. (2-tailed) .001 .039
N 32 32 32
threatened during Correlation Coefficient .578*^ 1.000 .773*'
Sig. (2-taiied) .001 .000
N 32 32 32
perceived attack during Correlation Coefficient .366* .773** 1.000
Sig. (2-tailed) .039 .000
N 32 32 32
'• Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed). 
Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed).
Scatterplots for significant correlations from above:
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PERCENTAGE OF AVAILABLE DETAILS RECALLED 
Free Recall
• Univariate Analysis of Variance
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Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Dependent Variable; total free recall
Source
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Corrected Model 191.203» 3 63.734 3.491 .021
Intercept 7168.797 1 7168.797 392.626 .000
INCIDENT 85.216 1 85.216 4.667 .035
WITNESS 97.540 1 97.540 5.342 .024
INCIDENT* WITNESS 8.446 1 8.446 .463 .499
Error 1095.516 60 18.259
Total 8455.516 64
Corrected Total 1286.718 63
3. R Squared = .149 (Adjusted R Squared = .106)
• Univariate Analysis of Variance - Central vs. Peripheral Details
Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts
Measure: MEASURE 1
Source INFO
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
INFO Linear 5412.941 1 5412.941 194.541 .000
INFO * INCIDENT Linear 2.404 1 2.404 .086 .770
INFO* WITNESS Linear 1.744 1 1.744 .063 .803
INFO * INCIDENT Linear 1.128E-03 1 1.128E-03 .000 .995
ÈrV«t(!lNt=©^ Linear 1669.448 60 27.824
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Measure: MEASURE_1 
Transformed Variable: Average
Source
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Intercept 17338.013 1 17338.013 463.696 .000
INCIDENT 106.507 1 106.507 2.848 .097
WITNESS 201.402 1 201.402 5.386 .024
INCIDENT* WITNESS 17.317 1 17.317 .463 .499
Error 2243.456 60 37.391
• Univariate Analysis of Variance - Intruder 1 vs. Intruder 2 Details
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Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts
Measure; MEASURE 1
Source INFO
Type III Sum  
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
INFO Linear 1279.042 1 1279.042 93.903 .000
INFO * INCIDENT Linear 4.083 1 4.083 .300 .586
INFO * WITNESS Linear 13.184 1 13.184 .968 .329
INFO * INCIDENT Linear 14.797 1 14.797 1.086 .301
Èrj^^(l|NF©^ Linear 817.255 60 13.621
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Measure: MEASURE_1 
Transformed Variable: Average
Source
Type III Sum  
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Intercept 13159.286 1 13159.286 385.584 .000
INCIDENT 211.562 1 211.562 6.199 .016
WITNESS 178.180 1 178.180 5.221 .026
INCIDENT* WITNESS 11.919 1 11.919 .349 .557
Error 2047.693 60 34.128
Univariate Analysis of Variance - Action vs. Verbal vs. Appearance Details
Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts
Measure: MEASURE 1
Source
Type III èum  
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
INLÜ .. ........ ..... ■.....  547151 2 5735.60 70.85 .000
INFO * INCIDENT 248.71 2 124.36 3.22 .043
INFO * WITNESS 46.56 2 23.28 .60 .549
INFO* INCIDENT* WIT 6.85 2 3.42 .09 .915
ErbW1(rNB3^ 4633.67 120 38.61
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Measure: MEASURE_1 
Transformed Variable: Average
Source
Type III Sum  
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Intercept 26159.006 1 26159.006 488.825 .000
INCIDENT 275.377 1 275.377 5.146 .027
WITNESS 269.043 1 269.043 5.028 .029
INCIDENT* WITNESS 20.935 1 20.935 .391 .534
Error 3210.842 60 53.514
• Posthoc Tukey’s Test - Interaction of information (Action vs Verbal vs
Appearance) by incident
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total free recall action details
Tukey HSCf'^
GROUP N
Subset
1 2 3 4
CAP 32 4.4069
TAP 32 6.9313 6.9313
TV 32 10.4825
CV 32 10.9375
CA 32 16.0800
TA 32 21.1963
Sig. .650 .151 1.000 1.000
Means for groups in hom ogeneous subsets are displayed.
Based on Type ill Sum of Squares
The error term is Mean Square(Error) = 44.021.
3 . Uses Harmonic Mean Sample Size = 32.000. 
h. Alpha — .05.
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Multiple Comparisons
Dependent Variable; total free recall action details
Tukey HSD
(1) GROUP (J) GROUP
Mean
Difference
(l-J) Std. Error Sig.
95% Confidence Interval
Lower Bound Upper BoundTA CA 5.1163* 1.6587 .025 .3894 9.8431
TV 10.7137* 1.6587 .000 5.9869 15.4406
CV 10.2587* 1.6587 .000 5.5319 14.9856
TAP 14.2650* 1.6587 .000 9.5382 18.9918
CAP 16.7894* 1.6587 .000 12.0625 21.5162
CA TA -5.1163* 1.6587 .025 -9.8431 -.3894
TV 5.5975* 1.6587 .010 .8707 10.3243
CV 5.1425* 1.6587 .024 .4157 9.8693
TAP 9.1487* 1.6587 .000 4.4219 13.8756
CAP 11.6731* 1.6587 .000 6.9463 16.4000
TV TA -10.7137* 1.6587 .000 -15.4406 -5.9869
CA -5.5975* 1.6587 .010 -10.3243 -.8707
CV -.4550 1.6587 1.000 -5.1818 4.2718
TAP 3.5513 1.6587 .266 -1.1756 8.2781
CAP 6.0756* 1.6587 .003 1.3488 10.8025
CV TA -10.2587* 1.6587 .000 -14.9856 -5.5319
CA -5.1425* 1.6587 .024 -9.8693 -.4157
TV .4550 1.6587 1.000 -4.2718 5.1818
TAP 4.0063 1.6587 .151 -.7206 8.7331
CAP 6.5306* 1.6587 .001 1.8038 11.2575
TAP TA -14.2650* 1.6587 .000 -18.9918 -9.5382
CA -9.1487* 1.6587 .000 -13.8756 -4.4219
TV -3.5513 1.6587 .266 -8.2781 1.1756
CV -4.0063 1.6587 .151 -8.7331 .7206
CAP 2.5244 1.6587 .650 -2.2025 7.2512
CAP TA -16.7894* 1.6587 .000 -21.5162 -12.0625
CA -11.6731* 1.6587 .000 -16.4000 -6.9463
TV -6.0756* 1.6587 .003 -10.8025 -1.3488
CV -6.5306* 1.6587 .001 -11.2575 -1.8038
TAP -2.5244 1.6587 .650 -7.2512 2.2025
Based on observed means.
*• The mean difference is significant at the .05 level.
Cued Recall
« Univariate Analysis of Variance
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Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Dependent Variable; total cued recall
Source
Type 111 Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Corrected Model 50.875» 3 16.958 .962 .416
Intercept 7126.103 1 7126.103 404.446 .000
INCIDENT 18.094 1 18.094 1.027 .315
WITNESS 7.392 1 7.392 .420 .520
INCIDENT* WITNESS 25.389 1 25.389 1.441 .235
Error 1057.164 60 17.619
Total 8234.142 64
Corrected Total 1108.039 63
3 . R Squared = .046 (Adjusted R Squared = -.002)
• Univariate Analysis of Variance - Central vs. Peripheral Details
Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts
Measure; MEASURE 1
Source INFO
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
INFO Linear 491.059 1 491.059 22.112 .000
INFO * INCIDENT Linear .167 1 .167 .008 .931
INFO* WITNESS Linear 64.284 1 64.284 2.895 .094
INFO* INCIDENT Linear 16.755 1 16.755 .754 .389
liW FJtN lF^.. Linear 1332.485 60 22.208
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Measure; MEASURE_1 
Transformed Variable; Average
Source
Type 111 Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Intercept 13413.787 1 13413.787 384.098 .000
INCIDENT 44.663 1 44.663 1.279 .263
WITNESS 24.948 1 24.948 .714 .401
INCIDENT* WITNESS 45.375 1 45.375 1.299 .259
Error 2095.367 60 34.923
Univariate Analysis of Variance - Intruder 1 vs. Intruder 2 Details
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Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts
Measure; MEASURE 1
Source INFO
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
INFO Linear 117.715 1 117.715 8.000 .006
INFO * INCIDENT Linear 6.261 1 6.261 .426 .517
INFO‘ WITNESS Linear .982 1 .982 .067 .797
INFO * INCIDENT Linear 10.482 1 10.482 .712 .402
ËrV«f|iiNI=^.. Linear 882.864 60 14.714
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Measure; MEASURE_1 
Transformed Variable; Average
Source
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Intercept 13875.489 1 13875.489 374.496 .000
INCIDENT 45.066 1 45.066 1.216 .274
WITNESS 14.967 1 14.967 .404 .527
INCIDENT‘ WITNESS 45.089 1 45.089 1.217 .274
Error 2223.064 60 37.051
Univariate Analysis of Variance - Action vs. Verbal vs. Appearance Details
Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts
Measure: MEASURE 1
Source
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
iNhU 5^09.80 2 1144.ÔO 53. Ô4 .000
INFO‘ INCIDENT 208.03 2 104.01 3.07 .050
INFO * WITNESS 92.34 2 46.17 1.36 .259
INFO ‘ INCIDENT ‘ WIT 59.52 2 29.76 .88 .418
ErhM(fNB8|8 4060.12 120 33.83
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Measure; MEASURE_1 
Transformed Variable; Average
Source
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Intercept 18347.675 1 18347.675 364.871 .000
INCIDENT 72.177 1 72.177 1.435 .236
WITNESS 51.315 1 51.315 1.020 .316
INCIDENT * WITNESS 60.840 1 60.840 1.210 .276
Error 3017.126 60 50.285
Posthoc Tukey’s Test - Interaction of information (Action vs Verbal vs
Appearance) by incident
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INFOCUED
Tukey
GROUP N
Subset
1 2 3
TV 32 5.5334
CV 32 6.2497
CA 32 7.0966 7.0966
TA 32 11.2100 11.2100
CAP 32 14.1409
TAP 32 14.4225
Sig. .920 .093 .317
Means for groups in hom ogeneous subsets are displayed.
Based on Type III Sum of Squares
The error term is Mean Square(Error) = 39.469.
3 . Uses Harmonic Mean Sample Size = 32.000. 
b. Alpha = .05.
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Multiple Comparisons
Dependent Variable; INFOCUED
Tukey HSD
(1) GROUP (J) GRO UP
Mean
D ifference
(l-J) Std. Error Sig.
95% C onfidence Interval
Lower Bound Upper Bound
TA CA 4 .1 1 3 4 1 .5706 .093 - .3 6 2 3 8 .5 8 9 2
TV 5.6766* 1 .5 7 0 6 .004 1 .2008 1 0 .1 5 2 3
CV 4.9603* 1 .5706 .020 .4845 9 .4361
TAP -3 .2 1 2 5 1 .5706 .317 -7 .6 8 8 3 1 .2 6 3 3
CAP -2 .9 3 0 9 1 .5706 .423 -7 .4 0 6 7 1 .5 4 4 8
CA TA -4 .1 1 3 4 1 .5 7 0 6 .093 -8 .5 8 9 2 .3 623
TV 1.5631 1 .5 7 0 6 .920 -2 .9 1 2 7 6 .0 3 8 9
CV .8 469 1 .5 7 0 6 .995 -3 .6 2 8 9 5 .3 2 2 7
TAP -7 .3259* 1 .5 7 0 6 .000 -1 1 .8 0 1 7 -2 .8 5 0 2
CAP -7 .0444* 1 .5706 .000 -1 1 .5 2 0 2 -2 .5 6 8 6
TV TA -5 .6766* 1 .5 7 0 6 .0 0 4 -1 0 .1 5 2 3 -1 .2 0 0 8
CA -1 .5631 1 .5 7 0 6 .920 -6 .0 3 8 9 2 .9 1 2 7
CV -.7 1 6 3 1 .5 7 0 6 .998 -5 .1 9 2 0 3 .7 5 9 5
TAP -8 .8891* 1 .5 7 0 6 .000 -1 3 .3 6 4 8 -4 .4 1 3 3
CAP -8 .6075* 1 .5 7 0 6 .000 -1 3 .0 8 3 3 -4 .1 3 1 7
CV TA -4.9603* 1 .5 7 0 6 .020 -9 .4361 - .4 8 4 5
CA -.8 4 6 9 1 .5 7 0 6 .995 -5 .3 2 2 7 3 .6 2 8 9
TV .7 163 1 .5706 .998 -3 .7 5 9 5 5 .1 9 2 0
TAP -8 .1728* 1 .5706 .000 -1 2 .6 4 8 6 -3 .6 9 7 0
CAP -7 .8913* 1 .5 7 0 6 .000 -1 2 .3 6 7 0 -3 .4 1 5 5
TAP TA 3 .2 1 2 5 1 .5 7 0 6 .317 -1 .2 6 3 3 7 .6 8 8 3
CA 7.3259* 1 .5 7 0 6 .000 2 .8 5 0 2 1 1 .8 0 1 7
TV 8.8891* 1 .5 7 0 6 ,000 4 .4 1 3 3 13 .3 6 4 8
CV 8.1728* 1 .5 7 0 6 .000 3 .6 9 7 0 12 .6 4 8 6
CAP .2 8 1 6 1 .5 7 0 6 1.000 -4 .1 9 4 2 4 .7 5 7 3
CAP TA 2 .9 3 0 9 1 .5 7 0 6 .423 -1 .5 4 4 8 7 .4 0 6 7
CA 7.0444* 1 .5 7 0 6 .000 2 .5 6 8 6 11 .5 2 0 2
TV 8.6075* 1 .5706 .000 4 .1 3 1 7 13 .0 8 3 3
CV 7.8913* 1 .5 7 0 6 .000 3 .4 1 5 5 1 2 .3 6 7 0
TAP -.2 8 1 6 1 .5706 1.000 -4 .7 5 7 3 4 .1 9 4 2
B a sed  on observed m eans.
*• T he m ean difference is significant at the .05  level.
Total Recall (Free + Cued) 
• Univariate Analysis of Variance
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Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Dependent Variable: total both recall
Source
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Corrected Model 403.503» 3 134.501 3.985 .012
Intercept 28588.892 1 28588.892 846.983 .000
INCIDENT 181.643 1 181.643 5.381 .024
WITNESS 158.697 1 158.697 4.702 .034
INCIDENT * WITNESS 63.163 1 63.163 1.871 .176
Error 2025.229 60 33.754
Total 31017.623 64
Corrected Total 2428.731 63
3 . R Squared = .166 (Adjusted R Squared = .124)
Univariate Analysis of Variance - Central vs. Peripheral Details
Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts
Measure: MEASURE 1
Source INFO
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
INFO Linear 2642.736 1 2642.736 88.299 .000
INFO‘ INCIDENT Linear 3.847 1 3.847 .129 .721
INFO‘ WITNESS Linear 87.071 1 87.071 2.909 .093
INFO ‘ INCIDENT Linear 16.481 1 16.481 .551 .461
Linear 1795.765 60 29.929
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Measure: MEASURE_1 
Transformed Variable: Average
Source
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.Intercept 61254.813 1 61254.813 895.633 .000
INCIDENT 289.171 1 289.171 4.228 .044
WITNESS 368.256 1 368.256 5.384 .024
INCIDENT ‘ WITNESS 118.830 1 118.830 1.737 .192
Error 4103.565 60 68.393
• Univariate Analysis of Variance - Intruder 1 vs. Intruder 2 Details
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Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts
Measure; MEASURE 1
Source INFO
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
INFO Linear 2174.701 1 2174.701 143.087 .000
INFO * INCIDENT Linear 20.560 1 20.560 1.353 .249
INFO‘ WITNESS Linear 6.956 1 6.956 .458 .501
INFO * INCIDENT Linear 49.925 1 49.925 3.285 .075
ÈrV^iljlNFëÿ Linear 911.909 60 15.198
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Measure: MEASURE_1 
Transformed Variable: Average
Source
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Intercept 54055.542 1 54055.542 794.283 .000
INCIDENT 452.403 1 452.403 6.648 .012
WITNESS 296.279 1 296.279 4.353 .041
INCIDENT‘ WITNESS 103.392 1 103.392 1.519 .223
Error 4083.345 60 68.056
Univariate Analysis of Variance - Action vs. Verbal vs. Appearance Details
Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts
Measure: MEASURE 1
Source
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
INFU 4^51. ^ iio .é e 39.32 .000
INFO ‘ INCIDENT 880.96 2 440.48 8.21 .000
INFO‘ WITNESS 87.62 2 43.81 .82 .445
INFO ‘ INCIDENT ‘ WIT 105.55 2 52.78 .98 .377
Er»M(fNE0)3 6441.24 120 53.68
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Measure: MEASURE_1 
Transformed Variable: Average
Source
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.Intercept 88322.950 1 88322.950 915.634 .000
INCIDENT 628.975 1 628.975 6.521 .013
WITNESS 555.662 1 555.662 5.760 .020
INCIDENT ‘ WITNESS 153.207 1 153.207 1.588 .212
Error 5787.660 60 96.461
Posthoc Tukey’s Test - Interaction of information (Action vs Verbal vs
Appearance) by incident
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total both recall action details
Tukey HSCf'*'
GROUP N
Subset
1 2 3
TV 32 16.0156
CV 32 17.1875
CAP 32 18.5491 18.5491
TAP 32 21.3541 21.3541
CA 32 23.1775
TA 32 32.4041
Sig. .112 .236 1.000
Means for groups in hom ogeneous subsets are displayed.
Based on Type III Sum of Squares
The error term is Mean Square(Error) = 70.597.
3 . Uses Harmonic Mean Sample Size = 32.000. 
b Alpha — .05.
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Multiple Comparisons
Dependent Variable: total both recall action details
Tukey HSD
(1) GROUP (J) GROUP
Mean
Difference
(l-J) Std. Error Sig.
95% Confidence Interval
Lower Bound Upper BoundTA CA 9.2266* 2.1005 .000 3.2406 15.2125
TV 16.3884* 2.1005 .000 10.4025 22.3744
CV 15.2166* 2.1005 .000 9.2306 21.2025
TAP 11.0500* 2.1005 .000 5.0641 17.0359
CAP 13.8550* 2.1005 .000 7.8691 19.8409
CA TA -9.2266* 2.1005 .000 -15.2125 -3.2406
TV 7.1619* 2.1005 .009 1.1759 13.1478
CV 5.9900* 2.1005 .050 4.065E-03 11.9759
TAP 1.8234 2.1005 .954 -4.1625 7.8094
CAP 4.6284 2.1005 .236 -1.3575 10.6144TV TA -16.3884* 2.1005 .000 -22.3744 -10.4025
CA -7.1619* 2.1005 .009 -13.1478 -1.1759
CV -1.1719 2.1005 .994 -7.1578 4.8141
TAP -5.3384 2.1005 .112 -11.3244 .6475CAP -2.5334 2.1005 .834 -8.5194 3.4525CV TA -15.2166* 2.1005 .000 -21.2025 -9.2306
CA -5.9900* 2.1005 .050 -11.9759 -4.0651 E-03
TV 1.1719 2.1005 .994 -4.8141 7.1578
TAP -4.1666 2.1005 .352 -10.1525 1.8194CAP -1.3616 2.1005 .987 -7.3475 4.6244TAP TA -11.0500* 2.1005 .000 -17.0359 -5.0641
CA -1.8234 2.1005 .954 -7.8094 4.1625
TV 5.3384 2.1005 .112 -.6475 11.3244CV 4.1666 2.1005 .352 -1.8194 10.1525CAP 2.8050 2.1005 .765 -3.1809 8.7909CAP TA -13.8550* 2.1005 .000 -19.8409 -7.8691CA -4.6284 2.1005 .236 -10.6144 1.3575TV 2.5334 2.1005 .834 -3.4525 8.5194CV 1.3616 2.1005 .987 -4.6244 7.3475
TAP -2.8050 2.1005 .765 -8.7909 3.1809
Based on observed means.
*• The mean difference is significant at the .05 level.
CORRELATION OF PHYSIOLOGICAL/PSYCHOLOGICAL AROUSAL WITH 
PERCENTAGE OF AVAILABLE DETAILS RECALLED
• Pearson & Spearman correlations (across the threat group witnesses) of the 
various measures of percentage of available details recalled with; the 
standardized residuals (to take account of baseline variation) of heart rate 
during the incident and heart rate immediately following the incident’ and
410
‘rated perceived threat during the incident’ and ‘rated perceived chance of 
attack during the incident’
Heart Rate Heart Rate Rated Tlireat Rated
Correlations - Percentage of During After During Perceived ;
available details - Free Recall (Residual (Residual Attack During
Values) Values)
PEARSON PEARSON SPEARMAN SPEARMAN
Overall Correlation .187 .113 .336 .382*
Sig. (2-tailed) .307 .537 .060 .031
N 32 32 32 32 :Central Correlation .123 .002 .161 .163
Sig. (2-tailed) .501 .991 .378 .372
N 32 32 32 32
Peripheral Correlation .145 .151 .347 .451**
Sig. (2-tailed) .430 .410 .052 .010
N 32 32 32 32
Intruder 1 Correlation .248 .069 .288 .394*
Sig. (2-tailed) .171 .706 .109 .026
N 32 32 32 32
Intruder 2 Correlation .001 .141 .397* .339
Sig. (2-tailed) .994 .440 .024 .057
N 32 32 32 32
Action Correlation -.009 -.024 .053 -.051
Sig. (2-tailed) .962 .895 .774 .781
N 32 32 32 32
Verbal Correlation .229 .070 .144 .302
Sig. (2-tailed) .206 .704 .431 .093
N 32 32 32 32
Appearance Correlation .160 .142 .344 .422*
Sig. (2-tailed) .383 .437 .054 .016
N 32 32 32 32
** Correlation is significant at tlie O.Ollevel (2-taüed)
Heart Rate Heart Rate Rated Tlireat Rated
Correlations - Percentage of During After During Perceived
available details - Cued Recall (Residual (Residual Attack During
Values) Values)
PEARSON PEARSON SPEARMAN SPEARMAN
Overall Correlation -.140 .094 -.077 -.066
Sig. (2-tailed) .445 .609 .675 .719
N 32 32 32 32
Central Correlation .027 .292 .217 .120
Sig. (2-tailed) .884 .105 .233 .515
N 32 32 32 32
Peripheral Correlation -.214 -.104 -.209 -.081
Sig. (2-tailed) .240 .570 .252 .660
N 32 32 32 32
Intruder 1 Correlation -.248 -.001 -.153 -.180
Sig. (2-tailed) .171 .998 .405 .324
N 32 32 32 32
Intruder 2 Correlation .027 .170 .045 .154
Sig. (2-tailed) .883 .353 .806 .400
N 32 32 32 32
411
Action Correlation .062 .254 .175 .226
Sig. (2-tailed) .737 .160 J37 .213
N 32 32 32 32
Verbal Correlation .004 .148 .157 -.029
Sig. (2-tailed) .984 .420 .390 .873
N 32 32 32 32
Appearance Correlation -.254 -.127 -.246 -.110
Sig. (2-tailed) .161 .490 .174 .548
N 32 32 32 32
Heart Rate Heart Rate Rated Threat Rated
Correlations - Percentage of During After Dining Perceived
available details - Both Recall (Residual (Residual Attack During
Values) Values)
PEARSON PEARSON SPEARMAN SPEARMAN
Overall Correlation .048 .171 .238 J66*
Sig. (2-tailed) .793 348 .189 .045
N 32 32 32 32
Central Correlation .137 .233 J32 .262
Sig. (2-tailed) .454 .199 .063 .147
N 32 32 32 32
Peripheral Correlation -.045 .051 .019 .211
Sig. (2-tailed) .805 .780 .917 .246
N 32 32 32 32
Intruder 1 Correlation .059 .072 .101 .191
Sig. (2-tailed) .749 .695 .584 .296
N 32 32 32 32
Intruder 2 Correlation .024 .244 .315 J80*
Sig. (2-tailed) .898 .178 • .079 .032
N 32 32 32 32
Action Correlation .041 .180 .218 .198
Sig. (2-tailed) .822 .325 .230 .277
N 32 32 32 32
Verbal Correlation 228 .198 .220 .225
Sig. (2-tailed) .210 .278 .225 .215
N 32 32 32 32
Appearance Correlation -.057 .030 .037 .214
Sig. (2-tailed) .758 .869 .841 .240
N 32 32 32 32
* Correlation is significant at tlie 0.05 level (2-tailed)
Scatterplots of significant correlations for the above:
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ACCURACY OF RECALL 
Free Recall 
• Univariate Analysis of Variance
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Dependent Variable: total free recall
Source
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F SIq.
Corrected Model 230.554» 3 76.851 1.202 .317
Intercept 527105.040 1 527105.040 8246.785 .000
INCIDENT 216.458 1 216.458 3,387 .071
WITNESS 13.268 1 13.268 .208 .650
INCIDENT* WITNESS .828 1 .828 .013 .910
Error 3834.986 60 63.916
Total 531170.580 64
Corrected Total 4065.539 63
3- R Squared = .057 (Adjusted R Squared = .010)
• Univariate Analysis of Variance - Central vs. Peripheral Details
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Tests of Wlthin-Subjects Contrasts
Measure: MEASURE 1
Source INFO
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
INFO Linear 10463.478 1 10463.478 46.385 .000
INFO* INCIDENT Linear 3766.182 1 3766.182 16.695 .000
INFO * WITNESS Linear 623.872 1 623.872 2.766 .103
INFO * INCIDENT
....
Linear 1024.235 1 1024.235 4.540 039
Linear 9925.550 44 225.581
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Measure: MEASURE_1 
Transformed Variable: Average
Source
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Intercept 676832.774 1 676832.774 2295.537 .000
INCIDENT 4479.605 1 4479.605 15.193 .000
WITNESS 801.579 1 801.579 2.719 .106
INCIDENT * WITNESS 1192.132 1 1192.132 4.043 .051
Error 12973.282 44 294.847
Posthoc Tukey’s Test - Interaction of incident by information
INFO
Tukey HSCf’^ ’*^
GRP2WAY N
Subset
1 2
Control Peripheral 22 60.6427
Threat Peripheral 26 86.9231
Control Central 32 93.8175
Threat Central 32 95.5606
Sig. 1.000 .187
Means for groups in homogeneous subsets are displayed.
Based on Type III Sum of Squares
The error term is Mean Square(Error) = 249.603.
3. Uses Harmonic Mean Sample Size = 27.319.
b. The group sizes are unequal. The harmonic mean 
of the group sizes is used. Type I error levels are 
not guaranteed.
c Alpha = .05.
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M ultiple C o m p ariso n s
D ependent Variable: INFO
Tukey HSD
(1) GRP2WAY (J) GRP2WAY
Mean
Difference
(l-J) Std. Error Sig.
95% Confidence Intervai
Lower Bound Upper BoundThreat Central Control Central 1.7431 3.9497 .971 -8.5636 12.0499
Threat Peripheral 8.6375 4.1714 .169 -2.2476 19.5227
Control Peripheral 34.9179* 4.3756 .000 23.4999 46.3359
Control Central Threat Central -1.7431 3.9497 .971 -12.0499 8.5636
Threat Peripheral 6.8944 4.1714 .354 -3.9907 17.7795
Control Peripheral 33.1748* 4.3756 .000 21.7567 44.5928
Threat Peripheral Threat Central -8.6375 4.1714 .169 -19.5227 2.2476
Control Central -6.8944 4.1714 .354 -17.7795 3.9907
Control Peripheral 26.2803* 4.5766 .000 14.3376 38.2231
Control Peripheral Threat Central -34.9179* 4.3756 .000 -46.3359 -23.4999
Control Central -33.1748* 4.3756 .000 -44.5928 -21.7567
Threat Peripheral -26.2803* 4.5766 .000 -38.2231 -14.3376
Based on observed means.
*• The mean difference is significant at the .05 level.
Posthoc Tukey’s Test - Interaction of incident by witness by information
INFO
Subset
GRP3WAY N 1 2 3
Control Bystanders 
Peripheral 11 48.3709
Control Victims 
Peripheral 11 72.9145
Threat Victims Peripheral 13 85.5669 85.5669
Threat Bystanders 
Peripheral 13 88.2792 88.2792
Control Victims Central 16 92.9388
Control Bystanders 
Central 16 94.6962
Threat Bystanders 
Central 16 95.2850
Threat Victims Central 16 95.8363
Sig. 1.000 .145 .633
Means for groups in hom ogeneous subsets are displayed.
Based on Type 111 Sum of Squares 
The error term is Mean Square(Error) = 226.625. 
a Uses Harmonic Mean Sample Size = 13.660.
b. The group sizes are unequal. The harmonic mean of the group sizes 
is used. Type I error levels are not guaranteed.
c. Alpha -  .05.
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Multiple C om parisons
Dependent Variable: INFO 
Tukey HSD
Difference 95% Confidence Interval
(DGRP3WAY (J) GRP3WAY (i-J) Std. Error Sig. Lower Bound Upper BoundThreat Victims Central T hreat Bystanders 
Central .5512 5.3224 1.000 -15.9139 17.0164
Control Victims Central 2.0975 5.3224 .998 -13.5877 19.3627Control Bystanders 
Central 1.1400 5.3224 1.000 -15.3252 17.6052
Threat Victims Peripheral 10.2093 5.6211 .603 -7.1199 27.6585
Threat Bystanders 
Peripheral 7,5570 5.6211 .879 -9.8322 24.9402
Control Victims 
Peripheral 22.9217* 5.0963 .004 4.6012 41.1622
Control Bystanders 
Peripheral 47.4653* 5.0863 ,000 28.2248 65.7059
Threat Bystanders Threat Victims Central -.5512 5.3224 1,000 -17.0164 15.9139Central Control Victims Central 2.3463 5.3224 1.000 -14.1109 18.8114Control Bystanders .5008 5.3224 1.000 -15.8764 17.0539
Threat Wctlms Peripheral 9.7181 5.6211 .669 -7.6711 27.1073Threat Bystanders 
Peripheral 7.0058 5.6211 .916 •10.3834 24.3950
Control Victims 
Peripheral 22.3705* 5.8963 .000 4.1299 40.6110
Control Bystanders 
Peripheral 46.9141* 5.8963 .000 28.6736 65.1546
Control Victims Central Threat Victims Central -2.0975 5.3224 .999 -19.3627 13.5677Threat Bystanders 
Central -2.3463 5.3224 1.000 -18.8114 14.1189
Control Bystanders 
Central -1.7575 5.3224 1.000 -18.2227 14.7077
Ttrreat Victims Peripheral 7.3718 5.6211 .893 -10.0174 24.7610Tlireat Bystanders 
Peripheral 4.6595 5.6211 .991 -12.7297 22.0487
Control Victims 
Peripheral 20.0242* 5.8963 .021 1.7037 38.2647
Control Bystanders 
Peripheral 44.5670* 5.8963 .000 26.3273 62.8084
Control Bystanders Threat Victims Central -1.1400 5.3224 1.000 -17.6052 15.3252Central Threat Bystanders 
Central -.5888 5.3224 1.000 -17.0539 15.8764
Control Victims Central 1.7575 5.3224 1.000 -14.7077 18.2227Threat Victims Peripheral 9.1293 5.6211 .735 -0.2599 26.5185Threat Bystanders 
Peripheral 6.4170 5.6211 .946 -10.9722 23.8062
Control Victims 
Peripheral 21.7017* 5.0963 .008 3.5412 40.0222
Control Bystanders 
Peripheral 46.3253* 5.0963 .000 20.0848 64.5659
Tlireat Victims Peripheral Threat Victims Central -10.2693 5.6211 .603 -27.6585 7.1199Threat Bystanders 
Central -9.7101 5.6211 .669 -27.1073 7.6711
Control Victims Central -7.3710 5.6211 .893 -24.7610 10.0174Control Bystanders 
Central -9.1293 5,6211 .735 -26.5185 0.2599
Threat Bystanders 
Peripheral -2.7123 5.9047 1.000 -20.9788 15.5542
Control Victims 
Peripheral 12.6524 6.1672 .453 -6.4264 31.7311
Control Bystanders 
Peripheral 37.1960* 6.1672 .000 18.1173 56.2747
Threat Bystanders Threat Victims Central -7.5570 5.6211 .678 -24.9462Peripheral Threat Bystanders -7.0058 5.6211 .916 -24.3950 10.3834
Control Victims Central -4.6595 5.6211 .981 -22.0407 12.7297Control Bystanders 
Central -6,4170 5.6211 .946 -23.8062 10.9722
Ttireat Victims Peripheral 2.7123 5.9047 1.000 -15.5542 20.0700Control Victims 
Peripheral 15.3847 6.1672 .211 -3.7140 34.4434
Control Bystanders 
Peripheral 39.8083* 6.1572 .000 20.6296 50.9071
Control Victims Threat VIcUms Centrai -22.9217* 5.8963 .004 -41.1622Peripheral Threat Bystanders 
Central -22.3705* 5.0963 .006 -40.6110 -4.1289
Control Victims Central -20.0242* 5.6963 .021 -38.2847 -1.7837Control Bystanders 
Central -21.7017* 5.8963 .008 -40.0222 -3.5412
Threat Victims Peripheral -12.6524 6.1672 .453 -31.7311 6.4264Threat Bystanders 
Peripheral -15.3647 6.1672 .211 -34.4434 3.7140
Control Bystanders 
Peripheral 24,5436* 6.4191 .005 4.6859 44.4014
Control Bystanders Threat Victims Central -47.4653* 5.8983 .000 -65.7059 -29.2248Peripheral Threat Bystanders 
Central -48.9141* 5.8963 .000 -65.1546 -28.6736
Control Victims Central -44.5670* 5.8983 .000 -62.8004 -26.3273Control Bystanders 
Central -46.3253* 5.0963 .000 -64.5659 -28.0848
Threat Victims Peripheral -37.1950* 6.1672 .000 -56.2747 -18.1173Threat Bystanders 
Peripheral -39.9083* 6.1672 .000 -58.9871 -20.0296
Control Victims 
Peripheral -24,5436* 6.4181 .005 -44.4014 -4.6859
The mean difference Is significant a t the .05 level.
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Univariate Analysis of Variance - Intruder 1 vs. Intruder 2 Details
Tests of Wlthin-Subjects Contrasts
Measure: MEASURE 1
Source INFO
Type ill Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
INFO Linear 1274.683 1 1274.683 4.247 .044
INFO * INCIDENT Linear 855.583 1 855.583 2.850 .097
INFO * WITNESS Linear 13.410 1 13.410 .045 833
INFO * INCIDENT Linear 162.608 1 162.608 .542 .465
ErVWf(t|N|:@ÿ Linear 18009.247 60 300.154
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Measure: MEASURE_1 
Transformed Variable: Average
Source
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Intercept 1008986.478 1 1008986.478 3919.019 .000
INCIDENT 1570.031 1 1570.031 6.098 .016
WITNESS 156.269 1 156.269 .607 .439
INCIDENT* WITNESS 121.817 1 121.817 .473 .494
Error 15447.537 60 257.459
Univariate Analysis of Variance - Action vs. Verbal vs. Appearance Details
Measure: MEASURE 1
Tests of Wlthin-Subjects Contrasts
Source
Type ill Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
iNhU 5933.25 2 èôéè.è^ 2Ù.04 .ÔÙO
INFO * INCIDENT 250.10 2 125.05 .84 .434
In f o * WITNESS 306.19 2 153.10 1.03 .361
INFO * INCIDENT * WIT 127.59 2 63.80 .43 .652
ErWHftNËSp 10657.40 72 148.02
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Measure: MEASURE_1 
Transformed Variable: Average
Source
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
intercept 895925.864 1 895925.864 4296.418 .000
INCIDENT 628.369 1 628.369 3.013 .091
WITNESS 115.412 1 115.412 .553 .462
INCIDENT* WITNESS 100.552 1 100.552 .482 .492
Error 7507.029 36 208.529
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Cued Recall
• Univariate Analysis of Variance
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Dependent Variable: total cued recall
Source
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Corrected Model 99.195» 3 33.065 .267 .849
Intercept 363599.955 1 363599.955 2931.488 .000
INCIDENT 80.910 1 80.910 .652 .422
WITNESS 9.456E-02 1 9.456E-02 .001 .978
INCIDENT* WITNESS 18.190 1 18.190 .147 .703
Error 7441.953 60 124.033
Total 371141.103 64
Corrected Total 7541.148 63
a- R Squared = .013 (Adjusted R Squared = -.036)
Univariate Analysis of Variance - Central vs. Peripheral Details
Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts
Measure: MEASURE 1
Source INFO
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
INFO Linear 9738.048 1 9738.048 20.827 .000
INFO * INCIDENT Linear 169.815 1 169.815 .363 .549
INFO * WITNESS Linear 323.217 1 323.217 .691 .409
INFO * INCIDENT Linear 165.342 1 165.342 .354 .554
■IW jiiN Pëÿ Linear 27118.856 58 467.566
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Measure: MEASURE_1 
Transformed Variable: Average
Source
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F a g .
Intercept 761358.889 1 761358.889 2608.921 .000
INCIDENT 10.362 1 10.362 .036 .851
WITNESS 43.150 1 43.150 .148 .702
INCIDENT* WITNESS 58.726 1 58.726 .201 .655
Error 16926.081 58 291.829
« Univariate Analysis of Variance - Intruder 1 vs. Intruder 2 Details
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Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts
Measure; MEASURE 1
Source INFO
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
INFO Linear 2521.236 1 2521.236 8.416 .005
INFO * INCIDENT Linear 255.218 1 255.218 .852 .360
INFO * WITNESS Linear 738.556 1 738.556 2.465 .122
INFO* INCIDENT Linear 5.264E-02 1 5.264E-02 .000 .989
•i?ï?8r(îiïqp^“ "'...... Linear 17674.598 59 299.569
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Measure: MEASURE_1 
Transformed Variable: Average
Source
Type ill Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Intercept 688310.709 1 688310.709 2084.546 .000
INCIDENT 35.844 1 35.844 .109 .743
WITNESS 37.056 1 37.056 .112 .739
INCIDENT* WITNESS 180.362 1 180.362 .546 .463
Error 19481.616 59 330.197
Univariate Analysis of Variance - Action vs. Verbal vs. Appearance Details
Tests of Wlthin-Subjects Contrasts
Measure: MEASURE 1
Source
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
iNf-u 9055.04 46^7.52 ■" 14’.S5 ' .ÔÔO
INFO * INCIDENT 539.15 2 269.58 .85 .429
INFO * WITNESS 2117.40 2 1058.70 3.36 .040
INFO* INCIDENT* WIT 305.68 2 152.84 .48 .618
ErWW(fNEO)3 26502.66 84 315.51
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Measure: MEASURE_1 
Transformed Variable: Average
Source
Type 111 Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Intercept 874217.525 1 874217.525 2608.118 .000
INCIDENT 91.579 1 91.579 .273 .604
WITNESS 677.795 1 677.795 2.022 .162
INCIDENT* WITNESS 468.499 1 468.499 1.398 .244
Error 14078.018 42 335.191
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Total Recall (Free + Cued)
• Univariate Analysis of Variance
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Dependent Variable: total both recall
Source
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Corrected Model 15.959» 3 5.320 .104 .957
Intercept 440725.037 1 440725.037 8630.890 .000
INCIDENT 14.128 1 14.128 .277 .601
WITNESS .803 1 .803 .016 .901
INCIDENT* WITNESS 1.028 1 1.028 .020 .888
Error 3063.821 60 51.064
Total 443804.817 64
Corrected Total 3079.780 63
3- R Squared = .005 (Adjusted R Squared = -.045)
Univariate Analysis of Variance - Central vs. Peripheral Details
Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts
Measure: MEASURE 1
Source INFO
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
INFO Linear 13955.566 1 13955.566 128.624 .000
INFO * INCIDENT Linear 46.429 1 46.429 .428 .516
INFO * WITNESS Linear 9.488 1 9.488 .087 J 6 8
INFO* INCIDENT Linear 116.644 1 116.644 1.075 .304
ErVWtflNPëÿ Linear 6509.933 60 108.499
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Measure: MEASURE_1 
Transformed Variable: Average
Source
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Intercept 865025.130 1 865025.130 9664.113 .000
INCIDENT 25.001 1 25.001 .279 .599
WITNESS 17.798 1 17.798 .199 .657
INCIDENT* WITNESS 5.742 1 5.742 .064 .801
Error 5370.540 60 89.509
• Univariate Analysis of Variance - Intruder 1 vs. Intruder 2 Details
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Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts
Measure: MEASURE 1
Source INFO
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
INFO Linear 2561.401 1 2561.401 20.251 .000
INFO * INCIDENT Linear 14.171 1 14.171 .112 .739
INFO * WITNESS Linear 290.074 1 290.074 2.293 .135
INFO * INCIDENT Linear 12.606 1 12.606 .100 .753
ÈrV^idlNP^ Linear 7588.910 60 126.482
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Measure: MEASURE_1 
Transformed Variable: Average
Source
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F a g .
Intercept 847405.084 1 847405.084 6296.297 .000
INCIDENT 138.799 1 138.799 1.031 .314
WITNESS 17.427 1 17.427 .129 .720
INCIDENT* WITNESS 12.097 1 12.097 .090 .765
Error 8075.271 60 134.588
• Univariate Analysis of Variance - Action vs. Verbal vs. Appearance Details
Measure: MEASURE 1
Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts
Source
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
INhU 15836.13 2 7918.06 Ü6.49 .000
INFO * INCIDENT 236.09 2 118.04 .84 .433
INFO * WITNESS 244.29 2 122.15 .87 .421
INFO* INCIDENT* WIT 148.17 2 74.09 .53 .591
ErkM(tNB9jB 16818.70 120 140.16
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Measure: MEASURE_1 
Transformed Variable: Average
Source
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Intercept 1361364.128 1 1361364.128 11420.938 .000
INCIDENT 45.757 1 45.757 .384 .538
WITNESS 2.356 1 2.356 .020 .889
INCIDENT* WITNESS 14.035 1 14.035 .118 .733
Error 7151.939 60 119.199
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CORRELATION OF PHYSIOLOGICAL/PSYCHOLOGICAL AROUSAL WITH 
RECALL ACCURACY
• Pearson & Spearman correlations (across the threat group witnesses) of the 
various measures of recall accuracy with: the standardized residuals (to take 
account of baseline variation) of heart rate during the incident and heart rate 
immediately following the incident’ and ‘rated perceived threat during the 
incident’ and ‘rated perceived chance of attack during the incident’
* Correlation is significant attire 0.05 level (2-tailed)
** CoiTelation is significant at tire 0.01 level (2-tailed)
Heart Rate Heart Rate Rated Tlneat Rated
Correlations - Free Recall During After During Perceived
Accuracy (Residual (Residual Attack During
Values) Values)
PEARSON PEARSON SPEARMAN SPEARMAN
Overall Correlation -.202 -.067 -.312 -.436*
Sig. (2-tailed) .267 .715 .082 .013
N 32 32 32 32
Central Correlation -.227 .121 -.102 -.245
Sig. (2-tailed) .211 .509 .580 .177
N 32 32 32 32
Peripheral Correlation -.100 -.094 -.306 -.340
Sig. (2-tailed) .628 .647 .128 .089
N 32 32 26 26
Intruder 1 Correlation -.222 -.021 -.255 -.262
Sig. (2-tailed) .222 .909 .159 .148
N 32 32 32 32
Intruder 2 Correlation .024 -.112 -.216 -.398*
Sig. (2-tailed) .895 .543 .236 .024N 32 32 32 32
Action Correlation -.202 -.098 -.125 -.207
Sig. (2-tailed) .918 .595 .497 .256
N 32 32 32 32
Verbal Correlation .019 .183 .123 .044
Sig. (2-tailed) .918 .317 .504 .812
N 32 32 32 32
Appearance Correlation -.161 -.025 -.316 -.373
Sig. (2-tailed) .464 .909 .142 .080
N 32 32 23 23
** Correlation is significant at tire O.Ollevel (2-tailed)
Heart Rate Heart Rate Rated Threat Rated
Correlations - Cued Recall During After During PerceivedAccuracy (Residual (Residual Attack Dining
Values) Values)
PEARSON PEARSON SPEARMAN SPEARMAN
Overall Correlation -.017 .129 .205 .254
Sig. (2-tailed) .928 .482 J61 .161
N 32 32 32 32
Central Correlation .057 .098 .137 .013
Sig. (2-tailed) .763 .605 .471 .946
N 30 30 30 30
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Peripheral Correlation -.070 -.037 -.046 .140
Sig. (2-tailed) .703 .842 .803 .446
N 32 32 32 32
Intruder 1 Correlation -.003 -.018 .068 -.052
Sig. (2-tailed) .988 .921 .713 .775
N 32 32 32 32
Intruder 2 Correlation .018 .207 .179 .368*
Sig. (2-tailed) .922 .256 .327 .038
N 32 32 32 32
Action Correlation .009 .096 .308 .080
Sig. (2-tailed) .965 .627 111 .685
N 28 28 28 28
Verbal Correlation -.003 .083 .093 -.034
Sig. (2-tailed) .989 .686 653 .869
N 26 26 26 26
Appearance Correlation -.146 -.156 -.125 .082
Sig. (2-tailed) .426 .394 .496 .656
N 32 32 32 32
Heart Rate Heart Rate Rated Tlneat Rated
Correlations - Both Recall During After During Perceived
Accuracy (Residual (Residual Attack During
Values) Values)
PEARSON PEARSON SPEARMAN SPEARNLAN
Overall Correlation -095 -.046 -.074 .028
Sig. (2-tailed) .604 .802 .687 .880
N 32 32 32 32
Central Correlation -.066 .061 .018 -.138
Sig. (2-tailed) .722 .741 .921 .451
N 32 32 32 32
Peripheral Correlation -.111 -.094 -.131 .071
Sig. (2-tailed) .547 .608 .474 .700
N 32 32 32 32
Intruder 1 Correlation -.075 .-041 .015 -.078
Sig. (2-tailed) .684 .822 .935 .672
N 32 32 32 32
Intruder 2 Correlation -.129 -.041 .057 .090
Sig. (2-tailed) .482 .824 .755 .623
N 32 32 32 32
Action Correlation -.126 -.026 .171 -.024
Sig. (2-tailed) .491 .888 .348 .898
N 32 32 32 32
Verbal Correlation .053 .178 .160 .026
Sig. (2-tailed) .773 .329 J82 .888
N 32 32 32 32
Appearance Conelation -.122 -.108 -122 .111
Sig. (2-tailed) .507 .557 .507 .545
N 32 32 32 32
Scatterplots for the significant correlations from above:
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4AFC RECOGNITION ACCURACY 
• Univariate Analysis of Variance
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Dependent Variable: accuracy across all questions
Source
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Corrected Model 1815.082= 3 605.027 9.575 .000
Intercept 169918.115 1 169918.115 2689.028 .000
INCIDENT 1752.574 1 1752.574 27.735 .000
WITNESS 5.411 1 5.411 .086 J7 1
INCIDENT* WITNESS 57.097 1 57.097 .904 .346
Error 3791.365 60 63.189
Total 175524.562 64
Corrected Total 5606.447 63
a- R Squared = .324 (Adjusted R Squared = .290)
Univariate Analysis of Variance - Central vs. Peripheral Details
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Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts
Measure; MEASURE 1
Source INFO
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
INFO Linear 87.467 1 87.467 .706 .404
INFO * INCIDENT Linear 1946.958 1 1946.958 15.713 .000
INFO* WITNESS Linear 405.520 1 405.520 3.273 .075
INFO * INCIDENT Linear .129 1 .129 .001 .974
Linear 7434.556 60 123.909
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Measure: MEASURE_1 
Transformed Variable: Average
Source
Type 111 Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Intercept 341690.611 1 341690.611 2452.624 .000
INCIDENT 5083.218 1 5083.218 36.487 .000
WITNESS 5.400 1 5.400 .039 .845
INCIDENT* WITNESS 106.598 1 106.598 .765 .385
Error 8358.982 60 139.316
Post hoc Tukey’s test - Interaction of Incident by Information
INFOCP
Tukey HSCf''"
GROUPCP N
Subset
1 2 3
Control Central 32 42.2916
Control Peripheral 32 48.4384 48.4384
Threat Peripheral 32 53.2419
Threat Central 32 62.6953
Sig. .139 .337 1.000
Means for groups in hom ogeneous subsets are displayed. 
Based on Type III Sum of Squares 
The error term is Mean Square(Error) = 131.542. 
a Uses Harmonic Mean Sample Size = 32.000. 
b. Alpha = .05.
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.J
Multiple C om parisons
Dependent Variable: INFOCP
Tukey HSD
(1) GROUPCP (J) GROUPCP
Mean
Difference
(I-J) Std. Error Sig.
95% Confidence Interval
Lower Bound Upper Bound
Threat Central Control Central 20.4038* 2.8673 .000 13.0376 27.7699
Threat Peripheral 9.4534* 2.8673 .005 2.0873 16.8196
Control Peripheral 14.2569* 2.8673 .000 6.8907 21.6230
Control Central Threat Central -20.4038* 2.8673 .000 -27.7699 -13.0376
Threat Peripheral -10.9503* 2.8673 .001 -18.3165 -3.5841
Control Peripheral -6.1469 2.8673 .139 -13.5130 1.2193
Threat Peripheral Threat Central -9.4534* 2.8673 .005 -16.8196 -2.0873
Control Central 10.9503* 2.8673 .001 3.5841 18.3165
Control Peripheral 4.8034 2.8673 .337 -2.5627 12.1696
Control Peripheral Threat Central -14.2569* 2.8673 .000 -21.6230 -6.8907
Control Central 6.1469 2.8673 .139 -1.2193 13.5130
Threat Peripheral -4.8034 2.8673 .337 -12.1696 2.5627
Based on observed means.
*• The mean difference is significant at the .05 level.
Univariate Analysis of Variance - Intruder 1 vs. Intruder 2 Details
Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts
Measure: MEASURE 1
Source INFO
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
INFO Linear 337.480 1 337.480 3.594 .063
INFO * INCIDENT Linear 406.695 1 406.695 4.331 .042
INFO* WITNESS Linear 1.140 1 1.140 .012 .913
INFO * INCIDENT Linear 2.977 1 2.977 .032 .859
Linear 5634.145 60 93.902
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Measure: MEASURE_1 
Transformed Variable: Average
Source
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Intercept 339282.031 1 339282.031 2683.657 .000
INCIDENT 3453.636 1 3453.636 27.318 .000
WITNESS 11.092 1 11.092 .088 .768
INCIDENT* WITNESS 114.761 1 114.761 .908 .345
Error 7585.515 60 126.425
• Post hoc Tukey’s test - Interaction of Incident by Information
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INFOINT
Tukey HSCf'*"
GROUPINT N
Subset
1 2 3
Control Intruder 1 32 46.1313
Control Intruder 2 32 46.4488
Threat Intruder 2 32 53.2725
Threat Intruder 1 32 60.0850
Sig. .999 1.000 1.000
Means for groups in homogeneous subsets are displayed. 
Based on Type III Sum of Squares 
The error term is Mean Square(Error) = 107.658. 
a Uses Harmonic Mean Sample Size = 32.000. 
b. Alpha = .05.
Multiple Comparisons
Dependent Variable: INFOINT 
Tukey HSD
(1) GROUPINT (J) GROUPINT
Mean
Difference
(I-J) _ Std. Error Sig.
95% Confidence Interval
Lower Bound Upper BoundThreat Intruder 1 Control Intruder 1 13.9537* 2.5940 .000 7.2898 20.6177
Threat Intruder 2 6.8125* 2.5940 .043 .1485 13.4765
Control Intruder 2 13.6362* 2.5940 .000 6.9723 20.3002
Control Intruder 1 Threat Intruder 1 -13.9537* 2.5940 .000 -20.6177 -7.2898
Threat Intruder 2 -7.1412* 2.5940 .030 -13.8052 -.4773
Control Intruder 2 -.3175 2.5940 .999 -6.9815 6.3465
Threat Intruder 2 Threat Intruder 1 -6.8125* 2.5940 .043 -13.4765 -.1485
Control Intruder 1 7.1412* 2.5940 .030 .4773 13.8052
Control Intruder 2 6.8237* 2.5940 .042 .1598 13.4877
Control Intruder 2 Threat Intruder 1 -13.6362* 2.5940 .000 -20.3002 -6.9723
Control Intruder 1 .3175 2.5940 .999 -6.3465 6.9815
Threat Intruder 2 -6.8237* 2.5940 .042 -13.4877 -.1598
Based on observed means.
*• The mean difference is significant at the .05 level.
Univariate Analysis of Variance - Action vs. Verbal vs. Appearance Details
Measure: MEASURE 1
Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts
Source
Type III Sum
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
inFu 27756.06 2 13878.03 .000
INFO * INCIDENT 4980.01 2 2490.00 13.72 .000
INFO * WITNESS 862.87 2 431.43 2.38 .097
INFO * INCIDENT * WIT 302.83 2 151.42 .83 .437
ErkM(FNBSp 21774.27 120 181.45
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Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Measure: MEASURE_1 
Transformed Variable: Average
Source
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Intercept 470419.290 1 470419.290 2392.437 .000
INCIDENT 6663.402 1 6683.402 33.990 .000
WITNESS 11.628 1 11.628 .059 809
INCIDENT * WITNESS 139.486 1 139.486 .709 .403
Error 11797.661 60 196.628
• Posthoc Tukey s Test - Interaction of information (Action vs Verbal vs 
Appearance) by incident
Tukey HSCf’^
INFOAVA
GROUPAVA N
Subset
1 2 3 4
CV 32 30.9375
TV 32 34.3750
CA 32 46.8747
CAP 32 52.9834 52.9834
TAP 32 58.8069
TA 32 73.0134
Sig. .917 .476 .531 1.000
Means for groups in hom ogeneous subsets are displayed.
Based on Type III Sum of Squares
The error term is Mean Square(Error) = 187.574.
a- Uses Harmonic Mean Sample Size = 32.000.
b. Alpha = .05.
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Multiple Comparisons
D ependent Variable: INFOAVA
Tukey HSD
(1) GROUPAVA (J) GROUPAVA
Mean
Difference
(I-J) Std. Error Sig.
95% Confidence Interval
Lower Bound Upper Bound
TA CA 26.1387* 3.4239 .000 16.3815 35.8960
TV 38.6384* 3.4239 .000 28.8812 48.3957
CV 42.0759* 3.4239 .000 32.3187 51.8332
TAP 14.2066* 3.4239 .000 4.4493 23.9638
CAP 20.0300* 3.4239 .000 10.2728 29.7872
CA TA -26.1387* 3.4239 .000 -35.8960 -16.3815
TV 12.4997* 3.4239 .004 2.7425 22.2569
CV 15.9372* 3.4239 .000 6.1800 25.6944
TAP -11.9322* 3.4239 .007 -21.6894 -2.1750
CAP -6.1088 3.4239 .476 -15.8660 3.6485
TV TA -38.6384* 3.4239 .000 -48.3957 -28.8812
CA -12.4997* 3.4239 .004 -22.2569 -2.7425
CV 3.4375 3.4239 .917 -6.3197 13.1947
TAP -24.4319* 3.4239 .000 -34.1891 -14.6746
CAP -18.6084* 3.4239 .000 -28.3657 -8.8512
CV TA -42.0759* 3.4239 .000 -51.8332 -32.3187
CA -15.9372* 3.4239 .000 -25.6944 -6.1800
TV -3.4375 3.4239 .917 -13.1947 6.3197
TAP -27.8694* 3.4239 .000 -37.6266 -18.1121
CAP -22.0459* 3.4239 .000 -31.8032 -12.2887
TAP TA -14.2066* 3.4239 .000 -23.9638 -4.4493
CA 11.9322* 3.4239 .007 2.1750 21.6894
TV 24.4319* 3.4239 .000 14.6746 34.1891
CV 27.8694* 3.4239 .000 18.1121 37.6266
CAP 5.8234 3.4239 .531 -3.9338 15.5807
CAP TA -20.0300* 3.4239 .000 -29.7872 -10.2728
CA 6.1088 3.4239 .476 -3.6485 15.8660
TV 18.6084* 3.4239 .000 8.8512 28.3657
CV 22.0459* 3.4239 .000 12.2887 31.8032
TAP -5.8234 3.4239 .531 -15.5807 3.9338
Based on observed means.
*• The mean difference is significant at the .05 level.
CORRELATION OF PHYSIOLOGICAL/PSYCHOLOGICAL AROUSAL WITH 
4AFC RECOGNITION ACCURACY
Pearson & Spearman correlations (across the threat group witnesses) of the 
various measures of recognition accuracy with: the ‘standardized residuals (to 
take account of baseline variation) of heart rate during the incident and heart 
rate immediately following the incident’ and rated perceived threat during the 
incident’ and rated perceived chance of attack during the incident’
Correlations - 4AFC
Heart Rate Heart Rate Rated Tlureat Rated
During After During Perceived
(Residual (Residual Attack During
Values) Values)
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PEARSON PEARSON SPEARMAN SPEARMAN
Overall Correlation -.055 .101 .391* .387*
Sig. (2-tailed) .766 .584 .027 .028
N 32 32 32 32
Central Correlation .047 .304 .374* .196
Sig. (2-tailed) .800 .091 .035 .283
N 32 32 32 32
Peripheral Correlation -.105 -.100 .218 .348
Sig. (2-tailed) .568 .587 .230 .051
N 32 32 32 32
Intruder 1 Correlation .099 .113 .260 .293
Sig. (2-tailed) .591 .539 .150 .103
N 32 32 32 32
Intruder 2 Correlation -.197 .043 .359* .318
Sig. (2-tailed) .281 .816 .044 .076
N 32 32 32 32
Action Correlation .013 .177 .364* .225
Sig. (2-tailed) .942 .334 .041 .216
N 32 32 32 32
Verbal Correlation .103 .136 .137 .130
Sig. (2-tailed) .576 .458 .456 .480N 32 32 32 32
Appearance Correlation -.131 -.055 .198 .290
Sig. (2-tailed) .474 .767 .277 .107N 32 32 32 32
* Correlation is significant at tlie 0.05 level (2-tailed)
Scatterplots for significant correlations from above:
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IDENTIFICATION
LINEUP ONE
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CONTINGENCY TABLE: INCIDENT BY WITNESS BY DECISION 
w itness type * decision * incident Crosstabulation
incident
decision
Totalcorrect incorrect
threat witness victim Count 8 8 16
type Expected Count 10.0 6.0 16.0
bystander Count 12 4 16
Expected Count 10.0 6.0 16.0
Total Count 20 12 32
Expected Count 20.0 12.0 32.0
control witness victim Count 7 9 16
type Expected Count 5.5 10.5 16.0
bystander Count 4 12 16
Expected Count 5.5 10.5 16.0
Total Count 11 21 32
Expected Count 11.0 21.0 32.0
3-WAY LOG-LINEAR ANALYSIS: INCIDENT BY WITNESS BY DECISION 
* * * * * * * *  h i e r a r c h i c a l  l o g  l i n e a r  * * *
DATA Information
8 unweighted cases accepted.
0 cases rejected because of out-of-range factor values.0 cases rejected because of missing data.
64 weighted cases will be used in the analysis.
FACTOR Information
Factor Level Label
INCIDENT 2 incidentWITNESS 2 witness type
DECISION 2 decision
* * * * * * * *  h i e r a r c h i c a l  l o g  l i n e a r  * * *
DESIGN 1 has generating class
i n c i d e n t *w i t n e s s *d e c i s i o n
Note; For saturated models .500 has been added to all observed cells 
This value may be changed by using the CRITERIA = DELTA subcommand.
The Iterative Proportional Fit algorithm converged at iteration 1.
The maximum difference between observed and fitted marginal totals is 
. 0 0 0
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and the convergence criterion is .250
Observed, Expected Frequencies and Residuals.
Factor Code OBS count EXP count Residual
Std Resid
INCIDENT threatWITNESS victim
DECISION correct 8.5 8.5 .00. 00
DECISION incorrec 8.5 8.5 .00
. 00
WITNESS bystande
DECISION correct 12.5 12.5 .00. 00
DECISION incorrec 4,5 4.5 .00. 00
INCIDENT controlWITNESS victimDECISION correct 7.5 7.5 .00
.00 DECISION incorrec 9.5 9.5 .00.00WITNESS bystandeDECISION correct 4.5 4.5 .00. 00
DECISION incorrec 12.5 12.5 .00. 00
Goodness-of- fit test statistics
Likelihood ratio chi square = .00000 DF = 0 P = 1.000Pearson chi square = .00000 DF = 0 P = 1.000
* * * * * * * * H I E R A R C H I C A L L O G  L :I N E A R  * * *
Tests that K-way and higher order effects are zero.
K DF L.R. Chisq Prob Pearson Chisq ProbIteration
3 1 3.355 .0670 3.317 . 06862
2 4 8.560 .0731 8.196 . 08472
1 7 8.623 .2809 8.250 .31110
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Tests that K-way effects are zero.
Iteration
0 
0 
0
K DF L.R. Chisq Prob Pearson Chisq Prob
1 3 . 063 . 9959 . 054 . 9967
2 3 5.205 .1574 4.879 . 1809
3 1 3.355 . 0670 3.317 . 0686
* * * * * * * *  H I E R A R C H I C A L  L O G  L I N E A R  * * * 
Backward Elimination (p = .050) for DESIGN 1 with generating class 
INCIDENT*WITNESS*DECISION 
Likelihood ratio chi square = .00000 DF = 0 P = 1.000
If Deleted Simple Effect is Prob Iter
INCIDENT*WITNESS*DECISION .0670 2
Step 1
The best model has generating class
INCIDENT*WITNESSINCIDENT*DECISION
WITNESS*DECISION
DF L.R. Chisq Change
3.355
Likelihood ratio chi square = 3.35537 DF 1 P = .067
If Deleted Simple Effect is Prob Iter
INCIDENT*WITNESS 
.9417 2
INCIDENT*DECISION .0234 2WITNESS*DECISION 
.7944 2
Step 2
The best model has generating class
INCIDENT*DECISION
WITNESS*DECISION
DF L.R. Chisq Change
1 .005
1 5.142
1 .068
Likelihood ratio chi square = 3.36072 DF = 2 P = .186
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- - - -
If Deleted Simple Effect is 
Prob Iter
DF L.R. Chisq Change
INCIDENT*DECISION 
.0234 2 
WITNESS*DECISION .8025 2
1
1
5 .1 3 7
.063
* * * * * * * *  H I E R A R C H  * * * * I C A L L O G L I N E A R  * * * *
Step 3
The best model has generating class
INCIDENT*DECISIONWITNESS
Likelihood ratio chi square = 3. 42329 DF = 3 P = .331
If Deleted Simple Effect is Prob Iter DF L.R. Chisq Change
INCIDENT*DECISION 
.0 2 3 4  2 WITNESS 1.0000 2
1
1
5 .1 3 7
.000
Step 4
The best model has generating class
INCIDENT*DECISION
Likelihood ratio chi square = 3. 42329 DF = 4 P = .490
If Deleted Simple Effect is Prob Iter
INCIDENT*DECISION 
.0 2 3 4  2
DF L.R. Chisq Change
5.137
Step 5
The best model has generating class 
INCIDENT*DECISION 
Likelihood ratio chi square = 3.42329 DF = 4 P = .490
440
* * * * * * * *  h i e r a r c h i c a l  l o g  l i n e a r  * * * * 
*  *  *  *
The final model has generating class
INCIDENT*DECISION
The Iterative Proportional Fit algorithm converged at iteration 0.
The maximum difference between observed and fitted marginal totals is 
. 000and the convergence criterion is .250
Observed, Expected Frequencies and Residuals.
Factor Std Resid Code OBS count EXP count Residual
INCIDENTWITNESSDECISION
00
DECISION
00WITNESSDECISION
00
DECISION
00
threat
victimcorrect
incorrec
bystande
correct
incorrec
8 . 0 
8 . 0
1 2 . 0
4.0
8 . 0
8 . 0
1 2 . 0
4.0
00
00
00
00
INCIDENTWITNESS
DECISION
00
DECISION
00
WITNESSDECISION
00
DECISION
00
controlvictimcorrect
incorrec
bystande
correct
incorrec
7.0
9.0
4.0 
1 2 . 0
7.0 
9 . 0
4.0 
12 . 0
00
00
00
00
Goodness-of-fit test statistics
Likelihood ratio chi square = 
Pearson chi square = .00000 DF = 4 P = 1.000.00000 DF = 4 P = 1.000
CONTINGENCY TABLE: INCIDENT BY DECISION
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incident * decision Crosstabulation
decision
Totalcorrect incorrect
Incident threat Count 20 12 32
Expected Count 15.5 16.5 32.0
control Count 11 21 32
Expected Count 15.5 16.5 32.0
Total Count 31 33 64
Expected Count 31.0 33.0 64.0
LINEUP TWO
CONTINGENCY TABLE; INCIDENT BY WITNESS BY DECISION
decision * witness type *  incident Crosstabulation
incident
w itness type
Totalvictim bystander
threat decision correct Count 5 2 7
Expected Count 3.5 3.5 7.0
incorrect Count 11 14 25
Expected Count 12.5 12.5 25.0
Total Count 16 16 32
Expected Count 16.0 16.0 32.0
control decision correct Count 4 4 8
Expected Count 4.0 4.0 8.0
incorrect Count 12 12 24
Expected Count 12.0 12.0 24.0
Total Count 16 16 32
Expected Count 16.0 16.0 32.0
CONTINGENCY TABLE: INCIDENT BY DECISION
incident * decision Crosstabulation
decision
Totalcorrect incorrect
incident threat Count 7 25 32
Expected Count 7.5 24.5 32.0
control Count 8 24 32
Expected Count 7.5 24.5 32.0
Total Count 15 49 64
Expected Count 15.0 49.0 64.0
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CHI-SQUARE TEST; INCIDENT BY DECISION
Chi-Square Tests
Value df
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-slded)
Exact Sig. 
(2-sided)
Exact Sig. 
(1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square .087^ 1 .768
Continuity Correctior? .000 1 1.000
Likelihood Ratio .087 1 .768
Fisher's Exact Test 1.000 .500
Llnear-by-Linear
Association .086 1 .770
N of Valid C ases 64
3. Computed only for a 2x2 table
b. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 
7.50.
CORRELATION OF PHYSIOLOGICAL & PSYCHOLOGICAL AROUSAL 
WITH IDENTIFICATION ACCURACY (CORRECT VS. INCORRECT)
POINT-BISERIAL CORRELATIONS (ACROSS THE THREAT GROUP 
WITNESSES) OF IDENTIFICATION ACCURACY WITH: THE STANDARDIZED 
RESIDUALS (TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF BASELINE VARIATION) OF HEART 
RATE DURING THE INCIDENT AND HEART RATE IMMEDIATELY 
FOLLOWING THE INCIDENT’ AND ‘RATED PERCEIVED THREAT DURING 
THE INCIDENT’ AND ‘RATED PERCEIVED CHANCE OF ATTACK DURING THE 
INCIDENT’
Identification Accuracy Lineup 1 
(Intruder 1)
Lineup 2 
(intruder 2)
Tlireat During Correlation .030 -.113
Sig. (2-tailed) .871 .536
N 32 32
Perceived Attack During Correlation .103 .165
Sig. (2-tailed) .574 J66
N 32 32
Heart Rate During Correlation -.136 -.072
Sig. (2-tailed) .457 .696
N 32 32
Heart Rate After Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
N
.087
.634
32
-.102
.579
32
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Append ix 11 : Statistical Output - Exercise Bicycle Study
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PHYSIOLOGICAL AROUSAL 
Heart Rate During 
• Univariate Analysis of Variance (with baseline as co-variate)
T ests of B etw een-Subjects Effects
Dependent Variable: DURING
Source
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Corrected Model 81432.305» 4 20358.076 258.090 .000
Intercept 3745.732 1 3745.732 47.487 .000
BASELINE 6375.361 1 6375.361 80.824 .000
VIDEO 616.744 1 616.744 7.819 .007
AROUSAL 66033.480 1 66033.480 837.142 .000
VIDEO* AROUSAL 906.487 1 906.487 11.492 .001
Error 4653.899 59 78.880
Total 866144.782 64
Corrected Total 86086.203 63
a- R Squared = .946 (Adjusted R Squared = .942)
• Posthoc Tukey’s Test - Interaction of video by arousal (computed using 
standardized residual values of the heart rate data in order to take account for 
baseline of participant’s resting heart rate levels)
Standardized Residual
Tu key HSCf'"
Subset
witnessing group N 1 2 3
Control Rest 16 -.9322494
Threat Rest 16 -.9295511
Control Exercise 16 .7032888
Threat Exercise 16 1.1585117
Sig. 1.000 1.000 1.000
Means for groups in hom ogeneous subsets are displayed.
Based on Type III Sum of Squares
The error term is Mean Square(Error) = 8.136E-02.
a- Uses Harmonic Mean Sample Size = 16.000.
b. Alpha = .05.
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Multiple Comparisons
Dependent Variable: Standardized Residual
Tukey HSD
(1) witnessing group (J) witnessing group
Mean
Difference
(l-J) Std. Error Sig. .
95% Confidence Interval
Lower Bound Upper BoundThreat Exercise Threat Rest 2.0880628* .1008433 .000 1.8215799 2.3545457
Control Exercise .4552230* .1008433 .000 .1887401 .7217059
Control Rest 2.0907611* .1008433 .000 1.8242782 2.3572440
Threat Rest Threat Exercise -2.0880628* .1008433 .000 -2.3545457 -1.8215799
Control Exercise -1.6328399* .1008433 .000 -1.8993228 -1.3663570
Control Rest 2.698E-03 .1008433 1.000 -.2637847 .2691812
Control Exercise Threat Exercise -.4552230* .1008433 .000 -.7217059 -.1887401
Threat Rest 1.6328399* .1008433 .000 1.3663570 1.8993228
Control Rest 1.6355381* .1008433 .000 1.3690552 1.9020210
Control Rest Threat Exercise -2.0907611* .1008433 .000 -2.3572440 -1.8242782
Threat Rest -2.698E-03 .1008433 1.000 -.2691812 .2637847
Control Exercise -1.6355381* .1008433 .000 -1.9020210 -1.3690552
Based on observed means.
*• The mean difference is significant at the .05 ievei.
Heart Rate After
• Univariate Analysis of Variance (with baseline as co-variate)
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Dependent Variable: AFTER
Source
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Siq.
Corrected Model 79408.851» 4 19852.213 267.109 .000
Intercept 4260.933 1 4260.933 57.330 .000
BASELINE 5954.523 1 5954.523 80.117 .000
VIDEO 431.918 1 431.918 5.811 .019
AROUSAL 65336.104 1 65336.104 879.088 .000
VIDEO * AROUSAL 279.332 1 279.332 3.758 .057
Error 4385.035 59 74.323
Total 879831.678 64
Corrected Total 83793.886 63
a- R Squared = .948 (Adjusted R Squared = .944)
SELF-REPORTED AROUSAL
STAI
® Univariate Analysis of Variance
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Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Dependent Variable: stal state
Source
Type 111 Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Corrected Model 516.625» 3 172.208 3.045 .036
Intercept 67340.250 1 67340.250 1190.765 .000
VIDEO 430.563 1 430.563 7.614 .008
AROUSAL 81.000 1 81.000 1.432 .236
VIDEO * AROUSAL 5.063 1 5.063 .090 .766
Error 3393.125 60 56.552
Total 71250.000 64
Corrected Total 3909.750 63
a R Squared = .132 (Adjusted R Squared = .089)
MacKay Arousal Scale 
• Univariate Analysis of Variance
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Dependent Variable: mackay arousal
Source
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Corrected Model 12.562» 3 4.187 1.306 .281
Intercept 885.063 1 885.063 276.043 .000
VIDEO 1.000 1 1.000 .312 .579
AROUSAL 10.563 1 10.563 3.294 .075
VIDEO * AROUSAL 1.000 1 1.000 .312 .579
Error 192.375 60 3.206
Total 1090.000 64
Corrected Total 204.937 63
a. R Squared = .061 (Adjusted R Squared = .014)
MacKay Stress Scale 
• Univariate Analysis of Variance
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, j
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Dependent Variable: mackay stress
Source
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Corrected Model 10.875» 3 3.625 .867 .463
Intercept 156.250 1 156.250 37.369 .000
VIDEO 6.250E-02 1 6.250E-02 .015 .903
AROUSAL .250 1 .250 .060 .808
VIDEO * AROUSAL 10.563 1 10.563 2.526 .117
Error 250.875 60 4.181
Total 418.000 64
Corrected Total 261.750 63
a. R Squared = .042 (Adjusted R Squared = -.006}
Threat whilst watching 
• Univariate Analysis of Variance
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Dependent Variable: threatened whilst watching
Source
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Corrected Model 4.563» 3 1.521 1.463 .234
Intercept 189.063 1 189.063 181.864 .000
VIDEO .000 1 .000 .000 1.000
AROUSAL .563 1 .563 .541 .465
VIDEO* AROUSAL 4.000 1 4.000 3.848 .054
Error 62.375 60 1.040
Total 256.000 64
Corrected Total 66.938 63
a. R Squared = .068 (Adjusted R Squared = .022) 
Threat immediately following 
• Uniyariate Analysis of Variance
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Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Dependent Variable: threatened immediately after
Source
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Corrected Model 1.000» 3 .333 .468 .706
Intercept 132.250 1 132.250 185.614 .000
VIDEO .000 1 .000 .000 1.000
AROUSAL .000 1 .000 .000 1.000
VIDEO * AROUSAL 1.000 1 1.000 1.404 .241
Error 42.750 60 .713
Total 176.000 64
Corrected Total 43.750 63
a- R Squared = .023 (Adjusted R Squared = -.026)
Angry whilst watching 
• Uniyariate Analysis of Variance
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Dependent Variable: angry whilst watching
Source
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Corrected Model 1.422» 3 .474 .887 .453
Intercept 97.516 1 97.516 ■ 182.485 .000
VIDEO 1.266 1 1.266 2.368 .129
AROUSAL 1.563E-02 1 1.563E-02 .029 .865
VIDEO * AROUSAL .141 1 .141 .263 .610
Error 32.063 60 .534
Total 131.000 64
Corrected Total 33.484 63
a R Squared = .042 (Adjusted R Squared = -.005) 
Angry immediately following 
• Uniyariate Analysis of Variance
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Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Dependent Variable: angry immediately after
Source
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Corrected Model .547» 3 .182 .459 .712
Intercept 92.641 1 92.641 233.425 .000
VIDEO 1.563E-02 1 1.563E-02 .039 .843
AROUSAL .141 1 .141 .354 .554
VIDEO * AROUSAL .391 1 .391 .984 .325
Error 23.813 60 .397
Total 117.000 64
Corrected Total 24.359 63
a- R Squared = .022 (Adjusted R Squared = -.026)
Afraid whilst watching 
• Univariate Analysis of Variance
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Dependent Variable: afraid whilst watching
Source
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Corrected Model 3.375» 3 1.125 1.241 .303
Intercept 156.250 1 156.250 172.414 .000
VIDEO .563 1 .563 .621 .434
AROUSAL .563 1 .563 .621 .434
VIDEO * AROUSAL 2.250 1 2.250 2.483 .120
Error 54.375 60 .906
Total 214.000 64
Corrected Total 57.750 63
a R Squared = .058 (Adjusted R Squared = .011)
Afraid immediately following
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Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Dependent Variable: afraid immediately after
Source
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F 8lg.
Corrected Model 1.297» 3 .432 .859 .467
Intercept 97.516 1 97.516 193.820 .000
VIDEO 1.266 1 1.266 2.516 .118
AROUSAL 1.563E-02 1 1.563E-02 .031 .861
VIDEO * AROUSAL 1.563E-02 1 1.563E-02 .031 .861
Error 30.188 60 .503
Total 129.000 64
Corrected Total 31.484 63
a. R Squared = .041 (Adjusted R Squared = -.007)
How arousing they found cycling/sitting
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Dependent Variable: how arousing cyoling/sitting
Source
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig,
Corrected Model 26.250» 3 8.750 8.235 .000
Intercept 256.000 1 256.000 240.941 .000
VIDEO 1.000 1 1.000 .941 .336
AROUSAL 25.000 1 25,000 23.529 .000
VIDEO * AROUSAL .250 1 .250 .235 .629
Error 63.750 60 1.063
Total 346.000 64
Corrected Total 90.000 63
a R Squared = .292 (Adjusted R Squared = .256)
How difficult they found cycling/sitting
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Dependent Variable: difficult cycling/sitting
Source
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Corrected Model 32.500» 3 10.833 16.049 .000
Intercept 225.000 1 225.000 333.333 .000
VIDEO .000 1 .000 .000 1.000
AROUSAL 30.250 1 30.250 44.815 .000
VIDEO * AROUSAL 2.250 1 2.250 3.333 .073
Error 40.500 60 .675
Total 298.000 64
Corrected Total 73.000 63
a. R Squared = .445 (Adjusted R Squared = .417)
How stressful they found cycling/sitting
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Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Dependent Variable; stressful sitting/cycling
Source
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Corrected Model 14.687» 3 4.896 8.969 .000
Intercept 162.563 1 162.563 297.824 .000
VIDEO 6.250E-02 1 6.250E-02 .115 .736
AROUSAL 14.063 1 14.063 25.763 .000
VIDEO * AROUSAL .563 1 .563 1.031 .314
Error 32.750 60 .546
Total 210.000 64
Corrected Total 47.437 63
a. R Squared = .310 {Adjusted R Squared = .275)
How enjoyable they found cycling/sitting
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Dependent Variable: enjoyable sitting/cycling
Source
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Corrected Model 14.750» 3 4.917 4.664 .005
Intercept 324.000 1 324.000 307.352 .000
VIDEO .250 1 .250 237 .628
AROUSAL 12.250 1 12.250 11.621 .001
VIDEO * AROUSAL 2.250 1 2.250 2.134 .149
Error 63.250 60 1.054
Total 402.000 64
Corrected Total 78.000 63
a. R Squared = .189 (Adjusted R Squared = .149)
How difficult they found cycling whilst watching the yideo
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Dependent Variable: difficult cycling/sitting and watching
Source
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Corrected Model 29.672» 3 9.891 5.975 .001
Intercept 260.016 1 260.016 157.089 .000
VIDEO .391 1 .391 .236 .629
AROUSAL 28.891 1 28.891 17.454 .000
VIDEO * AROUSAL .391 1 .391 236 .629
Error 99.313 60 1.655
Total 389.000 64
Corrected Total 128.984 63
a R Squared = .230 (Adjusted R Squared = .192)
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SELF-REPORTED ATTENTION 
How much attention was devoted to cycling
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Dependent Variable: attention to sitting/cycling
Source
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Corrected Model 30.797» 3 10.266 10.631 .000
Intercept 356.266 1 356.266 368.948 .000
VIDEO 1.563E-02 1 1.563E-02 .016 .899
AROUSAL 28.891 1 28.891 29.919 .000
VIDEO * AROUSAL 1.891 1 1.891 1.958 .167
Error 57.938 60 .966
Total 445.000 64
Corrected Total 88.734 63
a. R Squared = .347 (Adjusted R Squared = .314)
How much attention was devoted to watching the video
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Dependent Variable: attention to video
Source
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Corrected Model 5.422» 3 1.807 1.042 .381
Intercept 669.516 1 669.516 386.027 .000
VIDEO 2.641 1 2.641 1.523 222
AROUSAL 2.641 1 2.641 1.523 .222
VIDEO * AROUSAL .141 1 .141 .081 .777
Error 104.063 60 1.734
Total 779,000 64
Corrected Total 109.484 63
a R Squared = .050 (Adjusted R Squared = .002)
CORRELATION OF PHYSIOLOGICAL & PSYCHOLOGICAL AROUSAL 
Heart Rate During 
• Spearman correlations (across the exercise group witnesses) of ‘rated 
arousal whilst cycling’ and ‘rated attention devoted to watching the video’ 
with the ‘standardized residual (to take account of baseline variation) of 
heart rate during the video’
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C o rre la tio n s
Standardized
Residual
how arousing 
cycling/sitting
attention 
to videoSpearman's rho Standardized Residual Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .027 -.011
Sig. (2-tailed) .882 .953
N 32 32 32
how arousing Correlation Coefficient .027 1.000 .325cycling/sitting Sig, (2-tailed) .882 .070
N 32 32 32
attention to video Correlation Coefficient -.011 .325 1.000
Sig. (2-tailed) .953 .070
N 32 32 32
Heart Rate After 
• Spearman correlations (across the exercise group witnesses) of ‘rated arousal 
whilst cycling’ and rated attention devoted to watching the video’ with the 
‘standardized residual (to take account of baseline variation) of heart rate 
after the video’
Correlations
Standardized
Residual
how arousing 
cycling/sitting
attention 
to videoSpearman's rho Standardized Residual Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .054 -.053
Sig. (2-tailed) .770 .775
N 32 32 32
how arousing Correlation Coefficient .054 1.000 .325cycling/sitting Sig. (2-tailed) .770 .070
N 32 32 32
attention to video Correlation Coefficient -.053 .325 1.000
Sig. (2-tailed) .775 .070
N 32 32 32
PERCENTAGE OF AVAILABLE DETAILS RECALLED
Free Recall
Univariate Analysis of Variance
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Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Dependent Variable: total free recall
Source
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Corrected Model 108.084» 3 36.028 1.995 .124
Intercept 8187.535 1 8187.535 453.303 .000
VIDEO 26.832 1 26.832 1.486 .228
AROUSAL 35.790 1 35.790 1.982 .164
VIDEO * AROUSAL 45.461 1 45.461 2.517 .118
Error 1083.716 60 18.062
Total 9379.335 64
Corrected Total 1191.800 63
3- R Squared = .091 (Adjusted R Squared = .045)
• Univariate Analysis of Variance - Central vs. Peripheral Details
Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts
Measure: MEASURE 1
Source INFO
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
INFO Linear 6700.623 1 6700.623 237.792 .000
INFO* VIDEO Linear 31.156 1 31.156 1.106 .297
INFO* AROUSAL Linear 14.587 1 14.587 .518 .475
INFO*VIDEO * Linear 62.846 1 62.846 2.230 .141
ëMWtfNPG) Linear 1690.711 60 28.179
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Measure: MEASURE_1 
Transformed Variable: Average
Source
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.Intercept 18550.510 1 18550.510 531.207 .000
VIDEO 114.856 1 114.856 3.289 .075
AROUSAL 81.074 1 81.074 2.322 .133
VIDEO * AROUSAL 111.508 1 111.508 3.193 .079
Error 2095.284 60 34.921
• Univariate Analysis of Variance - Intruder 1 vs. Intruder 2 Details
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Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts
Measure: MEASURE 1
Source INFO
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
INFO Linear 897.291 1 897.291 93.193 .000
INFO* VIDEO Linear 174.892 . 1 174.892 18.164 .000
INFO* AROUSAL Linear 7.772 1 7.772 .807 .373
INFO*VIDEO * Linear 52.097 1 52.097 5.411 .023
m W A b ) Linear 577.698 60 9.628
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Measure: MEASURE_1 
Transformed Variable: Average
Source
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Intercept 14948.934 1 14948.934 436.311 .000
VIDEO 15.708 1 15.708 .458 .501
AROUSAL 59.569 1 59.569 1.739 .192
VIDEO * AROUSAL 66.875 1 66.875 1.952 .168
Error 2055.729 60 34.262
Posthoc Tukey's Test - Interaction of information (Intruder 1 vs. Intruder 2) 
by video
Int by video free recall prop
Tukey HSCf-*’
Subset
group 2 way N 1 2 3
Control intruder 2 32 7.3406
Threat Intruder 2 32 8.9778 8.9778
Threat Intruder 1 32 11.9353 11.9353
Control Intruder 1 32 14.9738
Sig. .516 .063 .053
Means for groups in hom ogeneous subsets are displayed. 
Based on Type III Sum of Squares 
The error term is Mean Square(Error) = 22.740. 
a- Uses Harmonic Mean Sample Size = 32.000. 
b. Alpha = .05.
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M ultiple C o m p a r iso n s
D ependent Variable: Int by video free recall prop
Tukey HSD
(1) group 2 way (J) group 2 way
Mean
Difference
(W) Std. Error Sig.
95% Confidence Interval
Lower Bound Upper Bound
Threat Intruder 1 Control Intruder 1 -3.0384 1.1922 .053 -6.1011 2.425E-02
Threat Intruder 2 2.9575 1.1922 .063 -.1052 6.0202
Control Intruder 2 4.5947* 1.1922 .001 1.5320 7.6574
Control Intruder 1 Threat Intruder 1 3.0384 1.1922 .053 -2.4255E-02 6.1011
Threat Intruder 2 5.9959* 1.1922 .000 2.9332 9.0586
Control Intruder 2 7.6331* 1.1922 .000 4.5704 10.6958
Threat Intruder 2 Threat Intruder 1 -2.9575 1.1922 .063 -6.0202 .1052
Control Intruder 1 -5.9959* 1.1922 .000 -9.0586 -2.9332
Control Intruder 2 1.6372 1.1922 .516 -1.4255 4.6999
Control Intruder 2 Threat Intruder 1 -4.5947* 1.1922 .001 -7.6574 -1.5320
Control Intruder 1 -7.6331* 1.1922 .000 -10.6958 -4.5704
Threat Intruder 2 -1.6372 1.1922 .516 -4.6999 1.4255
Based on observed means.
*• The mean difference is significant at the .05 level.
Posthoc Tukey's Test - Interaction of information (Intruder 1 vs. Intruder 2) 
by video by arousal (exercise vs. rest)
int by video by exercise free recall prop
Tukey HSCf '"'
Subset
Group 3 way N 1 2 3
Control Exer Int 2 16 6.8200
Control Rest Int 2 16 7.8613 7.8613
Threat Exer Int 2 16 8.6269 8.6269
Threat Rest Int 2 16 9.3288 9.3288
Threat Rest Int 1 16 11.5031 11.5031
Threat Exer Int 1 16 12.3675 12.3675
Control Exer Int 1 16 12.6844 12.6844
Control Rest Int 1 16 17.2631
Sig. .098 .079 .071
Means for groups in hom ogeneous subsets are displayed.
Based on Type 111 Sum of Squares
The error term Is Mean Square(Error) = 21.945.
3- Uses Harmonic Mean Sample Size = 16.000. 
b. Alpha = .05.
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Multiple Com parisons
Dependent Variable: int by video by exercise free recall prop
Tukey HSD
(1) Group 3 way (J) Group 3 way
MeanDifference(i-J) Std. Error Sig.
95% Confidence Interval
Lower Bound Upper BoundThreat Exer Int 1 Threat Rest Int 1 .8644 1.6562 1.000 -4.2454 5.9741Control Exer Int 1 -.3169 1.6562 1,000 -5.4266 4.7929Control Rest Int 1 -4.8956 1.6562 .071 -10.0054 .2141Threat Exer Int 2 3.7406 1.6562 .325 -1.3691 8.8504Threat Rest Int 2 3.0388 1.6562 .598 -2.0710 8.1485Control Exer Int 2 5.5475* 1.6562 .023 .4378 10.6572Control Rest Int 2 4.5063 1.6562 .126 -.6035 9,6160Threat Rest Int 1 Threat Exer Int 1 -.8644 1.6562 1.000 -5.9741 4,2454Control Exer Int 1 -1.1812 1.6562 .996 -6.2910 3.9285Control Rest Int 1 -5.7600* 1.6562 .016 -10.8697 -.6503Threat Exer int 2 2.8762 1.6562 .663 -2.2335 7.9860Threat Rest Int 2 2.1744 1.6562 .892 -2.9354 7.2841Control Exer Int 2 4.6831 1.6562 .098 -.4266 9.7929Control Rest Int 2 3.6419 1.6562 .360 -1.4679 8.7516Control Exer Int 1 Threat Exer int 1 .3169 1.6562 1.000 -4.7929 5.4266Threat Rest Int 1 1.1812 1.6562 .996 -3.9285 6.2910Control Rest int 1 -4.5787 1.6562 .114 -9.6885 .5310Threat Exer Int 2 4.0575 1.6562 .228 -1.0522 9.1672Threat Rest Int 2 3.3556 1.6562 .469 -1.7541 8,4654Control Exer Int 2 5.8644* 1.6562 .013 .7546 10.9741Control Rest int 2 4.8231 1.6562 .079 -.2866 9.9329Control Rest Int 1 Threat Exer Int 1 4.8956 1.6562 .071 -.2141 10.0054Threat Rest Int 1 5.7600* 1.6562 .016 .6503 10.8697Control Exer Int 1 4.5787 1.6562 .114 -.5310 9,6885Threat Exer Int 2 8.6362* 1.6562 .000 3.5265 13,7460Threat Rest Int 2 7.9344* 1.6562 .000 2.8246 13,0441Control Exer int 2 10.4431* 1.6562 .000 5.3334 15,5529Control Rest Int 2 9.4019* 1.6562 .000 4.2921 14,5116Threat Exer Int 2 Threat Exer Int 1 -3.7406 1.6562 .325 -8.8504 1.3691Threat Rest Int 1 -2.8762 1.6562 .663 -7.9860 2.2335Control Exer int 1 -4.0575 1.6562 .228 -9.1672 1.0522Control Rest Int 1 -8.6362* 1.6562 .000 -13.7460 -3.5265Threat Rest Int 2 -.7019 1.6562 1.000 -5.8116 4.4079Control Exer Int 2 1.8069 1.6562 .958 -3.3029 6.9166Control Rest Int 2 .7656 1.6562 1.000 -4.3441 5.8754Threat Rest Int 2 Threat Exer Int 1 -3.0388 1.6562 .598 -8.1485 2.0710Threat Rest Int 1 -2.1744 1.6562 .892 -7.2841 2.9354Control Exer Int 1 -3.3556 1.6562 .469 -8.4654 1.7541Control Rest Int 1 -7.9344* 1.6562 .000 -13.0441 -2.8246Threat Exer Int 2 .7019 1.6562 1.000 -4.4079 5.8116Control Exer Int 2 2.5087 1.6562 .798 -2.6010 7.6185Control Rest Int 2 1.4675 1.6562 .987 -3.6422 6.5772Control Exer int 2 Threat Exer Int 1 -5.5475* 1.6562 .023 -10.6572 -.4378Threat Rest Int 1 -4.6831 1.6562 .098 -9.7929 .4266Control Exer Int 1 -5.8644* 1.6562 .013 -10.9741 -.7546Control Rest Int 1 -10.4431* 1.6562 .000 -15.5529 -5.3334Threat Exer Int 2 -1.8069 1.6562 .958 -6.9166 3.3029Threat Rest Int 2 -2.5087 1.6562 .798 -7.6185 2.6010Control Rest Int 2 -1.0412 1.6562 .998 -6.1510 4.0685Control Rest Int 2 Threat Exer int 1 -4.5063 1.6562 .126 -9.6160 .6035Threat Rest Int 1 -3.6419 1.6562 .360 -8.7516 1.4679Control Exer Int 1 -4.8231 1.6562 .079 -9.9329 .2866Control Rest Int 1 -9.4019* 1.6562 .000 -14.5116 -4.2921Threat Exer Int 2 -.7656 1.6562 1.000 -5.8754 4.3441Threat Rest Int 2 -1.4675 1.6562 .987 -6.5772 3.6422Control Exer Int 2 1.0412 1.6562 .998 -4.0685 6.1510
• The mean difference is significant at the .05 level.
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• Univariate Analysis of Variance - Action vs. Verbal vs. Appearance Details
Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts
Measure: MEASURE 1
Source
Type 111 Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
INhU 63l9.Ôè 2 3iÈ9.92 77.48 ,000
INFO * VIDEO 3.46 2 1.73 .04 ,958
INFO * a r o u sa l 25.24 2 12.62 .31 ,734
INFO * VIDEO * AROUS 112.25 2 56.12 1.38 ,257
ErfcW1(rNB3jB 4894.09 120 40.78
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Measure: MEASURE_1 
Transformed Variable: Average
Source
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Intercept 29256.663 1 29256.663 517.596 .000
VIDEO 63.411 1 63.411 1.122 .294
AROUSAL 113.868 1 113.868 2.014 .161
VIDEO * AROUSAL 185.496 1 185.496 3.282 .075
Error 3391.450 60 56.524
Cued Recall 
• Univariate Analysis of Variance
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Dependent Variable: total free recall
Source
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.Corrected Model 108.084» 3 36.028 1.995 .124
Intercept 8187.535 1 8187.535 453.303 .000
VIDEO 26.832 1 26.832 1.486 .228
AROUSAL 35.790 1 35.790 1.982 .164
VIDEO * AROUSAL 45,461 1 45.461 2.517 .118
Error 1083.716 60 18.062
Total 9379.335 64
Corrected Total 1191,800 63
a- R Squared = .091 (Adjusted R Squared = .045)
459
• Univariate Analysis of Variance - Central vs. Peripheral Details
Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts
Measure: MEASURE 1
Source INFO
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
INFO Linear 519.870 1 519.870 37.454 .000
INFO* VIDEO Linear 33.825 1 33.825 2.437 .124
INFO * AROUSAL Linear .230 1 .230 .017 .898
INFO*VIDEO * Linear 3.843 1 3.843 .277 .601
ë M W è ) Linear 832.806 60 13.880
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Measure: MEASURE_1 
Transformed Variable: Average
Source
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Intercept 7454.816 1 7454.816 289.596 .000
VIDEO 2.808 1 2.808 .109 .742
AROUSAL 36.061 1 36.061 1.401 .241
VIDEO * AROUSAL 6.873 1 6.873 .267 .607
Error 1544.527 60 25.742
Univariate Analysis of Variance - Intruder 1 vs. Intruder 2 Details
Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts
Measure; MEASURE 1
Source INFO
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.INFO Linear 2.850 1 2.850 .237 ,628
INFO * VIDEO Linear 2.959 1 2.959 .246 .622
INFO* AROUSAL Linear 64.838 1 64.838 5.383 .024
INFO * VIDEO * Linear 4.198 1 4.198 .349 .557
ëK&tWAb) Linear 722.683 60 12.045
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Measure: MEASURE_1 
Transformed Variable: Average
Source
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Intercept 8678.702 1 8678.702 303.361 .000
VIDEO 5.823 1 5.823 .204 .654
AROUSAL 21.962 1 21.962 .768 .384
VIDEO * AROUSAL 2.767 1 2.767 .097 .757
Error 1716.509 60 28.608
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Posthoc Tukey’s Test - Interaction of information (intruder 1 vs. intruder 2) 
by arousal (exercise vs. rest)
Int by exercise cued recall prop
Tukey
group 2 way N
Subset
1
Rest Intruder 1 32 7.2575
Exer Intruder 2 32 7.7875
Rest Intruder 2 32 8.3825
Exer Intruder 1 32 9.5094
Sig. .179
Means for groups in hom ogeneous subsets are displayed.
Based on Type III Sum of Squares
The error term is Mean Square(Error) = 19.798.
3 Uses Harmonic Mean Sample Size = 32.000. 
b. Alpha = .05.
Multiple C om parisons
Dependent Variable: Int by exercise cued recall prop 
Tukey HSD
Jl) group 2 way (J) group 2 way
Mean
Difference
(I-J) Std. Error Sig.
95% Confidence Interval
Lower Bound Upper BoundExer Intruder 1 Rest Intruder 1 2.2519 1.1124 .179 -.6058 5.1096Exer Intruder 2 1.7219 1.1124 .409 -1.1358 4.5796
Rest Intruder 2 1.1269 1.1124 .742 -1.7308 3.9846Rest Intruder 1 Exer Intruder 1 -2.2519 1.1124 .179 -5.1096 .6058
Exer Intruder 2 -.5300 1.1124 .964 -3.3877 2.3277
Rest intruder 2 -1.1250 1.1124 .743 -3.9827 1.7327Exer Intruder 2 Exer Intruder 1 -1.7219 1.1124 .409 -4.5796 1.1358Rest Intruder 1 .5300 1.1124 .964 -2.3277 3.3877
Rest Intruder 2 -.5950 1.1124 .951 -3.4527 2.2627Rest Intruder 2 Exer Intruder 1 -1.1269 1.1124 .742 -3.9846 1.7308Rest Intruder 1 1.1250 1.1124 .743 -1.7327 3.9827
Exer Intruder 2 .5950 1.1124 .951 -2.2627 3.4527
Based on observed means.
Univariate Analysis of Variance - Action vs. Verbal vs. Appearance Details
461
Tests of Wlthin-Subjects Contrasts
Measure: MEASURE 1
Source
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
"INRJ . ... — ................ .. ..... 1777:37" 88Ô.83 32.^0 .0Û0
INFO* VIDEO 136.02 2 68.01 2.46 .089
INFO * AROUSAL 30.57 2 15.29 .55 .576
INFO * VIDEO * AROUS 4.75 2 2.38 .09 .918
ErkM(tNË8p 3312.91 120 27.61
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Measure: MEASURE_1 
Transformed Variable: Average
Source
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Intercept 11286.253 1 11286.253 269.751 .000
VIDEO .780 1 .780 .019 .892
AROUSAL 42.394 1 42.394 1.013 .318
VIDEO * AROUSAL 5.796 1 5.796 .139 .711
Error 2510.370 60 41.840
Total Recall (Free + Cued) 
• Univariate Analysis of Variance
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Dependent Variable: total both recall
Source
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Corrected Model 42.217= 3 14.072 .349 .790
Intercept 24548.622 1 24548.622 608.673 .000
VIDEO 14.421 1 14.421 .358 .552
AROUSAL 2.395 1 2.395 059 .808
VIDEO * AROUSAL 25,402 1 25.402 .630 .431
Error 2419.881 60 40.331
Total 27010.721 64
Corrected Total 2462.099 63
3 R Squared = .017 (Adjusted R Squared = -.032)
Univariate Analysis of Variance - Central vs. Peripheral Details
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Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts
Measure: MEASURE 1
Source INFO
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
INFO Linear 3487.064 1 3487,064 103.163 .000
INFO * VIDEO Linear 129.826 1 129.826 3.841 .055
INFO * AROUSAL Linear 18.506 1 18.506 .547 .462
INFO*VIDEO * Linear 35.585 1 35.585 1.053 .309
Linear 2028.092 60 33.802
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Measure: MEASURE_1 
Transformed Variable: Average
Source
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Intercept 49525.519 1 49525.519 636.559 .000
VIDEO 81.744 1 81.744 1.051 .309
AROUSAL 9.037 1 9.037 .116 734
VIDEO * AROUSAL 63,099 1 63.099 .811 .371
Error 4668.119 60 77.802
• Univariate Analysis of Variance - Intruder 1 vs. Intruder 2 Details
Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts
Measure: MEASURE 1
Source INFO
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.INFO Linear 1001.225 1 1001.225 54.994 .000
INFO* VIDEO Linear 223.793 1 223.793 12.292 .001
INFO* AROUSAL Linear 27.779 1 27.779 1.526 .222
INFO*VIDEO * Linear 26.782 1 26.782 1.471 .230
Linear 1092.365 60 18.206
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Measure: MEASURE_1 
Transformed Variable: Average
Source
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Intercept 46406.192 1 46406.192 589.155 .000
VIDEO 2.373 1 2.373 .030 ^ 6 3
AROUSAL 9.240 1 9.240 .117 .733
VIDEO * AROUSAL 42,332 1 42.332 .537 .466
Error 4726,046 60 78.767
Posthoc Tukey's Test - Interaction of information (Intruder 1 vs. Intruder 2)
by video
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int by video both recail prop
Tukey HSCf
Subset
group 2 way N 1 2 3
Control Intruder 2 32 15.0578
Threat Intruder 2 32 17.4300 17.4300
Threat Intruder 1 32 20.3791 20.3791
Control Intruder 1 32 23.2959
Sig. .517 .320 .330
Means for groups in hom ogeneous subsets are displayed.
Based on Type III Sum of Squares
The error term is Mean Square(Error) = 47.779.
3- Uses Harmonic Mean Sample Size = 32.000.
b- Alpha = .05.
Multiple Comparisons
Dependent Variable; int by video both recail prop 
Tukey HSD
(1) group 2 way (J) group 2 way
Mean
Difference
(l-J) Std. Error Sig.
95% Confidence Interval
Lower Bound Upper BoundThreat Intruder 1 Control Intruder 1 -2.9169 1.7281 .330 -7.3563 1.5225
Threat Intruder 2 2.9491 1.7281 .320 -1.4904 7.3885
Control Intruder 2 5.3213* 1.7281 .011 .8818 9.7607
Control Intruder 1 Threat Intruder 1 2.9169 1.7281 .330 -1.5225 7.3563
Threat Intruder 2 5.8659* 1.7281 .004 1.4265 10.3054
Control Intruder 2 8.2381* 1.7281 .000 3.7987 12.6775
Threat Intruder 2 Threat Intruder 1 -2.9491 1.7281 .320 -7.3885 1.4904
Control Intruder 1 -5.8659* 1.7281 .004 -10.3054 -1.4265
Control Intruder 2 2.3722 1.7281 .517 -2.0672 6.8116
Control Intruder 2 Threat Intruder 1 -5.3213* 1.7281 .011 -9.7607 -.8818
Control Intruder 1 -8.2381* 1.7281 .000 -12.6775 -3.7987
Threat Intruder 2 -2.3722 1.7281 .517 -6.8116 2.0672
Based on observed means.
*• The mean difference is significant at the .05 level.
* Univariate Analysis of Variance - Action vs. Verbal vs. Appearance Details
Measure: MEASURE 1
Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts
Source
Type 111 Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
INhu ^693.71 2 1346.86 21.^Ù .000
INFO * VIDEO 126.90 2 63.45 1.00 .371
INFO * AROUSAL 57.43 2 28.71 .45 .637
INFO* VIDEO* AROUS 160.75 2 80.37 1.27 .286
ErloMl(rNE0)S 7623.33 120 63.53
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Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Measure; MEASURE_1 
Transformed Variable: Average
Source
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Intercept 76883.623 1 76883.623 617,437 .000
VIDEO 50.092 1 50.092 .402 .528
AROUSAL 17.370 1 17.370 .139 .710
VIDEO * AROUSAL 125.728 1 125.728 1.010 .319
Error 7471.230 60 124.520
CORRELATION OF PHYSIOLOGICAL/PSYCHOLOGICAL AROUSAL 
WITH PERCENTAGE OF AVAILABLE DETAILS RECALLED
• Pearson & Spearman correlations (across exercise group witnesses) of the 
various measures of percentage of available details recalled with; the 
standardized residuals (to take account of baseline variation) of heart rate 
during the video and heart rate immediately following the video as well as 
rated arousal whilst cycling.
Percentage of Available Details: 
Free Recall
Heart Rate 
During 
(Residual 
Values) 
PEARSON
Heart Rate 
After 
(Residual 
Values) 
PEARSON
Rated Arousal 
Whilst 
Cyclmg
SPEARMAN
Overall Correlation .243 .294 .313
Sig. (2-tailed) .180 .102 .081
N 32 32 32
Central Correlation 211 .281 .294
Sig. (2-tailed) .247 .120 .103
N 32 32 32
Peripheral Correlation .098 .111 .066
Sig. (2-tailed) .593 .547 .720
N 32 32 32
Intruder 1 Correlation .259 .342 .170
Sig. (2-tailed) .153 .055 J53
N 32 32 32
hitmder 2 Correlation .134 .102 .284
Sig. (2-tailed) .465 .578 .115
N 32 32 32
Action Correlation .081 .176 j95*
Sig. (2-tailed) .661 .335 .025
N 32 32 32
Verbal Correlation .268 .212 .080
Sig. (2-tailed) .138 .244 663
N 32 32 32
Appearance Correlation .137 .181 .107
Sig. (2-tailed) .456 .322 .560
N 32 32 32
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)
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** Correlation is significant at the O.Ollevel (2-tailed)
Percentage of Available Details; 
Cued Recall
Heart Rate 
During 
(Residual 
Values) 
PEARSON
Heart Rate 
After 
(Residual 
Values) 
PEARSON
Rated Arousal 
Whilst 
Cycling
SPEARMAN
Overall Correlation .327 .359* .305
Sig. (2-tailed) .068 .043 .089
N 32 32 32
Central Correlation -.009 .009 .098
Sig. (2-tailed) .959 .961 .595
N 32 32 32
Peripheral Correlation .445* .474* .360*
Sig. (2-tailed) .011 .006 .043
N 32 32 32
Intruder 1 Correlation .219 .236 .071
Sig. (2-tailed) .228 .193 .700
N 32 32 32
Intruder 2 Correlation .393* .439* .408*
Sig. (2-tailed) .026 .012 .020
N 32 32 32
Action Correlation .156 .163 .033
Sig. (2-tailed) .394 .371 .857
N 32 32 32
Verbal Correlation .018 .062 .215
Sig. (2-tailed) .922 .735 .238
N 32 32 32
Appearance Correlation .410* .429* .277
Sig. (2-tailed) .020 .014 .125
N 32 32 32
Percentage of Available Details: 
Total (Botli) Recall
Heart Rate 
During 
(Residual 
Values) 
PEARSON
Heart Rate 
After 
(Residual 
Values) 
PEARSON
Rated Arousal 
Whilst 
Cycling
SPEARNIAN
Overall Correlation .350* .402* .397*
Sig. (2-tailed) .050 .023 .025
N 32 32 32
Central Correlation .154 .216 .286
Sig. (2-tailed) .401 .236 .112
N 32 32 32
Peripheral Correlation .411* .442* .344
Sig. (2-tailed) .019 .011 .054
N 32 32 32
Intruder 1 Correlation .312 .380* .193
Sig. (2-tailed) .082 .032 .289
N 32 32 32
Intruder 2 Correlation .346 .358* .416*
Sig. (2-tailed) .052 .044 .018
N 32 32 32
Action Correlation .150 .223 .320
Sig. (2-tailed) .412 .221 .074
N 32 32 32
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Verbal Correlation .195 .184 .146
Sig. (2-tailed) .284 .314 .426
N 32 32 32
Appearance Correlation .384* .430* .210
Sig. (2-tailed) .030 .014 .248
N 32 32 32
* Correlation is significant at tlie 0.05 level (2-tailed)
** Correlation is significant at tire O.Ollevel (2-tailed)
Scatterplots for significant correlations from above;
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ACCURACY OF RECALL 
Free Recall 
• Univariate Analysis of Variance
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Dependent Variable; total free recall
Source
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Corrected Model 70.403» 3 23.468 .316 .814
Intercept 515708.902 1 515708.902 6947.806 .000
VIDEO 69.535 1 69.535 .937 .337
AROUSAL .131 1 .131 .002 .967
VIDEO * AROUSAL .737 1 .737 .010 .921
Error 4453.569 60 74.226
Total 520232.874 64
Corrected Total 4523.972 63
a- R Squared = .016 (Adjusted R Squared = -.034)
Univariate Analysis of Variance - Central vs. Peripheral Details
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Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts
Measure: MEASURE 1
Source INFO
Type 111 Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
INFO Linear 12137.930 1 12137.930 29.316 .000
INFO* VIDEO Linear 87.986 1 87.986 .213 .647
INFO* AROUSAL Linear 427.760 1 427.760 1.033 .314
INFO*VIDEO * Linear 610.032 1 610.032 1.473 .231
Linear 20287.752 49 414.036
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Measure: MEASURE_1 
Transformed Variable: Average
Source
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Intercept 732957.050 1 732957.050 1911.587 .000
VIDEO 315.517 1 315.517 .823 .369
AROUSAL 176.516 1 176.516 .460 .501
VIDEO * AROUSAL 464.540 1 464.540 1.212 .276
Error 18787.995 49 383.428
• Univariate Analysis of Variance - Intruder 1 vs. Intruder 2 Details
Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts
Measure: MEASURE 1
Source INFO
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
INFO Linear 2539.885 1 2539.885 17.574 .000
INFO* VIDEO Linear 53.665 1 53.665 .371 .545
INFO * AROUSAL Linear 48.216 1 48.216 .334 .566
INFO*VIDEO * Linear 832.626 1 832.626 5.761 .020
ê f f W P ô ) Linear 8671.597 60 144.527
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Measure: MEASURE_1 
Transformed Variable: Average
Source
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F 8lg.
Intercept 998651.914 1 998651.914 5165.892 .000
VIDEO 100.643 1 100.643 .521 .473
AROUSAL 30.949 1 30.949 .160 .690
VIDEO * AROUSAL 278.716 1 278.716 1.442 .235
Error 11598.988 60 193.316
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Posthoc Tukey s Test - Interaction of info (Central vs Peripheral) by video by 
arousal
int by video by exercise free recall acc
Tukey HSCf’*"
Group 3 way N
Subset
1 2
Threat Rest Int 2 16 79.4194
Control Exer Int 2 16 80.2769 80.2769
Threat Exer Int 2 16 85.2606 85.2606
Control Rest Int 2 16 90.5400 90.5400
Threat Exer Int 1 16 91.5913 91.5913
Control Rest Int 1 16 91.8256 91.8256
Threat Rest Int 1 16 93.4969 93.4969
Control Exer Int 1 16 94.2194
Sig. .053 .057
Means for groups In homogeneous subsets are displayed. 
Based on Type III Sum of Squares 
The error term Is Mean Square(Error) = 168.922. 
a Uses Harmonic Mean Sample Size = 16.000. 
b. Alpha = .05.
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Multiple Comparisons
Dependent Variable: int by video by exercise free recall acc
Tukey HSD
(1) Group 3 way (J) Group 3 way
MeanDifference
(l-J) Std. Error
95% Confidence Interval
Sig. Lower Bound Upper BoundThreat Exer Int 1 Threat Rest Int 1 -1.9056 4.5951 1.000 -16.0822 12.2710
Control Exer Int 1 -2.6281 4.5951 .999 -16.8047 11.5485
Control Rest Int 1 -.2344 4.5951 1.000 -14.4110 13.9422
Threat Exer Int 2 6.3306 4.5951 .866 -7.8460 20.5072
Threat Rest Int 2 12.1719 4.5951 .149 -2.0047 26.3485
Control Exer Int 2 11.3144 4.5951 .222 -2.8622 25.4910
Control Rest Int 2 1.0513 4.5951 1.000 -13.1253 15.2278
Threat Rest Int 1 Threat Exer Int 1 1.9056 4.5951 1.000 -12.2710 16.0822
Control Exer Int 1 -.7225 4.5951 1.000 -14.8991 13.4541
Control Rest Int 1 1.6713 4.5951 1.000 -12.5053 15.8478
Threat Exer int 2 8.2363 4.5951 .626 -5.9403 22.4128
Threat Rest Int 2 14,0775 4.5951 .053 -9.9085E-02 28.2541
Control Exer Int 2 13.2200 4.5951 .087 -.9566 27.3966
Control Rest Int 2 2.9569 4.5951 .998 -11.2197 17.1335
Control Exer Int 1 Threat Exer Int 1 2.6281 4.5951 .999 -11.5485 16.8047
Threat Rest Int 1 .7225 4.5951 1.000 -13.4541 14.8991
Control Rest Int 1 2.3937 4.5951 1.000 -11.7828 16.5703
Threat Exer Int 2 8.9587 4.5951 .520 -5.2178 23.1353
Threat Rest Int 2 14.8000* 4.5951 .034 .6234 28.9766
Control Exer Int 2 13.9425 4.5951 .057 -.2341 28.1191
Control Rest Int 2 3.6794 4.5951 .993 -10.4972 17.8560
Control Rest Int 1 Threat Exer Int 1 .2344 4.5951 1.000 -13.9422 14.4110
Threat Rest Int 1 -1.6713 4.5951 1.000 -15.8478 12.5053
Control Exer Int 1 -2.3937 4.5951 1.000 -16.5703 11.7828
Threat Exer Int 2 6.5650 4.5951 .842 -7.6116 20.7416
Threat Rest Int 2 12,4063 4.5951 .133 -1.7703 26.5828
Confe-ol Exer Int 2 11.5488 4.5951 .200 -2.6278 25.7253
Control Rest Int 2 1.2856 4.5951 1.000 -12.8910 15.4622
Threat Exer Int 2 Threat Exer Int 1 -6.3306 4.5951 .866 -20.5072 7.8460
Threat Rest Int 1 -8.2363 4.5951 .626 -22.4128 5.9403
Control Exer Int 1 -8.9587 4.5951 .520 -23.1353 5.2178
Control Rest Int 1 -6.5650 4.5951 .842 -20.7416 7.6116
Threat Rest Int 2 5.8412 4.5951 ,908 -8.3353 20.0178
Control Exer Int 2 4.9838 4.5951 .959 -9.1928 19.1603
Control Rest Int 2 -5.2794 4.5951 .944 -19.4560 8.8972
Threat Rest Int 2 Threat Exer Int 1 -12.1719 4.5951 .149 -26.3485 2.0047
Threat Rest Int 1 -14.0775 4.5951 .053 -28.2541 9.909E-02
Control Exer Int 1 -14.8000* 4.5951 .034 -28.9766 -.6234
Control Rest Int 1 -12.4063 4.5951 .133 -26.5828 1.7703
Threat Exer Int 2 -5.8412 4.5951 .908 -20.0178 8.3353
Control Exer Int 2 -.8575 4.5951 1.000 -15.0341 13.3191
Control Rest Int 2 -11.1206 4.5951 .241 -25.2972 3.0560
Control Exer Int 2 Threat Exer Int 1 -11.3144 4.5951 .222 -25.4910 2.8622
Threat Rest Int 1 -13.2200 4.5951 .087 -27.3966 .9566
Control Exer Int 1 -13.9425 4.5951 .057 -28.1191 .2341
Control Rest Int 1 -11.5488 4.5951 .200 -25.7253 2.6278
Threat Exer Int 2 -4.9838 4.5951 .959 -19.1603 9.1928
Threat Rest Int 2 .8575 4.5951 1.000 -13.3191 15.0341
Control Rest Int 2 -10.2631 4.5951 .340 -24.4397 3.9135Control Rest Int 2 Threat Exer Int 1 -1.0513 4.5951 1.000 -15.2278 13.1253
Threat Rest int 1 -2.9569 4.5951 .998 -17.1335 11.2197
Control Exer Int 1 -3.6794 4.5951 .993 -17.8560 10.4972
Control Rest Int 1 -1.2856 4.5951 1.000 -15.4622 12.8910
Threat Exer Int 2 5.2794 4.5951 .944 -8.8972 19.4560
Threat Rest Int 2 11.1206 4.5951 .241 -3.0560 25.2972
Control Exer Int 2 10.2631 4.5951 .340 -3.9135 24.4397
Based on observed means.
*• The mean difference is significant at the .05 level.
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Univariate Analysis of Variance - Action vs. Verbal vs. Appearance Details
Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts
Measure: MEASURE 1
Source
Type III éum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
INFO' 6094.66 5 3047.àâ 8.70 .000
INFO* AROUSAL 23.90 2 11.95 .03 .966
INFO * VIDEO 657.08 2 328.54 .95 .393
INFO* VIDEO* AROUS 165.72 2 82.86 .24 .788
ErWVil(rNB9p 24300.05 70 347.14
T ests o f Betw een-Subjects Effects
M easure: MEASURE_1 
Transform ed Variable:
Source
Type III Sum  
of S q u ares df M ean S quare F Sig.
Intercept 077306.435 1 877306.435 3:^54.970 .ÜÙO
VIDEO 550.788 1 550.788 2.044 .162
AROUSAL 188.806 1 188.806 .701 .408
VIDEO* AROUSAL 148.881 1 148.881 .552 .462
Error 9433.463 35 269.528
Cued Recall 
• Univariate Analysis of Variance
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Dependent Variable: total cued recall
Source
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Corrected Model 1158.171» 3 386.057 1.614 .196
Intercept 287238.383 1 287238.383 1200.577 .000
VIDEO 42.723 1 42.723 .179 .674
AROUSAL 705.234 1 705.234 2.948 .091
VIDEO * AROUSAL 410.214 1 410.214 1.715 .195
Error 14355.017 60 239.250
Total 302751.571 64
Corrected Total 15513.189 63
3. R Squared = .075 (Adjusted R Squared = .028)
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Univariate Analysis of Variance - Central vs. Peripheral Details
Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts
Measure: MEASURE 1
Source INFO
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
INFO Linear 23305.369 1 23305,369 13.449 .001
INFO * VIDEO Linear 719.559 1 719.559 .415 .522
INFO * AROUSAL Linear 2031.522 1 2031.522 1.172 .284
INFO*VIDEO * Linear 823.414 1 823.414 .475 .494
Linear 93572.282 54 1732.820
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Measure: MEASURE_1 
Transformed Variable: Average
Source
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Intercept 655541.610 1 655541.610 609.435 .000
VIDEO 27.725 1 27.725 .026 .873
AROUSAL 4034.390 1 4034.390 3.751 .058
VIDEO * AROUSAL 2626.288 1 2626.288 2.442 .124
Error 58085.354 54 1075.655
Univariate Analysis of Variance - Intruder 1 vs. Intruder 2 Details
Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts
Measure: MEASURE 1
Source INFO
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
INFO Linear 2601.312 1 5SÔ1.S12 3.156 ... .051
INFO* VIDEO Linear 416.755 1 416.755 .491 .486
INFO * AROUSAL Linear 195.203 1 195.203 .230 .633
INFO * VibEO Linear 92.309 1 92.309 .109 .743
Linear 50126.787 59 849.607
Measure: MEASURE_1 
Transformed Variable:
T ests o f Betw een-Subjects Effects
Source
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Intercept ÏÏ71073.707 1 571075:707 853.433 M o
VIDEO 390.834 1 390.834 .584 .448
AROUSAL 2871.976 1 2871.976 4.292 .043
VIDEO* AROUSAL 2390.276 1 2390.276 3.572 .064
Error 39478.417 59 669.126
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Univariate Analysis of Variance -- Action vs. Verbal vs. Appearance Details
Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts
Measure; MEASURE 1
Source
Type III èum  
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
iNFO 5355:55.. 2 2927.54 5.Ô1 .Ù1Ù
INFO * AROUSAL 28.05 2 14.03 .02 .976
iNFO * VIDEO 2908.49 2 1454.24 2.49 .092
INFO * VIDEO * AROUS 600.75 2 300.37 .51 .601En#(fNB9jB 32712.20 56 584.15
T ests o f Betw een-Subjects Effects
M easure: MEASURE_1 
Transform ed Variable:
Source
Type III Sum  
of S q u ares df Mean Square F Sig.
Intercept 512008.933 1 512008.933 793.325 .000
VIDEO 3646.176 1 3646.176 5.650 .025
AROUSAL 1912.994 1 1912.994 2.964 .096
VIDEO* AROUSAL 540.670 1 540.670 .838 .368
Error 18071.103 28 645.397
Total Recall (Free + Cued) 
• Univariate Analysis of Variance
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Dependent Variable: total both recall
Source
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Corrected Model 97.403» 3 32.468 .429 .733
Intercept 411256.071 1 411256.071 5433.380 .000
VIDEO 68.517 1 68.517 .905 .345
AROUSAL 24.975 1 24.975 .330 .568
VIDEO * AROUSAL 3.911 1 3.911 .052 .821
Error 4541439 60 75.691
Total 415894.912 64
Corrected Total 4638.841 63
a. R Squared = .021 (Adjusted R Squared = -.028)
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Univariate Analysis of Variance - Central vs. Peripheral Details
Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts
Measure: MEASURE 1
Source INFO
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig."I'NFD'...... ... ..— Linear 25023.497 1 25023.4Ô7 i04".'55'2"' .000
INFO* VIDEO Linear 481.017 1 481.017 2.012 .161
INFO * AROUSAL Linear 51.334 1 51.334 .215 .645
INFO* VIDEO Linear 3.072 1 3.072 .013 .910ÈrAR#Nf- Linear 14107.546 59 239,111
Measure: MEASURE_1 
Transformed Variable:
T ests o f Betw een-Subjects Effects
Source
ty p e  III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
intercept 1 "776046.720 4609.625 .000
VIDEO 91.691 1 91.691 .519 .474
AROUSAL 210.697 1 210.697 1.193 .279
VIDEO * AROUSAL 18.065 1 18.065 .102 .750
Error 10417.695 59 176.571
Univariate Analysis of Variance - Intruder 1 vs. Intruder 2 Details
Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts
Measure: MEASURE 1
Source INFO
Type ill Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
"INFO"" .............. Linear 5458.558 1 "3T55'.'558" 28.990 .000
INFO* VIDEO Linear 201.302 1 201.302 1.069 .305
In fo  * a r o u sa l Linear 154.265 1 154.265 .819 .369
INFO* VIDEO Linear 9.461 1 9.461 .050 .823
Linear 11297.488 60 188.291
Measure: MEASURE_1 
Transformed Variable:
T ests o f Betw een-Subjects Effects
Source
Type Hi Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Intercept 787176.823 1 787176.823 3986.003 .000
VIDEO 1.531E-04 1 1.531E-04 .000 .999
AROUSAL 183.505 1 183.505 .929 .339
VIDEO * AROUSAL 92.786 1 92.786 .470 .496
Error 11849.117 60 197.485
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Univariate Analysis of Variance - Action vs. Verbal vs. Appearance Details
Measure: MEASURE 1
Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts
Source
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
INFU 26659.20 2 13629.60 éé.ôô .000
INFO * AROUSAL 11.15 2 5.57 .03 .972
INFO* VIDEO 898.73 2 449.37 2.25 .109
INFO * VIDEO * AROUS 311.28 2 155.64 .78 .460
ErWW(TNB9^ 23116.40 116 199.28
T ests o f Betw een-Subjects Effects
Measure: MEASURE_1 
Transformed Variable:
Source
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Intercept 1242523.748 1 1242523.748 .000
VIDEO 1.470E-02 1 1.470E-02 .000 .994
AROUSAL 309.630 1 309.630 1.280 .263
VIDEO * AROUSAL 19.045 1 19.045 .079 .780
Error 14032.393 58 241.938
CORRELATION OF PHYSIOLOGICAL/PSYCHOLOGICAL AROUSAL 
WITH RECALL ACCURACY
• Pearson & Spearman correlations (across the exercise group witnesses) of the 
various measures of recall accuracy with: the standardized residuals (to take 
account of baseline variation) of heart rate during the video and heart rate 
immediately following the video as well as rated arousal whilst cycling.
Correlations - 
Free Recall
Accuracy of
Heart Rate 
During 
(Residual 
Values) 
PEARSON
Heart Rate 
After 
(Residual 
Values) 
PEARSON
Rated Arousal 
Whilst 
Cycling
SPEARMAN
Overall Correlation -.028 -.071 -.081
Sig. (2-tailed) .877 .698 .660
N 32 32 32
Central Correlation .036 -.052 .048
Sig. (2-tailed) .844 .776 .796
N 32 32 32
Peripheral Correlation -.067 -.078 -.124
Sig. (2-tailed) .741 .699 .537
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N 27 27 27
Intruder 1 Correlation .011 -.115 .089
Sig. (2-tailed) .950 .530 .627
N 32 32 32
Intmder 2 Correlation .068 .061 .006
Sig. (2-tailed) .711 .740 .974
N 32 32 32
Action Correlation -.057 -.128 -.198
Sig. (2-tailed) .758 .486 .278
N 32 32 32
Verbal Correlation .206 .224 .141
Sig. (2-tailed) .267 .226 .450
N 31 31 31
Appearance Correlation -.205 -.210 -.243
Sig. (2-tailed) .400 .388 .316
N 19 19 19
* Correlation is significant at tlie 0.05 level (2-tailed)
** Correlation is significant at tlie O.Ollevel (2-tailed)
Heart Rate Heart Rate Rated Arousal
Correlations - Accuracy of During After Whilst
Cued Recall (Residual (R^idual Cycling
Values) Values)
PEARSON PEARSON
SPEARMAN
Overall Correlation -.203 -.284 .079
Sig. (2-tailed) .265 .116 .668
N 32 32 32
Central Correlation -.094 -.138 .062
Sig. (2-tailed) .617 .460 .739
N 31 31 31
Peripheral Correlation -.261 -.314 -.151
Sig. (2-tailed) .149 .080 .411
N 32 32 32
hitruder 1 Correlation -.003 -.084 .057
Sig. (2-tailed) .988 .648 .756
N 32 32 32 .
Intruder 2 Correlation -.315 -.356* .231
Sig. (2-taüed) .079 .045 .203
N 32 32 32
Action Correlation .006 -.096 -.048
Sig. (2-tailed) .975 .640 .815
N 26 26 26
Verbal Correlation -.291 -.334 .019
Sig. (2-tailed) .189 .128 .932
N 22 22 22
Appearance Correlation -.170 -.222 .022
Sig. (2-tailed) .352 .221 .904
N 32 32 32 '
Heart Rate Heart Rate Rated Arousal
Correlations - Accuracy of Dining After Whilst
Both Recall (Residual (Residual Cycling
Values) Values)
PEARSON PEARSON
SPEARMAN
Overall Correlation -.187 -.268 -.011
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Sig. (2-taiIed) .139 .953
N 32 32 32
Central Correlation .117 .041 .057
Sig. (2-tailed) .523 .822 .755
N 32 32 32
Peripheral Correlation -.225 -.268 -.222
Sig. (2-taiIed) .216 .139 .221
N 32 32 32
Intruder 1 Correlation .021 -.094 -.012
Sig. (2-tailed) .908 .608 .946
N 32 32 32
Intruder 2 Correlation -.316 -.306 .020
Sig. (2-tailed) .078 .089 .913
N 32 32 32
Action Correlation -.058 -.143 -.195
Sig. (2-taiIed) .752 .433 .285
N 32 32 32
Verbal Correlation .073 .067 .084
Sig. (2-tailed) .696 .718 .652
N 31 31 31
Appearance Correlation -.159 -.226 -.028
Sig. (2-tailed) J86 .214 .878
N 32 32 32
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)
Scatterplot for significant correlation above:
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4AFC RECOGNITION
Univariate Analysis of Variance - Accuracy across all questions
T ests of Between-Subjects Effects
D ependent Variable: accuracy  ac ro ss  all questions
Source
Type III Sum  
of S q u ares df M ean Square F Sig.
Corrected Model 334.185*=* 3 111.395 2.075 .113
Intercept 170158.313 1 170158.313 3169.925 .000
VIDEO 219.855 1 219.855 4.096 .047
AROUSAL 61.623 1 61.623 1.148 .288
VIDEO* AROUSAL 52.708 1 52.708 .982 .326
Error 3220.738 60 53.679
Total 173713.236 64
Corrected Total 3554.923 63
a. R S quared  = .094 (Adjusted R S quared  = .049)
Univariate Analysis of Variance - Central vs. Peripheral Details
Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts
Measure: MEASURE 1
Source INFO
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
iNhu Linear 1117.030 1 1117.936 Ô.442 .005
iNf O *VId Eo Linear 744.787 1 744.787 5.624 .021
INFO * AROUSAL Linear 5.176 1 5.176 .039 .844
INFO* VIDEO Linear .351 1 .351 .003 .959
Linear 7945.841 60 132.431
M easure: MEASURE_1 
Transform ed Variable:
T ests o f Between-Subjects Effects
Source
Type III Sum  
of S q u ares df Mean S quare F Sig.
Intercept 350535.645 1 3^0530.645 5684.672 .000
VIDEO 773.031 1 773.031 5.920 .018
AROUSAL 137.324 1 137.324 1.052 .309
VIDEO* AROUSAL 103.356 1 103.356 .792 .377
Error 7834.157 60 130.569
« Posthoc Tukey’s Test - Interaction of info (Central vs Peripheral) by video
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Tukey HSÔ^
INFO N
S u b se t
1 2
control peripheral 32 49.3306
th reat peripheral 32 49.4213
control central 32 50.4169
th reat central 32 60.1563
Sig. .981 1.000
M eans for g roups in hom ogeneous su b se ts  are  
B ased on Type lii Sum  of S q u ares  
The error term  is Mean S quare (Error) = 
a. U ses Harmonic Mean Sam ple Size = 32.000.
b. Alpha = .05.
Multiple Comparisons
Dependent Variable: accuracy 
Tukey HSD
(1) INFO (J) INFO
Mean
Difference
(l-J) Std. Error Sig.
95% Confidence interval
Lower Bound Upper Bound
threat central control central 9.7394* 5.8421 .üo3 5.4S7fe 17.0409
threat peripheral 10.7350* 2.8421 .001 3.4335 18.0365
control peripheral 10.8256* 2.8421 .001 3.5241 18.1272
control central threat central -9.7394* 2.8421 .003 -17.0409 -2.4378
threat peripheral .9956 2.8421 .985 -6.3059 8.2972
control peripheral 1.0862 2.8421 .981 -6.2153 8.3878
threat peripheral threat central -10.7350* 2.8421 .001 -18.0365 -3.4335
control central -.9956 2.8421 .985 -8.2972 6.3059
control peripheral 9.063E-02 2.8421 1.000 -7.2109 7.3922
control peripheral threat central -10.8256* 2.8421 .001 -18.1272 -3.5241
control central -1.0862 2.8421 .981 -8.3878 6.2153
threat peripheral -9.0625E-02 2.8421 1.000 -7.3922 7.2109
Based on observed means.
". The mean difference is significant at the .05 level.
Univariate Analysis of Variance - Intruder 1 vs. Intruder 2 Details
Tests of WIthin-Subjects Contrasts
Measure: MEASURE 1
Source INFO
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
INhu Linear 565.615 1 565.615 .020
INFO *VIDe q Linear 298.321 1 298.321 2.997 .089
INFO * AROUSAL Linear 265.047 1 265.047 2.663 .108
INFO * VIDEO Linear 6.877 1 6.877 .069 .794
Linear 5972.612 60 99.544
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Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
M easure: MEASURE_1 
Transform ed Variable:
Source
Type III Sum  
of S q u ares
'
df M ean Square F Sig.
Intercept 1 T40770.617 â1èè.5g'2. .000
VIDEO 417.063 1 417.063 3.878 .054
AROUSAL 121.856 1 121.856 1.133 .291
VIDEO * AROUSAL 113.534 1 113.534 1.056 .308
Error 6452.977 60 107.550
Univariate Analysis of Variance - Action vs. Verbal vs. Appearance Details
Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts
Measure; MEASURE 1
Source
type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
INFu 2PÔ7.54 2 '14243.77 Ô1.Ô3 .000
INFO* VIDEO 2032.87 2 1016.43 5.78 .004
INFO * AROUSAL 171,69 2 85.85 .49 .615
INFO* VIDEO *AROUS 101.11 2 50.55 .29 .751
ErkMOfNBSjS 21.092.99 120 175.77
T ests o f Between-Subjects Effects
M easure: MEASURE_1 
Transform ed Variable:
Source
Type III Èum 
of S q u ares df Mean S quare F Sig.
Intercept 496609.247 1 4^6609.247 270Ù.Ù66 .000
VIDEO 1259.828 1 1259.828 6.850 .011
AROUSAL 160.381 1 160.381 .872 .354
VIDEO * AROUSAL 184.436 1 184.436 1.003 .321
Error 11035.490 60 183.925
Posthoc Tukey's Test - Interaction of information (Action vs Verbal vs 
Appearance) by video
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recog act verb app by video
Tukey HSCP
recog act verb app 
by video N
Subset
1 2 3
control verb 32 34.3750
threat verb 32 36.2500
threat appearance 32 51.8472
control appearance 32 52.5575
control act 32 57.9559
threat act 32 72.1606
Sig. .993 .439 1.000
Means for groups in hom ogeneous subsets are displayed.
Based on Type III Sum of Squares
The error term is Mean Square(Error) = 176.054.
a- Uses Harmonic Mean Sample Size = 32.000.
b. Alpha = .05.
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M ultiple C o m p ariso n s
Dependent Variable; recog act verb app by video
Tukey HSD
(1) recog act verb 
app by video
(J) recog act verb 
app by video
Mean
Difference
(l-J) Std. Error Sig.
95% Confidence Interval
Lower Bound Upper Boundthreat act control act 14.2047* 3.3171 .000 4.7518 23.6576
threat verb 35.9106* 3.3171 .000 26.4578 45.3635
control verb 37.7856* 3.3171 .000 28.3328 47.2385
threat appearance 20.3134* 3.3171 .000 10.8606 29.7663
control appearance 19.6031* 3.3171 .000 10.1503 29.0560
control act threat act -14.2047* 3.3171 .000 -23.6576 -4.7518
threat verb 21.7059* 3.3171 .000 12.2531 31.1588
control verb 23.5809* 3.3171 .000 14.1281 33.0338
threat appearance 6.1088 3.3171 .439 -3.3441 15.5616
control appearance 5.3984 3.3171 .580 -4.0544 14.8513
threat verb threat act -35.9106* 3.3171 .000 -45.3635 -26.4578
control act -21.7059* 3.3171 .000 -31.1588 -12.2531
control verb 1.8750 3.3171 .993 -7.5779 11.3279
threat appearance -15.5972* 3.3171 .000 -25.0501 -6.1443
control appearance -16.3075* 3.3171 .000 -25.7604 -6.8546
control verb threat act -37.7856* 3.3171 .000 -47.2385 -28.3328
control act -23.5809* 3.3171 .000 -33.0338 -14.1281
threat verb -1.8750 3.3171 .993 -11.3279 7.5779
threat appearance -17.4722* 3.3171 .000 -26.9251 -8.0193
control appearance -18.1825* 3.3171 .000 -27.6354 -8.7296
threat appearance threat act -20.3134* 3.3171 .000 -29.7663 -10.8606
control act -6.1088 3.3171 .439 -15.5616 3.3441
threat verb 15.5972* 3.3171 .000 6.1443 25.0501
control verb 17.4722* 3.3171 .000 8.0193 26.9251
control appearance -.7103 3.3171 1.000 -10.1632 8.7426
control appearance threat act -19.6031* 3.3171 .000 -29.0560 -10.1503
control act -5.3984 3.3171 .580 -14.8513 4.0544
threat verb 16.3075* 3.3171 .000 6.8546 25.7604
control verb 18.1825* 3.3171 .000 8.7296 27.6354
threat appearance .7103 3.3171 1.000 -8.7426 10.1632
Based on observed means.
*■ The mean difference is significant at the .05 level.
CORRELATION OF PHYSIOLOGICAL/PSYCHOLOGICAL AROUSAL 
WITH RECOGNITION ACCURACY
Pearson & Spearman correlations (across the exercise group witnesses) of the 
various measures of recognition accuracy with: the standardized residuals 
(to take account of baseline variation) of heart rate during the video and 
heart rate immediately following the video as well as rated arousal whilst 
cycling.
Heart Rate Heart Rate Rated Arousal
Correlations - 4AFC During After Whilst
(Residual (Residual Cycling
Values) Values)
PEARSON PEARSON
SPEARMAN
1 Overall Correlation .119 .082 -.153
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Sig. (2-tailed) .518 .657 .404
N 32 32 32
Central Correlation .277 .168 .178
Sig. (2-tailed) .125 .358 .330
N 32 32 32
Peripheral Correlation -.141 -.075 -.454**
Sig. (2-tailed) .442 .682 .009
N 32 32 32
hitmder 1 Correlation -.027 .016 -.021
Sig. (2-tailed) .884 .931 .911
N 32 32 32
Intruder 2 Correlation .200 .102 -.205
Sig. (2-tailed) .273 .578 .260
N 32 32 32
Action Correlation .201 .081 .058
Sig. (2-tailed) .269 .658 .753
N 32 32 32
Verbal Correlation .145 .034 Oil
Sig. (2-tailed) .427 .853 .950
N 32 32 32
Appearance Correlation -.112 .019 -.368*
Sig. (2-tailed) .541 .918 .029
N 32 32 32
* Correlation is significant at tlie 0.05 level (2-tailed)
Scatterplots for significant correlations above:
how arousing cycling/sitting
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IDENTIFICATION 
LINEUP ONE
CONTINGENCY TABLE: VIDEO BY AROUSAL BY DECISION
arousal * decision * video Crosstabulation
v id e o
d e c is io n
Totalcorrect incorrect
th reat aro u sa l e x e r c ise C ount 6 10 16
E x p ected  C ount 6 .5 9 .5 1 6 .0
rest C ou nt 7 9 16
E x p ected  C ount 6 .5 9 .5 1 6 .0
Total C ount 13 19 3 2
E x p ec ted  C ount 1 3 .0 1 9 .0 3 2 .0
control aro u sa l e x e r c ise C ount 7 9 16
E x p ec ted  C ount 6 .5 9 .5 1 6 .0
rest C ount 6 10 16
E x p ec ted  C ount 6 .5 9 .5 1 6 .0
Total C ount 13 1 9 3 2
E x p ected  C ount 1 3 .0 1 9 .0 3 2 .0
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3-WAY LOG-LINEAR ANALYSIS: VIDEO BY AROUSAL BY DECISION
* * * * * * * *  H I E R A R C H I C A L  L O G  L I N E A R  * * *
DATA Information
8 unweighted cases accepted.0 cases rejected because of out-of-range factor values.
0 cases rejected because of missing data.
64 weighted cases will be used in the analysis.
FACTOR Information
Factor Level Label
VIDEO 2 videoAROUSAL 2 arousal
DECISION 2 decision
* * * * * * * *  h i e r a r c h i c a l  * * * * * L O G L I N E A R
DESIGN 1 has generating class
VIDEO*AROUSAL*DECISION
Note; For saturated models .500 has been added to all observed cells.
This value may be changed by using the CRITERIA = DELTA subcommand.
The Iterative Proportional Fit algorithm converged at iteration 1.The maximum difference between observed and fitted marginal totals is 
. 000
and the convergence criterion is .250
Observed, Expected Frequencies and Residuals
Factor 
Std Resid Code OBS count EXP count Residual
VIDEO
AROUSAL
DECISION
00
DECISION00
AROUSAL
threat
exercise
correct
incorrec
rest
6.5
10.5
6.5
10.5
. 00
. 00
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00
00
DECISION
DECISION
VIDEO
AROUSALDECISION
00 DECISION
00AROUSAL
DECISION
. 00 DECISION
, 00
correct
incorrec
control
exercisecorrect
incorrec
rest
correct
incorrec
7.5
9 .5
7.5
9.5
6 .5  
10.5
7.5
9.5
7.5
9.5
6 .5
10.5
00
00
, 00 
, 00
. 00 
. 00
Goodness-of-fit test statistics
Likelihood ratio chi square = 
Pearson chi square = 0000000000
DF
DF 0 P 0 P 1 . 0 0 01 . 0 0 0
H I E R A R C H I C A L  L O G  L I N E A R  * * *
Tests that K-way and higher order effects are zero,
K DF L.R. Chisq Prob Pearson Chisq ProbIteration
3 1 .259 .6106 .259 . 61072 2 4 .259 .9923 .259 . 99232
1 7 2.523 .9254 2.500 .92710
Tests that K-way effects are zero.
K DF L.R. Chisq Prob Pearson Chisq ProbIteration
1 3 2.263 .5196 2.241 .5 2 3 90
2 3 .000 1.0000 . 000 1 .0 0 0 00
3 1 .259 .6106 .259 .61070
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* * * * * * * *  h i e r a r c h i c a l  l o g  L I N E A R  * * * 
* * * * *
Backward Elimination (p = .050) for DESIGN 1 with generating class 
VIDEO*AROUSAL*DECISION 
Likelihood ratio chi square = .00000 DF = 0  P = 1.000
If Deleted Simple Effect is Prob Iter
VI DEO*AROUSAL*DECISION .6106 2
Step 1
The best model has generating class
VI DEO* AROUSALVIDEO*DECISIONAROUSAL*DECISION
Likelihood ratio chi square =
DF L.R. Chisq Change
.259
.25931 DF = 1 P = .611
If Deleted Simple Effect is Prob Iter
VI DEO* AROUSAL 
1 . 0 0 0 0  2
Step 2
The best model has generating class
VI DEO*DECISION AROUSAL* DECISION
Likelihood ratio chi square =
DF L.R. Chisq Change
. 000
.25931 DF = 2 P = .871
If Deleted Simple Effect is 
Prob Iter
VIDEO*DECISION
1 . 0 0 0 0  2
DF L.R. Chisq Change
000
* * * * * * * *  H I E R A R C H I C A L  L O G  L I N E A R  * * * 
* * * * *
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step 3
The best model has generating class
AROUSAL*DECISIONVIDEO
Likelihood ratio chi square = .25931 DF = 3 P 967
DF L.R. Chisq Change
. 000
If Deleted Simple Effect is Prob Iter
AROUSAL*DECISION
1 . 0 0 0 0  2
Step 4
The best model has generating class
VIDEOAROUSAL
DECISION
Likelihood ratio chi square = .25931 DF = 4 P = .992
DF L.R. Chisq Change
. 000
If Deleted Simple Effect is Prob Iter
VIDEO
1 . 0 0 0 0  2
Step 5
The best model has generating class
AROUSAL
DECISION
Likelihood ratio chi square = .25931 DF = 5 P = .998
If Deleted Simple Effect is Prob Iter
AROUSAL
1 . 0 0 0 0  2
DF L.R. Chisq Change
. 000
* * * * * * * *  H I E R A R C H I C A L  L O G  L I N E A R  * * * 
* * * * *
Step 6
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The best model has generating class 
DECISION
Likelihood ratio chi square = .25931 DF = 6  P = 1.000
If Deleted Simple Effect is DF L.R. Chisq Change
Prob Iter
DECISION 1 2.263.1325 0
Step 7
The best model has no factors (constant only model)
Likelihood ratio chi square = 2.52268 DF = 7 P = .925
Step 8
The best model has no factors (constant only model)
Likelihood ratio chi square = 2.52268 DF = 7  P = .925
* * * * * * * *  H I E R A R C H I C A L  L O G  L I N E A R  * * * 
* * * * *
The final model has no factors (constant only model)
* * * * * * * *  h i e r a r c h i c a l  l o g  L I N E A R  * * *
' k  - k  - k  -k  •k
The Iterative Proportional Fit algorithm converged at iteration 0.The maximum difference between observed and fitted marginal totals is 
8 . 000
and the convergence criterion is .250
Observed, Expected Frequencies and Residuals.
Factor Code OBS count EXP count ResidualStd Resid
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VIDEO
AROUSAL
DECISION
.71
DECISION
71
AROUSALDECISION
.3 5 DECISION
, 35
threat
exercise
correct
incorrec
rest
correct
incorrec
6.0
1 0 . 0
7.0
9.0
■2.00
2 . 0 0
- 1 . 0 0
1 . 00
VIDEOAROUSALDECISION
.3 5 DECISION
35AROUSAL
DECISION-.71
DECISION,71
controlexercisecorrect
incorrec
rest
correct
incorrec
7.0
9.0
6 . 0 
1 0 . 0
1 . 0 0
1 . 0 0
- 2 . 0 0
2 . 0 0
Goodness-of-fit test statistics
Likelihood ratio chi square = Pearson chi square = 2.52268 DF = 7 P = .9252.50000 DF == 7 P = . 927
LINEUP TWO
CONTINGENCY TABLE: AROUSAL BY VIDEO BY DECISION
500
arousal * decision * video Crosstabulation
video
decision
Totalcorrect incorrect
threat arousal exercise Count 7 9 16
Expected Count 6.5 9.5 16.0
rest Count 6 10 16
Expected Count 6.5 9.5 16.0
Total Count 13 19 32
Expected Count 13.0 19.0 32.0
control arousal exercise Count 2 14 16
Expected Count 3.5 12.5 16.0
rest Count 5 11 16
Expected Count 3.5 12.5 16.0
Total Count 7 25 32
Expected Count 7.0 25.0 32.0
CONTINGENCY TABLE; VIDEO BY DECISION
video * decision Crosstabulation
decision
Totalcorrect incorrect
video threat Count 13 19 32
Expected Count 10.0 22.0 32.0
control Count 7 25 32
Expected Count 10.0 22.0 32.0
Total Count 20 44 64
Expected Count 20.0 44.0 64.0
CHI-SQUARE TEST: VIDEO BY DECISION
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Chi-Square Tests
Value df
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided)
Exact Sig. 
(2-sided)
Exact Sig. 
(1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square 2.618b 1 .106
Continuity Correction* 1.818 1 .178
Likelihood Ratio 2.649 1 .104
Fisher's Exact Test .177 .088
Linear-by-Linear
Association 2.577 1 .108
N of Valid C ases 64
a Computed only for a 2x2 table
b. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 
10 . 00 .
CORRELATION OF PHYSIOLOGICAL & PSYCHOLOGICAL AROUSAL 
WITH IDENTIFICATION ACCURACY (CORRECT VS. INCORRECT)
POINT-BISERIAL CORRELATIONS (ACROSS TLIE EXERCISE GROUP 
WITNESSES) OF IDENTIFICATION ACCURACY WITH: THE 
STANDARDIZED RESIDUALS (TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF BASELINE 
VARIATION) OF HEART RATE DURING THE INCIDENT AND HEART RATE 
IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE INCIDENT AS WELL AS RATED 
AROUSAL WHILST CYCLING
Identification Accuracy Lineup 1 
(Intruder 1)
Lineup 2 
(mtruder 2)
Rated Arousal whilst Correlation .014 -.015
cycling Sig. (2-tailed) .940 .935
N 32 32
Heart Rate During Correlation -192 .168
Sig. (2-tailed) .291 .357
N 32 32
Heart Rate After Correlation -.074 .205
Sig. (2-tailed) .689 .261
N 32 32
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Appendix 12: Data & Statistical Output - CCTV Study
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1. RANKED SERIOUSNESS - LEVEL OF AGREEMENT AMONGST JUDGES
The mean level of agreement across raters was r = .81.
C o rre la tio n s
JU D G E i JUD GE2 JUDGES JUDGE4 JUDGES JUD GE6 JUD GE7
S p ea rm an 's  rho JU D G E i Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .738* .9 0 5 " .9 0 5 " .786* .714* .905"
Sig. (2-tailed) .037 .002 .002 .021 .047 .002
N 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
JU D G E2 Correlation Coefficient .7 3 8 ' 1.000 .833* .833* .690 .9 0 5 " .833*
Sig. (2-talled) .037 .010 .010 .058 .002 .010
N 8 8 8 8 6 8 8
JUDGES Correlation Coefficient .9 0 5 " .833* 1.000 1.000" .833* .667 .952"
Sig. (2-tailed) .002 .010 .010 .071 .000
N 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
JUD GE4 Correlation Coefficient .905*^ .833* 1 .0 0 0 " 1.000 .833* .667 .952"
Sig. (2-tailed) .002 .010 .010 .071 .000
N 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
JUD GES Correlation Coefficient .786* .690 .833* .833* 1.000 .452 929*
Sig. (2-taiied) .021 .058 .010 .010 .260 .001
N 8 6 8 8 8 8 8
JUD GES Correlation Coefficient .714* .905” .667 .667 .452 1.000 .667
Sig. (2-tailed) .047 .002 .071 .071 .260 .071
N 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
JU D G E ? Correlation Coefficient .9 0 5 " .833* .9 5 2 " .9 5 2 " .9 2 9 " .667 1.000
Sig. (2-taiIed) .002 .010 .000 .000 .001 .071
N 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
**. Correlation is significant a t the  .01 level (2-tailed).
Proximity Matrix
Correlation between Vectors of Values
JUDGE1 JUDGE2 JUDGES JUDGE4 JUDGES JUDGE6 JUDGE?JUDGE1 .738 .905 .905 .786 .714 .905JUDGE2 .738 .833 .833 .690 .905 .833
JUDGES .905 .833 1.000 .833 .667 .952JUDGE4 .905 .833 1.000 .833 .667 .952JUDGES .786 .690 .833 .833 .452 .929
JUDGE6 .714 .905 .667 .667 .452 .667
JUDGE? .905 833 .952 .952 .929 .667
This is a similarity matrix
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2, BREAKDOWN OF DETAILS REPORTED FOR EACH CASE
A full breakdown for each case concerning the total number of details and the percentage
of unclassifiable details reported for action, verbal and appearance details.
Case 1 Action Appearance Verbal Total
1 B 26 3 2 31Total 2 B 37 2 4 43
Amount 3 B 27 1 3 31 1
4 B 27 2 1 30
Mean 29.25 2.00 :L50 3L75
1 B 46.15 33.33 100.00 48J9
% 2 B 40.54 100.00 100.00 48 84
Unclassifiable 3 B 22.22 0.00 100.00 29.03
4 B 33.33 0.00 100.00 3L33
Mean 35.90 37.50 100.00 40.74
Case 2 Action Appearance Verbal Total
Total 1 B 23 0 1 24
Amount 2 V 41 0 8 49
3 V 57 9 11 77
Mean 40.33 3.00 6.67 50.00
% 1 B 34.78 - 100.00 37.50
Unclassifiable 2 V 56.10 - 100.00 6L27
3 V 47.37 5L56 100.00 55.84
Mean 47.93 55.56 100.00 5L33
Case 3 Action Appearance Verbal Total
Total 1 B 10 0 3 13
Amount 2 B 11 0 5 16
Mean 10.50 0 4.00 14.50
% 1 B 20.00 - 100.00 38A6
Unclassifiable 2 B 72.73 - 100.00 8L25
Mean 47.73 - 100.00 6Z07
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Case 4 Action Appearance Verbal Total
Total 1 V 30 0 0 30
Amount 2 V 27 0 0 27 :
Mean 28.50 0 0 28.50
% 1 V 50.00 - - 50.00
Unclassifiable 2 V 44.44 - - 44.44
Mean 47.37 - - 4T37
I
Case 5 Action Appearance Verbal Total
Total 1 V 19 3 6 28
Amount 2 B 21 4 3 28
Mean 20.00 3.50 4.50 2&00
% 1 V 63.16 66.67 100.00 71.43
Unclassifiable 2 B 61.90 100.00 100.00 71.43
Mean 62.50 85.71 100.00 71.43
■
Case 6 Action Appearance Verbal Total
Total 1 V 22 0 4 26
Amount 2 V 15 0 4 19
Mean 18.50 0 4.0 22.50
% 1 V 63.64 - 100.00 6&23
Unclassifiable 2 V 33.33 - 100.00 47.37
Mean 51.35 - 100.00 60.00
Case 7 Action Appearance Verbal Total
Total 1 B 21 0 8 29
Amount 2 V 17 0 2 19
Mean 19 0 5 :%koo
% 1 B 28.57 - 100.00 48.28
Unclassifiable 2 V 29.41 - 100.00 36.84
Mean 28.95 - 100.00 43.75
% 1 B 6&67 - - 66.67
Accurate 2 V 58.33 - - 58.33
Mean 62.96 - - 62.96
506
Case 8 Action Appearance Verbal Total
Total 1 B 9 0 0 9
Amount 2 V 11 4 2 17
Mean 10.00 2.00 1.00 13.00
% 1 B 44.44 - - 44.44
Unclassifiable 2 V 45A5 0.00 100.00 41.18
Mean 45.00 0.00 100.00 42.31
3. ANQVA - RATED EXTENT OF INJURIES AND ACTION DETAILS 
REPORTED
Univariate ANQVA comparing the action details reported when the incidents were 
grouped according to ratings of perceived seriousness of injury to victim (i.e., comparing 
incidents with the highest injury ratings (incidents 1,2,6 and 7) with those rated to be 
lowest in injury (incidents 3,4,5 and 8)).
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Dependent Variable: ACTION
Source
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Corrected Model 553.495a 1 553.495 5.213 .036
Intercept 9559.811 1 9559.811 90.030 .000
GROUP 553.495 1 553.495 5.213 .036
Error 1805.136 17 106.184
Total 12922.000 19
Corrected Total 2358.632 18
a- R Squared = .235 (Adjusted R Squared = .190)
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